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THE 


ANALOGY OF RELIGION, 


•m 


TO THE 


®austituti<m mt\ of Qixtrn. 


TO WHICH ARE ADDED 

TWO BRIEF DISSERTATIONS s 

I. ON PERSONAL IDENTITY.— II. ON THE NATURE OF VIRTUE. 


BY 


/ 


JOSEPH BUTLER, D.'C.L. 

i » 


Ejus [Analogize] haec vis est, ut id quod dubium est ad aliquid simile, de quo non quseritur, 
referat ut incerta certis probet.— Quintil. 1 . i. c. 6. 


WITH 

AN INTRODUCTION, NOTES, CONSPECTUS, AND AMPLE INDEX, 



HO AWARD MALCOM, D.D. 

PRESIDENT OF THE UNIVERSITY, LEWISBURG, PENNSYLVANIA. 


PHILADELPHIA: 

J. B. LTPPINCOTT & CO. 


1857 . 


0 


'O ' 0 

"p UA g\ 


Entered according to Act of Congress, in the year 1857, by 
J. B. LIPPINCOTT & CO. 

in the Clerk’s Office of the District Court of the United States in and for the 
Eastern District of Pennsylvania. 


The Library 
of Congress 


WASHINGTON 










CONTENTS 


PAGE 

Editor’s Introduction 5 

“ Preface 19 

“ Conspectus 21 

Author’s Advertisement 66 

“ Introduction 67 

PART I. 

OF NATURAL RELIGION. 

Chap. I. — A Future Life 77 

Chap. II. — The Government of God by Rewards and Punishments 95 

Chap. III. — The Moral Government of God 105 

Chap. IV. — Probation, as implying Trial, Difficulties, and Danger 128 

Chap. V. — Probation, as intended for Moral Discipline and Improvement. 136 

Chap. VI. — The Opinion of Necessity, considered as influencing Practice. 157 

Chap. VII. — The Government of God, considered as a Scheme or Consti- 
tution, imperfectly comprehended 171 

Conclusion 180 

3 


4 


CONTENTS. 


PART II. 

OF REVEALED RELIGION. 

PAGE 

Chap. I. — The Importance of Christianity 186 

Chap. II. — The supposed Presumption against a Revelation, considered 

as miraculous 202 

Chap. III. — Our Incapacity of judging, what were to be expected in a 
Revelation ; and the Credibility, from Analogy, that it must con- 
tain things appearing liable to Objections 209 

Chap. IV. — Christianity, considered as a Scheme or Constitution, imper- 
fectly comprehended 223 

Chap. V. — The Particular System of Christianity; the Appointment of a 

Mediator, and the Redemption of the World by him 230 

Chap. VI. — Want of Universality in Revelation; and of the supposed 

Deficiency in the Proof of it 247 

Chap. VII. — The Particular Evidence for Christianity 263 

Chap. VIII. — Objections against arguing from the Analogy of Nature to 

Religion 296 

Conclusion 306 

DISSERTATIONS. 

Dissertation I. — Personal Identity 317 

Dissertation II. — The Nature of Virtue 324 

Index to Part 1 333 


Index to Part II 


343 


(Suitor's Introduction 


Joseph Butler was born at Wantage, England, May 18th, 1692, 
the youngest of eight children. The biographies of that day were 
few and meagre ; and in few cases is this so much to be regretted as 
in Butler’s. It would have been both interesting and profitable to 
trace the development and occupations of one of the mightiest of 
human minds. But no cotemporary gathered up the incidents of his 
life, and now all efforts to elicit them have been without success. 

His father was a prosperous dry-goods merchant, who, at the time 
of his son’s birth, had retired from business with a competency, and 
resided in a suburban mansion called “ The Priory,” still in existence. 

Being a non-conformist, he educated Joseph at a “dissenting” 
academy at Gloucester, under Samuel Jones, a gentleman of great 
ability, and a skilful instructor, who raised up some of the greatest 
men of their day.* 

It was while a member of this academy, and about the age of 
twenty-one, that Butler disclosed to the world his wonderful power of 
abstract reasoning, in his famous correspondence with Samuel Clarke, 
in relation to that eminent author’s “ Demonstration of the Being and 
Attributes of God.” This correspondence is now generally inserted 
at the end of that work. 

Mr. Butler having deliberately adopted Episcopal views, and re- 
solved to unite himself with the Established Church, his father, with 
praiseworthy liberality, sent him to Oxford, where he entered Oriel 
College, March, 1714. Of his college life there is no account ; nor 
of the time and place of his ordination. He removed to London 
in 1718, on receiving the appointment of “Preacher at the Rolls.” 
His famous Fifteen Sermons were preached in that chapel, and 
published before resigning the place, with a dedication to Sir Joseph 
Jekyl, “as a parting mark of gratitude for the favors received during 
his connection with that learned society.” 


* Among these were Jones, author of the admirable Treatise on the Canon 
of the New Testament: Lardner , Maddox, Chandler, Archbishop Seeker, &c. 


G 


EDITOR S INTRODUCTION. 


One of Butler’s warmest college friends was Edward Talbot, 
second son of a clergyman who afterwards became Bishop of Durham. 
This admirable young man died of smallpox ; in his last hours re- 
commending Butler to his father’s patronage ; and scarcely had that 
gentleman attained the see of Durham, before he gave Mr. B. the 
living of Haughton, from whence he transferred him, in 1725, to the 
richer benefice of Stanhope. 

On receiving this honorable and lucrative appointment, he re- 
signed the Lectureship at the Rolls, and in the autumn of 1726 retired 
to his beautiful residence at Stanhope. Here, without a family to 
occupy his time, he devoted himself to his great work, the Analogy; 
using horseback exercise, seeing little company, living abstemiously, 
and caring for his flock. 

Seven years thus rolled away ; when to draw him from what seemed 
to his friends too great retirement and application, Lord-Chancellor 
Talbot made him his chaplain, and afterwards, in 1736, gave him a 
prebend’s stall in Rochester. In 1736, Butler being now forty-four, 
Caroline, consort of George II., appointed him “ Clerk of the Closet,” 
an office which merely required his attendance at the Queen’s apart- 
ments every evening, from seven to nine. 

Being now in London, convenient to the press, and enjoying both 
leisure and competency, he published his immortal Analogy — the 
cherished work of his life. The Queen was delighted with the book, 
and made herself master of its glorious array of reasoning. But she 
died the same year, and he lost not only a patroness, but a friend. 
He returned to his benefice at Stanhope, the income of which had 
been held during his residence in London. 

On her death-bed, the Queen had urged her husband to promote 
her honored chaplain to a bishopric ; and next year, the see of 
Norwich becoming vacant, the Bishop of Bristol was translated to it, 
and the see^ of Bristol given to Butler. Bristol was the poorest 
bishopric in England, its emoluments being but $2,000 per annum; 
less than those of the rectorship of Stanhope. Butler distinctly 
disclosed his disappointment in his letter to the minister Walpole, 
accepting the portion; and declared that he did not think it “very 
suitable to the condition of his fortune, nor answerable to the recom- 
mendation with which he was honored.” The king was not dis- 
pleased at this candor, and in 1740 improved his income by giving 
him, in addition to his bishopric, the profitable and influential office 
of Dean of St. Paul’s. Butler, who had retained the living of Stan- 


editor’s introduction. 


7 


hope along with his bishopric, now resigned that rectorship. “ The 
rich revenues,” says Professor Fitzgerald, “ of the Deanery of St. Paul, 
enabled him to gratify his taste at Bristol.- ” He expended about 
$25,000 in improving and beautifying the episcopal residence and 
gardens. He fostered useful charities, and employed his wealth for 
others rather than for himself. 

In 1750, upon the death of Dr. Edward Chandler, Bishop of 
Durham, Butler was promoted to that see, the most honorable and 
lucrative in England. He had before been offered the Primacy, on 
the death of Archbishop Potter, but declined it, with the remark that 
“ it was too late for him to try to support a falling church.” On 
assuming his diocese at Durham, Butler delivered and published his 
famous Charge to the Clergy, upon “ The Use and Importance of 
External Religion.” He was at once assailed vigorously, in pamph- 
lets and papers, by Archdeacon Blackburn, the Rev. T. Lindsay, and 
others, on the charge of Popery ; an imputation which is still some- 
times cast upon him, and which finds some slender support in his 
setting up a marble cross over the communion-table at Bristol. That 
he never was a Papist, is now so evident, that we can account for the 
imputation only by the strong jealousy of the Romish Church then 
prevalent. 

Butler now became still more munificent. His private charities 
were exceedingly generous, and his public ones seemed sometimes to 
border on extravagance. He gave $2,000 a year to the county hospital, 
and often gave away thousands of dollars at a time. But though 
quite lavish in buildings and ornaments, as well as in benevolence, 
he was remarkably frugal in his personal expenses. It is said of 
him, by Rev. John Newton, that on one occasion, when a distin- 
guished visitor dined with him by appointment, the provision con- 
sisted of a single joint of meat, and a pudding. The bishop remarked 
to his guest- on that occasion, that he “ had long been disgusted with 
the fashionable expense of time and money in entertainments, and 
was determined that it should receive no countenance from his 
example.” 

Of his amusements we know little except that he took much horse- 
back exercise, and often employed his secretary, Mr. Emms, to play 
for him on the organ. 

Butler held the see of Durham less than two years. Symptoms 
of general physical decay betrayed themselves about the time of 
Ins promotion, and in spite of all that skill and affection could 


8 


editor’s introduction. 


prompt, lie sunk to rest June lGth, 1752, aged sixty. He was never 
married. 

A considerable number of his sermons and charges have been 
printed, but are too philosophical to be generally read. Ilis great 
work is the Analogy, published in 1736, and from that day read and 
admired by every highly-cultivated mind. He was induced to write 
by a state of things very remarkable in the history of religion. 
Debauchery and infidelity were almost universal, not in any one class 
of society but in all. England had reached the culminating point 
of irreligion, and the firm re-establishment of Episcopacy had as yet 
done nothing to mend the nation’s morals. Piety was deemed a mark 
of ignorance and vulgarity, and multitudes of those who professed it 
were persecuted to dungeons and death. 

Infidel writers, warmed into life by court corruption, became more 
numerous and audacious than ever before. Their methods of attack- 
ing Christianity were various ; but the most successful then, as 
always, was to impugn certain doctrines and declarations of the 
Sacred Scriptures, as irrational, and hence reject the whole. They 
generally admitted the Being and perfection of God, and extolled the 
sufficiency of natural religion ; but denied any revelation, or any 
necessity for one. The verdict of the world was that the Bible is not 
authentic, that man is not accountable, nor even probably immortal, 
that God neither rewards nor punishes, and that present indulgence, 
as far as our nature admits, is both wise and safe. 

Bishop Downam,* one of the most learned of the clergy, in the 
early part of the seventeenth century writes thus : “In these times, 
if a man do but labor to keep a good conscience, though he meddle 
not with matters of state, if he make conscience of swearing, sanctify 
the Sabbath, frequent sermons, or abstain from the common corrup- 
tions of the times, he shall straightway be condemned for a puritan, 
and be less favored than either a carnal gospeller, or a close Papist.” 

It was considered settled, especially in polite circles, that Chris- 
tianity, after so long a prevalence, had been found out to be an im- 
posture. The clergy, as a body, did nothing to dispel this moral 
gloom, but rather increased it by their violent and scandalous con- 
duct. In the sad language of Bishop Warburton, “Religion had 
lost its hold on the minds of the people.” He adds with great point, 
“ Though a rule of right may direct the philosopher to a principle of 


* Sermon at Spittle, on Abraham’s trial. 


EDITOR S INTRODUCTION. 


9 


action ; and the point of honor may keep up the thing called man- 
ners, among gentlemen: yet nothing but religion can ever fix a sober 
standard of behavior among the common people.” Even the uni- 
versities were on the side of irreligion ; for professorships, as well as 
pulpits, were given to men, not for positive worth and fitness, but for 
possessing qualities then most in vogue with those who held the 
appointing power. Such were the trying times which had driven our 
pilgrim fathers to seek a home amid the wilds of an unexplored con- 
tinent, and to face the dangers of sea and savage. 

It must ever be regarded as among the highest instances of God’s 
bringing good out of evil, that this outrageous rampancy of infidelity 
brought out a host of champions for the truth of His word ; who 
boldly met the odium of discipleship, and waged battle in such style 
that the Deistical controversy was settled forever. Never was a dis- 
pute more determined on both sides, and never was victory more 
complete. Literary infidelity not only recoiled, but was routed ; and 
can never again prevail. Henceforth, no scholar will ever treat the 
evidences of Christianity as a subject of ridicule or contempt. 

When we contrast the stupendous learning, and powerful logic, of 
the Christian writers of that century, with the superficial and almost 
contemptible productions of the writers against whom they contended, 
we are tempted to wonder why such power should be requisite to 
overthrow such weakness. But we must remember, that frail logic 
and shallow considerations, will persuade men to indulge their vices ; 
while the soundest reasonings and the most impressive inducements, 
with difficulty lead them to self-restraint and true holiness. 

The infidel writers of that day have sunk into such oblivion that 
their works are now seldom found but in great libraries ; and even 
well-educated persons scarcely know more of them than their names. 
Yet so perfectly did their principles accord with the temper of the 
times and the universal depravity of the carnal heart, that they 
enjoyed the highest popularity with all classes. Forever honored be 
the names of that noble band, who, in face of such odds, established 
the authority of the Bible, and left the advocates of atheism and im- 
morality without a lurking-place.* In this noble cohort Butler 


* Among them were Cudworth, born 1617; “Intel. Syst. of the Universe:” 
Boyle, 1626; “Things above Reason:” Stillingfleet, 1635; “Letters to a 
Deist:” Sir I. Newton, 1642; “Observations on Prophecy:” Leslie, 1650; 
“Short Method with Deists:” Lowth’s 1661 Yindic. of the Divine Author 


10 


editor’s introduction. 


stands conspicuous : and to him, I think, more than to all the others, 
is to he attributed the sudden and total overthrow of infidelity, when 
it was in its glory. 

As a metaphysician, few have equalled him. What he added to 
the science, has ever since remained a part of it, which can be said 
of scarcely another. He advanced more that was new, fortified old 
positions more ably, and applied speculation to religion more usefully 
than any before him. Our language furnishes no profounder thinking. 
Merely to understand him is an honorable distinction, and requires 
no small previous training of the power of attention. As a polemic, 
he is keen, sagacious, candid, patient, persevering, calm, inventive, 
and profound : every page indicates that repose of mind, which belongs 
only to true greatness, combined with a full knowledge of the subject. 
So far as I am able to judge, he never presses a consideration beyond 
its just limits, and seldom introduces an illustration which has not 
the force of an argument. Fallacies he seems to abolish at a touch. 

The Analogy employed much of his life. It was begun in his 
twentieth year, but was not published till he was forty-five. Such a 
mode of writing never makes large books, for the matter, constantly 
revised, becomes constantly condensed. The Analogy is so con- 
densed, as that to make a satisfactory synopsis is scarcely practicable. 
Hence, though my Conspectus and notes have aided my pupils to 
understand and remember the argument, they do not in any measure 
obviate the necessity of studying the book itself. If they do not 
increase the number of those who shall studiously peruse the book 
itself, my aim and expectations will be disappointed. 

To this work no reply has ever been attempted ! Extensive as is 
its diffusion, and great as is its acknowledged influence, infidelity has 
had the highest inducements to attempt to set it aside. Written for 
a present purpose, and most signally accomplishing it, it is yet so 
written as to endure, in full value, through all coming time. It is 


of the Bible: King, 1669; “ Origin of Evil:” Sam. Clark, 1675 ; “ Evidences 
of Nat. and Rev. Religion:” Waterland, 1683; “ Scripture Vindicated:” 
Lardner, 1684; “ Credibility of Gospel History:” Leland, 1691; “View of 
Deistical Writers,” and “Advantage and Necessity of Rev. :” Chandler, 1693; 
“Definition of Christianity,” on “ Prophecy,” <fcc. : Warburton, 1698; “Di- 
vine Leg. of Moses;” Bishop Newton, 1704; “On the Prophecies:” Watson, 
1737 ; “ Apology for Christianity,” (against Gibbon,) and also “Apology for the 
Bible,” (against Paine.) 


editor’s introduction. 


11 


undoubtedly “the most original and the most profound work extant, 
in any language, on the philosophy of religion.”* “ The most argu- 
mentative and philosophical defence of Christianity ever submitted 
to the world.”f 

Writers in defence of Christianity had, before Butler, amply dis- 
cussed the several departments of evidences ; but still there remained 
objections. The structure of the globe, the course of nature, the 
organization of animals, &c. were affirmed to contradict revelation. 
Its doctrines and duties, moreover, were pronounced inconsistent with 
sound reason. Butler repeats none of the old arguments, but confines 
himself to the showing that the declarations of revelation are in per- 
fect harmony with facts seen daily in the world, and which all admit. 
That the world might not have been ordered and governed otherwise, 
he does not choose to dispute. Taking things as they are, and closely 
studying the connection between one thing and another, we ought to 
inquire what course of action on our part, will conform to the needs 
of such a nature and such circumstances. Our bodies are constructed 
of parts, all adapted to each other, and also to one general end. So 
too, our souls. And the two together have relations and adaptations, 
which may, to some extent at least, indicate what is designed to be 
the general end of our existence. If Christianity befits these several 
parts of our mixed nature and their obvious uses, then there is no- 
thing incongruous between the two ; and no objections against Chris- 
tianity can be drawn from the course of nature. On the contrary, all 
seems to be governed as the gospel declares it is, and shows that the 
Author of man and the Author of the Bible is the same. This is still 
more impressive when we consider that we have a moral faculty ; for 
it is the very object and business of this faculty to deal with right 
and wrong, good and evil ; the facts and magnitudes of which are 
obvious in the course of nature. If Christianity does, in an especial 
manner, heft this faculty, if it is adapted to promote our general 
rectitude and happiness, and if it contains no principle which is not 
discernible in the government of the visible world, then there is no 
discrepancy between Christianity and Providence. 

This is Butler’s position. He confines himself to proving such an 
analogy between revelation and the daily course of things, as that 
nothing known in the universe can be offered in disproof of Chris- 


# McIntosh : “ Progress of Ethical Philosophy.” 
f Brougham: “Disc, on Nat. Theology.” 


12 


editor’s introduction. 


tianity. The mode of warfare was new. Without professing to 
prove Christianity to be true, he demonstrates that it cannot be 
proved to be false ; and that if it be even probable, the rejection of it 
is a gross folly and a tremendous hazard. Every objection against it 
he proves to be equally forcible against facts which constantly occur, 
and which all admit, though none profess to understand. Thus leav- 
ing the ramparts of the church to be guarded by the mighty men 
who had valiantly maintained its defence, he quietly walked out into 
the camp of the enemy, and spiked every gun ! 

It has been said that the whole argument of the “Analogy” seems 
to be built on Ecclesiasticus xlii. 24: “All things are double, one 
against the other, and God hath made nothing imperfect.” If it be 
so, it involves no disparagement to have received thus the seminal 
idea of this immortal work. Who else has so gloriously discerned 
and expanded the profound philosophy of the son of Sirac ? Others 
have uttered sentiments which seem to involve the whole exposition 
of Butler. Origen affirms that “he who believes the Scripture to 
have proceeded from Him who is the Author of nature, may well ex- 
pect to find the same sort of difficulties in it, as are found in nature.” 
Shall we assign to Origen the whole credit of the “Analogy”? As 
well might we bestow all our admiration for the delightful papers of 
Addison, in the Spectator, to the classical authors from whom he 
selected appropriate mottoes ! By such a rule, the entire merit of 
this most Christian work of Butler should be attributed to the pagan 
Quintilian, from whom he derives the motto which so appropriately 
graces his title-page. 

A rapid sketch of the outline of the argument will aid the student 
at his outset. He begins by taking for granted the existence of an 
intelligent Author and Governor of the universe. Then, from the con- 
ditions and changes observed in the visible world, he argues the folly 
of objecting to revelation on account of doctrines which do but 
declare the same general laws and the same principles of govern- 
ment. That there is this harmony, he proves ; and hence the proba- 
bility that the same sort of government will prevail hereafter, which 
prevails now. He demonstrates that man is under exactly such a 
probation in this world, and as to this world, that revelation affirms 
him to be under, as to the next ; and that embarrassments produced 
by the doctrine of necessity, involve nature no less than religion. He 
then evinces the need that man should be placed in a state of train- 
ing and trial, if he is ever to be qualified for better conditions ; and 


editor’s introduction. 


13 


that this world, as now governed, is exactly adapted to give that 
training, and to produce such a character as will insure happiness 
under any possible contingencies. This is the argument of Part I. 

Proceeding to examine Christianity, he discusses its importance, its 
proofs, the unavoidableness of its containing strange things, the 
absurdity of expecting fully to comprehend its statements, and the 
abundance of its evidence for candid minds, though they are not, 
and ought not to be, irresistible. He answers not only the objections 
to Christianity, but the objections against its proofs ; which he shows 
are very different things. Though he keeps rigidly to the refutation 
of objections, and nowhere meddles with the direct evidence of Chris- 
tianity, yet, by removing every objection, he does in fact confirm its 
claims. This clearing away of objections, after the usual proofs are 
presented, crowns and completes the evidence. Thus the ultimate 
result of a study of his book is not only negative but positive ; and 
such has been its effect on every candid and competent student. 

We should remember that we have no right to require the removal 
of objections, and that therefore the whole of Butler’s work is in fact 
supererogatory ; a concession and kindness to such as have doubts, 
either honest or captious. Our only rightful demand of Christianity 
is for credentials. It presents these in its nature, its miracles, its 
prophecies, its propagation, its influence, and its success. If these 
are competent, 1 * we should bow to its teachings. To suppose that we 
are capable of judging of the propriety of all God’s law, or even to 
understand his reasons for it, if they were disclosed, is absurd. 

It is true we naturally presume that a revelation in words, and a 
revelation by natural objects and the visible order of things, would 
coincide ; but to find out the fact or the extent of such coincidence, 
is not our first business. W e are to weigh the testimony in favor of 
religion, embrace it, if sufficient, and attribute the obscurity of any 
part, to our present want of capacity. The solution of difficulties 
serves to confirm our faith in Christianity, but has no place in our 
ground of reception : and we have no right to wait for such solution, 
however painful and embarrassing may be the difficulties. 

Another, and perhaps even more important, use of the “Analogy,” 
is to dissipate the prejudices and objections to Christianity which 
prevent a candid study of its evidences. These prepossess and poison 
the mind, and obstruct or abate the force of the best arguments. 
Few, if any, after a careful examination of the positive evidences of 
Christianity, conclude them to be inadequate. But many are they, 

2 


14 


editor’s introduction. 


who having heard objections which their scanty learning does not 
enable them to answer, and their no less scanty interest in the subject 
does not induce them to examine, or which their inclinations lead 
them to cherish, cast it all aside. In this way they relieve themselves 
from the labor of investigation, as well as their compunctions of 
conscience; while they indulge both their love of sin and pride of 
singularity. 

An instance of the use of this book to such a mind, we have in the 
case of Chalmers. He had read, when a young man, several infidel 
productions. Their semblance of logic and learning, and supercilious 
confidence of style, disposed him to regard all religion as mere super- 
stition. His mind was poisoned. Accustomed as he had been to the 
positive and precise reasonings of mathematics, he could not find 
similar proofs for Christianity. But he was induced, by some friends, 
to study Butler’s Analogy. This, as he expresses it, took Christianity 
“ out of the class of unlikelihoods.” It brought him to the investi- 
gation, as if the evidence was neither plus nor minus. He examined 
the evidences as he would have done a declaration that Cicero weighed 
just one hundred and fifty pounds; open to the smallest proof or 
presumption on the positive side of the question. Delivered from 
prejudice, not only against Christianity but against its proofs, he soon 
saw the madness of deism, and immovably accepted the word of 
God, though he did not, at that time, feel its transforming power 
on his own heart. Long afterwards he writes, “I cannot render 
sufficient homage to the argument, which first, addressing itself to the 
subject-matter of Christianity, relieves it of all disproof, and pro- 
nounces it worthy of a trial ; and then, addressing itself to the evi- 
dence of Christianity, relieves it of all objections, and makes good, to 
that evidence, all the entireness and efficiency which natively belong 
to it.” Years afterwards he said, “Butler made me a Christian.” 
That it did far more for him than to effect his change of sentiment, 
that it continued to be a light in his firmament, is touchingly told in 
the Preface of his Bridgewater Treatise, where he says, “ I have 
derived greater aid from the views and reasonings of Butler, than I 
have been able to find, besides, in the whole range of our extant 
authorship.” 

To the sincere believer in the word of God the study of Butler is 
of great use. Doubts are among Satan’s tried weapons, and often 
haunt the holiest, especially if of a contemplative turn. They see 
goodness oppressed, and vice rampant ; the world ruled by wicked 


editor’s introduction. 


15 


men, and truth making its way with difficulty. Their hearts are 
traitorous, their surroundings full of temptation, and the direct evi- 
dence of Christianity they may never have studied. To such the 
analogical argument comes with full power, meets a candid exami- 
nation, and prevails. 

To no Christian is this hook so useful as the minister. He is con- 
stantly confronted by the difficulties which Butler so triumphantly 
handles. Here he is furnished, not only with a shield to protect his 
own mind from subtle darts, but a sword to demolish the cavil, and 
defend the system of which he is a public teacher. 

To all persons this book is of great value. We arrive at certainty 
in but few of our decisions, and are often obliged, even in matters of 
great moment, to act on probability. Thus we employ precautions 
when an evil is not certain to occur. If the evil would be very 
serious, we adopt the precaution, when there is but little probability, 
or perhaps a bare possibility, of its occurrence. Now, Butler has 
shown that if the proofs of revelation were weak, nay, if it had abso- 
lutely no proof, nay further, if on fair examination there appeared 
not even a probability of its truth, still there would remain a possi- 
bility, and this alone, considering the tremendous issues at stake, 
should make every man a Christian. This argument cannot be 
applied to Mahometanism or any other religion, because against those 
much may be advanced as disproof. Our author, having shown the 
utter absence of disproof, shuts us up to the reception of Christianity, 
were its truth barely possible. 

There have not been wanting persons to disparage the “ Analogy,” 
because it affords, as they say, no direct proof of revelation. As well 
might we demand a discussion of chemistry in a work on astronomy. 
Scores of writers prove Christianity, and here we have one to relieve 
us from the difficulties which beset it, and objections which still 
remain. There is an aspect in which the Analogy may be said to 
contribute the best of proof. What can go further towards establish- 
ing a point, than to demonstrate that there is no proof of the con- 
trary? What can show the fallacy of a set of objections, more than 
to prove that they might be urged with no less force against the 
obvious course of nature? This use of analogy is conformable to the 
severest logic, and though offering no pretence of positive argument, 
goes far towards establishing full conviction. “The probabilities,” 
says Stewart, “resulting from a concurrence of different analogies, 


1 () 


editor’s introduction. 


may rise so high as to produce an effect on the belief scarcely dis- 
tinguishable from moral certainty.” 

When it is considered that Butler’s argument is wholly in addition 
to the cumulative mass of direct and almost irresistible evidence, 
and removes even the objections which attend the subject, we see the 
rejection of Christianity to be inexpressibly rash and absurd. We 
see the skeptic condemned at his own bar, for acting in the most 
momentous of all possible concerns, in a manner the very opposite of 
that which he^ calls sensible and prudent in his ordinary affairs. The 
“Analogy” establishes, beyond cavil, strong presumptions that Chris- 
tianity is true, aside from all inspection of its proofs. The man, 
therefore, who really understands this book, and refuses to be a 
Christian, is led by his lusts and not his reason. 

Some admirers of this book have lamented as a defect, its want of 
evangelical tincture, and its exclusive reference to natural things. 
To me, this is a prime recommendation. Were it otherwise, the 
reasoning would be in a circle. The very structure of the argument 
demands that it should avoid quotations from the Bible. 

It must be admitted, however, that some expressions, taken just 
as they stand, without qualification by the current of the argument, 
tend to lead astray. For instance, “There is nothing in the human 
mind contrary to virtue.” “Men’s happiness and virtue are left to 
themselves.” “ Religion requires nothing which we are not well 
able to perform.” “Our repentance is accepted, to eternal life.” 
“Our relations to God are made known by reason.” Such 'expres- 
sions are not to be taken alone, but as explained by the general drift 
of sentiment and doctrine. No one can be familiar with his works, 
without finding the fullest evidence that Christianity was to Butler 
infinitely more than a creed or a ritual. Nor should we forget that 
such expressions are not to be interpreted by the tenor of the 
“Analogy” only, but by that of his whole ‘Works.’ 

Even if it be judged that he everywhere fails to express himself in 
such phrase as we usually call evangelical, it should be remembered 
that he was a Church-of-England man, at a time when there was a 
powerful reaction against the evangelism of the Puritans, and when 
a real lack of emotional piety was general in his church. 

That he did not enjoy in his last illness, which extended over a 
long period, that sustaining sense of the love of Christ which hearty 
Christians generally feel, is certain. A friend, trying to relieve his 
depression, reminded him of his excellent life, and especially his 


editor’s introduction. 


17 


wide liberalities. He immediately replied, “lam but a steward! 
All is His, intrusted to me, to promote his glory and the good of 
mankind ; how can I know that I have not abused the trust ? I 
reflect on all these things, and they fill my soul with terror by the 
feeling of responsibility they awaken.” 

On another occasion, his chaplain sought to soothe his troubled spirit 
by referring to the extensive influence of his Analogy in reclaiming 
skeptics. His reply was, “ I began the Analogy with a view to the 
glory of God ; but as I proceeded, visions of the fame it might bring 
me mingled themselves with my motives, and all was polluted and 
made sinful ! The book may be a blessing to others, but it weighs like 
lead on my soul.” “Admit all this,” tenderly replied the chaplain; 
“yet has not Jesus said, ‘Whosoever cometh unto me shall in nowise 
be cast out'?”. Instantly the Bishop raised himself in the bed, exclaim- 
ing, “How wonderful that the force of this passage never struck 
me before! ‘Whosoever/ — all, all! ‘In nowise/ — no amount of 
sin can prevent acceptance ! Christ’s righteousness will hide the 
iniquities of all who accept his offer of mercy !” 

From that time, for weeks, Butler spoke to all who approached 
him, of a full and free salvation. He died triumphantly repeating 
this passage. 

If all that is said of the lack of evangelical sentiment in Butler or 
his book be conceded, it certainly cannot impair either the value of 
the analogical argument, or the force of our author’s use of it. 

Various circumstances conspire to make the study of “The 
Analogy” difficult. The nature of the reasoning — the conciseness, 
and often obscurity of the style — the dislocation of parts by frequent 
digressions — the arrest of a close course of reasoning to answer 
objections — and the abstruseness of the subject itself — combine to 
make the full comprehension of its import difficult. Mackintosh says, 
“ No thinker so great, was ever so bad a writer.” But this, like some 
other objections of Sir James, is stated too strongly. The language 
is good, sinewy Saxon, and will endure when much that is now 
called fine writing, will seem grotesque. Still it is possible to 
write philosophy in better phrase, as has been shown by at least 
two great men, Berkeley and Stewart. Had Butler but possessed the 
glowing style of Berkeley, or the smooth, graceful, and transparent 
diction of Dugald Stewart, his work, instead of serving only for close 
thinkers, or a college text-book, would have been read by all classes, 
and banished that vulgar infidelity which flippant writers still dis- 
B 2* 


18 


editor’s introduction. 


seminate. That it is thus restricted in its influence is a misfortune 
to the world. But he wrote for a class, and did his work completely. 
Literary infidelity was conquered. Vulgar, ignorant, licentious 
infidelity, will always exist, and is even now deplorably prevalent. 
Both Europe and America contain conceited and malignant igno- 
ramuses, who by their sneers, their cavils, and their audacity, make 
havoc of souls. Of these, Tom Paine is a type, whose book, the 
contempt of cultivated minds, continues to be sold and read. For 
this class of persons, “Baxter’s Call,” or “Alleine’s Alarm,” are 
far more suitable than treatises on the evidences of Christianity, or 
even Butlers Analogy. 


(Suitor’s 


rtfatt 


The text is the result of a careful collation of the various principal 
editions. Occasionally solecisms are corrected, and a word transposed 
or put in italics, when a sentence could thus he made perspicuous. 
The author had a fashion of beginning a large proportion of his sen- 
tences with “ and,” “ but,” “ now,” “ indeed,” “ however,” &c., which 
often served to perplex, and in such cases they have been omitted. 
Long paragraphs, comprehending different topics, have been so 
divided as to correspond with the true analysis ; which will greatly 
assist the student in detecting the successive stages of the argument. 
Special pains has been taken to correct and improve the punctuation. 
Hundreds of sentences have thus been rendered more perspicuous, 
and many which were obscure, have been made lucid. In no respect 
was Butler's style, as printed, so defective. 

The Conspectus is made much ampler than any other, for this 
reason: that students are apt to content themselves with such help 
instead of mastering the full discussion by the author. In the present 
case they cannot so do, for such is the fulness of the Conspectus, that 
if they master this, they have mastered the subject itself in full. 

Notes by the present editor are distinguished from those of the 
author by being enclosed in brackets. They are designed to open out 
further views, to elucidate the text, to facilitate extended researches, 
and to suggest topics for conversation in the class-room. 

The Index has cost far more labor than would be supposed, and 
may not be of much benefit to the undergraduate. Its advantages 

will not be small to him in after life when he desires to recur to par- 

19 


20 


editor’s preface. 


ticular topics. The general scholar will find it enable him to make 
use of the book for occasional reference. Without it the work is not 
complete for the class-room, still less for the library. 

That students of the Analogy need help, is confessed ; and all 
attempts to furnish it have been kindly received. As is remarked by 
Bishop Wilson, “His argument, clear and convincing as it is to a 
prepared mind, is not obvious to the young reader, whose experience 
of life being small, and his habits of reflection feeble, has not the 
furniture necessary for comprehending, at first, the thoughts and 
conclusions of such a mind. The style is too close, too negligent, too 
obscure, to be suitable for the young.” 

If it be asked why, with several existing helps to the study of the 
Analogy, I offer another, I frankly reply, because I have found none 
of them satisfactory as text-books for the class-room. 


Citrasptto of % ^at|or’s |ntrotatiiira 


I. What is probable evidence? 

1* It differs from demonstration in that it admits of degrees ; of all degrees. 

1. ) One probability does not beget assurance. 

2. ) But the slightest presumption makes a probability, 

3. ) The repetition of it may make certainty. 

2» What constitutes probability is likeness ; in regard to the event itself, or its 
kind of evidences, or its circumstances. 

1. ) This daily affords presumptions, evidence, or conviction : according as it 

is occasional, common, or constant. 

2. ) Measures our hopes and fears. 

3. ) Regulates our expectations as to men’s conduct. 

4. ) Enables us to judge of character from conduct. 

3. It is an imperfect mode of judging, and adapted to beings of limited 

capacities. 

4 . Where better evidence cannot be had, it constitutes moral obligation, even 

though great doubts remain. 

1. ) We are as much bound to do -what, on the whole, appears to be best, as 

if we knew it to be so. 

2. ) In questions of great moment, it is reasonable to act when the favorable 

chances are no greater than the unfavorable. 

3. ) There are numberless cases in which a man would be thought distracted 

if he did not act, and that earnestly, where the chances of success were 
greatly against him. 

II. The use and application of probabilities. 

Shall not go further into the nature of probable evidence, nor inquire why 
likeness begets presumption and conviction; nor how far analogical 
reasoning can be reduced to a system ; but shall only show how just and 
conclusive this mode of reasoning is. 

1* In determining our judgments and practice. 

1. ) There may be cases in which its value is doubtful. 

2. ) There may be seeming analogies, which are not really such. 

3. ) But as a mode of argument, it is perfectly just and conclusive. 

2. In noting correspondencies between the different parts of God’s govern- 
ment. 


21 


22 


CONSPECTUS OF INTRODUCTION. 


1. ) We may expect to find the same sort of difficulties in the Bible, as we do 

in Nature. 

2. ) To deny the Bible to be of God, because of these difficulties, requires us 

to deny that the world was made by him. 

3. ) If there be a likeness between revelation and the system of nature, it 

affords a presumption that both have the same author. 

4. ) To reason on the construction and government of the world, without 

settling foundation-principles, is mere hypothesis. 

5. ) To apply principles which are certain to cases which are not applicable, 

is no better. 

6. ) But to join abstract reasonings to the observation of facts, and argue, 

from known present things, to what is likely or credible, must be 
right. 

7. ) We cannot avoid acting thus, if we act at all. 

3. In its application to religion, revealed, as well as natural. This is the use 
which will be made of analogy in the following work. In so using it, 

1. ) It will be taken for proved that there is an intelligent Creator and 

Ruler. 

— There are no presumptions against this, prior to proof. 

— There are proofs : — from analogy, reason, tradition, <fcc. 

— The fact is not denied by the generality of skeptics. 

2. ) No regard will be paid to those who idly speculate as to how the world 

wight have been made and governed. 

— Such prating would amount to this : 

. All creatures should have been made at first as happy as they 
could be. 

. Nothing of hazard should be put upon them. 

• Should have been secured in their happiness. 

. All punishments avoided. 

— It is a sufficient reply to such talk that mankind have not faculties 
for such speculations. 

3. ) We are, to some extent, judges as to ends; and may conclude that Na- 

ture and Providence are designed to produce virtue and happiness; 
but of the means of producing these in the highest degree, we are not 
competent judges. 

— We know not the extent of the universe; 

— Nor even how one person can best be brought to perfection. 

— We are not often competent to judge of the conduct of each other. 

— As to God, we may presume that order will prevail in his universe; 
but are no judges of his modes for accomplishing this end. 

4. ) Instead of vainly, and perhaps sinfully, imagining schemes for God’s 

conduct, we must study what is. 

— Discovering general laws. 

— Comparing the known course of things with what revelation teaches 
us to expect. 

III. The force of this use of Analogy. 

1. Sometimes is practically equivalent to proof. 

2. Confirms what is otherwise proved. 


CONSPECTUS OF INTRODUCTION. 


23 


3 . Shows that the system of revelation is no more open to ridicule, than the 

system of nature. 

4 . Answers almost all objections against religion. 

5 . To a great extent answers objections against the proofs of religion. 

IY. General scope of the hook. 

1. The divine government is considered, as containing in it, 

Chap. 1. Man's future existence. 

“ 2. In a state of reward or punishment. 

“ 3. This according to our behavior. 

“ 4. Our present life probationary. 

** 5. And also disciplinary. 

“ 6. Notwithstanding the doctrine of necessity. 

u 7. Or any apparent want of wisdom or goodness. 

2. Revealed religion is considered, 

Chap. 1. As important. 

“ 2. As proved by miracles. 

u 3. As containing strange things. 

" 4. As a scheme imperfectly comprehended. 

“ 5. As carried on by a mediator. 

“ 6. As having such an amount of evidence as God saw fit to give 

“ 7. As having sufficient and full evidence. 


Conspectus of % JumLo®. 


PART I. 

CHAPTER I. 

A FUTURE LIFE. 

Will not discuss the subject of identity; but will consider what analogy sug- 
gests from changes which do not destroy ; and thus see whether it is not 
probable that we shall live hereafter. 

I. The probabilities that we shall survive death. 

I. It is a law of nature that creatures should exist in different stages, and 
in various degrees of perfection. 

— Worms turn into flies. 

— Eggs are hatched into birds. 

— Our own present state is as different from our state in the womb, as 
two states of the same being can be. 


‘24 


CONSPECTUS OF THE ANALOGY. 


— That we shall hereafter exist in a state as different from the present as 
the present is from our state in the womb, is according to analogy. 
We now have capacities for happiness, action, misery, &c., and there is 
always a probability that things will continue as they are, except when 
experience gives us reason to think they will be altered. This is a gene- 
ral law; and is our only natural reason for expecting the continuance of 
any thing. 

3. There is no reason to apprehend that death will destroy us. 

If there was, it would arise from the nature of death ; or from the analogy 
of nature. 

1. ) Not from the nature of death. 

— We know not what death is. 

— But only some of its effects, 

— These effects do not imply the destruction of the living agent. 

— We know little of what the exercise of our powers depends upon; and 
nothing of what the powers themselves depend on. 

— We may be unable to exercise our powers, and yet not lose them — 
e.g. sleep, swoon. 

2. ) Not from analogy. 

— Reason shows no connection between death and our destruction. 

— We have no faculties by which to trace any being beyond it. 

— The possession of living powers, up to the very moment when our 
faculties cease to be able to trace them, is a probability of their 
continuing. 

— We have already survived wonderful changes. 

— To live after death is analogous to the course of nature. 

II. Presumptions against a future life. 

I. That death destroys us. 

Ans. 1. This is an assumption that we are compound and material beings, and 
hence discerptible ; which is not true. 

1. ) Consciousness is a single, indivisible power, and of course the subject of 

it must be. 

2. ) The material body is not ourself. 

3. ) We can easily conceive of our having more limbs, or of a different kind, 

or of having more or fewer senses, or of having no bodies at all, or of 
hereafter animating these same bodies, remodelled. 

4. ) The dissolution of a succession of new and strange bodies, would have 

no tendency to destroy us, 

Ans. 2. Though the absolute simplicity of the living being cannot be proved by 
experiment, yet facts lead us so to conclude. We lose limbs, &c. 
Our bodies were once very small, but we might, then, have lost part 
of them. There is a constant destruction and renewal going on. 

1. ) Thus we see that no certain hulk is necessary to our existence, and unless 

it were proved that there is, and that it is larger than an indissoluble 
atom, there is no reason to presume that death destroys us, even if we 
are discerptible. 

2. ) The living agent is not an internal material organism, which dies with 

the body. Because 


CONSPECTUS OF TIIE ANALOGY. 25 

— Our only ground for this presumption is our relation to other systems 
of matter. But we see these are not necessary to us. 

— It will not do to say that lost portions of the body were not essential — 
who is to determine? 

— The relation between the living agent, and the most essential parts of 
the body, is only one by which they mutually affect each other. 

3.) If we regard our body as made up of organs of sense, we come to the 

same result. 

— We see with the eyes, just as we do with glasses. The eye is not a 
recipient , any more than a telescope. 

— It is not pretended that vision, hearing, &c. can be traced clear up to 
the percipient ; but so far as we can trace perceptions, the organ 
does not perceive. 

— In dreams we perceive without organs. 

— When we lose a limb we do not lose the directing power ; wo could 
move a new one, if it could be made, or a wooden one. But the 
limb cut off has no power of moving. 

— Thus, our loss of the organs of perception and motion, not being the 
destruction of the power, there is no ground to think that the de- 
struction of other organs or instruments would destroy us. 

Objection. These observations apply equally to brutes. 

Ana. 1. Be it so. Perhaps they are immortal: — may hereafter improve: we 
know not what latent powers they may have. 

1. ) The human being at one period looks as little likely to make great 

intellectual attainments; for a long time he has capacities for virtue 

and religion, but cannot use them. 

2. ) Many persons go out of the world who never became able to exercise 

these capacities; e.g. infants. 

Ans. 2. If brutes were immortal, it does not prove them to be moral agents. 

1. ) It may be necessary, for aught we know, that there should be living 

creatures not moral agents, nor rational. 

2. ) All difficulties as to what would become of them, are founded in our 

ignorance. 

2. That our souls, though not material, so depend upon the bodily structure, 

that we cannot survive its destruction. 

Ans. 1. Reason, memory, &c. do not depend on the body, as perceptions by 
the senses do. Death may destroy those instruments, and yet not 
destroy the powers of reflection. 

Ans. 2. Human beings exist, here, in two very different states, each having its 
own laws: sensation and reflection. By the first we feel; by the 
second we reason and will. 

1. ) Nothing which we know r to be destroyed at death, is necessary to reflect- 

ing on ideas formerly received. 

2. ) Though the senses act like scaffolds, or levers, to bring in ideas, yet when 

once in, we can reflect, &c. without their aid. 

Ans. 3. There are diseases which prove fatal, &c., yet do not, in any part of 
their course, impair the intellect; and this indicates that they do not 
destroy it. 


20 


CONSPECTUS OF THE ANALOGY. 


1. ) In the diseases alluded to, persons have their reflective power, in full, 

the very moment before death. 

2. ) Now, why should a disease, at a certain degree, utterly destroy powers 

which were not even affected by it, up to that point? 

3. That death at least suspends our reflective powers, or interrupts our con- 
tinuing to exist in the like state of reflection which we do now. 

Ans. There appears so little connection between our powers of sensation and 
our powers of reflection that we cannot presume that what might 
destroy the former, could even suspend the latter. 

1. ) We daily see reason, memory, <fcc. exercised without any assistance, that 

we know of, from our bodies. 

2. ) Seeing them in lively exercise to the last, we must infer that death is not 

a discontinuance of their exercise, nor of the enjoyments and sufferings 
of such exercise. 

3. ) Our posthumous life may be but a going on, with additions. Like the 

change at our birth — which produced not a suspension of the faculties 
we had before, nor a total change in our state of life; but a continuance 
of both, with great alterations. 

4. ) Death may but at once put us into a higher state of life, as our birth 

did; our relation to bodily organs may be the only hinderance to our 
entering a higher condition of the reflective powers. 

5. ) Were we even sure that death would suspend our intellectual powers, it 

would not furnish even the lowest probability that it would destroy 
them. 

Ohjec. From the analogy of plants. 

Ans. This furnishes poets with apt illustrations of our frailty, but affords no 
proper analogy. Plants are destitute of perception and action, and 
this is the very matter in question. 

REMARKS. 

1. It has been shown, that confining ourselves to what we know, we see no 

probability of ever ceasing to be: — it cannot be concluded from the reason 
of the thing : — nor from the analogy of nature. 

2. We are therefore to go upon the belief of a future existence. 

3. Our going into new scenes and conditions, is just as natural as our coming 

into the world. 

4. Our condition may naturally be a social one. 

5* The advantages of it may naturally be bestowed, according to some fixed 
law, in proportion to one’s degrees in virtue. 

1. ) Perhaps not so much as now by society ; but by God’s more immediate 

action. 

2. ) Yet this will be no less natural, i.e. stated, fixed, or settled. 

3. ) Our notions of what is natural, are enlarged by greater knowledge of God 

and his works. 

4. ) There may be some beings in the world, to whom the whole of Chris- 

tianity is as natural as the visible course of nature seems to us. 

O. These probabilities of a future life, though they do not satisfy curiosity, 
answer all the purposes of religion, as well as demonstration. 

1.) Even a demonstration of a future state, would not demonstrate religion, 
but would be reconcilable with atheism. 


CONSPECTUS OF THE ANALOGY. 


27 


2. ) But as religion implies a future state, any presumption against such a 

state, would be a presumption against religion. 

3. ) The foregoing observations remove all presumptions of that sort, and 

prove to a great probability, a fundamental doctrine of religion. 


CHAPTER ir. 

THE GOVERNMENT OF GOD BY REWARDS AND PUNISHMENTS. 

The question of a future life is rendered momentous by our capacity for 
happiness and misery. 

Especially if that happiness or misery depends on our present conduct. 

We should feel the deepest solicitude on this subject. 

And that if there were no proof of a future life and interest, other than the 
probabilities just discussed. 

I. In the present world oar pleasures and pains are , to a great extent , 

in our own power. 

1. We see them to be consequences of our actions. 

2 . And we can foresee these consequences. 

3 . Our desires are not gratified, without the right kind of exertion. 

4. By prudence we may enjoy life; rashness, or even neglect may make us 

miserable. 

5 . Why this is so is another matter. 

1. ) It may be impossible to be otherwise. 

2. ) Or it may be best on the whole. 

3. ) Or God’s plan may be to make only the good happy. 

4. ) Or the whole plan may be incomprehensible to us. 

Oojec. It may be said “this is only the course of nature.” 

Ans. It is granted : but 

1. The course of nature is but the will of God. We admit that God is the 

natural governor of the world : and must not turn round and deny it 
because his government is uniform. 

2. Our natural foresight of the consequences of actions, is his appointment. 

3. The consequences themselves, are his appointment. 

4. Our ability to foresee these consequences, is God’s instruction how we are 

to act. 

Objec. By this reasoning we are instructed to gratify our appetites, and such 
gratification is our reward for so doing. 

Ans. Certainly not. Foreseen pleasures and pains are proper motives to action 
in general; but we may, in particular cases, damage ourselves by 
indulgence. Our eyes are made to see with, but not to look at every 
thing : — for instance the sun. 

It follows, from what has been said, that 

II. We are, now, actually under God's government, in the strictest 

sense. 

1. Admitting that there is a God, it is not so much a matter of speculation, as 
of experience, that he governs us. 


28 


CONSPECTUS OF THE ANALOGY. 


2. The annexing of pleasures and pains to certain actions, and giving notice 

of them, is the very essence of government. 

3. Whether by direct acts apon us, or by contriving a general plan, does not 

affect the argument. 

1. ) If magistrates could make laws which should execute themselves, their 

government would be far more perfect than it is. 

2. ) God’s making fire burn us, is as much an instance of government, as if 

he directly inflicted the burn, whenever we touched fire. 

4. Hence the analogy of nature shows nothing to render incredible the Bible 

doctrine of God’s rewarding or punishing according to our actions. 

Additional remarks on Punishment. 

As men object chiefly to future punishment, it is proper to show further that 
the course of administration, as to present punishment, is analogous to what 
religion teaches as to the fxiture. 

Indeed they add credibility to it. 

And ought to raise the most serious apprehension. 

I. Circumstances to be observed touching present punishments. 

1. They often follow acts which produce present pleasure or advantage. 

2. The sufferings often far exceed the pleasure or advantage. 

3. They often follow remotely. 

4. After long delay they often come suddenly. 

5. As those remote effects are not certainly foreseen, they may not be thought 

of at the time ; or if so, there is a hope of escaping. 

6. There are opportunities of advantage, which if neglected do not recur. 

7. Though, in some cases, men who have sinned up to a certain point, may 

retrieve their affairs, yet in many cases, reformation is of no avail. 

8. Inconsiderateness is often as disastrous as wilful wrong-doing. 

9. As some punishments by civil government, are capital, so are some natural 

punishments. 

1. ) Seem intended to remove the offender out of the way. 

2. ) Or as an example to others. 

II. These things are not accidental, but proceed from fixed laws. 

■ l- 

1. They are matters of daily experience. 

2. Proceed from the general laws, by which the world is governed. 

III. They so closely resemble what religion teaches, as to future punish- 

ment, that both might be expressed in the same words. 

e.g. Proverbs, ch. i. 

The analogy sufficiently answers all objections against the Scripture doctrine 
of future punishment, such as 

1. ) That our frailty or temptations annihilate the guilt of vice. 

2. ) Or the objection from necessity. 

3. ) Or that the Almighty cannot be contradicted. 

4. ) Or that he cannot be offended. 


CONSPECTUS OF THE ANALOGY. 


29 


REMARKS. 

1. Such reflections are terrific, but ought to be stated and considered. 

2. Disregard of a hereafter cannot be justified by any thing short of a 

demonstration of atheism. Even skeptical doctrines afford no justifi- 
cation. 

3. There is no pretence of reason for presuming that the licentious will not 

find it better for them that they had never been born. 


CHAPTER III. 

MORAL GOVERNMENT OF GOD. 

As the structure of the world shows intelligence, so the mode of distributing 
pleasure and pain, shows government. That is, God’s natural government, 
such as a king exercises over his subjects. 

But this does not, at first sight, determine what is the moral character of 
such government. 

I. What is a moral or righteous government ? 

1. Not mere rewarding and punishing. 

2. But doing this according to character. 

3. The perfection of moral government is doing this exactly. 

Ohjec. God is simply and absolutely benevolent. 

An8. Benevolence, infinite in degree, would dispose him to produce the greatest 
possible happiness, regardless of behaviour. This would rob God of 
other attributes; and should not be asserted unless it can be proved. 
And whether it can be proved is not the point now in hand. 

The question is not whether there may not be, in the universe, beings to 
whom he manifests absolute benevolence, which might not be incompatible with 
justice; but whether he treats us so. 

4. It must be owned to be vastly difficult, in such a disordered world, to esti- 

mate with exactness the overplus of happiness on the side of virtue: and 
there may be exceptions to the rule. But it is far from being doubtful 
that on the whole, virtue is happier than vice, in this world. 

II. The beginnings of a righteous administration , are seen in nature. 

1. It has been proved (ch. ii.) that God governs : and it is reasonable to sup- 

pose that he would govern righteously. 

1. ) Any other rule of government would be harder to account for. 

2. ) The Bible doctrine that hereafter the good shall be happy, and the 

wicked miserable, is no more than an expectation that a method of 
government, now begun, shall be carried on. 

2. The opposite consequences of prudence and rashness, show a right consti- 

tution of nature; and our ability to foresee and control these consequences, 
shows that we are under moral law. 

3. God has so constructed society that vice, to a great degree, is actually 

punished by it. 

1.) Without this, society could not exist. 


30 


CONSPECTUS OP THE ANALOGY. 


2.) This is God’s government, through society; and is as natural , as society. 
2.) Since the course of things is God’s appointment, men are unavoidably 
accountable for their behaviour. 

Objec. Society often punishes good actions, and rewards wickedness. 

Ana. 1. This is not necessary, and consequently not natural. 

2. Good actions are never punished by society as good, but because 
considered bad. 

4. By the course of nature, virtue is rewarded, and vice punished, as such, 

which proves a moral government; as will be seen if we rightly distin- 
guish between actions and their qualities. 

1. ) An action may produce present gratification though it be wrong: in 

which case the gratification is in the act, not the morality of it: in other 
cases the enjoyment consists wholly in the quality of virtuousness. 

2. ) Vice is naturally attended with uneasiness, apprehension, vexation, 

remorse, <fcc. 

— This is a very different feeling from that produced by mere misfortune. 
— Men comfort themselves under misfortune, that it was not their own fault. 

3. ) Honest and good men are befriended as such. 

4. ) Injuries are resented as implying fault ; and good offices are regarded 

with gratitude on account of the ‘intention, even when they fail to 
benefit us. 

— This is seen in family government, where children are punished for 
falsehood, fretfulness, <fec., though no one is hurt. 

• — And also in civil government, where the absence or presence of ill 
intention goes far in determining the penalty of wrong-doing. 

5. ) The whole course of the world, in all ages and relations, turns much upon 

approbation and disapprobation. 

6. ) The very fact of our having a moral nature, is a proof of our being 

under God’s moral government. 

— We are placed in a condition which unavoidably operates on our moral 
nature. 

— Hence it arises that reward to virtue and reprobation of vice, as such, 
is a rule, never inverted. If it be thought that there are instances 
to the contrary, (which is not so,) they are evidently monstrous. 

— The degree in which virtue and vice receive proper returns, is not the 
question now, but only the thing itself, in some degree. 

7. ) It is admitted that virtue sometimes suffers, and vice prospers; but this 

is disorder, and not the order of nature. 

8. ) It follows, that we have in the government of the world, a declaration 

from God, for virtue and against vice. So far as a man is true to virtue, 
is he on the side of the divine administration. Such a man must have 
a sense of security, and a hope of something better. 

5. This hope is confirmed by observing that virtue has necessary tendencies, 

beyond their present effects. 

1. ) These axe very obvious with regard to individuals. 

2. ) Are as real, though not so patent, in regard to society. 

— The power of a society under the direction of virtue, tends to prevail 
over power not so directed, just as power under direction of reason, 
tends to prevail over brute force. 


CONSPECTUS OF THE ANALOGY. 


0 1 

01 

— As this may not be conceded, wc will notice how the case stands, 
as to reason : 

. Length of time, and proper opportunity, are necessary for reason 
to triumph over brutes. 

• Rational beings, disunited, envious, unjust, and treacherous, may 

be overcome by brutes, uniting themselves by instinct: but this 
would be an inverted order of things. 

— A like tendency has virtue to produce superiority. 

. By making the good of society, the object of every member 
of it. 

• By making every one industrious in his own sphere. 

. By uniting all in one bond of veracity and justice. 

3. ) If the part of God’s government which we see, and the part we do 

not see, make up one scheme, then we see a tendency in virtue to 
superiority. 

4. ) But to produce that superiority there must be 

— A force proportioned to the obstacles. 

— Sufficient lapse of time. 

— A fair field of trial ; such as extent of time, adequate occasions, and 
opportunities for the virtuous to unite. 

5. ) These things are denied to virtue in this life, so that its tendencies, 

though real, are hindered. 

6. ) But it may have all requisite advantages hereafter. 

— Eternity will be lasting enough. 

— Good men will unite ; as they cannot do now, scattered over the earth, 
and ignorant of one another. 

— Other orders of virtuous beings will join ; for the very nature of virtue 
is a bond of union. 

7. ) The tendency of such an order of things, so far as seen by vicious beings 

in any part of the universe, would be to the amendment of all who 
were capable of it, and their recovery to virtue. 

8. ) All this goes to show that the hinderances to virtue are contingent, and 

that its beneficial tendencies are God’s declarations in its favor. 

9. ) If the preceding considerations are thought to be too speculative, we 

may easily come to the same result by reflecting on the supremacy 
which any earthly nation would attain, by entire virtue for many ages. 

REMARKS. 

Consider now the general system of religion. The government of the world 
is one; it is moral; virtue shall in the end prevail over wickedness ; and to 
see the importance and fitness of such an arrangement we have only to 
consider what would be the state of things, if vice had these advantages, or 
virtue the contrary. 

Objec. Why may not things be now going on in other worlds, and continue 
always to go on in this world, in the same mixed and disordered 
state as at present? 

Ans. We are not proving that God’s moral government is perfect, or the truth 
of religion, but only seeing what there is in the course of nature, to 
confirm it, supposing it to be known. Were there nothing to judge by, 


32 


CONSPECTUS OF THE ANALOGY. 


but the present distribution of pleasure and pain, we should have no 
ground to conclude that hereafter we should be rewarded or punished 
exactly according to our deserts. But even then there would bo no 
indication that vice is better than virtue. Still the preceding observa- 
tions confirm the doctrine of future retribution ; for, 

1. ) They show that the Author of nature is not indifferent to virtue 

and vice. / 

2. ) That future distributive justice would differ not in kind, but in degree 

only, from God’s present government. It would be the effect, towards 
which we see the tendency. 

3. ) That higher rewards and punishments may be hereafter. 

4. ) That we should expect it to be so ; because the tendencies of vice and 

virtue are immutable, while the hinderances are only artificial. 

SUMMARY. 

[This enumerates the steps of the argument, in the foregoing chapter, in 
as condensed a form as possible.] 


CHAPTER IV. 

OP A STATE OF PROBATION. 

The doctrine of probation comprehends several particulars. But the most 
common notion is that our future interests are depending ; and depending on 
ourselves. And that we have opportunities for both good and bad conduct, 
and temptations to each. 

This is not exactly the same as our being under moral government; for it 
implies allurement to evil, and difficulties in being good. 

Hence needs to be considered by itself. 

Doctrine. The natural government of God, in this world, puts us on 

TRIAL AS TO THE THINGS OF THIS WORLD; AND SO IMPLIES, WHAT 
RELIGION TEACHES, THAT HIS MORAL GOVERNMENT PUTS US ON 
TRIAL AS TO A FUTURE WORLD. 

I. So far as we are tempted to do what will damage our future temporal 
interests, so far we are under probation as to those interests. 

1. The annexing of pleasures and pains to actions, as good or bad, and 

enabling us to foresee their effect, implies that our interests, in part at 
least, depend on ourselves. 

2. We often blame ourselves and others for evils, as resulting from mis- 

conduct. 

3. It is very certain that we often miss possible good, and incur evils, not for 

want of knowing better, but through our fault. 

4 . Every one speaks of the hazards of young persons, from other causes 

than ignorance. 


CONSPECTUS OF THE ANALOGY. 


oo 
.») O 

II. These natural or temporal trials are analogous to our moral 

and religious trial. 

1* In both cases, what constitutes the trial, is either in our circumstances 
or in our nature. 

1. ) Some would do right but for violent or extraordinary temptations. 

2. ) Others will seek evil, and go out of their way after wicked indulgence, 

when there are no external temptations. 

3 . ) But even those who err through temptation, must have that within which 

makes them susceptible of temptation. 

4. ) So that we are in a like state of probation with respect to both present 

and future interests. 

2. If we proceed to observe how mankind behave in both capacities, we see 

the same analogy. 

1. ) Some scarcely look beyond the present gratification. 

2 . ) Some are driven by their passions against their better judgment and 

feeble resolutions. 

3 . ) Some shamelessly go on in open vice. 

4. ) Some persist in wrong-doing, even under strong apprehensions of future 

misery. 

3. The analogy is no less plain in regard to the influence of others upon us. 

1. ) Bad example. 

2 . ) Wrong education. 

3 . ) Corruptions of religion. 

4. ) General prevalence of mistakes as to true happiness. 

4 . In both cases negligence and folly bring difficulty as well as vice. 

III. The disadvantages we labor under from our fallen and disordered 

state , are the same, in relation to both earthly and future interests. 

This disadvantage affords no ground of complaint; for, 

1. We may manage to pass our days in comfort and peace. 

2« And so may we obtain the security and comfort of religion. 

3. We might as well complain that we are not a higher order of beings. 

REMARKS. 

1. It is thus proved that the state of trial, which religion says we are in, is 

credible; for it exactly corresponds to what we see. 

1. ) If from birth till death we were in a constant security of enjoyment, 

without care or correctness, it would be a i^resumption against religion. 

2. ) It might, if we had no experience, be urged that an infinitely good Being 

would not expose us to the hazard of misery. This is indeed a diffi- 
culty, and must remain so ; but still the course of nature is as it is. 

3 . ) The miseries which we bring on ourselves are no more unavoidable than 

our deportment. 

2. It has been proved that we are in danger of miscarrying as to our interests, 

both present and future. 

3. The sum of the whole is, that as we do not have present enjoyments and 

honors forced upon us, in spite of misconduct, so this may be the case, 
as to that chief and final good which religion proposes. 

C 


34 


CONSPECTUS OF THE ANALOGY. 


CHAPTER V. 

PROBATION INTENDED FOR MORAL DISCIPLINE AND IMPROVEMENT. 

Why we should be placed in the condition spoken of in the last chapter, is 
a question which cannot be answered. It may be that we could not under- 
stand, if told. And if we could, it might injure us to know, just now. It 
certainly is consistent with God’s righteous government. 

Religion tells us that we are so placed in order to become qualified for 
a better state. 

This, though a very partial answer to the inquiry why we are so placed, 
answers an infinitely more important question, — viz. : What is our business 
here ? 

I. We are placed in this state of trial , for our improvement in 
virtue, as the requisite qualification for future security and 
happiness. 

1. Every creature is designed for a particular way of life. 

1. ) Happiness depends on the congruity between a creature’s nature and its 

circumstances. 

2. ) Man’s character might be so changed as to make him incapable of 

happiness on earth. 

3. ) Or he might be placed, without changing his nature, in a world where he 

must be wretched, for want of the proper objects to answer to his 
desires. 

4. ) So that without determining what is the future condition of good men, 

we know there must be necessary qualifications to make us capable of 
enjoying it. 

2. Human beings are so constituted as to become fit for new and different 

conditions. 

1. ) We not only acquire ideas, but store them up. 

2. ) We can become more expert in any kind of action. 

3. ) And can make settled alterations in our tempers. 

4. ) We can form habits — both bodily and mental. 

As these operate in producing radical changes in human character, we will 
look for a moment at the process. 

— Neither perceptions, nor knowledge, are habits; though necessary to 
forming them. 

— There are habits of perception, however, and habits of action : the 
former are passive, the latter active. 

— Habits of body are produced by external acts, and habits of mind by 
the exertion of principles; i.e. carrying them out. 

— Resolutions to do well are acts, and may help towards forming 
good habits. But mere theorizing, and forming pictures in the 
mind, not only do not help, but may harden the mind to a 
contrary course, 

— Passive impressions, by repetition grow weaker. Thus familiarity with 
danger lessens fear. 


CONSPECTUS OF THE ANALOGY. 


35 


— Hence active habits may be formed and strengthened, by acting accord- 
ing to certain motives or excitements, which grow less sensibly felt; 
and less and less felt, as the habit strengthens. 

• Thus the sight of distress excites the passive emotion of pity, 

and the active principle of benevolence. But inquiring out 
cases of distress in order to relieve them, causes diminished 
sensitiveness at the sight of misery, and stronger benevolence 
and aptitude in relieving it. 

• So admonition, experience, and example, if acted upon, produce 

good ; if not, harden. 

5. ) The formation of a habit may be imperceptible and even inexplicable, 

but the thing itself is matter of certain experience. 

6. ) A habit once formed, the action becomes easy and often pleasurable : 

opposite inclinations grow weaker : difficulties less : and occasions more 

frequent. 

7. ) Thus, a new character, in several respects, is formed. 

3. We should not have these capacities for improvement and for the recon- 
struction of character, if it were not necessary. 

1. ) They are .necessary, even as to this life. 

— We are not qualified, at first, for mature life: understanding and 
strength come gradually. 

— If we had them in full, at birth, we should at first be distracted 
and bewildered, and our faculties would be of no use previous to 
experience. Ignorant of any employment, we could not provide 
fo^ ourselves. 

• — So that man is an unformed, unfinished creature, even as to this world, 
till he acquire knowledge, experience, and habits. 

2. ) Provision is made for our acquiring, in youth, the requisite qualities for 

manhood. 

— Children learn, from their very birth, 

• The nature and use of objects. 

. The subordinations of domestic life. 

. The rules of life. 

— Some of this learning is acquired so insensibly, as to seem like in- 
stinct; but some requires great care and labor, and the doing of 
things we are averse to. 

— According as we act during this formative period, is our character 
formed; and our capacity for various stations in society determined. 

— Early opportunities lost, cannot be recovered. 

3. ) Our state of discipline throughout this life, for another, is exactly of the 

same kind : and comprehended under one general law. 

— If we could not see how the present discipline fitted us for a higher 
life, it would be no objection. 

. We do not know how food, sleep, &c. enlarges the child’s body; 
nor would we expect such a result, prior to experience. 

. Nor do children understand the need of exercise, temperance, 
restraint, <fcc. 

— We thus see a general analogy of Providence indicating that the 
present life is preparatory. 


86 


CONSPECTUS OF THE ANALOGY. 


4, If virtue is a necessary qualification for future happiness, then we see our 

need of the moral culture of our present state. 

1. ) Analogy indicates that our future state will be social. 

—Nature furnishes no shadow of unreasonableness in the Scripture 
doctrine that this future community will be under the more imme- 
diate government of God. 

— Nor the least proof that its members will not require the exercise of 
veracity, justice, <fcc. towards each other; and that character which 
results from the practice of such virtues: 

— Certainly the universe is under moral government; and a virtuous 
character must, in Some way, be a condition of happiness in that 
state. 

2. ) We are deficient, and in danger of deviating from what is right. 

— We have desires for outward objects. 

— The times, degrees, <fec. of gratifying these desires, are, of right, sub- 
ject to the control of the moral principle. 

— But that principle neither excites them, nor prevents their being 
excited. 

— They may exist, when they cannot be lawfully gratified, or gratified 
at all. 

— When the desire exists, and the gratification is unlawful, we are 
tempted. 

3. ) The only security is the principle within. 

— The strengthening of this lessens the danger. 

— It may be strengthened, by discipline and exercise. 

. Noting examples. 

. Attending to the right, and not to preference. 

. Considering our true interests. 

— When improved, it becomes, in proportion to its strength, our security 
from the dangers of natural propensions. 

—Virtue, become habitual by discipline, is improved virtue ; and im- 
proved virtue must produce increased happiness, if the government 
of the world is moral. 

4. ) Even creatures made upright may fall. 

— The fall of an upright being, is not accounted for by the nature of 
liberty ; for that would only be saying that an event happened 
because it might happen. 

— But from the very nature of propensions. 

— A finitely perfect being would have propensions corresponding to its 
surroundings; its understanding; and its moral sense ; and all these 
in due proportions. 

— Such a being would have propensions, though the object might not 
be present, or the indulgence might be contrary to its moral sense; 
and this would have some tendency, however small, to induce 
gratification. 

— The tendency would be increased by the frequency of occasions; and 
yet more by the least indulgence, even in thought ; till, under peculiar 
conjunctures, it would become effect. 

• — The first transgression might so utterly disorder the constitution, and 


CONSPECTUS OF THE ANALOGY. 


37 


change the proportions of forces, as to lead to a repetition of irregu- 
larities; and hence to the construction of bad habits, and a depraved 
character. 

5. ) On the contrary, a finitely perfect being may attain higher virtue, and 

more security, by obeying the moral principle. 

— For the danger would lessen, by the increased submissiveness of 
propensions. 

— The moral principle would gain force by exercise. 

6. ) Thus vice is not only criminal, but degrading; and virtue is not only 

right, but improving. 

— The degree of improvement may be such that the danger of sinning 
maj 7 be almost infinitely lessened. 

— Yet the security may always be the habits formed in a state of dis- 
cipline; making such a state altogether fit and necessary. 

7. ) This course of reasoning is vastly stronger when applied to fallen and 

corrupt creatures. 

— The upright need improvement; the fallen must be renewed. 

— Discipline is expedient for the one; necessary for the other; and of a 
severer sort. 

II. The present world is peculiarly fit for such discipline as we need. 

1. Surrounding evils tend to produce moderation, practical knowledge, Ac. 

very different from a mere speculative knowledge of our liability to vice 
and misery. 

2. Our experience in this world, with right views and practice, may leave 

eternal impressions for good. 

3. Every act of self-government in the exercise of virtue, must, from the very 

make of our nature, form habits of virtue, and a more intense virtuous 
principle. 

4. Resolute and persevering resistance to particular and violent temptations, is 

a continued act of virtue, and that in a higher degree than if the seduction 
were transient and weak. 

5. Self-denial is not essential to virtue, but is almost essential to discipline and 

improvement. 

1. ) Because actions materially virtuous, which have no difficulty, but agree 

with our inclinations, may be done merely from inclination, and so not 
be really virtuous. 

2. ) But when they are done in face of danger and difficulty, virtuousness is 

increased, and confirmed into a habit. 

Ohjec. 1. As our intellectual or physical powers may be overtasked, so may our 
moral. 

Ana. This may be so in exceptional cases, but it does not confute the argument. 
In general, it holds good. All that is intended to be proved is, that this 
world is intended to be a state of improvement, and is fitted for it. 

1. ) Some sciences which of themselves are highly improving, require a 

trying measure of attention, which some will not submit to. 

2. ) It is admitted that this world disciplines many to vice: but this vicious- 

ness of many is the very thing which makes the world a virtuous 
discipline to good men. The whole end in placing mankind as they 

4 


38 


CONSPECTUS OP THE ANALOGY. 


are we know not; but these things are evident — the virtues of some 
are exercised : — and so exercised as to be improved : and improved 
beyond what they would be in a perfectly virtuous community. 

3.) That all, or even the generality, do not improve, is no proof that their 
improvement was not intended. Of seeds and animals not one in a 
million comes to perfection ; yet such as do, evidently answer an end 
for which they were designed. The appearance of waste in regard to 
seeds, Ac. is just as unaccountable, as the ruin of moral agents. 

Objec. 2. Rectitude arising from hope and fear, is only the discipline of 
self-love. 

Atis. Obedience is obedience, though prompted by hope or fear : and a course 
of such obedience, forms a habit of it : and distinct habits of various 
virtues, by repressing inclination whenever justice, veracity, Ac. 
require. 

Beside, veracity, justice, regard to God’s authority, and self-interest, are 
coincident; and each, separately, a just principle. To begin a good 
life from either of them, and persist, produces that very character 
which corresponds to our relations to God, and secures happiness. 

Objec. 3. The virtues requisite for a state of afflictions, and produced by it, are 
not wanted to qualify us for a state of happiness. 

Am. Such is not the verdict of experience. Passive submission is essential to 
right character. Prosperity itself begets extravagant desires; and 
imagination may produce as much discontent as actual condition. 
Hence, though we may not need patience in heaven, we shall need that 
temper which is formed by patience. 

Self-love would always coincide with God’s commands, when our interest 
was rightly understood ; but it is liable to error. Therefore, habits of 
resignation are necessary, for all creatures; and the proper discipline 
for resignation is affliction. 

Objec. 4. The trouble and danger of such discipline, might have been avoided 
by making us at once, what we are intended to become. 

Am. What we are to be, is the effect of what we are to do. God’s natural 
government is arranged not to save us from trouble or danger, but to 
enable and incline us to go through them. It is as natural for us to 
seek means to obtain things, as it is to seek the things ; and in worldly 
things we are left to our choice, whether to improve our powers and so 
better our condition, or to neglect improvement and so go without the 
advantage. 

Analogy, therefore, makes the same arrangement credible, as to a future 
state. 

III. This state of discipline may be necessary for the display of 
character. 

1. Not to the all-knowing Being, but to his creation, or part of it, and in many 

ways which we know not. 

2. It may be a means in disposing of men according to character. 

3. And of showing creation that they are so disposed of. 

4. Such display of character certainly contributes, largely, to the general 

course of things considered in this chapter. 


CONSPECTUS OF THE ANALOGY. 


39 


CHAPTER VI. 

OP NECESSITY AS INFLUENCING CONDUCT. 

Fatalists have no right to object to Christianity, for they of course hold 
the doctrine to be compatible with what they see in nature. 

The question is, whether it be not equally compatible with what Chris- 
tianity teaches. 

To argue on the supposition of so great an absurdity as necessity, is puzzling; 
and the obscurity and puzzle of the argument must therefore be excused. 

I. Necessity does not destroy the proof of an intelligent Author and 
Governor of the world. 

1. It does not exclude design and deliberation. 

1. ) This is matter of actual experience and consciousness. 

— Necessity does not account for the existence of any thing, but is only a 
circumstance relating to its origin. Instance the case of a house: 
the fatalist admits that it had a builder, and the only question would 
be, was he obliged to build it as he did ? 

2. ) It is the same as to the construction of the world. To say it exists by 

necessity must mean it had a maker, who acted by necessity: for 
necessity is only an abstract notion, and can do nothing. 

3. ) We say God exists by necessity, because we intuitively discern that there 

must be an infinite Being, prior to all causes; but we cannot say that 
every thing so exists. The fact that many changes in nature are pro- 
duced by man’s contrivance is a proof of this. 

4. ) Thus though the fatalist does not choose to mean by necessity an agent 

acting necessarily, he is obliged to mean this. 

5. ) And it also follows that a thing’s being done by necessity does not exclude 

design. 

2. It does not exclude a belief that we are in a state of religion. 

1. ) Suppose a fatalist to educate a child on his own principles, — viz. : that 

he cannot do otherwise than he does; and is not subject to praise or 
blame. 

(It might be asked, would he, if possessed of common sense, so educate 
his child ?) 

The child would be delighted with his freedom; but would soon prove 

a pest, and go to destruction. 

He would meet with checks and rebuffs, which would teach him that he 

was accountable. 

He would, in the end, be convinced either that his doctrine was wrong, 

or that he had reasoned inconclusively upon it, and misapplied it. 

2. ) To apply fatalism to practice, in any other way, would be found equally 

fallacious : e.g. that he need not take care of his life. 

3. ) No such absurdity follows the doctrine of freedom. 

— Reasoning on this ground is justified by all experience. 

— The constitution of things is as if we were free. 


40 


CONSPECTUS OF TIIE ANALOGY. 


4. ) If the doctrine of necessity be true, and yet, when we apply it to life, 

always misleads us; how, then, can we be sure it would not mislead us 
with respect to future interests? 

5. ) It follows that if there are proofs of religion on the supposition of free- 

dom, they are just as conclusive on the supposition of necessity. 

3. It does not refute the notion that God has a will and a character. 

1. ) It does not hinder us from having a will and a character; from being 

cruel, or benevolent, or just, <fcc. 

2. ) If necessity be plead as the excuse for crime, it equally excuses the 

punishment of crime; for if it destroys the sin of the one, it destroys 
the sin of the other. 

3. ) The very assumption of injustice in punishing crime, shows that we can- 

not rid ourselves of the notion of justice and injustice. 

Objec. If necessity be reconcilable with the character of God, as portrayed in 
Christianity, does it not destroy the proof that he has that character; 
and so destroy the proofs of religion ? 

Ans. No. Happiness and misery are not our fate, hut the results of our con- 
duct. God’s government is that of a father and a magistrate; and his 
natural rule of government must be veracity and justice. We shall 
proceed to show that, 

II. Necessity does not destroy the proofs of religion. 

1. It is a plain fact that God rewards and punishes. 

1. ) He has given us a moral faculty, by which we discern between actions, 

and approve or disapprove, &c. 

2. ) This implies a rule, a peculiar hind of rule ; i.e. one from which we 

cannot depart without being self-condemned. 

3. ) The dictates of our moral faculty are God’s laws, with sanctions. It not 

only raises a sense of duty, but a v sense of security in obeying, and 
danger in disobeying; and this is an explicit sanction. 

4. ) God’s government must conform to the nature he has given us; and we 

must infer that in the upshot happiness will follow virtue, and misery 
vice. 

5. ) Hence religious worship is a duty, if only as a means of keeping up the 

sense of this government. 

6. ) No objection from necessity can lie against this course of proof. 

— The conclusion is wholly and directly from facts ; not from what 
might appear to us to be Jit, but from what his actions tell us he 
wills. 

2. Natural religion has external evidence which necessity, if true, does not 

affect. 

1.) Suppose a person convinced of the truths of natural religion, but 
ignorant of history, and of the present state of mankind, he would 
inquire : 

— How this religion came? 

— How far the belief of it extended? 

— If he found that some one had totally propounded it, as a deduction 
of reason, then, though its evidences from reason would not be im- 
paired, its history would furnish no further proof. 


CONSPECTUS OF THE ANALOGY. 


41 


2. ) But such an one would find, on the contrary, 

— That essentially it had been professed in all countries. 

— And can be traced up through all ages. 

— And was not reasoned out, but revealed. 

3. ) These things are of great weight. 

— Showing natural religion to be conformed to the common sense of 
mankind. 

— And either that it was revealed, or forces itself upon the mind. 

— The rude state of the early ages leads to the belief of its being 
revealed, and such is the opinion of the learned. 

3 . Early pretences to revelation indicate some original real one from which 

they were copied. 

— The history of revelation is as old as history itself. 

— Such a fact is a proof of religion, against which there is no pre- 
sumption. 

— And indicates a revelation prior to the examination of the hook said 
to contain it; and independent of all considerations of its being 
corrupted, or darkened by fables. 

4 . It is thus apparent that the external evidence of religion is considerable; 

and is not affected by the doctrine of necessity. 

REMARKS. 

1. The danger of taking custom, <fcc. for our moral rule. 

1. ) We are all liable to prejudice. 

2. ) Reason may be impaired, perverted, or disregarded. 

3. ) The matter in hand is of infinite moment. 

2. The foregoing observations amount to practical proof. 

Objec. Probabilities which cannot be confuted, may be overbalanced by 
greater probabilities: much more by demonstration. Now, as the 
doctrine of necessity must be true, it cannot be that God governs us 
as if we were free when he knows we are not. 

Aits. This brings the matter to a point, and the answer is not to be evaded, — 
viz.: that the whole constitution and course of things shows this 
reasoning to be false, be the fallacy where it may. 

The doctrine of freedom shows where, — viz. : in supposing ourselves neces- 
sary agents w r hen in fact we are free. 

Admitting the doctrine of necessity, the fallacy evidently lies in denying 
that necessary agents are accountable; for that they are rewarded and 
punished is undeniable. 

Conclusion. — It follows that necessity, if true, neither proves that God will 
not make his creatures happy or miserable according to their conduct, nor 
destroys the proofs that he will do so. That is, necessity, practically, is 
false. 


42 


CONSPECTUS OF TIIE ANALOGY. 


CHAPTER VII. 

DIVINE GOVERNMENT A SCHEME IMPERFECTLY COMPREHENDED. 

Moral government, as a fact, has now been considered; it remains for us 
to remove objections against its wisdom and. goodness. A thing being true 
does not prove it to be good. 

In arguing as to its truth, analogy could only show it to be credible. But, if 
a moral government be admitted as a fact, analogy makes it credible that it is 
a scheme or system, and that man's comprehension of it is necessarily so 
limited, as to be inadequate to determine its injustice. 

This we shall find to be the case. 

Doctrine. On the supposition that God exercises moral government, 

THE ANALOGY OF NATURE TEACHES THAT IT MUST BE A SCHEME, 
AND ONE QUITE BEYOND OUR COMPREHENSION. 

I. The ordering of nature is a scheme ; and makes it credible by 
analogy, that moral government is a scheme. 

1. The parts curiously correspond to each other; individuals to individuals, 

species to species, events to events ; and all these both immediate and 
remote. 

2. This correspondence embraces all the past, and all the future ; including 

all creatures, actions, and events. 

1. ) There is no event, which does not depend for its occurrence on some 

further thing, unknown to us; we cannot give the whole account of 
any one thing. 

2. ) Things apparently the most insignificant, seem to be necessary to others, 

of the greatest importance. 

3. If such is God’s natural government, it is credible that such is his moral 

government. 

1. ) In fact they are so blended as to make one scheme. 

— One is subservient to the other, just as the vegetable kingdom subserves 
the animal, and our animal organization subserves our mental. 

— Every act of God seems to look beyond the occasion, and to have 
reference to a general plan. 

— There is evidently a previous adjustment. 

. The periods, <Stc. for trying men. 

• The instruments of justice. 

. The kinds of retribution. 

2. ) The whole comprises a system, a very small part of which is known to 

us : therefore no objections against any part can be insisted on. 

3. ) This ignorance is universally acknowledged, except in arguing against 

religion. That it ought to be a valid answer to objections against 
religion, we proceed to show. 

— Suppose it to be asserted that all evils might have been prevented by 
repeated interpositions ; or that more good might have been so pro- 
duced ; which would be the utmost that could be said : still, 

— Our ignorance would vindicate religion from any objections arising 
from apparent disorders in the world. 


CONSPECTUS OF THE ANALOGY. 


43 


— The government of the world might be good, even on those supposi- 
tions ; for at most they could but suggest that it might be better. 

— At any rate, they are mere assertions. 

— Instances may be alleged, in things much less out of reach, of supposi- 
tions palpably impossible, which all do not see to be so: nor any, 
at first sight. 

4.) It follows that our ignorance is a satisfactory answer to all objections 
against the divine government. 

— An objection against an act of Providence, no way connected with 
any other thing, as being unjust, could not be answered by our 
ignorance. 

— But when the objection is made against an act related to other and 
unknown acts, then our ignorance is a full answer. 

— Some unknown relation, or unknown impossibility, may render the act 
not only good, but good in the highest degree. 

II. Consider some particular things, in the natural government of 
God , the like of which we may infer , by analogy , to be con- 
tained in his moral government . 

1. No ends are accomplished without means. 

1. ) Often, means very disagreeable bring the most desirable results. 

2. ) Hovr means produce ends, is not learned by reason, but experience. 

3. ) In many cases, before experience, we should have expected contrary 

results. 

4. ) Hence we may infer that those things which are objected against God’s 

moral government, produce good. 

5. ) It is evident that our not seeing how the means work good, or their 

seeming to have an opposite effect, offers no presumption against their 
fitness to work good. 

8.) They may not only be fit, but the only means of ultimate good. 

Objec. Though our capacity of vice and misery may promote virtue, and our 
suffering for sin be better than if we were restrained by force, yet it 
would have been better if evil had not entered the world. 

Ann. It is granted that though sinful acts may produce benefits, to refrain 
from them would produce more. We have curative pains, yet pain is 
not better than health. 

2. Natural government is carried on by general laws. 

1. ) Nature shows that this is best: all the good we enjoy is because there 

are general laws. They enable us to forecast for the procurement of 
good. 

2. ) It may not be possible, by general laws, to prevent all irregularities, or 

remedy them. 

3. ) Direct interpositions might perhaps remedy many disorders arising 

under them, but this would have bad effects. 

— Encouraging improvidence. 

— Leaving us no rule of life. 

— Every interposition would have distant effects : so that we could not 
guess what would be the whole result. 

. If it be replied that those distant effects might also be corrected 
by direct interpositions — this is only talking at random. 


44 


CONSPECTUS OF THE ANALOGY. 


Objec. If we are so ignorant as this whole argument supposes, we are too 
ignorant to understand the proofs of religion. 

Ans. 1 . Total ignorance of a subject precludes argument, but partial ignorance 
does not. We may, in various degrees, know a man’s character, and 
the way he is likely to pursue certain ends ; and yet not know how he 
ought to act to gain those ends. In this case objections to his mode 
of pursuing ends may be answered by our ignorance, though that be 
does act in a certain manner is capable of proof. So we may have 
evidence of God’s character and aims, and yet not be competent judges 
as to his measures. Our ignorance is a good answer to the difficulties 
of religion, but no objection to religion itself. 

Ans. 2. If our ignorance did invalidate the proofs of religion, as well as the 
objections, yet is it undeniable that moral obligations remain un- 
affected by our ignorance of the consequences of obedience or viola- 
tion. The consequences of vice and virtue may not be fully known, 
yet it is credible that they may be such as religion declares : and this 
credibility is an obligation, in point of prudence, to abstain from sin. 

Ans. 3. Our answers to the objections against religion, are not equally valid 
against the proofs of it. 

[Answers rehearsed.] 

Ans. 4. Our answers, though they may be said to be based on our ignorance, 
are really not so, but on what analogy teaches concerning our igno- 
rance, — viz. : that it renders us incompetent judges. They are based 
on experience, and what we do know ; so that to credit religion is to 
trust to experience, and to disregard it is the contrary. 

CONCLUSION. 

1 . The reasoning of the last chapter leads us to regard this life as part of a 

larger plan of things. 

1. ) Whether we are connected with the distant parts of the universe, is 

uncertain; but it is very clear we are connected, more or less, with 
present, past, and future. 

2. ) We are evidently in the midst of a scheme, not fixed but progressive; 

and one equally incomprehensible, whether we regard the present, past, 
or future. 

2. This scheme contains as much that is wonderful as religion does: for 

it certainly would be as wonderful that all nature came into existence 
without a Creator, as that there should be a Creator: and as wonderful 
that the Creator should act without any rule or scheme, as that he should 
act with one ; or that he should act by a bad rule, rather than a righteous 
one. 

3. Our very nature compels us to believe that the will and character of the 

Author of nature, is just and good. 

4. Whatever be his character, he formed the world as it is, and controls it as 

he does, and has assigned us our part and lot. 

5. Irrational creatures act their part, and receive their lot, without reflection; 

but creatures endued with reason, can hardly avoid reflecting whitfier we 
go, and what is the scheme, in the midst of which we find ourselves. 

[Here follows a recapitulation of the book.] 


CONSPECTUS OF THE ANALOGY. 


45 


PART ri. 

CHAPTER I. 

IMPORTANCE OP CHRISTIANITY. 

Every one must admit that we need a revelation. Few, if any, could reason 
out a system, even of natural religion. If they could, there is no probability 
that they would. Such as might, would still feel the want of revelation. To 
say that Christianity is superfluous, is as wild as to say all are happy. 

No exactness in attending to natural religion can make Christianity of small 
importance. 

If Christianity be from God, we must obey, unless we know all his reasons 
for giving it; and also that those reasons no longer exist; at least in our case. 
This we cannot know. 

The importance of Christianity appears if we regard it 

I. As a republication of natural religion. 

I. It gives the moral system of the universe. 

1. ) Free from corruptions ; teaching that 

— Jehovah created all things. 

— governs all things. 

— Virtue is his law. 

— Mankind will be judged according to character. 

2. ) It publishes its facts authoritatively. 

3. ) With vastly more clearness; e.g. the doctrines of a future state: danger 

of sin : efficacy of repentance. 

4. ) With the advantage of a visible church, distinguished from the world by 

peculiar institutions. 

Objec. The perversions of Christianity, and the little good it has done. 

Ails. 1. Natural religion is no less perverted, and has done less good. 

2. The benefits of Christianity are not small. 

3. The evils ascribed to it, are not its effects. Things are to be judged 

by their genuine tendencies. 

4. The light of reason, no more than revelation forces acquiescence. 

5. ) With the additional advantage that every Christian, is bound to instruct 

and persuade others. 

II. As containing truths not discoverable by natural reason. 

1. A mode of salvation for the ruined. 

2. Duties unknown before. 

3. Our relations to the Son and Holy Ghost. 

1. ) Hence the form of baptism. 

2. ) Pious regards to Christ, and the Holy Ghost, based on our relations to 

them. 

4 . The manner of external worship. 


46 


CONSPECTUS OF THE ANALOGY. 


III. The fearful hazard of neglecting Christianity. 

1. Those who think natural religion sufficient, must admit that Christianity is 

highly important. 

2. Our relations to Christ being made known, our religious regard to him is 

an evident obligation. 

3 * These relations being real, there is no reason to think that our neglect of 
behaving suitably to them, will not be attended with the same kind of 
consequences as follow the neglect of duties made known by reason. 

4 . If we are corrupt and depraved, and so unfit for heaven, and if we need 

God’s Holy Spirit to renew our nature, how can it be a slight thing 
whether we make use of the means for obtaining such assistance ? 

5. Thus, if Christianity be either true, or merely credible, it is most rash and 

presumptuous to treat it lightly. 

REMARKS. 

1. The distinction between positive and moral obligations. 

1. ) For moral precepts we can see the reason : for positive we cannot. 

2. ) Moral duties are such prior to command; positive duties are such because 

commanded. 

3. ) The manner in which a duty is made known, does not make it moral or 

positive. 

2. The ground of regarding moral duties as superior to positive. 

1. ) Both have the nature of moral commands. 

2. ) If the two conflict, we must obey the moral. 

— Positive institutions are means to moral ends. 

— Ends are more excellent than means. 

— Obedience to positive institutions, has no value but as proceeding from 
moral principle. 

3. ) Both moral and positive duties are revealed, and so are on a level; but 

the moral law is also interwoven with our very nature, and so its 
precepts must prevail when the two interfere. 

3 . There is less necessity for determining their relative authority, than some 

suppose. 

1.) Though man is disposed to outward and ritual religion, nothing can give 
us acceptance with God, without moral virtue. 

2 ) Scripture always lays stress on moral duties. 

3.) It is a great weakness, though very common, to make light of positive 
institutions, because less important than moral. 

— We are bound to obey all God's commands. 

— A precept, merely positive, admitted to be from God, creates moral 
obligation, in the strictest sense. 

CONCLUSION. 

This account of Christianity shows our great obligation to study the 
Scriptures. 


CONSPECTUS OF THE ANALOGY. 


47 


CHAPTER II. 

PRESUMPTIONS AGAINST A REVELATION, CONSIDERED AS MIRACULOUS. 

Having shown the need of revelation, we now examine the presumptions 
against it. 

The analogy of nature is generally supposed to afford presumptions against 
miracles. 

They are deemed to require stronger evidence than other events. 

I. Analogy furnishes no presumptions against the general scheme of 

Christianity. 

1. It is no presumption against Christianity, that it is not the discovery of 

reason, or of experience. 

2. Nor is it a presumption against Christianity, that it contains things unlike 

the apparent course of nature. 

1. ) We cannot suppose every thing, in the vast universe, to be just like what 

is the course of nature in this little world. 

2. ) Even within the present compass of our knowledge, we see many things 

greatly unlike. 

3. If we choose to call what is unlike our known course of things, miraculous, 

still that does not make it improbable. 

II. There is no presumption against such a revelation, as we should 

now call miraculous, being made, at the beginning of the 
world. 

1. There was then no course of nature, as to this world. 

2. Whether man then received a revelation involves a question not of miracles, 

but of fact. 

3. Creation was a very different exertion of power from that which rides the 

world, now it is made. 

4. Whether the power of forming stopped when man was made; or went on, 

and formed a religion for him, is merely a question as to the degree or 
extent, to which a power was exerted. 

5. There is then no presumption from analogy against supposing man had a 

revelation when created. 

6. All tradition and history teaches that he had, ivhich amounts to a real and 

material proof. 

III. There is no presupiption against miracles, or a miraculous revela- 

tion, after the course of nature was settled. 

1. Such a presumption, requires the adduction of some parallel case. 

2. This would require us to know the history of some other world. 

3. Even then, if drawn from only one other world, the presumption would 

he very precarious. 

To be more particular, 

1. There is a strong presumption against any truth till it is proved — which yet 
is overcome by almost any proof. 


48 


CONSPECTUS OF TI1E ANALOGY. 


— Hence the question of a presumption against miracles, involves only 
the degree of presumption, (not whether the presumption is peculiar 
to miracles,) and whether that degree is such as to render them 
incredible. 

2. If we leave out religion, we are in total darkness as to the cause or circum- 

stances on which the course of nature depends. 

— Five or six thousand years may have given occasion and reasons for 
miraculous interpositions of Providence. 

3. Taking in religion, there are distinct reasons for miracles; to afford 

additional instruction ; to attest the truth of instruction. 

4. Miracles must not be compared with common events, but with uncommon ; 

earthquakes, pestilence, &c. 


CONCLUSION. 

1. There are no analogies to render miracles incredible. 

2. On the contrary, we see good reasons for them. 

3. There are no presumptions against them, peculiar to them, as distinguished 

from other unusual phenomena. 


CHAPTER III. 

OUR INCAPACITY OF JUDGING "WHAT SHOULD BE EXPECTED IN A REVELATION 

FROM GOD. 

Beside the objectors to the evidences of Christianity, there are many who 
object to its nature. They say it is not full enough : has in it foolish things : 
gives rise to superstition: subserves tyranny: is not universally known : not 
well arranged : figurative language, <fec. 

It is granted that if it contained immoralities or contradictions they would 
show it to be false. But other objections against religion, aside from objections 
against its evidences, are frivolous: as will now be shown. 

Let the student look to the force of the proofs, rather than any consequences 
which may be drawn from them. 

I. The Scripture informs us of a scheme of government, in addition 
to the material laws of the ivorld. 

1. If both these schemes, the physical and the moral, coincide and form one 

whole, then our inability to criticise the system of nature, renders it 
credible that we are incompetent to criticise the system of grace. 

2. Nature shows many things we should not have expected, prior to expe- 

rience. 

3. Hence it is altogether likely it would be so in religion. 

4. If a citizen is incompetent to judge of the propriety of the general laws of 

his government, he is equalty incompetent to judge when and how far 
those laws should be suspended, or deviated from. 


CONSPECTUS OF THE ANALOGY. 


49 


II. We are no better judges of how revelation should be imparted. 

Whether to every man, or to some for others; or what mode 
or degree of proof should he given ; or whether the know- 
ledge should be given gradually or suddenly. 

1. We are not able to judge how much new knowledge ought to he given 

by revelation. 

2. Nor how far, nor in what way, God should qualify men to transmit any 

revelation he might make. 

3. Nor whether the evidence should be certain, probable, or doubtful. 

4 . Nor whether all should have the same benefit from it. 

5. Nor whether it should be in writing, or verbal. If it be said that if not, in 

writing it would not have answered its purpose: I ask, what purpose? 
Who knows what purposes would best suit God’s general government? 

6. All which shows it to be absurd to object to particular things in revelation 

as unsuitable. 

III. Hence the only question , concerning the truth of revelation is, 

whether it is a revelation. 

1. No obscurities, &c. could overthrow the authority of a revelation. 

2. It can onlj” be overthrown by nullifying the proofs. 

3. Though the proofs could be shown to be less strong than is affirmed, it still 

should control our conduct. 

IV. Modes of arguing , ivhich are perfectly just , in relation to other 

books , are not so as to the Bible. 

1. We are competent judges of common books, but not of Scripture. 

2. Our only inquiry should be to find out the sense. 

3. In other books, internal improbabilities weaken external proof; but iu 

regard to revelation, we scarcely know what are improbabilities. 

1. ) Those who judge the Scripture by preconceived expectations, will imagine 

they find improbabilities. 

2. ) And so they would by thus judging in natural things. 

— It would seem very improbable, prior to experience, that man should 
be better able to determine the magnitudes and motions of heavenly 
bodies, than he is to determine the causes and cures of disease, which 
much more nearly concerns him. 

— Or that we should sometimes hit upon a thing in an instant, even when 
thinking of something else, which we had been vainly trying to 
discover for years. 

— Or that language should be so liable to abuse, that every man may be 
a deceiver. 

— Or that brute instinct should ever be superior to reason. 

V. Such observations apply to almost all objections to Christianity, 

as distinguished from objections against its evidence. 

For instance, the disorderly manner in which some, in the apostolic age, 
used their miraculous gifts. 

1. This docs not prove the acts not miraculous. 

I) o 


50 


CONSPECTUS OF THE ANALOGY. 


2 . The person having any such gift, would have the same power over it which 

he would have over any other ability, and might pervert it. 

3 . To say why was he not also endued with prudence, to restrain its use, 

is but saying why did not God give a higher degree of miraculous 
endowment? As to which we are not competent judges. 

4 . God does not confer his natural gifts, (memory, eloquence, knowledge, <fcc.) 

only on those who are prudent and make the best use of them. 

5. Nor is worldly instruction, by educators, commonly given in the happiest 

manner. 

VI. There is a resemblance between religion and nature in several 
other respects. 

1. In both, Common and necessary things, are plain; but to “go on to perfec- 

tion” in either, requires exact and laborious study. 

2 . The hinderances to both religious and physical knowledge, are the same 

in kind. A more perfect knowledge may be brought about, 

1. ) By the progress of learning and liberty. 

2. ) By students attending to intimations overlooked by the generality. 

3 . It is not wonderful that our knowledge of Bible truth should be small; for 

the natural world has laid open to inspection, for thousands of years, and 
yet only lately are any great discoveries made. 

4 . Perhaps these scientific discoveries, are to be the means of opening and 

ascertaining Bible truth. 

Objec. The cases are not parallel; for natural knowledge is of no consequence, 
compared to spiritual. 

Ah8. 1. The cases are parallel ; for natural knowledge is as important to 
our natural well-being, as spiritual knowledge is to our spiritual 
well-being. 

Ah8. 2. If the cases were not parallel, there are plenty of other analogies, 
which show that God does not dispense his gifts according to our 
notions of their value. 

Objec. 2. If Christianity be intended for the recovery of men, why not sooner 
introduced, and more widely diffused? 

Ails. The objection is just as strong against the natural sciences. Nay, if the 
light of nature and of revelation are both from the same source, we 
might expect that revelation would have been introduced and diffused 
just as it is. 

1. ) Remedies for disease are known but to a few, or not known at all, nor to 

any without care and study. 

2. ) When proposed by discoverers, they have been treated with derision, and 

the use rejected by thousands whom they might have cured. 

3. ) The best remedies have been used unskilfully, and so made to produce 

more disease. 

4. ) Their benefit may come very slowly. 

5. ) In some cases they may be wholly ineffectual. 

6. ) They maybe so disagreeable that many will not submit to use them, even 

with the prospect of a cure. 

7. ) Sometimes the remedy may be entirely out of reach if we were ready 

to take it. 

All this reasoning may be applied to Christianity. 


CONSPECTUS OF THE ANALOGY. 


51 


YIT. Having obviated all objections to Christianity, from its con- 
taining things we should not have expected, we ivill now 
consider the objections against its morality. 

1. Reason may judge, as to whether revelation contains things contrary to 

justice, and wisdom, &c. as those attributes are taught by natural religion. 
But no such objections are advanced, except such as would equally 
condemn the constitution of nature. 

2. There are indeed particular precepts, to particular persons, which would he 

immoral, but for the precept. The precept changes the nature of the 
action. 

3. None are contrary to immutable morality. We are never commanded to 

cultivate the principles of ingratitude, treachery, &c. 

4r, God may command the taking of life or property because these are his. 

5. The only real difficulty is, that such commands are liable to be perverted by 
the wicked to their own horrid purposes ; and to mislead the weak. But 
such objections do not lie against revelation, as such, but against the very 
notion of religion as a trial. 

G. The sum of the whole is> objections against the scheme of Christianity 
do not affect its truth ; since there are no objections against its morality. 
Hence objections against it, aside from its evidences, are frivolous. Objec- 
tions against the evidence , will be considered in a subsequent chapter, 
[i.e. ch. vii.] 


CHAPTER IV.* 

CHRISTIANITY A SCHEME IMPERFECTLY UNDERSTOOD. 

In the last chapter it was shown that we might expect, beforehand, that a 
revelation would contain strange things, and things liable to great objections. 
This abates the force of such objections, or rather precludes them. 

But it may be said this does not show such objectionable things to be good, 
or credible. 

It was a sufficient answer [ch. vii. part i.] to objections against the course 
of nature, that it was a scheme, imperfectly comprehended. 

If Christianity be a scheme, the like objections admit of a like answer. 

I. Christianity is a scheme, beyond our comprehension. 

1. God’s general plan is to conduct things gradually, so that, finally, every one 

shall receive what he deserves. 

2. Christianity is a particular arrangement, under this general plan : is a part 

of it, and conduces to its completion. 

3. It is itself a complicated and mysterious economy. 

1. ) Its arrangements began from the fall of man. 

2. ) Various dispensations, patriarchal, prophetic, &c. were preparatory to it. 

3. ) At a certain juncture in the condition of the world Jesus Christ came. 


[In studying this chapter, let chap. vii. part i. be kept in view.] 


52 


CONSPECTUS OF THE ANALOGY. 


4. ) The mission of the Holy Ghost was part of this economy. 

5. ) Christ now presides over it, and will establish the church, judge the 

world, give up the kingdom, &c. &c. 

4 . Of course, we can comprehend but little of such a scheme. 

5. We plainly see, from what is revealed, that there is very much unrevealed. 

6. Thus it is evident that we are as little capable of judging as to the whole 

system of religion, as we are as to the whole system of nature. 

II. In both material and spiritual things , means are used to 

accomplish ends. 

1. Hence a thing may seem foolish to us, because we do not know its object 

and end. 

2. Its seeyning foolish to us, is no proof that it is so. 

III. Christianity is carried on by general laws, no less than nature. 

1. Why do we say there are laws of nature f 

1. ) We indeed know some such. But nothing of the laws of many things, e.g. 

• Pestilence. . Storms. . Earthquakes. . Diversities of 
human powers. • Association of ideas. 

2. ) Hence we call many things accidental, which we know are not matters 

of chance, but are subject to general laws. 

3. ) It is a very little way that we can trace things to their general laws. 

4. ) We attribute many things to such laws, only by analogy. 

2. Just for the same reasons, we saj' that miracles comport with God’s general 

laws of wisdom. These laws may be unknown to us; but no more so than 
those by which some die as soon as born, or live to old age, or have 
superior understandings, <tc. 

3* We see no more reason to regard the frame and course of nature as a 
scheme, than we have to regard Christianity as such. 

1. ) If the first is a scheme, then Christianity, if true, would be likely to be 

a scheme. 

2. ) As Christianity is revealed but in part, and is an arrangement to 

accomplish ends, there would of course seem to us, in it, irregularities; 
just as we see in nature. 

3. ) Therefore objections against the one, are answered in the same manner 

as objections against the other. 


Having, in a previous chapter, [ch. iii.,] answered objections to Christianity 
as a matter of fact, and in this, as a general question of wisdom and goodness, 
the next thing is to discuss objections in particular. 

As one of these is directed against the scheme, as just now described, it will 
be considered here. 

Objec. Christianity is a roundabout, and perplexed contrivance; just such as 
men, for want of understanding or power, are obliged to adopt, in 
their designs. 

Ans. 1.) God uses just such complex arrangements in the natural world. The 
mystery is quite as great in nature as in grace. 


CONSPECTUS OF THE ANALOGY. 


53 


2. ) We do not know what are means, and what are ends. 

3. ) The natural world, and its government, are not fixed, but progressive. 

4. ) Great length of time is required in some changes; e.g. animals, vege- 

tables, geological periods; &c. 

5. ) One state of life is a preparation and means for attaining another. 

6. ) Man is impatient, but Jehovah deliberate. 


CHAPTER Y. 

OF A MEDIATOR, AND REDEMPTION BY HIM. 

Nothing in Christianity is so much objected to as the position assigned to 
Christ; yet nothing is more unjust. The whole world exhibits mediation. 

I. Our existence, and all its sa'isfactions, are by the medium of others. 

1. If so in the natural world, why not in the spiritual? 

2. The objection therefore i$ not only against Christ’s mediation, but all 

mediation. 

II. We cannot know all the ends for which God punishes, nor by 

whom he should punish. 

1. Future punishment may be as natural a sequence of sin, as a broken limb 
is of falling from a precipice. 

2* This is not taking punishment out of the hands of God, and giving it to 
nature ; it is only distinguishing ordinary events from miraculous. 

III. In natural providence, God has made provision that the bad 

consequences of actions do not always follow. 

1. We may say God could have prevented all evil. But we see he permits it, 

and has provided relief, and even sometimes perfect remedies for it. 

1. ) Thus the bad consequences of trifling on a precipice may be prevented 

by a friend, if we do not reject his assistance. 

2. ) We may ourselves do much towards preventing the bad consequences of 

our misdeeds. 

3. ) Still more if assisted. 

2. It might have been perfectly just if it were not so; but that it is so, shows 

compassion, as distinguished from goodness. 

3. The course of nature affords many instances of such compassion. 

4 . Thus analogy sanctions an arrangement, by which the ruinous consequences 

of vice or folly may be averted, at least in some cases. 

5. If the consequences of rash and inconsiderate acts, which we scarcely call 

vicious, are often so serious, we may apprehend that the bad consequences 
will be greater, in proportion as the irregularity is greater. 

6 . A dissolute disregard to all religion, if there be a religion, is incomparably 

more reprehensible than the mere neglects, imprudencies, &c. of this life. 

7. As the effects of worldly imprudence and vice are often misery, ruin, and 

even death, no one can say what may be the consequences of blasphemy, 
contempt of God, and final impenitence. 


54 


CONSPECTUS OF THE ANALOGY. 


8. Nor can any one tell, how far the consequences of such great wickedness 

can possibly be prevented, consistently with the eternal rule of right. 

9. Still there would, from analogy, be some hope of room for pardon. 

IV. There is no probability that any thing we could do alone , would 
entirely prevent the effects of our irregularities. 

1. "We do not know all the reasons for punishment, nor why it should be fit 
to remit punishment. 

2* Nor do we know all the consequences of vice, and so should not know how 
to prevent them. 

3. Vice impairs men’s abilities for helping themselves. 

4 . Misconduct makes assistance necessary, which otherwise would not have 

been. Why should not the same things be so, as to our future interests? 

5. In temporal things, behaving well in time to come, does not repair old errors, 

wdiy should it as to future things ? 

6. Were it so in all cases it would be contrary to all our notions of government. 

7. It could not be determined in what degree, or in what cases, it would be 

so, even if we knew it might in some cases. 

8. The efficacy of repentance, as urged in opposition to atonement, is contrary 

to the general sense of mankind ; as shown by the prevalence of pro- 
pitiatory sacrifices. 

V. In this state of apprehension , a iv aliened by the light of nature, 

revelation comes in, and teaches positively, the possibility of 
pardon and safety. 

1. Confirms our fears as to the unprevented consequences of sin. 

2. Declares the world to be in a state of ruin. 

3. That repentance alone will not secure pardon. 

4 . That there is a mode of pardon, by interposition. 

5. That God’s moral government is compassionate, as well as his natural 

government. 

6. That he has provided, by the interposition of a mediator, to save men. 

7. All this seems to put man in a strange state of helpless degradation. But 

it is not Christianity which puts him so. All philosophy and history 
show man to be degraded and corrupt. 

VI. Scripture, in addition to confirming the dim testimony of the 

light of nature , reveals a Christ, as mediator and propitiatory 
sacrifice. 

1* He is “that prophet.” 

1. ) Declared the will of God. 

2. ) Published anew the law of nature. 

3. ) Taught with authority. 

4. ) Revealed the right manner of worship, 

5. ) Revealed the exact use of repentance. 

6. ) Revealed future rewards and punishments. 

7. ) Set us a perfect example. 


CONSPECTUS OF TIIE ANALOGY. 


55 


2. lie has a kingdom which is not of this world. 

1. ) Founded a church. 

2. ) Governs it. 

3. ) Of it, all who obey him are members. 

4. ) Each of these shall live and reign with him forever. 

3 . He is a propitiatory sacrifice. 

1. ) How his sacrifice becomes efficacious, we are not exactly told. 

2. ) Conjectures may be absurd ; at least cannot be certain. 

3. ) If any complain for want of further instruction, let him produce his 

claim to it. 

4. ) Some, because they cannot explain, leave it out of their creed; and 

regard Christ only as a teacher. 

5. ) We had better accept the benefit, without disputing about how it was 

procured. 

VII. We are not judges, antecedent to revelation , whether a mediator 

icas necessary, nor what should be the whole nature of his 
office. 

1. We know not how future punishment would have been inflicted. 

2 . Nor all the reasons why it would be necessary. 

3 . The satisfaction by Christ, does not represent God as indifferent whether 

he punishes the innocent or guilty. 

1. ) We see, in this world, the innocent forced to suffer for the faults of 

the guilty. 

2. ) But Christ suffered voluntarily. 

4 . Though, finally, every one shall receive according to his own deserts; 

yet, during the progress of God’s scheme, vicarious sufferings may be 
necessary. 

1. ) God commands us to assist others, though in many cases it costs us 

suffering and toil. 

2. ) One person’s sufferings often tend to relieve another. 

5. Vicarious atonement for sinners, serves to vindicate the authority of God’s 

laws, aaid to deter men from sin. 

6. Objections to vicarious suffering are obviously not objections to Christianity, 

but to the whole course of nature. 

7. The objection, therefore, amounts to nothing more than saying that a 

divine arrangement is not necessary, or fit, because the objector does 
not see it to be so ; though he must own he is no judge, and could not 
understand why it should be necessary, if it were so ! 

VIII. We have no reason to expect the same information touching 

God's conduct, as we have in relation to our own duty. 

1. God instructs us by experience. 

2 . This experience, though sufficient for our purposes, is an infinitely small 

part of his providence. 

3 . The things not understood involve God’s appointment, and Christ’s exe- 

cution ; but what is required of us, we are clearly informed. 

4 . Even the reasons for Christian precepts are made obvious. 


56 


CONSPECTUS OF THE ANALOGY. 


CHAPTER YI. 

STJPrOSED LACK OF PROOF OF REVELATION, AND ITS WANT OF UNIVERSALITY. 

It has been thought to be a positive argument against revelation, that its 
evidences are not adequate, and that it is not universally known and believed. 

But the argument amounts to just this, that God would not bestow on us any 
favor, except in such a mode and degree as we thought best, and did exactly 
the same for everybody else. 

Such a notion, all analogy contradicts. 

I. Men act in their most important concerns on doubtful evidence. 

1. It is often absolutely impossible to say which of two modes of acting will 

give most pleasure or profit. 

2. If it were possible, we cannot know what changes temper, satiety, ill 

health, &c. might produce, so as to destroy our pleasure. 

3. We cannot foresee what accidents may cut it all off. 

4. Strong objections and difficulties may attach to the course of action we 

adopt, which yet all would admit ought not to deter us. 

5. We may, after all, be deceived by appearances, or by our passions, &c. 

G. Men think it reasonable to engage in pursuit of advantage, even when the 
probabilities of success are against them. 

II. As to the light of Christianity not being universal. 

1. Temporal good is enjoyed in very different degrees even among creatures 

of the same species. 

2. Yet it is certain that God governs. 

3. We may prudently or imprudently use our good things. 

4. The Jewish religion was not universal. 

5. If it be intended that Christianity should be a small light, shining in a 

great and wide-spread darkness, it would be perfectly uniform with 
other parts of God’s providence. 

G. If some have Christianity so corrupted, and interpolated, as to cause 
thoughtful persons to doubt it, as is the case in some countries ; and if, 
where it is the purest, some learn much less from it than they might, there 
are manifest parallels in God’s natural dispensations. 

7. No more is expected of any one, than is equitable under his circumstances. 

8. Every one is hound to get rid of his ignorance, as far as he can, and to 

instruct his neighbor. 

9. If revelation were universal, in extent and degree, different understandings, 

educations, tempers, length of lives, and outward advantages, would soon 
make the knowledge of it as different as it is at present. 

III. Practical reflections. 

First. That the evidence of religion is not such as unavoidably to convince all, 
may be part of our probation. 

I. It gives scope for a wise or vicious use of our understanding. Just as is 
the case in common affairs. 


CONSPECTUS OE THE ANALOGY. 


57 


2. Intellectual inattention to so serious a matter, is as immoral, as disobe- 
dience after conviction of the truth. 

Secondly. If the evidence is really doubtful, it puts us on probation. 

1. If a man were in doubt whether a certain person had done him the greatest 

favor, or whether his whole temporal interest depended on him, he ought 
not to regard that person as he would if there were no reason to think so. 

2. So if there is only reason to apprehend that Christianity may be true, we 

are as much bound to examine, &c. as we would be bound to obey, if we 
knew it was true. 

3. Considering the infinite importance of religion, there is not much differ- 

ence as to what ought to be the mode of life of those who are convinced 
and those who doubt its truth. Their hopes and fears are the same in 
kind, though not in degree; and so their obligations are much the same. 

4. Doubts presuppose some evidence, belief more, and certainty more still. 

Each state should influence our conduct, and does so, in common things. 

5. It shows a mental defect not to see evidence unless it is glaring; and a 

corrupt heart not to be influenced by it unless overpowering. 

Thirdly. Difficulties as to believing religion, are no more a ground of complaint, 
than difficulties in practising it. 

1. They constitute a wholesome discipline. 

1. ) In allowing an unfair mind to deceive itself. 

2. ) In requiring belief and the practice of virtue under some uncertainties. 

2. In the case of some minds, speculative difficulties as to the evidence of 

religion is the principal trial. A full conviction of its truth would 
constrain some to obedience. 

Fourthly. The difficulties may be in the objector rather than in the religion. 

1. Not sufficiently in earnest to be informed. 

2. Secretly wishes religion not to be true. 

3. Looks at objections rather than replies. 

4. Treats the subject ludicrously. 

Fifthly. The proof of Christianity is level to common men. 

1. They are capable of being convinced of the existence of God, and of their 

moral accountability. 

2. And they can understand the evidence of miracles, and the fulfilment of 

prophecy. 

3. If they are capable of seeing the difficulty, they are capable of understand- 

ing the proof. 

4. If they pick up objections from hearsay, and will not or cannot examine 

them thoroughly, they must remain ignorant, just as they do as to the 
sciences. 

Objec. Our directions should be too plain to admit of doubt; like those of an 
earthly master. 

Ans. The earthly master only wants his work done, and is careless as to the 
state of the heart; but as the whole of morality consists in the state of 
the heart, the cases are not parallel. 

Finally. The credibility of our being in a state of probation is just as great 
as the credibility of there being any religion. Our probation may 
be whether we choose to inform ourselves as to our duty, and then 
whether we choose to do it. 


58 


CONSPECTUS OF THE ANALOGY. 


Such is exactly the case as to temporal matters. To discern what is 
best often requires difficult consideration, and yet leaves doubts : 
and not reflecting carefully, or not acting even when there may 
be doubt, is often fatal. 


CHAPTER VII. 

POSITIVE EVIDENCES OF CHRISTIANITY. 

Having considered the objections both to the general scheme of Christianity, 
and to particular doctrines in it, it only remains to consider the positive evi- 
dence of its truth ; i.e. what analogy teaches with regard to that evidence. 

There are many evidences of Christianity, beside those from miracles or 
prophecy, which are the principal; embracing a great variety of proofs, direct 
and collateral, and reaching through all past time. We shall now consider 
the proofs from miracles and prophecy. 

I. Miracles. 

1. Bible history gives the same evidence for the miracles described, as for 

common events. 

1. ) The miracles are evidently not put in for ornament, as speeches are by 

historians and poets put into the mouths of heroes. 

2. ) The accounts of them have been quoted as genuine, by various writers, 

from that day to this. , 

3. ) These accounts are confirmed by subsequent events; and the miracles 

alone, can account for those events. 

4. ) The only fair way of accounting for these statements, and their reception 

in the world, is that the things really happened. 

5. ) The statements should be admitted till disproved, even if doubtful. 

2. Paul’s Epistles have evidences of genuineness, beyond what can attach to 

mere history. 

1. ) Additional. Ilis evidence is quite detached. He received the gospel not 

in common with the other apostles, but separately, and direct from 
Christ, after his ascension. 

2. ) Peculiar. He speaks of Christ’s miracles and those of others incidentalli/, 

as familiar facts, fully believed by those to whom he wrote. 

3 . Christianity demands credence on the ground of its miracles, and was so 

received by great numbers, at the time and on the spot; which is the 
case with no other religion. 

1. ) Its first converts embraced it on this ground. 

2. ) It is not conceivable that the} 7 would have dono so, at such fearful 

sacrifice, unless fully satisfied of the truth of these miracles. 

3. ) Such a profession and sacrifices furnish the same kind of evidence as 

if they had testified to the truth of the miracles in writing. 

4. ) It is real evidence, for they had full opportunity to inform themselves. 

5. ) It is a sort of evidence distinct from direct history, though of the same 

nature. 


CONSPECTUS OF TIIE ANALOGY. 


59 


6.) Men are suspicious as well as credulous, and slow to believe against their 
interests, as these did. 

4. It lies upon unbelievers to show why all this array of proof is to be 
rejected ; but in such an important concern we shall proceed to notice 
some possible objections. 

Ohjec. 1. Enthusiasts make similar sacrifices for idle follies. 

An8. 1. This objection ignores the distinction between opinions and facts. 

Suffering for an opinion is no proof of its truth ; but in attestation 
of observed facts, it is proof. 

2. Enthusiasm weakens testimony, it is true, even as to facts ; and so does 

disease, in particular instances. But when great numbers, not weak, 
nor negligent, affirm that they saw and heard certain things, it is the 
fullest evidence. 

3. To reject testimony on the ground of enthusiasm, requires that the 

things testified be incredible; which has not been shown, as to 
religion, but the contrary. 

4. Religion is not the only thing in regard to which witnesses are liable 

to enthusiasm. In common matters, we get at the truth through 
witnesses, though influenced by party spirit, custom, humor, 
romance, &c. &c. 

Ohjec. 2. Enthusiasm and knavery may have been combined in the apostles 
and first Christians. 

Ans. Such a mixture is often seen, and is often reproved in Scripture; but not 
more in religious than in common affairs. Men in all matters deceive 
themselves and others, in every degree, yet human testimony is good 
ground of belief. 

Ohjec. 3. Men have been deluded by false miracles. 

Ans. Not oftener than by other pretences. 

Ohjec. 4. Fabulous miracles have historical evidence. 

Ans. 1. If this were equal to that for Scripture miracles, the evidence for the 
latter would not be impaired. The objection really amounts to this, 
that evidence proved not to be good, destroys evidence which is good 
and unconfuted ! Or to this, that if two men, of equal reputation, 
testify, in cases not related to each other, and one is proved false, the 
other must not be believed ! 

2. Nothing camrebut testimony, but proof that the witness is incompetent, 

or misled. 

3. Against all such objections must be set the fact that Christianity was 

too serious a matter to allow the first converts to be careless as to its 
evidence; and also that their religion forbid them to deceive others. 

' II. As to the evidence from prophecy. 

1. Obscurity as to part of a prophecy does not invalidate it, but is, as to us, as 

if that part were not written, or were lost. We may not see the whole 
prophecy fulfilled, and yet see enough fulfilled to perceive in it more 
than human foresight. 

2. A long series of prophecies, all applicable to certain events, is proof that 

such events were intended. This answers the objection that particular 
prophecies were not intended to be applied as Christians apply them. 


60 


CONSPECTUS OP THE ANALOGY. 


Mythological arid satirical writings greatly resemble prophecy. Now we 
apply a parable, or fable, or satire, merely from seeing it cajjable of such 
application. 

So if a long series of prophecies be applicable to the present state of the 
world, or to the coming of Christ, it is proof that they were so intended. 

Besides, the ancient Jews, before Christ, applied the prophecies to him, just 
as Christians do now. 

3. If it could be shown that the prophets did not understand their own pre- 
dictions, or that their prophecies are capable of being applied to other 
events than those to which Christians apply them, it would not abate the 
force of the argument from prophecy, even with regard to those instances. 
For, 

1. ) To know the whole meaning of an author we must know the whole 

meaning of his book, but knowing the meaning of a book is not 
knowing the whole mind of the author. 

2. ) If the book is a compilation, the authors may have meanings deeper 

than the compiler saw. If the prophets spoke by inspiration, they are 
not the authors, but the writers of prophecy, and may not have known 
all that the Divine Spirit intended. But the fulfilment of the prophecy 
shows a foresight more than human. 

REMARK. 

This whole argument is just and real; but it is not expected that those will 
be satisfied who will not submit to the perplexity and labor of understanding 
it; or who have not modesty and fairness enough to allow an argument its due 
weight; or who wilfully discard the whole investigation. 


We now proceed to the general argument embracing both direct and cir- 
cumstantial evidence. A full discussion would require a volume, and cannot 
be expected here ; but something should be said, especially as most questions 
of difficulty, in practical affairs, are settled by evidence arising from circum- 
stances which confirm each other. 

The thing asserted is that God has given us a revelation declaring himself 
to be a moral governor; stating his system of government; and disclosing a 
plan for the recovery of mankind out of sin, and raising them to perfect and 
final happiness. 

I. Consider this revelation as a history. 

I. It furnishes an account of the world, as God’s world. 

1. ) God's providence, commands, promises, and threatenings. 

2. ) Distinguishes God from idols. 

3. ) Describes the condition of religion and of its professors, in a world 

considered as apostate and wicked. 

4. ) Political events are related as affecting religion, and not for their 

importance as mere political events. 

5. ) The history is continued by prophecy, to the end of the world. 

‘Z-, It embraces a vast variety of other topics; natural and moral. 


CONSPECTUS OF TIIE ANALOGY 


61 


1. ) Thus furnishing the largest scope for criticism. • 

2. ) So that doubts of its truth confirm that truth, for in this enlightened age, 

the claims of a book of such a nature could bo easily and finally shown 
to be false, if they were so. 

3. ) None who believe in natural religion, hold that Christianity has been 

thus confuted. 

3 . It contains a minute account of God’s selecting one nation for his peculiar 

people, and of his dealings with them. 

1. ) Interpositions in their behalf. 

2. ) Threats of dispersion, &c. if they rebelled. 

3. ) Promises of a Messiah as their prince ; so clearly as to raise a general 

expectation, &c. 

4. ) Foretelling his rejection by them, and that he should be the Savior of 

the Gentiles. 

4 . Describes minutely the arrival of the Messiah, and his life and labors; and 

the result, in the establishment of a new religion. 

II. As to the authenticity of this history. 

Suppose a person ignorant of all history but the Bible, and not knowing 
even that to be true, were to inquire into its evidence of authenticity, he 
would find, 

1. That natural religion owes its establishment to the truths contained in this 

book. This no more disproves natural religion, than our learning a 
proposition from Euclid, shows that the proposition was not true before 
Euclid. 

2. The great antiquity of revelation. 

3 . That its chronology is not contradicted but confirmed by known facts. 

4 :. That there is nothing in the history itself to awaken suspicion of its 
fidelity. 

1. ) Every thing said to be done in any age or country, is conformable to the 

manners of that age and country. 

2. ) The characters are all perfectly natural. 

3. ) All the domestic and political incidents are credible. Some of these, 

taken alone, seem sti'ange to some, in this day; but not more so than 
things now occurring. 

4. ) Transcribers may have made errors, but these are not more numerous 

than in other ancient books; and none of them impair the narrative. 

5 . That profane authors confirm Scripture accounts. 

G. That the credibility of the general history, confirms the accounts of the 
miracles, for they are all interwoven, and make but one statement. 

7. That there certainly was and is such a people as the Jews ; whose form of 

government was founded on these very books of Moses; and whose 
acknowledgment of the God of the Bible, kept them a distinct race. 

8. That one Jesus, of Jewish extraction, arose at the time when the Jews 

expected a Messiah, was rejected by them, as was prophesied, and was 
received by the Gentiles, as was prophesied. 

9. That the religion of this Jesus spread till it became the religion of the 

world, notwithstanding every sort of resistance; and has cjntinuea till 


now. 


6 


62 


CONSPECTUS OF THE ANALOGY. 


10 . That the Jewish government was destroyed, and the people dispersed into 
all lands; and still for many centuries, continue to be a distinct race, 
professing the law of Moses. If this separateness be accounted for, in 
any way, it does not destroy the fact that it was predicted. 

CONCLUSION. 

1. Recapitulation of the preceding ten observations. 

2. Add the fact that there are obvious appearances in the •world, aside from 

the Jews, which correspond to prophetic history. 

3 . These appearances, compared with Bible history, and with each other, in 

a joint view, will appear to be of great weight, and would impress one 
who regarded them for the first time, more than they do us who have 
been familiar with them. 

4 . The preceding discussion, though not thorough, amounts to proof of some- 

thing more than human in this matter. 

1. ) The sufficiency of these proofs may be denied, but the existence of them 

cannot be. 

2. ) The conformity of prophecies to events may be said to be accidental, but 

the conformity itself cannot be denied. 

3. ) These collateral proofs may be pronounced fanciful, but it cannot be said 

they are nothing. Probabilities may not amount to demonstration, but 
they remain probabilities. 

5. Those who will set down all seeming completions of prophecy, and judge 

of them by the common rules of evidence, will find that together they 
amount to strong proof. Because probable proofs, added together, not 
only increase evidence, but multiply it. 

6. It is very well to observe objections; but it should be remembered that a 

mistake on one side is far more dangerous than a mistake on the other; 
and the safest conclusion is the best. 

7 . Religion, like other things, is to be judged by all the evidence taken 

together. Unless all its proofs be overthrown, it remains proved. If 
no proof singly were sufficient, the whole taken together might be. 

8. It is much easier to start an objection, than to comprehend the united force 

of a whole argument. 

9 . Thus it appears that the positive evidence of revelation cannot be destroyed, 

though it should be lessened. 


CHAPTER VIII. 

OBJECTIONS against the analogical argument. 

If all made up their minds with proper care and candor, there would be no 
need of this chapter. But some do not try to understand what they condemn : 
and our mode of argument is open to objections, especially in the minds of 
those who judge without thinking. The chief objections will therefore be con- 
sidered. They are these : — it does not solve difficulties in revelation to say 
that there are as great in natural religion: — it will not make men religious to 


CONSPECTUS OF THE ANALOGY. 


63 


show them that it is as important as worldly prudence, for showing that, does 
not make them prudent: — the justice of God in the system of religion, is not 
proved by showing it is as apparent as in his natural providence: — no reason- 
ing from analogy can carry full conviction: — mankind will not renounce pre- 
sent pleasures, for a religion which is not free from doubt. To each of which 
a reply will now be given. 

I. to requiring a solution of all difficulties 

1. This is but resolving to comprehend the nature of God, and the whole plan 

of his government throughout eternity. 

2. It is always right to argue from what is known, to what is disputed. We 

are constantly so doing. The most eminent phj'sician does not understand 
all diseases, yet we do not despise what he does know. 

3. It is very important to find that objections against revelation are just as 

strong, not only against natural religion, but against the course of nature. 

II. As to men's having as little reason for worldly pursuits , as they 

have for being religious. 

1. If men can be convinced that they have as much reason to be religious as 

they have to practise worldly prudence, then there is a reason for being 
religious. 

2. If religion proposes greater than worldly interests, and has the same reasons 

for belief, then it has proportionally a greater claim. 

3* If religion being left doubtful, proves it to be false, then doubts as to the 
success of any worldly pursuit show it to be wrong. Yet we constantly 
act, even in the most important affairs, without.cfirtamty of being right. 

III. As to the justice and goodness of God in religion. 

1. Our business is not to vindicate God, but to learn our duty, governed as we 

are; which is a very different thing. It has been shown that if we knew 
all things, present, past, and future, and the relations of each thing to all 
other things, we might see to be just and good what now do not seem so : 
and it is probable we should. 

2. We do not say that objections against God’s justice and goodness are 

removed by showing the like objections against natural providence, but 
that they are not conclusive, because they apply equally to what we know 
to be facts. 

3. The existence of objections does not destroy the evidence of facts. The 

fact for instance that God rewards and punishes, though men may think 
it unjust. Even necessity, plead for human acts, does no more to abolish 
justice than it does injustice. 

4. Though the reasonableness of Christianity cannot be shown from analogy, 

the truth of it may. The truth of a fact may be proved without regard 
to its quality. The reasonableness of obeying Christianity is proved, 
if we barely prove Christianity itself to be possible. 

5. Though analogy may not show Christian precepts to be good, it proves 

them to be credible. 


64 


CONSPECTUS OF THE ANALOGY. 


IV. The analogical argument does not remove doubt. 

1. What opinion does any man hold, about which there can be no doubt? 

Even the best way of preserving and enjoying this life, is not agreed 
upon. Whether our measures will accomplish our objects, is always 
uncertain; and still more whether the objects, if accomplished, will 
give us happiness. Yet men do not on this account refuse to make 
exertion. 

2. This objection overlooks the very nature of religion. The embracing of it 

presupposes a certain degree of candor and integrity, to try which, and 
exercise, and improve it, is its intention. Just as warning a man of 
danger, presupposes a disposition to avoid danger. 

3. Religion is a probation, and has evidence enough as such; and would not 

be such, if it compelled assent. 

4. W r e never mean by sufficient evidence, such an amount as necessarily 

determines a man to act, but only such as will show an action to be 
prudent 

V. As to the small influence of the analogical argument. 

1. As just observed, religion is a test, and an exercise, of character; and that 

some reject it is nothing to our purpose. We are inquiring not what sort 
of creature man is, but what he should be. This is each man’s own 
concern. 

2. Religion, as a probation, accomplishes its end, whether individuals believe 

or not. 

3. Even this objection admits that religion has some weight, and of course 

it should have some influence; and if so, there is the same reason, 
though not so strong, for publishing it, that there would be, if it were 
likely to have greater influence. 

EtTRTiiER. It must be considered that the reasoning in this treatise is on the 
principles of other men, and arguments of the utmost importance are omitted, 
because not universally admitted. Thus as to Fatalism, and the abstract fitness 
or unfitness of actions. The general argument is just a question of fact, and 
is here so treated. Abstract truths are usually advanced as proof ; but in this 
work, only facts are adduced. That the three angles of a triangle are equal to 
two right angles, is an abstract truth : but that they so appear to us, is only 
a matter of fact. That there is such a thing as abstract right and wrong, which 
determines the will of God in rewarding and punishing, is an assertion of an 
abstract truth, as well as a fact. Suppose God in this world rewarded and 
punished every man exactly as he obeyed or disobeyed his conscience, this 
would not be an abstract truth, but a fact. And if all acknowledged this as a 
fact, all would not see it to be right. If, instead of his doing it now, we say 
he will do it hereafter, this too is not an abstract truth, but a question of fact. 
This fact, could be fully proved on the abstract principles of moral fitness; but 
without them, there has now been given a conclusive practical proof ; which 
though it may be cavilled at, and shown not to amount to demonstration, cannot 
be answered. 


CONSPECTUS OF THE ANALOGY. 


65 


Hence it may be said as to the force of this treatise, 

1. To such as are convinced of the truth of revelation, as proved on the 

principles of liberty and moral fitness, it will furnish a full confirmation. 
To such as do not admit those principles it is an original proof. 

2. Those who believe will find objections removed, and those who disbelieve 

will find the}’’ have no grounds for their scepticism ; and a good deal 
beside. 

3. Thus though some may think too much is here made of analogy, yet there 

can be no denying that the argument is real. It confirms all facts to 
which it can be applied; and of many is the only proof. It is strong 
on the side of religion, and ought to be regarded by such as prefer facts 
to abstract reasonings. 

CONCLUSION. 

Recapitulates the general structure and design of the argument, the classes 
of persons for whose benefit it is particularly adopted, and declares those who 
reject Christianity to be wholly without excuse. 






/ 


JJtotrtisftntnt to % .first €bitton. 


If the reader should here meet with any thing which he had not 
before attended to, it will not be in the observations upon the consti- 
tution and course of nature, these being all obvious, but in the appli- 
cation of them ; in which, though there is nothing but what appears 
to me of some real weight, and therefore of great importance, yet he 
will observe several things, which will appear to him of very little, 
if he can think things to be of little importance, which are of any 
real weight at all, upon such a subject of religion. However, the 
proper force of the following treatise lies in the whole general analogy 
considered together. 

/ It is come, I know not how to be taken for granted, by many 

/ 

f persons, that Christianity is not sv. much as a subject of inquiry; 
but that it is, now at length, discovered to be fictitious.) Accordingly 
they treat it, as if, in the present age, this were an agreed point 

N among all people of discernment ; and nothing remained, but to set 
it up as a principal subject of mirth and ridicule, as it were by way 
of reprisals, for its having so long interrupted the pleasures of the 
world. On the contrary, thus much at least, will be here found, not 
taken for granted but proved, that any reasonable man, who will 
thoroughly consider the matter, may be as much assured, as he is 
of his own being, that it is not so clear a case, that there is nothing 
in it. There is, I think, strong evidence of its truth ; but it is certain 
no one can, upon principles of reason, be satisfied of the contrary. 
The practical consequence to be drawn from this, is not attended to 
by every one who is concerned in it. 

May, 1736 . 


66 


INTRODUCTION. 


Probable evidence is essentially distinguished from demon- 
strative by this, that it admits of degrees ; and of all variety of 
them, from the highest moral certainty, to the very lowest pre- 
sumption. We cannot indeed say a thing is probably true upon 
one very slight presumption for it; because, as there may be pro- 
babilities on both sides of a question, there may be some against 
it ; and though there be not, yet a slight presumption does not 
beget that degree of conviction, which is hn plied in saying a 
thing is probably true. But that the slightest possible presump- 
tion is of the nature of a probability, appears from hence; that 
such low presumption, often repeated, will amount even to moral 
certainty. Thus a man’s having observed the ebb and flow of 
the tide to-day, affords some sort of presumption, though the 
lowest imaginable, that it may happen again to-morrow : but the 
observation of this event for so many days, and months, and ages 
together, as it has been observed by mankind, gives us a full 
assurance that it will. 

That which chiefly constitutes probability is expressed in the 
word likely , i.e. like some truth,* or true event; like it, in itself, 
in its evidence, in some (more or fewer) of its circumstances. a For 
when we determine a thing to be probably true, suppose that an 
event has or will come to pass, it is from the mind’s remarking 
in it a likeness to some other event, which we have observed has 
come to pass. This observation forms, in numberless daily in- 
stances, a presumption, opinion, or full conviction, that such 
event has or will come to pass; according as the observation is, 
that the like event has sometimes, most commonly, or always, so 

* Verisimile. 

a [These three ways of being “like,” are very distinct from each other. The 
first is equivalent to a logical induction. The second produces belief, because 
the same evidence made us believe in a similar case. The third is just an 
analogy, in the popular sense of the term.] 


67 


G8 


INTRODUCTION 


far as our observation reaches, come to pass at like distances of 
time, or place, or upon like occasions. Hence arises the belief, 
that a child, if it lives twenty years, will grow up to the stature 
and strength of a man ; that food will contribute to the preserva- 
tion of its life, and the want of it for such a number of days, be 
its certain destruction. So likewise the rule and measure of our 
hopes and fears concerning the success of our pursuits ; our ex- 
pectations that others will act so and so in such circumstances; 
and our judgment that such actions proceed from such principles; 
all these rely upon our having observed the like to what we hope, 
fear, expect, judge ; I say, upon our having observed the like, 
either with respect to others or ourselves. Thus, the prince* 
who had always lived in a warm climate, naturally concluded in 
the way of analogy, that there was no such thing as water’s be- 
coming hard, because he had always observed it to be fluid and 
yielding. We, on the contrary, from analogy conclude, that there 
is no presumption at all against this : that it is supposable there 
may be frost in England any given day in January next; pro- 
bable that there will on some day of the month ; and that there 
is a moral certainty, i.e. ground for an expectation without any 
doubt of it, in some part or other of the winter. 

Probable evidence, in its very nature, affords but an imperfect 
kind of information ; and is to be considered as relative only to 
beings of limited capacities. For nothing which is the possible 
object of knowledge, whether past, present, or future, can be pro- 
bable to an infinite intelligence; since it cannot but be discerned 
absolutely as it is in itself, certainly true, or certainly false. But 
to us, probability is the very guide of life. 

From these things it follows, that in questions of difficulty, or 
such as are thought so, where more satisfactory evidence cannot 
be had, or is not seen ; if the result of examination be, that there 
appears upon the whole, any even the lowest presumption on one 
side, and none on the other, or a greater presumption on one side, 
though in the lowest degree greater; this determines the ques- 
tion, even in matters of speculation. In matters of practice, it 
will lay us under an absolute and formal obligation, in point of 
prudence and of interest, to act upon that presumption or low 
probability, though it be so low as to leave the mind in very great 
* The story is told by Mr. Locke in the Chapter of Probability. 


BY THE AUTHOR. 


69 


doubt which is the truth. For surely a man is as really bound 
in prudence to do what upon the whole, according to the best of 
his judgment, appears to be for his happiness, 1 * as what he cer- 
tainly knows to be so. 

Further, in questions of great consequence, a reasonable man 
will think it concerns him to remark lower probabilities and pre- 
sumptions than these ; such as amount to no more than showing 
one side of a question to be as supposable and credible as the 
other : nay, such even as but amount to much less than this. 
For numberless instances might be mentioned respecting the com- 
mon pursuits of life, where a man would be thought, in a literal 
sense, distracted, who would not act, and with great application 
too, not only upon an even chance, but upon much less, and 
where the probability or chance was greatly against his suc- 
ceeding.* 

It is not my design to inquire further into the nature, the 
foundation, and measure of probability; or whence it proceeds 
that likeness should beget that presumption, opinion, and full 
conviction, which the human mind is formed to receive from it, 
and which it does necessarily produce in every one; or to guard 
against the errors, to which reasoning from analogy is liable. 
This belongs to the subject of Logic ; and is a part of that sub- 
ject which has not yet been thoroughly considered. Indeed I 
shall not tal*e upon me to say, how far the extent, compass, and 
force, of analogical reasoning, can be reduced to general heads 
and rules ; and the whole be formed into a system. But though 
so little in this way has been attempted by those who have treated 
of our intellectual powers, and the exercise of them ; this does 
not hinder but that we may be, as we unquestionably are, assured, 
that analogy is of weight, in various degrees, towards determin- 
ing our judgment and our practice. Nor does it in any wise 
cease to be of weight in those cases, because persons, either given 
to dispute, or who require things to be stated with greater exact- 

b [This is good common sense, and men always act thus if prudent. But it 
is not enough thus to act in the matter of salvation. “ He that believeth not 
shall be damned:” Mark xvi. 16. “He that believeth hath everlasting life:” 
John iii. 36. “ With the heart man believetli unto righteousness :” Rom. x. 10. 

Belief is part of the sinner’s duty in submitting himself to God ; and not merely 
a question of prudence.] 

* See Part II. chap. vi. 


70 


INTRODUCTION 


ness than our faculties appear to admit of in practical matters, 
may find other cases in which it is not easy to say, whether it be, 
or be not, of any weight; or instances of seeming analogies, 
which are really of none. It is enough to the present purpose to 
observe, that this general way of arguing is evidently natural, 
just, and conclusive. For there is no man can make a question 
but that the sun will rise to-morrow, and be seen, where it is seen 
at all, in the figure of a circle, and not in that of a square. 

Hence, namely from analogical reasoning, Origen* has with 
singular sagacity observed, that “ he who believes the Scripture 
to have proceeded from him who is the Author of nature , may 
well expect to find the same sort of difficulties in it, as are found 
in the constitution of nature” And in a like way of reflection 
it may be added, that he who denies the Scripture to have been 
from God upon account of these difficulties, may, for the very 
same reason, deny the world to have been formed by him. On 
the other hand, if there be an analogy or likeness between that 
system of things and dispensation of Providence, which revela- 
tion informs us of, and that system of things and dispensation of 
Providence, which experience together with reason informs us 
of, i.e. the known course of nature; this is a presumption, that 
they have both the same author and cause ; at least so far as to 
answer objections against the former’s being from God, drawn 
from any thing which is analogical or similar to what is in the 
latter, which is acknowledged to be from him; for an Author of 
nature is here supposed. 

Forming our notions of the constitution and government of 
the world upon reasoning, without foundation for the principles 
which we assume, whether from the attributes of God, or any 
thing else, is building a world upon hypothesis, like Des Cartes. 
Forming our notions upon reasoning from principles which are 
certain, but applied to cases to which we have no ground to 
apply them, (like those who explain the structure of the human 
body, and the nature of diseases and medicines, fram mere mathe- 
matics,) is an error much akin to the former: since what is as- 
sumed in order to make the reasoning applicable, is Hypothesis. 
Put it must be allowed just, to join abstract reasonings with the 
observation of facts, and argue from such facts as are known, to 
* Philoeal. p. 23, Eel. Cant. 


BY THE AUTHOR. 


71 


others that are like them ; from that part of the divine govern- 
ment over intelligent creatures which comes under our view, to 
that larger and more general government over them which is 
beyond it; and from what is present, to collect what is likely, 
credible, or not incredible, will be hereafter. 

This method then of concluding and determining being prac- 
tical, and what, if we will act at all, we cannot but act upon in the 
common pursuits of life; being evidently conclusive, in various 
degrees, proportionable to the degree and exactness of the whole 
analogy or likeness ; and having so great authority for its intro- 
duction into the subject of religion, even revealed religion; my 
design is to apply it to that subject in general, both natural and 
revealed : taking for proved, that there is an intelligent Author 
of nature, and natural Governor of the world. For as there is no 
presumption against this prior to the proof of it : so it has been 
often proved with accumulated evidence ; from this argument of 
analogy and final causes; from abstract reasonings; from the 
most ancient tradition and testimony; and from the general con- 
sent of mankind. Nor does it appear, so far as I can find, to be 
denied by the generality of those who profess themselves dis- 
satisfied with the evidence of religion. 

As there are some, who, instead of thus attending to what is 
in fact the constitution of nature, form their notions of God’s 
government upon hypothesis : so there are others, who indulge 
themselves in vain and idle speculations, how the world might 
possibly have been framed otherwise than it is ; and upon sup- 
position that things might, in imagining that they should, have 
been disposed and carried on after a better model, than what ap- 
pears in the present disposition and conduct of them. 0 Suppose 
now a person of such a turn of mind, to go on with his reveries, 
till he had at length fixed upon some particular plan of nature, 
as appearing to him the best. — One shall scarce be thought guilty 
of detraction against human understanding, if one should say, 
even beforehand, that the plan which this speculative person 
would fix upon, though he were the wisest of the sons of men, 
probably would not be the very best, even according to his own 

c [Some of these speculations, carried to the full measure of absurdity and 
impiety, may be found in Bayle’s great “ Historical and Critical Dictionary/' 
t?ee as instances, the articles Origen, ManiciijEus, Paulicians.] 


INTRODUCTION 


notions of best; whether he thought that to be so, which afforded 
occasions and motives for the exercise of the greatest virtue, or 
which was productive of the greatest happiness, or that these two 
were necessarily connected, and run up into one and the same 
plan. 

It may not be amiss, once for all, to see what would be the 
amount of these emendations and imaginary improvements upon 
the system of nature, or how far they would mislead us. It 
seems there could be no stopping, till we came to some such con- 
clusions as these: that all creatures should at first be made as 
perfect and as happy as they were capable of ever being : that 
nothing, surely, of hazard or danger should be put upon them to 
do; some indolent persons would perhaps think nothing at all : 
or certainly, that effectual care should be taken, that they should, 
whether necessarily or not, yet eventually and in fact, always do 
what was right and most conducive to happiness ; which would 
be thought easy for infinite power to effect, either by not giving 
them any principles which would endanger their going wrong, or 
by laying the right motive of action in every instance before their 
minds in so strong a manner, as would never fail of inducing 
them to act conformably to it : and that the whole method of go- 
wernment by punishments should be rejected as absurd; as an 
awkward roundabout method of carrying things on ; nay, as con- 
trary to a principal purpose, for which it would be supposed 
creatures were made, namely, happiness. 

Now, without considering what is to be said in particular to 
the several parts of this train of folly and extravagance, what has 
been above intimated, is a full direct general answer to it ; namely, 
that we may see beforehand that we have not faculties for this 
kind of speculation. For though it be admitted that, from the 
first principles of our nature, we unavoidably judge or determine 
some ends to be absolutely in themselves preferable to others, and 
that the ends now mentioned, or if they run up into one, that 
this one is absolutely the best ; and consequently that we must 
conclude the ultimate end designed, in the constitution of nature 
and conduct of Providence, is the most virtue and happiness pos- 
sible ; yet we are far from being able to judge what particular 
disposition of things would be most friendly and assistant to vir- 
tue; or what means might be absolutely necessary to produce the 


BY THE AUTHOR. 


73 


most happiness in a system of such extent as our own world may 
be, taking in all that is past and to come, though we should sup- 
pose it detached from the whole things. Indeed we are so far 
from being able to judge of this, that we are not judges what 
may he the necessary means of raising and conducting one per- 
son to the highest perfection and happiness of his nature. Nay, 
even in the little affairs of the present life, we find men of differ- 
ent educations and ranks are not competent judges of the con- 
duct of each other. Our whole nature leads us to ascribe all 
moral perfection to God, and to deny all imperfection of him. 
And this will forever be a practical proof of his moral character, 
to such as will consider what a practical proof is ; because it is 
the voice of God speaking in us. Hence we conclude, that virtue 
must be the happiness, and vice the misery, of every creature; 
and that regularity and order and right cannot but prevail finally 
in a universe under his government. But we are in no sort 
judges, what are the necessary means of accomplishing this end. 

Let us then, instead of that idle and not very innocent em- 
ployment of forming imaginary models of a world, and schemes 
of governiDg it, turn our thoughts to what we experience to be 
the conduct of nature with respect to intelligent creatures; which 
may be resolved into general laws or rules of administration, in 
the same way as many of the laws of nature respecting inanimate 
matter may be collected from experiments. Let us compare the 
known constitution and course of things with what is said to be 
the moral system of nature ; the acknowledged dispensations of 
Providence, or that government which we find ourselves under, 
with what religion teaches us to believe and expect ; and see 
whether they are not analogous and of a piece. Upon such a 
comparison it will, I think, be found that they are very much 
so : that both may be traced up to the same general laws, and 
resolved into the same principles of divine conduct. 

The analogy here proposed to be considered is of pretty large 
extent, and consists of several parts ; in some more, in others less 
exact. In some few instances perhaps, it may amount to a real 
practical proof; in others not so. Yet in these it is a confirma- 
tion of what is proved otherwise. It will undeniably show, what 
too many need to have shown them, that the system of religion, 
both natural and revealed, considered only as a system, and prior 


w 


74 INTRODUCTION 

to the proof of it, is not a subject of ridicule, unless that of na- 
ture be so too. And it will afford an answer to almost all objec- 
tions against the system both of natural and revealed religion ; 
though not perhaps an answer in so great a degree, yet in a very 
considerable degree an answer to the objections against the evi- 
dence of it : for objections against a proof, and objections against 
what is said to be proved, the reader will observe are different 
things. 

The divine government of the world, implied in the notion of 
religion in general and of Christianity, contains in it: that man- 
kind is appointed to live in a future state ;* that there every one 
shall be rewarded or punished ;f rewarded or punished respect- 
ively for all that behaviour here, which we comprehend under the 
words, virtuous or vicious, morally good or evil that our pre- 
sent life is a probation, a state of trial, § and of discipline, || for 
that future one ; notwithstanding the objections, which men may 
fancy they have, from notions of necessity, against there being 
any such moral plan as this at all j^f and whatever objections may 
appear to lie against the wisdom and goodness of it, as it stands so 
imperfectly made known to us at present :** that this world being 
in a state of apostasy and wickedness, and consequently of ruin, 
and the sense both of their condition and duty being greatly cor- 
rupted amongst men, this gave occasion for an additional dispensa- 
tion of Providence; of the utmost importance ;fj* proved by mira- 
cles;^ but containing in it many things appearing to us strange, 
and not to have been expected ;§§ a dispensation of Providence, 
which is a scheme or system of things ;|||| carried on by the media- 
tion of a divine person, the Messiah, in order to the recovery of 
the world ;^[ yet not revealed to all men, nor proved with the 
strongest possible evideuce to all those to whom it is revealed; 
but only to such a part of mankind, and with such particular 
evidence, as the wisdom of God thought fit.*** 

The design then of the following treatise will be to show, that 
the several parts principally objected against in this moral and 
Christian dispensation, including its scheme, its publication, and 
the proof which God has afforded us of its truth ; that the par- 

* Ch. i. f Ch. ii. J Ch. iii. § Ch. iv. || Ch. v. f Ch. vi. 

**Ch.viL ft Part II. Ch. i. Ch. ii. Ch. iii. |||| Ch. iv. 

f Ch. y. *** Ch. vi. vii. 


BY THE AUTHOR. 


75 


ticular parts principally objected against in this whole dispensa- 
tion, are analogous to what is experienced in the constitution and 
course of nature or Providence ; that the chief objections them- 
selves which are alleged against the former, are no other than 
what may be alleged with like justness against the latter, where 
they are found in fact to be inconclusive; and that this argu- 
ment from analogy is in general unanswerable, and undoubtedly 
of weight on the side of religion,* notwithstanding the objections 
which may seem to lie against it, and the real ground which there 
may be for difference of opinion, as to the particular degree of 
weight which is to be laid upon it. This is a general account of 
what may be looked for in the following treatise. I shall begin 
it with that which is the foundation of all our hopes and of all 
our fears; all our hope£ and fears, which are of any conside- 
ration ; I mean a future life. 

* Ch. viii. 































































































































































































THE 


ANALOGY OF RELIGION. 


PART I. 

Natural lb lip on. 


CHAPTER I. 

A FUTURE LIFE.* 

Strange difficulties have been raised by some concerning per- 
sonal identity, or the sameness of living agents, implied in the 
notion of our existing now and hereafter, or in any two succes- 

a [This chapter Dr. Chalmers regards as the least satisfactory in the book: 
not because lacking in just analogies, but because infected with the obscure 
metaphysics of that age. His reasoning, however, only serves to show that B. 
has perhaps made too much of thj^ argument from the indivisibility of con- 
sciousness; and by no means that be does not fairly us*e it. 

We certainty cannot object that the subject of identity is not made plain. 
Who has explained identity, or motion, or cohesion, or crystallization, or any 
thing? Locke goes squarely at the subject of personal identity, (see Essay, 
ch. 27,) but has rendered us small aid. His definition is, “Existence itself, 
which determines a being of any sort, to a particular time and place, incom- 
municable to two beings of the same kind.” I had rather define it “the un- 
interrupted continuance of being.” What ceases to exist, cannot again exist: 
for then it would exist after it had ceased to exist, and would have existed be- 
fore it existed. Locke makes consciousness to constitute identity, and argues 
that a man and a person are not the same ; and that hence if I kill a man, but 
was not conscious of what I did, or bave utterly forgotten, I am not the same 
person. Watts shows up this notion of Locke very ludicrously. 

Butler, in his “ Dissertation,” urges that consciousness presupposes identity, 
as knowledge presupposes truth. On Locke's theory, no person would have 
existed any earlier than the period to which his memory extends. We cannot 
suppose the soul made up of many consciousnesses, nor could memory, if ma- 
terial. spread itself over successive years of life.] 

7* 


77 


78 


A FUTURE LIFE. 


PART I. 


sive moments ; which, whoever thinks it worth while, may see 
considered in the first dissertation at the end of this treatise. 
But without regard to any of them here, let us consider what the 
analogy of nature, and the several changes which we have under- 
gone, and those which we know we may undergo without being 
destroyed, suggest, as to the effect which death may, or may not, 
have upon us ; and whether it be not from thence probable, that 
we may survive this change, and exist in a future state of life 
and perception. 

I. From our being born into the present world in the helpless 
imperfect state of infancy, and having arrived from thence to 
mature age, we find it to be a general law of nature in our own 
species, that the same creatures, the same individuals , should 
exist in degrees of life and perception, with capacities of action, 
of enjoyment and suffering, in one period of their being, greatly 
different from those appointed them in another period of it. In 
other creatures the same law holds. For the difference of their 
capacities and states of life at their birth (to go no higher) and 
in maturity; the change of worms into flies, and the vast enlarge- 
ment of their locomotive powers by such change : and birds and 
insects bursting the shell of their habitation, and by this means 
entering into a new world, furnished with new accommodations 
for them, and finding a new sphere of action assigned them ; 
these are instances of this general law of nature. Thus all the 
various and wonderful transformations of animals are to be taken 
into consideration here. The states of life in which we ourselves 
existed formerly, in the womb and in our infancy, are almost as 
different from our present in mature age, as it is possible to con- 
ceive any two states or degrees of life can be. Therefore that we 
are to exist hereafter, in a state as different (suppose) from our 
present, as this is from our former, is but according to the analogy 
of nature ; according to a natural order or appointment of the very 
same kind, with what we have already experienced. 

II. We know we are endued with capacities of action, of hap- 
piness and misery: for we are conscious of acting, of enjoying 
pleasure and suffering pain. Now that we have these powers and 
capacities before death, is a presumption that we shall retain 
them through and after death; indeed a probability of it abun- 
dantly sufficient to act upon, unless there be some positive reason 


CHAP I. 


A FUTURE LIFE. 


79 


to think that death is the destruction of those living powers; be- 
cause there is in every case a probability, that all things will con- 
tinue as we experience they are, in all respects, except those in 
which we have some reason to think they will be altered. This 
is that kind* of presumption or probability from analogy, ex- 
pressed in the very word continuance , which seems our only na- 
tural reason for believing the course of the world will continue 
to-morrow, as it has done so far as our experience or knowledge 
of history can carry us back. Nay, it seems our only reason for 
believing, that any one substance now existing will continue to 
exist a moment longer ; the self-existent substance only excepted. 
Thus if men were assured that the unknown event, death, was 
not the destruction of our faculties of perception and of action, 
there would be no apprehension that any other power or event, 
unconnected with this of death, would destroy these faculties just 
at the instant of each creature’s death ; and therefore no doubt 
but that they would remain after it ; which shows the high pro- 
bability that our living powers will continue after death, unless 
there be some ground to think that death is their destruction.*}* 
For, if it would be in a manner certain that we should survive 
death, b provided it were certain that death would not be 
our destruction, it must be highly probable we shall survive 

* I say kind of presumption or probability; for I do not mean to affirm that 
there is the same degree of conviction, that our living powers will continue after 
death, as there is, that our substances will. 

t Destruction of living powers, is a manner of expression unavoidably ambi- 
guous ; and may signify either the destruction of a living being, so as that the same 
living being shall be incapable of ever perceiving or acting again at all j or the 
destruction of those means and instruments by which it is capable of its present 
life, of its present state of perception and of action. It is here used in the 
former sense. When it is used in the latter, the epithet present is added. The 
loss of a man’s eye is a destruction of living powers in the latter sense. But 
we have no reason to think the destruction of living powers, in the former 
sense, to be possible. We have no more reason to think a being endued with 
living powers, ever loses them during its whole existence, than to believe that 
a stone ever acquires them. 

b [The next paragraph indicates that Butler does not, as Chalmers thinks, 
consider this argument as' “ handing us over to an absolute demonstration.” It 
just places all arguments for and against the soul’s future life, in that balanced 
condition, which leaves us to learn the fact from revelation, free from presump- 
tions against its truth. This view of the case entirely relieves the objection as 
to the future life of brutes; and shows how entirely we must rely on revela- 
tion. as to the future, both of man and beast.] 


80 


A FUTURE LIFE. 


PART I. 


it, if there be no ground to think death will be our destruc- 
tion. 

Though I think it must be acknowledged, that prior to the 
natural and moral proofs of a future life commonly insisted upon, 
there would arise a general confused suspicion, that in the great 
shock and alteration which we shall undergo by death, we, i.e. 
our living powers, might be wholly destroyed ; yet even prior to 
those proofs, there is really no particular distinct ground or reason 
for this apprehension at all, so far as I can find. If there be, it 
must arise either from the reason of the thing , or from the analogy 
of nature. 

But we cannot argue from the reason of thet hing , that death 
is the destruction of living agents, because we know not at all 
what death is in itself ; but only some of its effects, such as the 
dissolution of flesh, skin, and bones. These effects do in no wise 
appear to imply the destruction of a living agent. Besides, as 
we are greatly in the dark, upon what the exercise of our living 
powers depends, so we are wholly ignorant what the powers them- 
selves depend upon ; the powers themselves as distinguished, not 
only from their actual exercise, but also from the present capa- 
city of exercising them ; and as opposed to their destruction : for 
sleep, or certainly a swoon, shows us, not only that these powers 
exist when they are not exercised, as the passive power of motion 
does in inanimate matter; but shows also that they exist, when 
there is no present capacity of exercising them : or that the capa- 
cities of exercising them for the present, as well as the actual 
exercise of them, may be suspended, and yet the powers them- 
selves remain undestroyed. Since then we know not at all upon 
what the existence of our living powers depends, this shows fur- 
ther, there can no probability be collected from the reason of the 
thing, that death will be their destruction : because their exist- 
ence may depend upon somewhat in no degree affected by death; 
upon somewhat quite out of the reach of this king of terrors. 
So that there is nothing more certain, than that the reason of the 
tiling shows us no connection between death and the destruction 
of living agents. 

Nor can we .find any thing throughout the whole analogy of 
nature to afford us even the slightest presumption, that animals 
ever lose their living powers ; much less if it were possible, that 


CHAP I. 


A FUTURE LIFE. 


81 


they lose them by death : for we have no faculties wherewith to 
trace any beyond or through it, so as to see what becomes of 
them. This event removes them from our view. It destroys 
the sensible proof, which we had before their death, of their being 
possessed of living powers, but does not appear to afford the least 
reason to believe that they are, then, or by that event, deprived 
of them. 

Our knowing that they were possessed of these powers, up to 
the very period to which we have faculties capable of tracing 
them, is itself a probability of their retaining them beyond it. 
This is confirmed, and a sensible credibility is given to it, by ob- 
serving the very great and astonishing changes which we have 
experienced ; so great, that our existence in another state of life, 
of perception and of action, will be but according to a method of 
providential conduct, the like to which has been already exer- 
cised even with regard to ourselves; according to a course of 
nature, the like to which we have already gone through. 

However, as one cannot but be greatly sensible, how diflicult 
it is to silence imagination enough to make the voice of reason 
even distinctly heard in this case ; as we are accustomed, from 
our youth up, to indulge that forward, delusive faculty, ever ob- 
truding beyond its sphere; (of some assistance indeed to appre- 
hension, but the author of all error,) as we plainly lose ourselves 
in gross and crude conceptions of things, taking for granted that 
we are acquainted with what indeed we are wholly ignorant of : 
it may be proper to consider the imaginary presumptions, that 
death will be our destruction, arising from these kinds of early 
and lasting prejudices ; and to show how little they really amount 
to, even though we cannot wholly divest ourselves of them. 
And, 

I. All presumption of death’s being the destruction of living 
beings, must go upon supposition that they are compounded ; c and 

c [Dodwell had published a book, in which he argues that human souls are 
not naturally immortal, but become so, by the power of the Holy Ghost, in re- 
generation. Dr. Clarke replied. The controversy was continued by Collins. 
Dr. C. wrote four tracts on the subject. 

These “presumptions” form the base of materialism, and hence the denial 
of a future state. Surely, thoughts and feelings, if material, have extension. 
But can any one conceive of love a foot long, or anger an inch thick ? How 
superior to the gloomy mists of modern infidels have even pagans been ! Cicero 
F 


82 


A FUTURE LIFE. 


PART X. 


so, discerptible. But since consciousness is a single and indi- 
visible power, it should seem that the subject in which it resides 
must be so too. For were the motion of any particle of matter 
absolutely one and indivisible, so as that it should imply a con- 
tradiction to suppose part of this motion to exist, and part not 
to exist, i.e. part of this matter to move, and part to be at rest, 
then its power of motion would be indivisible ; and so also would 
the subject in which the power inheres, namely, the particle of 
matter : for if this could be divided into two, one part might 
be moved and the other at rest, which is contrary to the sup- 
position. 

In like manner it has been argued,* and, for any thing ap- 
pearing to the contrary, justly, that since the perception or con- 
sciousness, which we have of our own existence, is indivisible, so 
as that it is a contradiction to suppose one part of it should be 
here and the other there; the perceptive power, or the power of 
consciousness, is indivisible too : and consequently the subject in 
which it resides, i.e.. the conscious being. Now, upon supposi- 
tion that the living agent each man calls himself, is thus a single 
being, which there is at least no more difficulty in conceiving 
than in conceiving it to be a compound, and of which there is the 
proof now mentioned ; it follows, that our organized bodies are no 
more ourselves or part of ourselves, than any other matter around 
us. And it is as easy to conceive, how matter, which is no part 
of ourselves, may be appropriated to us in the manner which our 
present bodies are ; as how we can receive impressions from, and 
have power over, any matter. It is as easy to conceive, that we may 
exist out of bodies, as in them ; and that we might have animated 
bodies of any other organs and senses wholly different from these 
now given us; aud that we may hereafter animate these same or 
new bodies, variously modified and organized ; as to conceive how 

makes Cato say, “The soul is a simple, uncompounded substance, without parts 
or mixture: it cannot be divided, and so cannot perish/’ And in another place, 
“I never could believe that the soul lost its senses by ©scaping from senseless 
matter; or that such a release will not enlarge and improve its powers;” and 
again, “ I am persuaded that I shall only begin truly to live, when I cease to 
live in this world.” Xenophon reports Cyrus as saying, in his last moments, 
“ 0 my sons ! do not imagine that when death has taken me from you, I shall 
cease to exist.”] 

* See Dr. Clarke’s Letter to Mr. Dodwell, and the defences of it. 


CHAP T. 


A FUTURE LIFE. 


83 


we can animate such bodies as our present. And lastly, the dis- 
solution of all these several organized bodies, supposing ourselves 
to have successively animated them, would have no more con- 
ceivable tendencyto destroy the living beings ourselves, or de- 
prive us of living faculties, the faculties of perception and of 
action, than the dissolution of any foreign matter, which we are 
capable of receiving impressions from, and making use of, for the 
common occasions of life. 

II. The simplicity and absolute oneness of a living agent can- 
not, from the nature of the thing, be properly proved by experi- 
mental observations. But as these fall in with the supposition 
of its unity, so they plainly lead us to conclude certainly, that our 
gross organized bodies, with which we perceive objects of sense, 
and with which we act, ^re no part of ourselves ; and therefore 
show us, that we have no reason to believe their destruction to be 
ours : even without determining whether our living substance be 
material or immaterial. For we see by experience, that men may 
lose their limbs, their organs of sense, and even the greatest part 
of these bodies, and yet remain the same living agents. Persons 
can trace up the existence of themselves to a time, when the bulk 
of their bodies was extremely small, in comparison of what it is 
in mature age : and we cannot but think, that they might then 
have lost a considerable part of that small body, and yet have re- 
mained the same living agents; as they may now lose great part 
of their present body, and remain so. And it is certain, that the 
bodies of all animals are in a constant flux, d from that never- 
ceasing attrition, which there is in every part of them. Now, 
things of this kind unavoidably teach us to distinguish, between 
these living, agents ourselves, and large quantities of matter, in 
which we are very nearly interested ; since these may be alien- 
ated, and actually are in a daily course of succession, and changing 
their owners; whilst we are assured, that each living agent re- 

d [As every particle of our bodies is changed within seven years, an ave- 
rage life would take us through many such changes. If the mind changes 
with the body, it would be unjust for an old man to be made to suffer for tho 
sins of his youth. To escape this, the materialist is driven to affirm that the 
whole is not altered, though every particle be changed. 

This argument from the constant flux is irresistible. It proves our identity, 
and that matter and mind are not the same. Does it not also destroy all pre- 
sumption that the Ego cannot exist without this particular body?] 


84 


A FUTURE LIFE. 


PART I. 


mains one and the same permanent being.* And this general 
observation leads us on to the following ones. 

First , That we have no way of determining by experience, 
what is the certain bulk of the living being each man calls him- 
self : and yet, till it be determined that it is larger in bulk than 
the solid elementary particles of matter, which there is no ground 
to think any natural power can dissolve, there is no sort of reason 
to think death to be the dissolution of it, of the living being, 
even though it should not be absolutely indiscerptible. 

Secondly , From our being so nearly related to and interested 
in certain systems of matter, (suppose our flesh and bones,) and 
afterwards ceasing to be at all related to them, the living agents, 
ourselves, remaining all this while undestroyed notwithstanding 
such alienation ; and consequently these systems of matter not 
being ourselves, it follows further that we have no ground to 
conclude any other (suppose internal ) systems of matter, to be 
the living agents ourselves ; because we can have no ground to 
conclude thisf, but from our relation to and interest in such other 
systems of matter : and therefore we can have no reason to con- 
clude what befalls those systems of matter at death, to be the 
destruction of the living agents. We have already several times 
over, lost a great part or perhaps the whole of our body, accord- 
ing to certain common established laws of nature, yet we remain 
the same living agents. When we shall lose as great a part, or the 
whole, by another common established law of nature, death, why 
may we not also remain the same ? That the alienation has been 
gradual in one case, and in the other will be more at once, does 
not prove any thing to the contrary. We have passed un destroyed 
through those many and great revolutions of matter, so peculiarly 
appropriated to us ourselves ; why should we imagine death will 
be so fatal to us? Nor can it be objected, that what is thus 
alienated or lost, is no part of our original solid body, but only 
adventitious matter. Because we may lose entire limbs, which 
must have contained many solid parts and vessels of the original 
body; or if this be not admitted, we have no proof, that any of 
these solid parts are dissolved or alienated by death. Though we 
are very nearly related to that extraneous or adventitious matter, 
whilst it continues united to and distending the several parts of 
* See Dissertation I. 


CHAP. I. 


A FUTURE LIFE. 


85 


our solid body, yet after all, the relation a person bears to those 
parts of his body, to which he is most nearly related, amounts but 
to this, that the living agent, and those parts of the body, mutu- 
ally affect each other. 6 The same thing, the same thing in kind 
though not in degree, may be said of all foreign matter, which 
gives us ideas, and over which we have any power. From these 
observations the whole ground of the imagination is removed, 
that the dissolution of any matter, is the destruction of a living 
agent, from the interest he once had in such matter. 

Thirdly , If we consider our body somewhat more distinctly, 
as made up of organs and instruments of perception and of mo- 
tion, it will bring us to the same conclusion. Thus the common 
optical experiments show, and even the observation how sight is 
assisted by glasses shows, that we see with our eyes in the same 
sense as we see with glasses. Nor is there any reason to believe, 
that we see with them in any other sense; any other, I mean, 
which would lead us to think the eye itself a percipient. The like 
is to be said of hearing; and our feeling distant solid matter by 
means of something in our hand, seems an instance of the like 
kind, as to the subject we are considering. All these are in- 
stances of foreign matter, or such as is no part of our body, 
being instrumental in preparing objects for, and conveying them 
to, the perceiving power, in a manner similar to the manner in 
which our organs of sense prepare and convey them. Both are 
in a like way instruments of our receiving such ideas from ex- 
ternal objects, as the Author of nature appointed those external 
objects to be the occasions of exciting in us. Glasses are evident 
instances of this; namely of matter which is no part of our 
body, preparing objects for and conveying them towards the per- 
ceiving power, in like manner as our bodily organs do. And if 
we see with our eyes only in the same manner as we do with 
glasses, the like may justly be concluded, from analogy, of all 
our other senses. It is not intended, by any thing- here said, to 
affirm, that the whole apparatus of vision, or of perception by 

e [The mind affects the body, as much as the body does the mind. Love, 
anger, &c. quicken the circulation; fear checks it; terror may stop it alto- 
gether. Mania is as often produced by moral, as by physical causes, and 
hence of late moral means are resorted to for cure. The brain of a maniac, 
seldom shows, on dissection, any derangement. But this does not prove that 
there was no functional derangement.] 

8 


86 


A FUTURE LIFE. 


PART I. 


any other sense, can be traced through all its steps, quite up to 
the living power of seeing, or perceiving : but that so far as it 
can be traced by experimental observations, so far it appears, that 
our organs of sense prepare and convey objects, in order to their 
being perceived, in like manner as foreign matter does, without 
affording any shadow of appearance, that they themselves per- 
ceive. And that we have no reason to think our organs of sense 
percipients, is confirmed by instances of persons losing some of 
them, the living beings themselves, their former occupiers, re- 
maining unimpaired. It is confirmed also by the experience of 
dreams ; by which we find we are at present possessed of a latent, 
and what would be otherwise an unimagined unknown power of 
perceiving sensible objects, in as strong and lively a manner with- 
out our external organs of sense, as with them. 

So also with regard to our power of moving, or directing 
motion by will and choice ; upon the destruction of a limb, this 
active power evidently remains, unlessened; so that the living 
being, who has suffered this loss, would be capable of moving as 
before, if it bad another limb to move with. It can walk by the 
help of an artificial leg. It can make use of a pole or a lever, 
to reach towards itself and to move things, beyond the length 
and the power of its arm ; and this it does in the same manner 
as it reaches and moves, with its natural arm, things nearer and 
of less weight. Nor is there so much as any appearance of our 
limbs being endued with a power of moving or directing them- 
selves; though they are adapted, like the several parts of a 
machine, to be the instruments of motion to each other ; and 
some parts of the same limb, to be instruments of motion to the 
other parts. 

Thus a man determines that he will look at an object through 
a microscope; or being lame, that he will walk to such a 
place with a staff, a week hence. His eyes and his feet no 
more determine in these cases, than the microscope and the staff. 
Nor is there any ground to think they any more put the determi- 
nation in practice ; or that his eyes are the seers, or his feet the 
movers, in any other sense than as the microscope and the staff 
are Upon the whole, then, our organs of sense, and our limbs, 
are certainly instruments , f which the living persons ourselves 
f [“ S. What shall we say, then, of the shoemaker ? That he cuts with his 


CHAP. I. 


A FUTURE LIFE. 


87 


make use of to perceive and move with : there is not any proba- 
bility, that they are any more; nor consequently, that we have 
any other kind of relation to them, than what we have to any 
other foreign matter formed into instruments of perception and 
motion, suppose into a microscope or a staff ; (I say any other kind 
of relation, for I am not speaking of the degree of it) nor con- 
sequently is there any probability, that the alienation or disso- 
lution of these instruments, is the destruction of the perceiving 
and moving agent. 

And thus our finding that the dissolution of matter, in which 
living beings were most nearly interested, is not their dissolution ; 
and that the destruction of several of the organs and instruments 
of perception and of motion belonging to them, is not their 
destruction; shows demonstratively, that there is no ground to 
think that the dissolution of any other matter, or destruction of 
any other organs and instruments, will be the dissolution or 
destruction of living agents, from the like kind of relation. And 
we have no reason to think we stand in any other kind of relation 
to any thing which we find dissolved by death. 

But it is said, these observations are equally applicable to 
brutes : g and it is thought an insuperable difficulty, that they 

instrument only, or with his hands also? A. With his hands also. S. Does 
he use his eyes also, in making shoes ? A. Yes. S. But are we agreed that he 
who uses, and what he uses, are different ? A. Yes. S. The shoemaker, then, 
and harper, are different from the hands and eyes they use ? A. It appears so. 
S. Does a man then use his whole body ? A. Certainly. S. But he who uses, 
and that which he uses are different. A. Yes. S. A man then is something 
different from his own body.” Plat. Alcibi. Prim. p. 129, D. Stallb. Ed. 

“ It may easily be perceived that the mind both sees and hears, and not those 
parts which are, so to speak, windows of the mind.” “Neither are we bodies; 
nor do I, while speaking this to thee, speak to thy body.” “ Whatever is done 
by thy mind, is done by thee.” Cicero, Tusc. Disput. I. 20, 46 and 22, 52 

“ The mind of each man is the man ; not that figure which may be pointed 
out with the finger.” Cic., de Rep. b. 6, s. 24.] 

e [Butler’s argument, if advanced for proof would prove too much, not only 
as to brutes but as to man ; for it would prove preexistence. And this is really 
the tenet, (t.e. transmigration,) of those who arrive at the doctrine of immor- 
tality only by philosophy. Philosophy cannot establish the doctrine of a 
future state, nor can it afford any presumptions against either a future or a 
preexistent state. 

Nothing is gained by insisting that reason teaches the true doctrine of the 
soul ; any more than there would be by insisting that by it we learned the 
doctrine of a trinity, or atonement. Philosophy does teach that He who can 


A FUTURE LIFE. 


PART I. 


should be immortal, and by consequence capable of everlasting 
happiness. Now this manner of expression is both invidious and 
weak : but the thing intended by it, is really no difficulty at all, 
either in the way of natural or moral consideration. For 1, Sup- 
pose the invidious thing, designed in such a manner of expres- 
sion, were really implied, as it is not in the least, in the natural 
immortality of brutes, namely, that they must arrive at great 
attainments, and become rational and moral agents; even this 
would be no difficulty, since we know not what latent powers and 
capacities they may be endued with. There was once, prior to 
experience, as great presumption against human creatures, as 
there is against the brute creatures, arriving at that degree of 
understanding, which we have in mature age. For we can trace 
up our own existence to the same original with theirs. We find 
it to be a general law of nature, that creatures endued with 
capacities of virtue and religion should be placed in a condition 
of being, in which they are altogether without the use of them, 
for a considerable length of their duration; as in infancy and 
childhood. And great part of the human species go out of the 
present world, before they come to the exercise of these capacities 
in any degree. 

2. The natural immortality of brutes does not in the least 
imply, that they are endued with any latent capacities of a 
rational or moral nature. The economy of the universe might re- 
quire, that there should be living creatures without any capacities 
of this kind. And all difficulties as to the manner how they are 
to be disposed of, are so apparently and wholly founded in our 
ignorance, that it is wonderful they should be insisted upon by 
any, but such as are weak enough to think they are acquainted 
with the whole system of things. There is then absolutely 

create, under infinite diversity of forms, can sustain existence, in any mode he 
pleases. 

The reader who chooses to look further into the discussion as to the immor- 
tality of brutes, will find it spread out in Polignac’s Anti-Lucretius, and still 
more in Bayle’s Dictionary, under the articles Pereira, and Rorarius. 
The topic is also discussed in Des Cartes on the Passions : Baxter on The 
Nature of the Soul : Hume’s Essays, Essay 9 : Search’s Light of Nature : 
Cheyne, Philosophical Principles : Wagstaff on the Immortality of Brutes : 
Edwards’ Critical and Philosophical Exercitations : Watt’s Essays, Essay 9: 
C'olliber’s Enquiry: Locke on the Understanding, b. 2, ch. ix. : Ditton on 
the Resurrection: Willis De Anima Brutse.] 


<11 A P. I. 


A FUTURE LIFE. 


89 


nothing at all in this objection, which is so rhetorically urged, 
against the greatest part of the natural proofs or presumptions of 
the immortality of human minds ; I say the greatest part, for it 
is less applicable to the following observation, which is more 
peculiar to mankind. 

III. As it is evident our present powers and capacities of 
reason, memory, and affection, do not depend upon our gross 
body in the manner in which perception by our organs of sense 
does; so they do not appear to depend upon it at all, in any such 
manner as to give ground to think, that the dissolution of this 
body will be the destruction of these our present powers of reflec- 
tion, as it will of our powers of sensation ; or to give ground 
to conclude, even that it will be so much as a suspension of the 
former. 

Human creatures exist at present in two states of life and per- 
ception, greatly different from each other ; each of which has its 
own peculiar laws, and its own peculiar enjoyments and suffer- 
ings. When any of our senses are affected, or appetites gratified 
with the objects of them, we may be said to exist or live in a 
state of sensation. When none of our senses are affected or 
appetites gratified, and yet we perceive, and reason, and act, we 
may be said to exist or live in a state of reflection. Now it is 
by no means certain, that any thing which is dissolved by death, 
is in any way necessary to the living being, in this its state of 
reflection, after ideas are gained. For, though, from our present 
constitution and condition of being, our external organs of sense 
are necessary for conveying in ideas to our reflecting powers, as 
carriages, and levers, and scaffolds are in architecture : h yet when 
these ideas are brought in, we are capable of reflecting in the 
most intense degree, and of enjoying the greatest pleasure, and 
feeling the greatest pain, by means of that reflection, without 

h [It is as absurd to suppose that a brain thinks, as that an eye sees, or a finger 
feels. The eye no more sees, than the telescope or spectacles. If the nerve be 
paralyzed, there is no vision, though the eye be perfect. A few words spoken 
or read, may at once deprive of sight, or knock a person down. 

The mind sometimes survives the body. Swift, utterly helpless from palsy, 
retained bis faculties. In some, the body survives the mind. Morgagni, 
Haller, Bonnet, and others, have proved that there is no part of the brain, 
not even the pineal gland, which has not been found destroyed by disease, 
where there had been no hallucination of mind, nor any suspicion of such 
disease, during life.] 

$* 


90 


A FUTURE LIFE. 


TAUT r. 


any assistance from our senses ; and without any at all, which we 
know of, from that body which will be dissolved by death. It 
does not appear then, that the relation of this gross body to the 
reflecting being is, in any degree, necessary to thinking ; to in- 
tellectual enjoyments or sufferings : nor, consequently, that the 
dissolution or alienation of the former by death, will be the 
destruction of those present powers, which render us capable of 
this state of reflection. 

Further, there are instances of mortal diseases, which do not 
at all affect our present intellectual powers ; and this affords a 
presumption, that those diseases will not destroy these present 
powers. Indeed, from the observations made above,* it appears, 
that there is no presumption, from their mutually affecting each 
other, that the dissolution of the body is the destruction of the 
living agent. By the same reasoning, it must appear too, that 
there is no presumption, from their mutually affecting each other, 
that the dissolution of the body is the destruction of our present 
reflecting powers : indeed instances of their not affecting each 
other, afford a presumption of the contrary. Instances of mortal 
diseases not impairing our present reflecting powers, evidently 
turn our thoughts even from imagining such diseases to be the 
destruction of them. Several things indeed greatly affect all our 
living powers, and at length suspend the exercise of them ; as 
for instance drowsiness, increasing till it ends in sound sleep : 
and hence,we might have imagined it would destroy them, till 
we found by experience the weakness of this way of judging. 
But in the diseases now mentioned, there is not so much as this 
shadow of probability, to lead us to any such conclusion, as to 
the reflecting powers which we have at present. For in those 
diseases, persons the moment before death appear to be in the 
highest vigor of life. They discover apprehension, memory, 
reason, all entire ; the utmost force of affection ; a sense of cha- 
racter, of shame and honor; and the highest mental enjoyments 
and sufferings, even to the last gasp. These surely prove even 
greater vigor of life than bodily strength does. Now what pre- 
tence is there for thinking, that a progressive disease when 
arrived to such a degree, I mean that degree which is mortal, 
will destroy those powers, which were not impaired, which were 
* Pp. 84, 85. 


CHAP. I. 


A FUTURE LIFE. 


91 


not affected by it, during its whole progress quite up to that 
degree ? And if death by diseases of this kind, is not the 
destruction of our present reflecting powers, it will scarce be 
thought that death by any other means is. 

It is obvious that this general observation may be carried 
further. There appears to be so little connection between our 
bodily powers of sensation, and our present powers of reflection, 
that there is no reason to conclude, that death, which destroys 
the former, does so much as suspend the exercise of the latter, or 
interrupt our continuing to exist in the like state of reflection 
which we do now. 1 For suspension of reason, memory, and the 
affections which they excite, is no part of the idea of death, nor 
implied in our notion of it. Our daily experiencing these powers 
to be exercised, without any assistance, that we know of, from 
those bodies which will be dissolved by death ; and our finding 
often, that the exercise of them is so lively to the last; afford a 
sensible apprehension, that death may not perhaps be so much as 
a discontinuance of the exercise of these powers, nor of the 
enjoyments and sufferings which it implies.* So that our post- 
humous life, whatever there may be in it additional to our present, 
may yet not be beginning entirely anew; but going on. Death 
may, in some sort and in some respects, answer to our birth; 
which is not a suspension of the faculties which we had before 
it, or a total change of the state of life in which we existed when 
in the womb ; but a continuation of both, with such and such 
great alterations. 

Nay, for aught we know of ourselves, of our present life and 
of death, death may immediately, in the natural course of 

1 [We are told by sceptics that “mind is the result of a curious and compli- 
cated organization.” A mere jumble of words ! But were the mind material, 
there is no evidence that death would destroy it: for we do not see that death 
has any power over matter. The body remains the very same as it does in a 
swoon, till chemical changes begin.] 

* There are three distinct questions, relating to a future life, here considered : 
Whether death be the destruction of living agents; if not, Whether it be the 
destruction of their present powers of reflection, as it certainly is the destruc- 
tion of their present powers of sensation ; and if not, Whether it be the sus- 
pension, or discontinuance of the exercise of these present reflecting powers. 
Now, if there be no reason to believe the last, there will be, if that were 
possible, less for the next, and less still for the first. 


02 


A FUTURE LIFE. 


PART I. 


things, put us into a higher and more enlarged state of life, as 
our birth does;* a state in which our capacities, and sphere of 
perception and of action, may be much greater than at present. 
For as our relation to our external organs of sense, renders us 
capable of existing in our present state of sensation ; so it may 
be the only natural hinderance to our existing, immediately, and 
of course, in a higher state of reflection. The truth is, reason 
does not at all show us, in what state death naturally leaves us. 
But were we sure, that it would suspend all our perceptive and 
active powers ; yet the suspension of a power and the destruction 
of it, are effects so totally different in kind, as we experience 
from sleep and a swoon, that we cannot in any wise argue from 
one to the other; or conclude even to the lowest degree of pro- 
bability, that the same kind of force which is sufficient to sus- 
pend our faculties, though it be increased ever so much, will be 
sufficient to destroy them. j 

These observations together may be sufficient to show, how 
little presumption there is, that death is the destruction of 
human creatures. However, there is the shadow of an analogy, 
which may lead us to imagine it, — viz. : the supposed likeness 
which is observed between the decay of vegetables, and of living 
creatures. This likeness is indeed sufficient to afford the poets 
very apt allusions to the flowers of the field, in their pictures of 
the frailty of our present life. But in reason, the analogy is so 
far from holding, that there appears no ground for the com- 
parison, as to the present question ; because one of the two sub- 
jects compared is wholly void of that, which is the principal and 
chief thing in the other, the power of perception and of action; 
which is the only thing we are inquiring about the continu- 

* This, according to Strabo, was the opinion of the Brachmans, vop'^eiv pip 
yap 6>i rd v piv evOaie fiiov, wj av dKpiir Kvophoov eivar top 6 i Savarov, yivtaiv elg rov Svtoos 
( iiov, Kai rdv evdaipova rots <f>i\ooo<brioaoi' Lib. xv. p. 1039, Ed. Amst. 1707. [“ For 
they think that the present life is like that of those who are just ready to be 
born ; and that death is a birth into the real life, and a happy one to those 
who have practised philosophy.”] To which opinion perhaps Antoninus may 
allude in these words, vvv nepipems, no-e epfipov Ik rr\s yaarpds rrjg ywaoeds oov 
tl&Qrj, ovreo; fxbexeaQai, ti)v lopav iv rj rd \po\api6v ooo rov iXvrpov rovrov ixrreoeirai. Lib. 
ix. c. 3. [As this last passage may, by some, be thought indelicate, it is left 
untranslated.] 

j [The increase of a force in any direction, cannot of itself change that direc- 
tion. An arrow shot from a bow, towards an object, does not aim at some 
other object, by being shot with more force.] 


CHAP. I. 


A FUTURE LIFE. 


ance of. So that the destruction of a vegetable, is an event not 
similar or analogous to the destruction of a living agent. 

If, as was above intimated, leaving off the delusive custom of 
substituting imagination in the room of experience, we would 
confine ourselves to what we do know and understand; if we 
would argue only from that, and from that form our expectations, 
it would appear at first sight, that as no probability of living 
beings ever ceasing to be so, can be concluded from the reason 
of the thing, so none can be collected from the analogy of 
nature ; because we cannot trace any living beings beyond death. 
But as we are conscious that we are endued with capacities of 
perception and of action, and are living persons ; what we are to 
go upon is, that we shall continue so, till we foresee some acci- 
dent or event, which will endanger those capacitities, or be likely 
to destroy us : which death does in no wise appear to be. 

Thus, when we go out of this world, we may pass into new 
scenes, and a new state of life and action, just as naturally as we 
came into the present. And this new state may naturally be a 
social one. k And the advantages of it, advantages of every kind, 
may naturally be bestowed, according to some fixed general laws 
of wisdom, upon every one in proportion to the degrees of his 
virtue. And though the advantages of that future natural state 
should not be bestowed, as these of the present in some measure 
are, by the will of the society; but entirely by his more imme- 
diate action, upon whom the whole frame of nature depends : yet 
this distribution may be just as natural, as their being distributed 
here by the instrumentality of men. Indeed, though one should 
allow any confused undetermined sense, which people please to 
put upon the word natural , it would be a shortness of thought 
scarce credible, to imagine, that no system or course of things 
can be so, but only what we see at present :* especially whilst the 

k [Our nature will always be ours, or we should cease to be ourselves, and 
become something else. And this nature is social. Every one feels, at least 
sometimes, that he is not complete in himself for the production of happiness; 
and so looks round for that which may fit his wants, and supply what he can- 
not produce from within. Hence amusements, of a thousand kinds, are re- 
sorted to, and still more, society. Society is a want of the mind ; as food is 
of the body. Society, such as perfectly suits our real nature, and calls out, in 
a right manner, its every attribute, would secure our perfect happiness. But 
such society must include God.] 

See Part II. chap. ii. and Part II. chap. iv. 


94 * 


A FUTURE LIFE. 


PART I. 


probability of a future life, or the natural immortality of the 
soul, is admitted upon the evidence of reason ; because this is 
really both admitting and denying at once, a state of being differ- 
ent from the present to be natural. But the only distinct mean- 
ing of that word is, stated , fixed, or settled ; since what is natural 
as much requires and presupposes an intelligent agent to render 
it so, i.e. to effect it continually, or at stated times, as what is 
supernatural or miraculous does to effect it for once. 

Hence it must follow, that persons’ notion of what is natural, 
will be enlarged in proportion to their greater knowledge of the 
works of God, and the dispensations of his providence. Nor is 
there any absurdity in supposing, that there may be beings in the 
universe, whose capacities, and knowledge, and views, may be so 
extensive, as that the whole Christian dispensation may to them 
appear natural, i.e. analogous or conformable to God’s dealings 
with other parts of his creation ; as natural as the visible known 
course of things appears to us. For there seems scarce any other 
possible sense to be put upon the word, but that only in which it 
is here used ; similar, stated, or uniform. 

This credibility of a future life, which has been here insisted 
upon, how little soever it may satisfy our curiosity, seems to 
answer all the purposes of religion, in like manner as a demon- 
strative proof would. Indeed a proof, even a demonstrative one, of 
a future life, would not be a proof of religion. For, that we are 
to live hereafter, is just as reconcilable with the scheme of 
atheism, and as well to be accounted for by it, as that we are 
now alive is : and therefore nothing can be more absurd than to 
argue from that scheme, that there can be no future state. 
But as religion implies a future state, any presumption against 
such a state, is a presumption against religion. The foregoing 
observations remove all presumptions of that sort, and prove, to 
a very considerable degree of probability, one fundamental doc- 
trine of religion; which, if believed, would greatly open and 
dispose the mind seriously to attend to the general evidence 
of the whole. 


CHAP. II. 


GOVERNMENT OF GOD. 




CHAPTER II. 

THE GOVERNMENT OF GOD BY REWARDS AND PUNISHMENTS. 

That which makes the question concerning a future life to be 
of so great importance to us, is our capacity of happiness and 
misery. And that which makes the consideration of it to be of 
so great importance to us, is the supposition of our happiness and 
misery hereafter depending upon our actions here. Indeed, 
without this, curiosity could not but sometimes bring a subject, 
in which we may be so highly interested, to our thoughts; espe- 
cially upon the mortality of others, or the near prospect of our 
own. But reasonable men would not take any further thought 
about hereafter, than what should happen thus occasionally to 
rise in their minds, if it were certain that our future interest no 
way depended upon our present behavior; whereas, on the con- 
trary, if there be ground, either from analogy or any thing else, 
to think it does, then there is reason also for the most active 
thought and solicitude, to secure that interest; to behave so as 
that we may escape that misery, and obtain that happiness, in 
another life, which we not only suppose ourselves capable of, but 
which we apprehend also is put in our own power. And whether 
there be ground for this last apprehension, certainly would deserve 
to be most seriously considered, were there no other proof of a 
future life and interest, than that presumptive one, which the 
foregoing observations amount to. 

In the present state, all which we enjoy, and a great part of 
what we suffer, is put in our own power. Pleasure and pain are 
the consequences of our actions; and we are endued by the 
Author of our nature with capacities of foreseeing these conse- 
quences. We find by experience that he does not so much as 
preserve our lives, exclusive of our own care and attention, to 
provide ourselves with, and to make use of, that sustenance, by 
which he has appointed our lives shall be preserved ; and with- 
out which, he has appointed, they shall not be preserved. In 
general we foresee, that the external things, which are the objects 
of our various passions, can neither be obtained nor enjoyed, 
without exerting ourselves in such and such manners : but by 


96 


GOVERNMENT OF GOD 


PAST I. 


thus exerting ourselves, we obtain and enjoy these objects, in 
which our natural good consists ; or by this means God gives us 
the possession and enjoyment of them. I know not, that we have 
any one kind or degree of enjoyment, but by the means of our 
own actions. By prudence and care, we may, for the most part, 
pass our days in tolerable ease and quiet : on the contrary, we 
may, by rashness, ungoverned passion, wilfulness, or even by 
negligence, make ourselves as miserable as ever we please. And 
many do please to make themselves extremely miserable, i.e. to 
do what they know beforehand will render them so. They follow 
those ways, the fruit of which they know, by instruction, ex- 
ample, and experience, will be disgrace, and poverty, and sick- 
ness, and untimely death. This every one observes to be the gene- 
ral course of things ; though it is to be allowed, we cannot find by 
experience, that all our sufferings are owing to our own follies. 

Why the Author of nature does not give his creatures pro- 
miscuously such and such perceptions, without regard to their 
behavior; why he does not make them happy without the instru- 
mentality of their own actions, and prevent their bringing any 
sufferings upon themselves, is another matter. 4 Perhaps there 
may be some impossibilities in the nature of things, which we are 
unacquainted with.* Or less happiness, it may be, would upon 
the whole be produced b}’ such a method of conduct, than is by 
the present. Or perhaps divine goodness, with which, if I mis- 
take not, we make very free in our speculations, may not be a 
bare single disposition to produce happiness ; but a disposition to 
make the good, the faithful, the honest, happy. Perhaps an 
infinitely perfect mind may be pleased with seeing his creatures 
behave suitably to the nature which he has given them ; to the 
relations which he has placed them in to each other; and to that 
which they stand in to himself : that relation to himself, which, 
during their existence, is even necessary, b and which is the most 

a [Objections and difficulties belong to all subjects, in some of their bearings. 
Ingenious and uncandid men may start others, which care and candor may 
remove. It is therefore no proof of weakness in a doctrine, that it is attacked 
with objections, both real and merely plausible. Error has been spread by two 
opposite means : — a dogmatic insisting on doubtful points, and an unteachable 
cavilling at certain truth.] 

* Part I. chap. vii. 

b [Our relation to God is “ even necessary,” because we are his creatures j so 


CHAP. II. 


BY REWARDS AND PUNISHMENTS. 


97 


important one of all : perhaps, I say, an infinitely perfect mind 
may be pleased with this moral piety of moral agents, in and for 
itself ; as well as upon account of its being essentially conducive 
to the happiness of his creation. Or the whole end, for which 
God made, and thus governs the world, may be utterly beyond 
the reach of our faculties : there may be somewhat in it as im- 
possible for us to have any conception of, as for a blind man to 
have a conception of colors. However this be, it is certain 
matter of universal experience, that the general method of divine 
administration is, forewarning us, or giving us capacities to fore- 
see, with more or less clearness, that if we act so and so, we shall 
have such enjoyments, if so and so, such sufferings; and giving 
us those enjoyments, and making us feel those sufferings, in 
consequence of our actions. 

u But all this is to be ascribed to the general course of nature.” 
True. This is the very thing which I am observing. It is to be 
ascribed to the general course of nature : i.e. not surely to the 
words or ideas, course of nature; but to Him who appointed it, 
and put things into it; or to a course of operation, from its 
uniformity or constancy, called natural;* and which necessarily 
implies an operating agent. For when men find themselves 
necessitated to confess an Author of nature, or that God is the 
natural governor of the world, they must not deny this again, 
because his government is uniform. They must not deny that 
he does things at all, because he does them constantly, 0 because 
the effects of his acting are permanent, whether his acting be so 
or not ; though there is no reason to think it is not. In short, 
every man, in every thing he does, naturally acts upon the fore- 
thought and apprehension of avoiding evil or obtaining good : 
and if the natural course of things be the appointment of God, 
and our natural faculties of knowledge and experience are given 

that the relation must endure so long as we endure. But our relations to other 
creatures are contingent, and may be changed or abrogated.] 

* Pp. 93, 94. 

c [“The terms nature, and power of nature, and course of nature, are but 
empty words, and merely mean that a thing occurs usually or frequently. The 
raising of a human body out of the earth we call a miracle, the generation of 
one in the ordinary way we call natural, for no other reason than because one 
is usual the other unusual. Did men usually rise out of the earth like corn we 
should call that natural.” Dr. Clark is, Controv. with Leibnitz.] 


08 


GOVERNMENT OF GOD 


PART I. 


us by him, then the good and bad consequences which follow our 
actions, are his appointment, and our foresight of those conse- 
quences, is a warning given us by him, how we are to act. 

“ Is the pleasure then, naturally accompanying every particular 
gratification of passion, intended to put us upon gratifying our- 
selves in every such particular instance, and as a reward to us for 
so doing V* No, certainly. Nor is it to be said, that our eyes 
were naturally intended to give us the sight of each particular 
object, to which they do or can extend; objects which are de- 
structive of them, or which, for any other reason, it may become 
us to turn our eyes from. Yet there is no doubt, but that our 
eyes were intended for us to see with. d So neither is there any 
doubt, but that the foreseen pleasures and pains belonging to the 
passions, were intended, in general, to induce mankind to act in 
such and such manners. 

From this general observation, obvious to every one, (that God 
has given us to understand, he has appointed satisfaction and 
delight to be the consequence Qf our acting in one manner, and 
pain and uneasiness of our acting in another, and of our not act- 
ing at all; and that we find these consequences, which we were 
beforehand informed of, uniformly to follow;) we may learn, that 
we are at present actually under his government in the strictest 
and most proper sense ; in such a sense, as that he rewards and 
punishes us for our actions. 

An Author of nature being supposed, it is not so much a 
deduction of reason, as a matter of experience, that we are 
thus under his government ; under his government, in the same 
sense, as we are under the government of civil magistrates. 
Because the annexing of pleasure to some actions, and pain to 
others, in our power to do or forbear, and giving notice of this 

d [That man consists of parts, is evident; and the use of each part, and of 
the whole man, is open to investigation. In examining any part we learn what 
it is, and what it is to do: e.g. the eye, the hand, the heart. So of mental 
faculties; memory is to preserve ideas, shame to deter us from things shameful, 
compassion to induce us to relieve distress. In observing our whole make, we 
may see an ultimate design, — viz. : not particular animal gratifications, but in- 
tellectual and moral improvement, and happiness by that means. If this be 
our end, it is our duty. To disregard it, must bring punishment; for shame, 
anguish, remorse, are by the laws of mind, the sequences of sin. 

See Law’s Notes on King’s Origin of Evil.] 


CHAP. II. 


BY REWARDS AND PUNISHMENTS. 


99 


appointment beforehand to those whom it concerns, is the proper 
formal notion of government. 

Whether the pleasure or pain which thus follows upon our 
behavior, be owing to the Author of nature’s acting upon us 
every moment which we feel it; or to his having at once con- 
trived and executed his own part in the plan of the world; 
makes no alteration as to the matter before us. For if civil 
magistrates could make the sanctions of their laws take place, 
without interposing at all, after they had passed them; with- 
out a trial, and the formalities of an execution : if they were 
able to make their laws execute themselves, or every offender to 
execute them upon himself ; we should be just in the same sense 
under their government then, as we are now; but in a much 
higher degree, and more perfect manner. 

Vain is the ridicule, with which one foresees some persons 
will divert themselves, upon finding lesser pains considered as 
instances of divine punishment. There is no possibility of 
answering or evading the general thing here intended, without 
denying all final causes. For final causes being admitted, the 
pleasures and pains now mentioned must be admitted too as in- 
stances of them. And if they are ; if God annexes delight to 
some actions, and uneasiness to others, with an apparent design 
to induce us to act so and so ; then he not only dispenses happi- 
ness and misery, but also rewards and punishes actions. If, for 
example, the pain which we feel, upon doing what tends to the 
destruction of our bodies, suppose upon too near approaches to 
fire, or upon wounding ourselves, be appointed by the Author of 
nature to prevent our doing what thus tends to our destruction ; 
this is altogether as much an instance of his punishing our 
actions, and consequently of our being under his government,® as 
declaring by a voice from heaven, that if we acted so, he would 
inflict such pain upon us; and inflicting it, whether it be greater 
or less. 

Thus we find, that the true notion or conception of the Author 

e [It is almost amazing that philosophy, because it discovers the laws of 
matter, should be placed in antagonism with the Bible which reveals a super- 
intending Providence. The Bible itself teaches this very result of philosophy, 
— viz.: that the world is governed by general laics. See Prov. viii. 29: Job. 
xxxviii. 12, 24, 31, 33: Ps. cxix. 90, 91 : Jer. xxxi. 35, and xxxiii. 25.] 


100 


GOVERNMENT OF GOD 


PART I. 


of nature, is that of a master or governor, prior to the considera- 
tion of his moral attributes. The fact of our case, which we 
find by experience, is, that he actually exercises dominion or 
government over us at present, by rewarding and punishing us 
for our actions, in as strict' and proper a sense of these words, 
and even in the same sense, as children, servants, subjects, are 
rewarded and punished by those who govern them. 

Thus the whole analogy of nature, the whole present course 
of things, most fully shows, that there is nothing incredible in 
the general doctrine of religion, that God will reward and punish 
men for their actions hereafter : nothing incredible, I mean, 
arising out of the notion of rewarding and punishing. For the 
whole course of nature is a present instance of his exercising that 
government over us, which implies in it rewarding and punishing. 


As divine punishment is what men chiefly object against, and 
are most unwilling to allow; it may be proper to mention some 
circumstances in the natural course of punishments at present, 
which are analogous to what religion teaches us concerning a 
future state of punishment; indeed so analogous, that as they 
add a further credibility to it, so they cannot but raise a most 
serious apprehension of it in those who will attend to them. 

It has been now observed, that such and such miseries natu- 
rally follow such and such actions of imprudence and wilfulness, 
as well as actions more commonly and more distinctly considered 
as vicious ; and that these consequences, when they may be fore- 
seen, are properly natural punishments annexed to such actions. 
The general thing here insisted upon, is, not that we see a great 
deal of misery in the world, but a great deal which men bring 
upon themselves by their own behavior, which they might have 
foreseen and avoided. Now the circumstances of these natural 
punishments, particularly deserving our attention, are such as 
these. Oftentimes they follow, or are inflicted in consequence 
of, actions which procure many present advantages, and are ac- 
companied with much present pleasure; for instance, sickness 
and untimely death are the consequence of intemperance, though 
accompanied with the highest mirth and jollity. These punish- 


CHAP. II. 


BY REWARDS AND PUNISHMENTS. 


101 


ments arc often much greater, than the advantages or pleasures 
obtained by the actions, of which they are the punishments or 
consequences. Though we may imagine a constitution of nature, 
in which these natural punishments, which are in fact to follow, 
would follow, immediately upon such actions being done, or very 
soon after; we find on the contrary in our world, that they are 
often delayed a great while, sometimes even till long after the 
actions occasioning them are forgot; so that the constitution of 
nature is such, that delay of punishment is no sort nor degree 
of presumption of final impunity. After such delay, these 
natural punishments or miseries often come, not by degrees, but 
suddenly, with violence, and at once; however, the chief misery 
often does. As certainty of such distant misery following such 
actions, is never afforded persons, so perhaps during the actions, 
they have seldom a distinct, full expectation of its following :* 
and many times the case is only thus, that they see in general, or 
may see, the credibility, that intemperance, suppose, will bring 
after it diseases; civil crimes, civil punishments; when yet the 
real probability often is, that they shall escape ; but things not- 
withstanding take their destined course, and* the misery inevi- 
tably follows at its appointed time, in very many of these cases. 
Thus also though youth may be alleged as an excuse for rashness 
and f«>lly, as being naturally thoughtless, and not clearly foresee- 
ing all the consequences of being untractable and profligate, this 
does not hinder, but that these consequences follow; and are 
grievously felt, throughout the whole course of mature life. 
Habits contracted even in that age, are often utter ruin : and 
men’s success in the world, not only in the common sense of 
worldly success, but their real happiness and misery, depends, in 
a great degree, and in various ways, upon the manner in which 
they pass their youth; which consequences they for the most 
part neglect to consider, and perhaps seldom can properly be said 
to believe, beforehand. In numberless cases, the natural course 
of things affords us opportunities for procuring advantages to 
ourselves at certain times, which we. cannot procure when we 
will ; nor ever recall the opportunities, if we have neglected 
them. . Indeed the general course of nature is an example of 
this. If, during the opportunity of youth, persons are indocile 
* §ee Part II. chap. vi. 


102 


GOVERNMENT OF GOD 


PART I. 


and self-willed, they inevitably suffer in their future life, for 
want of those acquirements, which they neglected the natural 
season of attaining. If the husbandman lets seedtime pass 
without sowing, the whole year is lost to him beyond recovery. 
Though after men have been guilty of folly and extravagance up 
to a certain degree , it is often in their power, to retrieve their 
affairs, to recover their health and character, at least in good 
measure ; yet real reformation is in many cases, of no avail at all 
towards preventing the miseries, poverty, sickness, infamy, natu- 
rally annexed to folly and extravagance exceeding that degree. 
There is a certain bound to imprudence and misbehavior, which 
being transgressed, there remains no place for repentance in the 
natural course of things. It is further very much to be re- 
marked, that neglects from inconsiderateness, want of attention,* 
not looking about us to see what we have to do, are often at- 
tended with consequences altogether as dreadful, as any active 
misbehavior, from the most extravagant passion. And lastly, 
civil government being natural, the punishments of it are so too : 
and some of these punishments are capital ; as the effects of a 
dissolute course of pleasure are often mortal. So that many 
natural punishments are finalf to him who incurs them, if con- 
sidered only in his temporal capacity; and seem inflicted by 

* Part II. chap. vi. 

f The general consideration of a future state of punishment, most evidently 
belongs to the subject of natural religion. But if any of these reflections 
should be thought to relate more peculiarly to this doctrine, as taught in Scrip- 
ture, the reader is desired to observe, that Gentile writers, both moralists and 
poets, speak of the future punishment of the wicked, both as to the duration 
and degree of it, in a like manner of expression and of description, as the 
Scripture does. So that all which can positively be asserted to be matter of 
mere revelation, with regard to this doctrine, seems to be, that the great dis- 
tinction between the righteous and the wicked, shall be made at the end of this 
world; that each shall then receive according to his deserts. Reason did, as it 
well might, conclude that it should, finally and upon the whole, be well with 
the righteous, and ill with the wicked: butr it could not be determined upon 
any principles of reason, whether human creatures might not have been ap- 
pointed to pass through other states of life and being, before that distributive 
justice should finally and effectually take place. Revelation teaches us, that 
the next state of things after the present is appointed for the execution of this 
justice ; that it shall be no longer delayed ; but the mystery of God, the great 
mystery of his suffering vice and confusion to prevail, shall then be finished ; 
and he will take to him his great power and will reign, by rendering to every 
one according to his works. 


CIIAP. II. 


BY REWARDS AND PUNISHMENTS. 


103 


natural appointment, either to remove the offender out of the 
way of being further mischievous, or as an example, though fre- 
quently a disregarded one, to those who are left behind. 

These things are not what we call accidental, or to be met with 
only now and then; but they are things of every day’s expe- 
rience. They proceed from general laws, very general ones, by 
which God governs the world in the natural course of his 
providence/ 

And they are so analogous, to what religion teaches us con- 
cerning the future punishment of the wicked, so much of a piece 
with it, that both would naturally be expressed in the very same 
words, and manner of description. In the book of Proverbs* for 
instance, wisdom is introduced, as frequenting the most public 
places of resort, and as rejected when she offers herself as the 
natural appointed guide of human life. How long, speaking to 
those who are passing through it, how long , ye simple ones, will 
ye love folly , arid the scorners delight in their scorning , and fools 
hate knowledge ? Turn ye at my reproof. Behold , I will pour 
out my spirit upon you , I will make known my words unto you. 
But upon being neglected, Because I have called , and ye refused, 
I have stretched out my hand, and no man regarded ; but ye 
have set at nought all my counsel, and would none of my re- 
proof : I also will laugh at your calamity, I will mock when 
your fear cometh ; when your fear cometh as desolation, and 
your destruction cometh as a whirlwind ; when distress and 
anguish come upon you. Then shall they call upon me, but I 
will not answer; they shall seek me early, but they shall not find 
me. This passage, every one sees, is poetical, and some parts of 
it are highly figurative ; but the meaning is obvious. And the 
thing intended is expressed more literally in the following words; 
For that they hated knowledge, and did not choose the fear of 

the Lord therefore shall they eat of the fruit of their own 

way, and be filled with their own devices. For the security of 

f [Our language furnishes no finer specimens of the argument analogical. 
Butler here seizes the very points, which are most plausible and most insisted 
on, as showing the harshness and unreasonableness of Christianity; and over- 
throws them at a stroke by simply directing attention to the same things, in the 
universally observed course of nature.] 

- Chap. i. 


104 


GOVERNMENT OF GOD. 


PART I. 


the simple shall slay them , and the prosperity of fools shall de- 
stroy them. The whole passage is so equally applicable to what 
we experience in the present world, concerning the consequences 
of men’s actions, and to what religion teaches us is to be expected 
in another, that it may be questioned which of the two was prin- 
cipally intended. 

Indeed when one has been recollecting the proper proofs of a 
future state of rewards and punishments, nothing methinks can 
give one so sensible an apprehensiou of the latter, or representa- 
tion of it to the mind, as observing, that after the many dis- 
regarded checks, admonitions, and warnings, which people meet 
with in the ways of vice and folly and extravagance, warnings 
from their very nature, from the examples of others, from the 
lesser inconveniences which they bring upon themselves, from 
the instructions of wise and virtuous men : after these have been 
long despised, scorned, ridiculed : after the chief bad conse- 
quences, temporal consequences, of their follies, have been de- 
layed for a great while, at length they break in irresistibly, like 
an armed force : repentance is too late to relieve, and can serve 
only to aggravate their distress, the case is become desperate : 
and poverty and sickness, remorse and anguish, infamy and 
death, the effects of their own doings, overwhelm them beyond 
possibility of remedy or escape. This is an account of what is, 
in fact, the general constitution of nature. 

It is not in any sort meant, that, according to what appears at 
present of the natural course of things, men are always uniformly 
punished in proportion to their misbehavior. But that there are 
very many instances of misbehavior punished in the several ways 
now mentioned, and very dreadful instances too; sufficient to 
show what the laws of the universe may admit, and, if thoroughly 
considered, sufficient fully to answer all objections against the 
credibility of a future state of punishments, from any imagina- 
tions, that the frailty of our nature and external temptations, 
almost annihilate the guilt of human vices : as well as objections 
of another sort; from necessity, from suppositions, that the will 
of an inhnite Being cannot be contradicted, or that he must be 
incapable of offence and provocation.* 

Reflections of this kind are not without their terrors to serious 
* See chaps, iv. and vi. 


CTIAP. III. 


THE MORAL GOVERNMENT OF GOD. 


105 


persons, even the most free from enthusiasm, and of the greatest 
strength of mind; but it is fit that things be stated and con- 
sidered as they really are. There is, in the present age, a certain 
fearlessness with regard to what may be hereafter under the 
government of God, which nothing but a universally acknow- 
ledged demonstration on the side of atheism can justify; and 
which makes it quite necessary, that men be reminded, and if 
possible made to feel, that there is no sort of ground for being 
thus presumptuous, even upon the most sceptical principles. For, 
may it not be said of any person upon his being born into the 
world, he may behave so as to be of no service to it, but by 
being made an example of the woeful effects of vice and folly? 
That he may, as any one may, if he will, incur an infamous 
execution from the hands of civil justice, or in some other 
course of extravagance shorten his days ; or bring upon himself 
infamy and diseases worse than death ? So that it had been 
better for him, even with regard to the present world, that he 
had never been born. And is there any pretence of reason for 
people to think themselves secure, and talk as if they had certain 
proof, that, let them act as licentiously as they will, there can be 
nothing analogous to this, with regard to a future and more gene- 
ral interest, under the providence and government of the same 
God? 


CHAPTER III . 8 

THE MORAL GOVERNMENT OF GOD. 

As the manifold appearances of design, and of final causes, in 
the constitution of the world, prove it to be the work of an in- 
telligent mind, so the particular final causes of pleasure and pain 
distributed amongst his creatures, prove that they are under his 

a [This chapter, more than any other, carries the force of positive argument. 
If in this world, we have proofs that God is a moral governor, then in order to 
evince that we shall be under moral government hereafter, we have only to 
supply an intermediate consideration, — viz. : that God, as such, must be un- 
changeable. The argument, as just remarked, assumes a substantive form; 
because admitted facts, as to this world, exhibiting the very principles on which 
God’s government goes at present, compel us not only to suppose that the prin- 
ciples of God will remain, but to believe so.] 


106 


THE MORAL GOVERNMENT OF GOD. 


PART I. 


government; what may he called his natural government of 
creatures endued with sense and reason. This implies somewhat 
more than seems usually attended to, when we speak of God’s 
natural government of the world. It implies government of 
the very same kind with that which a master exercises over 
his servants, or a civil magistrate over his subjects. These latter 
instances of final causes, as really prove an intelligent Governor 
of the wcrld, in the sense now mentioned, and before* distinctly 
treated of ; as any other instances of final causes prove an intelli- 
gent Maker of it. 

But this alone does not appear at first sight to determine any 
thiug certainly, concerning the moral character of the Author of 
nature, considered in this relation of governor; does not ascer- 
tain his government to be moral, or prove that he is the righteous 
Judge of the world. Moral government consists, not in barely 
rewarding and punishing men for their actions, which the most 
tyrannical may do, but in rewarding the righteous, and punish- 
ing the wicked : in rendering to men according to their actions, 
considered as good or evil. And the 'perfection of moral govern- 
ment consists in doing this, with regard to all intelligent creatures, 
in an exact proportion to their personal merits or demerits. 

Some men seem to think the only character of the Author of 
nature to be that of simple absolute benevolence. This, con- 
sidered as a principle of action and infinite in degree, is a disposi- 
tion to produce the greatest possible happiness, without regard 
to persons’ behavior, otherwise than as such regard would pro- 
duce higher degrees of it. And supposing this to be the only 
character of God, veracity and justice in him would be nothing 
but benevolence conducted by wisdom. Surely this ought not to 
be asserted, unless it can be proved ; for we should speak with 
cautious reverence upon such a subject. Whether it can be 
proved or no, is not the thing here to be inquired into; but 
whether in the constitution and conduct of the world, a righteous 
government be not discernibly planned out : which necessarily 
implies a righteous governor. There may possibly be in the 
creation beings, to whom the Author of nature manifests himself 
under this most amiable of all characters, this of infinite abso- 
lute benevolence ; for it is the most amiable, supposing it not, as 

* Chap. ii. 


CHAP. m. 


THE MORAL GOVERNMENT OF GOD. 


107 


perhaps it is not, incompatible with justice; but he manifests 
himself to us under the character of a righteous governor. He 
may, consistently with this, be simply and absolutely benevolent, 
in the sense now explained : but he is (for he has given us a 
proof in the constitution and conduct of the world that he is) a 
governor over servants, as he rewards and punishes us for our 
actions. And in the constitution and conduct of it, he may also 
have given, besides the reason of the thing, and the natural pre- 
sages of conscience, clear and distinct imitations, that his govern- 
ment is righteous or moral : clear to such as think the nature of 
it deserving their attention, and yet not to every careless person, 
who casts a transient reflection upon the subject.* 

It is particularly to be observed, that the divine government, 
which we experience ourselves under in the present state, taken 
alone, is allowed not to be the perfection of moral government. 
Yet this by no means hinders, but that there may be somewhat ', 
be it more or less, truly moral in it. A righteous government 
may plainly appear to be ‘carried on to some degree, enough to 
give us the apprehension that it shall be completed, or carried on 
to that degree of perfection which religion teaches us it shall ; 
but which cannot appear, till much more of the divine adminis- 
tration be seen, than can be seen in the present life. The design 
of this chapter is to inquire how far this is the case : how far, 
over and above the moral naturef which God has given us, and 
our natural notion of him as righteous governor of those his 
creatures, to whom he has given this nature I say how far be- 
sides this, the principles and beginnings of a moral government 
over the world may be discerned, notwithstanding and amidst all 
the confusion and disorder of it. 

One might mention here, what has been often urged with 


* The objections against religion, from the evidence of it not being universal, 
nor so strong as might possibly have been, may be urged against natural reli- 
gion, as well as against revealed. And therefore the consideration of them 
belongs to the first part of this treatise, as well as the second. But as these 
objections are chiefly urged against revealed religion, I choose to consider 
them in the second part. And the answer to them there, ch. vi., as urged 
against Christianity, being almost equally applicable to them as urged against 
the religion of nature ; to avoid repetition, the reader is referred to that 
chapter. 

f Dissertation IL 


X Chap. vi. 


108 


THE MORAL GOVERNMENT OF GOD. 


TAUT I. 


great force, that, in general, less uneasiness and more satisfac- 
tion, are the natural consequences* of a virtuous than of a vicious 
course of life, in the present state, as an instance of a moral 
government established in nature ; an instance of it collected 
from experience and present matter of fact. b But it must be 
owned a thing of difficulty to weigh and balance pleasures and un- 
easinesses, each amongst themselves, and also against each other, 
so as to make an estimate with any exactness, of the overplus of 
happiness on the side of virtue. And it is not impossible, that, 
amidst the infinite disorders of the world, there may be excep- 
tions to the happiness of virtue; even with regard to persons, 
whose course of life from their youth up has been blameless : and 
more with regard to those who have gone on for some time in the 
ways of vice, and have afterwards reformed. For suppose an in- 
stance of the latter case; a person with bis passions inflamed, 
his natural faculty of self-government impaired by habits of in- 
dulgence, and with all his vices about him, like so many harpies, 
craving their accustomed gratification ; who can say how long it 
might be, before such a person would find more satisfaction in 
the reasonableness and present good consequences of virtue, than 
difficulties and self-denial in the restraints of it? Experience 
also shows, that men can to a great degree, get over their sense 
of shame, so as that by professing themselves to be without prin- 

* See Lord Shaftesbury’s Inquiry concerning Virtue, Part II. 

b [At the foundation of moral improvement, lies the conviction that what is 
right, is our happiness, no less than our duty. This again is based upon a con- 
viction that God governs justly ; and has all power over us for good or evil. 
As creation is full of the evidences of design , so is Providence. And as the 
human mind shows, in its structure, the most exquisite marks of design, so the 
government of mind shows a final object for all our faculties. Among the 
attributes of mind we observe, conspicuous, a disposition to seek ends, lay 
plans, and sacrifice present indulgencfrlo future and greater good : and a 
facility in learning how to subordinate one thing to another, so as to secure 
success in our plans. This, with conscience to approve or disapprove our 
modes, constitutes an evident adajitedness to a moral government on the part 
of God ; and would be worse than superfluous, if there be no such government. 
Every rule of action, deduced by reason from the light of nature, may fairly be 
regarded as God’s law ; and the inconveniences resulting from wrong actions, 
are God’s retributions. These retributions, felt or observed, are divine teach- 
ings, saying, emphatically, if you act thus you shall receive thus. We do 
actually so judge, in relation to physics. Every rule of motion, distance, 
gravitation, heat, electricity, &c. &e., is received as God’s law; and we would 
deem it insane to act in opposition.] 


CHAT. III. 


THE MORAL GOVERNMENT OF GOD. 


109 


ciple, and avowing even direct villany, they can support them- 
selves against the infamy of it. But as the ill actions of any 
one will probably be more talked of, and oftener thrown in his 
way, upon his reformation ; so the infamy of them will be much 
more felt, after the natural sense of virtue and of honor is re- 
covered. Uneasiness of this kind ought indeed to be put to the 
account of former vices : yet it will be said they are in part the 
consequences of reformation. Still I am far from allowing it 
doubtful, whether virtue, upon the whole, be happier than vice 
in the present world. If it were, yet the beginnings of a 
righteous administration may, beyond all question, be found in 
nature, if we will attentively inquire after them. 0 

I. In whatever manner the notion of God’s moral government 
over the world might be treated, if it did not appear, whether he 
were in a proper sense our governor at all ; yet when it is certain 
matter of experience, that he does manifest himself to us under 
the character of a governor in the sense explained,* it must 
deserve to be considered, whether there be not reason to appre- 
hend, that he may be a righteous or moral governor. Since it 
appears to be fact, that God does govern mankind by the method 
of rewards and punishments, according to some settled rules of 
distribution ; it is surely a question to be asked, what presump- 
tion is there against his finally rewarding and punishing them 
according to this particular rule, namely, as they act reasonably, 
or unreasonably, virtuously or viciously? Rendering men happy 
or miserable by this rule, certainly falls in, much more falls in, 
with our natural apprehensions and sense of things, than doing 
so by any other rule whatever ; since rewarding and punishing 
actions by any other rule, would appear much harder to be ac- 
counted for, by minds formed as he has formed ours. Be the 
evidence of religion then more or less clear, the expectation 
which it raises in us, that the righteous shall, upon the whole, 
be happy, and the wicked miserable, cannot possibly be con- 

0 [Consult Capp on the Gov. of God : Twisse Vindicise Prov. Dei : Wittichii 
Exerc. Theol. : Dwight’s Theol. : Martinius de Gubernatione Mundi : Lief- 
cheld on Providence: Morton on do. : Sherlock on do.: Rutherford on 
do.: and the Sermons of Thos. Leland, Porteus, Topping, Hunt, Davies, 
Horseley, South, Wisheart, Seed, Collings, and Doddridge.] 

* Chap. ii. 


# 


10 


110 


THE MORAL GOVERNMENT OF GOD. 


PART I. 


sidered as absurd or chimerical; because it is no more than an 
expectation, that a method of government already begun, shall 
be carried on, the method of rewarding and punishing actions; 
and shall be carried on by a particular rule, which unavoidably 
appears to us at first sight more natural than any other, the rule 
which we call distributive justice. Nor, 

II. Ought it to be entirely passed over, that tranquillity, satis- 
faction, and external advantages, being the natural consequences 
of prudent management of ourselves, and our affairs ; and rash- 
ness, profligate negligence, and wilful folly, bringing after them 
many inconveniences and sufferings ; these afford instances of a 
right constitution of nature, as the correction of children, for 
their own sakes, and by way of example, when they run into 
danger or hurt themselves, is a part of right education. 4 Thus, 
that God governs the world by general fixed laws, that he has 
endued us with capacities of reflecting upon this constitution of 
things, and foreseeing the good and bad consequences of behavior, 
plainly implies some sort of moral government ; since from such 
a constitution of things it cannot but follow, that prudence and 
imprudence, which are of the nature of virtue and vice,* must 
be, as they are, respectively rewarded and punished. 

III. From the natural course of things, vicious actions are, to 
a great degree, actually punished as mischievous to society ; and 
besides punishment actually inflicted upon this account, there is 
also the fear and apprehension of it in those persons, whose 
crimes have rendered them obnoxious to it, in case of a discovery; 
this state of fear being often itself a very considerable punish- 
ment. The natural fear and apprehension of it too, which re- 
strains from such crimes, is a declaration of nature against them. 
It is necessary to the very being of society, that vices, destruc- 
tive of it, should be punished as being so ; the vices of falsehood, 
injustice, cruelty: which punishment therefore is as natural as 

d [In the structure of man, physical and mental, we find no contrivances for 
disease or pain, so that in general those who conform to the laws of their king, 
enjoy happiness ; and suffering is chiefly the result of our own conduct. But, 
as without revelation we could only leafn the evil of vice, by its effects, and 
would often learn it too late to retrieve our affairs, or our souls’ peace, God has 
in mercy given forth his teachings, by which, beforehand, we may know the 
effects of actions.] 

* See Dissertation II. 


cnAP. hi. 


THE MORAL GOVERNMENT OF GOD. 


Ill 


society, and so is an instance of a kind of moral government, 
naturally established, and actually taking place. And, since the 
certain natural course of things is the conduct of providence or 
the government of God, though carried on by the instrumentality 
of men, the observation here made amounts to this, that mankind 
find themselves placed by him in such circumstances, as that they 
are unavoidably accountable for their behavior; and are often 
punished, and sometimes rewarded, under his government, in 
the view of their being mischievous, or eminently beneficial to 
society. 

If it be objected that good actions and such as are beneficial 
to society, are often punished, as in the case of persecution and 
in other cases; and that ill and mischievous actions are often 
rewarded : e it may be answered distinctly, first, that this is in no 
sort necessary, and consequently not natural in the sense in 
which it is necessary, and therefore natural, that ill or mis- 
chievous actions should be punished : and in the next place, that 
good actions are never punished, considered as beneficial to 
society, nor ill actions rewarded, under the view of their being 
hurtful to it. So that it stands good, without any thing on the 
side of vice to be set over against it, that the Author of nature 
has as truly directed, that vicious actions, considered as mis- 
chievous to society, should be punished, and put mankind under 
a necessity of thus punishing them, as he has directed and neces- 
sitated us to preserve our lives by food. 

IV. In the natural course of things, virtue as such is actually 
rewarded, and vice as such punished : which seems to afford an 
instance or example, not only of government, but of moral 
government, begun and established ; moral in the strictest sense, 
though not in that perfection of degree, which religion teaches 
us to expect. In order to see this more clearly, we must distin- 
guish between actions themselves, and that quality ascribed to 
them, which we call virtuous or vicious/ The gratification itself 

0 [It was contended by Mandeville in his “ Fable of the Bees,” that private 
vices, as luxury for instance, are often conducive to the well-being of society. 
This idea is fully refuted by Warburton, Divine Legation of Moses, b. 1: 
Berkeley, Minute Philosopher, Dial. 2 : and by Brown, Characteristics, 
Ess. 2.] 

f [A strong illustration of this distinction is seen in the “delivering up” of 
our Savior to be crucified. As to the mere act of delivering up, we find it 


112 


THE MORAL GOVERNMENT OF GOD. 


PART I. 


of every natural passion, must be attended with delight; and 
acquisitions of fortune, however made, are acquisitions of the 
means or materials of enjoyment. An action then, by which 
any natural passion is gratified, or fortune acquired, procures 
delight or advantage ; abstracted from all consideration of the 
morality of such action. Consequently, the pleasure or advan- 
tage in this case, is gained by the action itself, not by the 
morality, the virtuousness or viciousness of it; though it be per- 
haps vh-tuous or vicious. 

To {my that such an action or course of behavior, procured 
such pleasure or advantage, or brought on such inconvenience 
and pain, is quite a different thing from saying, that such good 
or bad effect was owing to the virtue or vice of such action or 
behavior. In one case, an action abstracted from all moral con- 
sideration, produced its effect : in the other case, for it will ap- 
pear that there are such cases, the morality of the action under 
a moral consideration, i.e. the virtuousness or viciousness of it, 
produced the effect. Now I say virtue as such, naturally pro- 
cures considerable advantages to the virtuous, and vice as such, 
naturally occasions great inconvenience and even misery to the 
vicious, in very many instances. The immediate effects of virtue 
and vice upon the mind and temper, are to be mentioned as in- 
stances of it. Vice as such is naturally attended with some sort 
of uneasiness, and not uncommonly, with great disturbance and 
apprehension. That inward feeling, which, respecting lesser 
matters and in familiar speech we call being vexed with oneself, 
and in matters of importance and in more serious language, re- 
morse ; is an uneasiness naturally arising from an action of a 
man’s own, reflected upon by himself as wrong, unreasonable, 
faulty, i.e. vicious in greater or less degrees : and this manifestly 
is a different feeling from that uneasiness, which arises from a 
sense of mere loss or harm. What is more common, than to 
hear a man lamenting an accident or event, and adding — but 

referred, 1. To God the Father, John iii. 16 : Acts ii. 23 : Rom. viii. 32 . 2. To 
Christ himself, Eph. v. 2 , and v. 25 , Ac. In this last passage it is literally 
delivered himself. 3. To the Jewish rulers, Luke xx. 20 : Mark xii. 12 . 4. To 
Pontius Pilate, Matt, xxvii. 26 : Mark xv. 15 : John xix. 6 . 5. To Judas, Matt, 
xxvi. 15 : Zee. xi. 12 . 

As to the mere act, Judas and Pilate did just what God the Father, and our 
Lord Jesus did. But how infinitely unlike the qualities of the act !] 

\ 


chap. in. THE MORAL GOVERNMENT OF GOD. H3 

however he has the satisfaction that he cannot blame himself for 
it ; or on the contrary, that he has the uneasiness of being sen- 
sible it was his own doing? Thus also the disturbance and fear, 
which often follow upon a man’s having done an injury, arise 
from a sense of his being blameworthy; otherwise there would, 
in many cases, be no ground of disturbance, nor any reason to 
fear resentment or shame. On the other hand, inward security 
and peace, and a mind open to the several gratifications of life, 
are the natural attendants of innocence and virtue. To which 
must be added the complacency, satisfaction, and even joy of 
heart, which accompany the exercise; the real exercise of grati- 
tude, friendship, benevolence. 

And here, I think, ought to be mentioned the fears of future 
punishment, and peaceful hopes of a better life, in those who 
fully believe, or have any serious apprehension of religion : be- 
cause these hopes and fears are present uneasiness and satisfac- 
tion to the mind, and cannot be got rid of by great part of the 
world, even by men who have thought most thoroughly upon the 
subject of religion. And no one can say, how considerable this 
uneasiness or satisfaction may be, or what upon the whole it may 
amount to. g 

In the next place comes in the consideration, that all honest 
and good men are. disposed to befriend honest good men as such, 
and to discountenance the vicious as such, and do so in some 
degree; indeed in a considerable degree: from which favor and. 
discouragement cannot but arise considerable advantage and in- 
convenience. Though the generality of the world have little 
regard to the morality of their own actions, and may be supposed 
to have less to that of others, when they themselves are not con- 
cerned ; yet let any one be known to be a man of virtue, some- 
how or other he will be favored and good offices will be done him, 
from regard to his character, without remote views, occasionally, 
and in some low degree, I think, by the generality of the world, 


s [“ When one supposes he is about to die, there comes over him a fear and 
anxiety about things in regard to which he felt none before. For the stories 
which are told about Hades, that such as have practised wrong, must there 
suffer punishment, although made light of for a while, these torment the soul 
lest they should be true. But he who is conscious of innocence, has a pleasant 
and good hope, which will support old age.” Plato, Respub. i. s. 5.] 

10 * 


114 


THE MORAL GOVERNMENT OF GOD. 


PART i. 


as it happens to come in their way. Public honors too and ad- 
vantages are the natural consequences, and sometimes at least, 
the consequences in fact, of virtuous actions; of eminent justice, 
fidelity, charity, love to our country, considered in the view of 
being virtuous. And sometimes even death itself, often infamy 
and external inconveniences, are the public consequences of vice 
as vice. For instance, the sense which mankind have of tyranny, 
injustice, oppression, additional to the mere feeling or fear of 
misery, has doubtless been instrumental in bringing about revo- 
lutions, which make a figure even in the history of the world. 
For it is plain, that men resent injuries as implying faultiness, 
and retaliate, not merely under the notion of having received 
harm, but of having received wrong ; and they have this resent- 
ment in behalf of others, as well as of themselves. So likewise 
even the generality are, in some degree, grateful and disposed to 
return good offices, not merely because such a one has been the 
occasion of good to them, but under the view, that such good 
offices implied kind intention and good desert in the doer. 

To all this may be added two or three particular things, which 
many persons will think frivolous ; but to me nothing appears so, 
which at all comes in towards determining a question of such im- 
portance, as, whether there be or be not, a moral institution of 
government, in the strictest sense moral, visibly established and 
begun in nature. The particular things are these: That in 
domestic government, which is doubtless natural, children and 
others also are very generally punished for falsehood, injustice, 
and ill-behavior, as such, and rewarded for the contrary: which 
are instances of veracity and justice and right behavior, as such, 
naturally enforced by rewards and punishments, more or less con- 
siderable. That, though civil government be supposed to take 
cognizance of actions in no other view than as prejudicial to 
society, without respect to the immorality of them, yet as such 
actions are immoral, so the sense which men have of the im- 
morality of them, very greatly contributes, in different ways, to 
bring offenders to justice. And that entire absence of all crime 
and guilt in the moral sense, when plainly appearing, will almost 
of course procure, and circumstances of aggravated guilt prevent, 
a remission of the penalties annexed to civil crimes, in manv 
cases, though by no means in all. 


cnAP. hi. 


THE MORAL GOVERNMENT OF GOD. 


115 


Upon the whole then, besides the good and bad effects of 
virtue and vice upon men’s own minds, the course of the world 
does, in some measure, turn upon the approbation and disappro- 
bation of them as such, in others. The sense of well and ill 
doing, the presages of conscience, the love of good characters 
and dislike of bad ones, honor, shame, resentment, gratitude, all 
these, considered in themselves, and in their effects, do afford 
manifest real instances, of virtue as such naturally favored, and 
of vice as such discountenanced, more or less, in the daily course 
of human life; in every age, in every relation, in every general 
circumstance of it. That God has given us a moral nature,* may 
most justly be urged as a proof of our being under his moral 
government: but that he has placed us in a condition, which 
gives this nature, as one may speak, scope to operate, and in 
which it does unavoidably operate ; i.e. influence mankind to act, 
so as thus to favor and reward virtue, and discountenance and 
punish vice, this is not the same, but a further additional proof 
of his moral government; for it is an instance of it. The first 
is a proof, that he will finally favor and support virtue effectually : 
the second is an example of his favoring and supporting it at 
present, in some degree. 

If a more distinct inquiry be made, whence it arises, that 
virtue as such is often rewarded, and vice as such is punished, 
and this rule never inverted, it will be found to proceed, in part, 
immediately from the moral nature itself, which God has given 
us ; h and also in part, from his having given us, together with 

* See Dissertation II. 

h [Aside from revelation, our ideas of the divine attributes must be derived 
from a knowledge of our own. Among these is our moral sense, which con- 
strains us to consider right and wrong as an immutable distinction, and moral 
worth as our highest excellence. Hence we ascribe perfect virtue to God. It 
does not follow from such reasoning, that we form a Deity after our own con- 
ceptions, for it is but the argument a forteriori, “ He that formed the eye, shall 
he not see? He that teacheth man knowledge, shall he not know?” Ps. xciv. 
9. We do not conceive of a Deity who sees just as we do ; but that lie sees, for 
he makes sight. So we infer that he has moral attributes, because we have 
them, from him. 

This point is not sufficiently pressed upon infidels. They readily acknow- 
ledge God’s physical attributes, because the argument is addressed to their 
understanding, but deny his moral ones, because their hearts are hardened 
through the deceitfulness of sin.] 


116 


THE MORAL GOVERNMENT OF GOD. 


PART f. 


this nature, so great a power over each other’s happiness and 
misery. For, first, it is certain, that peace and delight, in some 
degree and upon some occasions, is the necessary and present 
effect of virtuous practice; an effect arising immediately from 
that constitution of our nature. We are so made, that well-doing 
as such, gives us satisfaction, at least in some instances ; ill-doing 
as such, in none. And, secondly , from our moral nature, joined 
with God’s having put our happiness and misery in many respects 
in each other’s power, it cannot but be, that vice as such, some 
kinds and instances of it at least, will be infamous, and men will 
be disposed to punish it as in itself detestable ; and the villain 
will by no means be able always to avoid feeling that infamy, any 
more than he will be able to escape this further punishment, 
which mankind will be disposed to inflict upon him, under the 
notion of his deserving it. But there can be nothing on the side 
of vice, to answer this ; because there is nothing in the human 
mind contradictory, as the logicians speak, to virtue. For virtue 
consists in a regard to what is right and reasonable, as being so ; 
in a regard to veracity, justice, charity, in themselves : and there 
is surely no such thing, as a like natural regard to falsehood, 
injustice, cruelty. If it be thought, that there are instances of 
an approbation of vice, as such, in itself, and for its own sake, 
(though it does not appear to me, that there is any such thing at 
all ;) it is evidently monstrous : as much so, as the most acknow- 
ledged perversion of any passion whatever. Such instances of 
perversion then being left out, as merely imaginary, or at least 
unnatural; it must follow, from the frame of our nature, and 
from our condition, in the respects now described, that vice can- 
not at all be, and virtue cannot but be, favored as such by others, 
upon some occasions, and happy in itself, in some degree. For 
what is here insisted upon, is not tbe degree in which virtue and 
vice are thus distinguished, but only the thing itself, that they 
are so in some degree ; though the whole good and bad effect of 
virtue and vice as such, is not inconsiderable in degree. But 
that they must be thus distinguished in some degree, is in a 
manner necessary : it is matter of fact of daily experience, even 
in the greatest confusion of human affairs. 

It is not pretended but that, in the natural course of things, 
happiness and misery appear to be distributed by other rules, 


CHAP. III. 


THE MORAL GOVERNMENT OF GOD. 


117 


than only the personal merit and demerit of characters. They 
may sometimes be distributed by way of mere discipline. There 
may be the wisest and best reasons, why the world should be 
governed by general laws, from whence such promiscuous distri- 
bution perhaps must follow; and also why our happiness and 
misery should be put in each other’s power, in the degree which 
they are. . And these things, as, in general, they contribute to 
the rewarding virtue and punishing vice, as such, so they often 
contribute also, not to the inversion of this, which is impossible, 
but to the rendering persons prosperous, though wicked ; afflicted, 
though righteous ; and, which is worse, to the rewarding some 
actions , though vicious, and punishing other actions , though 
virtuous. 1 But all this cannot drown the voice of nature in the 
conduct of Providence, plainly declaring itself for virtue, by way 
of distinction from vice, and preference to it. For our being so 
constituted as that virtue and vice are thus naturally favored and 
discountenanced, rewarded and punished, respectively as such, is 
an intuitive proof of the intent of nature, that it should be so ; 
otherwise the constitution of our mind, from which it thus im- 
mediately and directly proceeds, would be absurd. But it cannot 
be said, because virtuous actions are sometimes punished, and 
vicious actions rewarded, that nature intended it. For, though 
this great disorder is brought about, as all actions are, by means 
of some natural passion ; yet this may he , as it undoubtedly is, 
brought about by the perversion of such passion, implanted in us 
for other, and those very good purposes. And indeed these other 
and good purposes, even of every passion, may be clearly seen. 

We have then a declaration, in some degree of present effect, 
from Him who is supreme in nature, which side he is of, or 
what part he takes ; a declaration for virtue, and against vice. 
So far therefore as a man is true to virtue, to veracity and justice, 
to equity and charity, and the right of the case, in whatever he 
is concerned ; so far he is on the side of the divine administra- 
tion, and co-operates with it: and from hence, to such a man, 

1 [It is easy to see that the occasional disadvantages of virtue, are no less 
conducive to moral excellence, than its being generally advantageous. In view 
of its general advantages, we are virtuous with a proper and commanded view 
to our instinctive desire for happiness. In face of its disadvantages, we culti- 
vate virtue for its own sake.] 


118 


THE MORAL GOVERNMENT OF GOD. 


PART I. 


arises naturally a secret satisfaction and sense of security, and 
implicit hope of somewhat further. 

V. This hope is confirmed by the necessary tendencies of 
virtue, which, though not of present effect, yet are at present 
discernible in nature; and so afford an instance of somewhat 
moral in the essential constitution of it. There is, in the nature 
of things, a tendency in virtue and vice to produce the good and 
had effects now mentioned, in a greater degree than they do in 
fact produce them. For instance; good and bad men would be 
much more rewarded and punished as such, were it not, that 
justice is often artificially eluded/ that characters are not known, 
and many, who would thus favor virtue and discourage vice, are 
hindered from doing so, by accidental causes. These tendencies 
of virtue and vice are obvious with regard to individuals. But 
it may require more particularly to be considered, that power in 
a society , by being under the direction of virtue, naturally in- 
creases, and has a necessary tendency to prevail over opposite 
power, not under the direction of it; in like manner, as power, 
by being under the direction of reason, increases, and has a 
tendency to prevail over brute force. There are several brute 

j [The common remark, “virtue brings its own reward,” is true only with 
qualifications. The apostles, as to this life, were the most miserable of men: 
(1 Cor. xv. 9.) Virtue does not always bring earthly rewards. The grand 
support of the good is drawn from considerations of that future state which 
the infidel denies. Observe, 1. We cannot suppose that God would so construct 
man, as that his principal comfort and reward for virtue, is a delusion. 2. Very 
good persons are often beset with painful doubts and fears, as to their future 
safety. Would God allow such doubts, if the expectation of future happiness 
were the only reward of virtue? 3. This reward, at best, is private; but for 
the encouragement of virtue, it must have obvious triumphs. 

On the other hand, bad men grow callous to the rebukes of conscience, so 
that great sinners suffer less from remorse than small ones, and what is worse, 
owe their tranquillity to their guilt. Again, he who kills a good man, wholly 
deprives him of his only reward, if this life alone gives it. And the villain 
who kills himself, escapes his only punishment. 

Virtuous persons, in the strong language of Robert Hall,* would be “ the 
only persons who are wholly disappointed of their object; the only persons 
who (by a fatal and irreparable mistake), expecting an imaginary happiness 
in an imaginary world, lose their only opportunity of enjoying those present 
pleasures, of which others avail themselves; dooming themselves to grasp at 
shadows, while they neglect the substance, and harassed w'ith a perpetual 
struggle against their natural propensities and passions, and all in vain !”] 


* Sermon on the Vanity of Man. 


oriAr. m. THE MORAL GOVERNMENT OF GOD. H9 

creatures of equal, and several of superior strength, to that of 
men 3 and possibly the sum of the whole strength of brutes may 
be greater than that of mankind; but reason gives us the advan- 
tage and superiority over them; and thus man is the acknow- 
ledged governing animal upon the earth. Nor is this superiority 
considered by any as accidental 3 but as what reason has a ten- 
dency, in the nature of the thing, to obtain. And yet perhaps 
difficulties may be raised about the meaning, as well as the truth, 
of the assertion, that virtue has the like tendency. 

To obviate these difficulties, let us see more distinctly, how the 
case stands with regard to reason 3 which is so readily acknow- 
ledged to have this advantageous tendency. Suppose then two or 
three men, of the best and most improved understanding, in a deso- 
late open plain, attacked by ten times the number of beasts of 
prey : would their reason secure them the victory in this unequal 
combat? Power then, though joined with reason, and under its 
direction, cannot be expected to prevail over opposite power, 
though merely brutal, unless the one bears some proportion to 
the other. Again : put the imaginary case, that rational and 
irrational creatures were of like external shape and manner : it 
is certain, before there were opportunities for the first to distin- 
guish each other, to separate from their adversaries, and to form 
a union among themselves, they might be upon a level, or in 
several respects upon great disadvantage 3 though united they 
might be vastly superior : since union is of such efficacy, that 
ten men united, might be able to accomplish, what ten thousand 
of the same natural strength and understanding wholly ununited, 
could not. In this case, brute force might more than maintain 
its ground against reason, for want of union among the rational 
creatures. Or suppose a number of men to land upon an island 
inhabited only by wild beasts; men who, by the regulations of 
civil government, the inventions of art, and the experience of 
some years, could they be preserved so long, would be really suffi- 
cient to subdue the wild beasts, and to preserve themselves in 
security from them : yet a conjuncture of accidents might give, 
such advantage to the irrational animals as they might at once 
overpower, and even extirpate, the rational ones. Length of 
time then, proper scope, and opportunities for reason to exert 


120 


THE MORAL GOVERNMENT OF GOD. 


PART J. 


itself, may be absolutely necessary to its prevailing over brute 
force. 

Further : there are many instances of brutes succeeding in 
attempts, which they could not have undertaken, had not their 
irrational nature rendered them incapable of foreseeing the danger 
of such attempt, or the fury of passion hindered their attending 
to it : and there are instances of reason and real prudence pre- 
venting men’s undertaking what, it has appeared afterwards, 
they might have succeeded in by a lucky rashness. In certain 
conjunctures, ignorance and folly, weakness and discord, may have 
their advantages. So that rational animals have not necessarily 
the superiority over irrational ones; but, how improbable soever 
it may be, it is evidently possible, that in some globes the latter 
may be superior. And were the former wholly at variance and dis- 
united, by false self-interest and envy, by treachery and injustice, 
and consequent rage and malice against each other, whilst the 
latter were firmly united among themselves by instinct, this might 
greatly contribute to the introducing such an inverted order of 
things. For every one would consider it as inverted : since 
reason has, in the nature of it, a tendency to prevail over brute 
force ; notwithstanding the possibility it may not prevail, and the 
necessity, which there is, of many concurring circumstances to 
render it prevalent. 

Now I say, virtue in a society has a like tendency to procure 
superiority and additional power : whether this power be con- 
sidered as the means of security from opposite power, or of ob- 
taining other advantages. It has this tendency, by rendering 
public good, an object and end, to every member of the society ; 
by putting every one upon consideration and diligence, recollec- 
tion and self-government, both in order to see what is the most 
effectual method, and also in order to perform their proper part, 
for obtaining and preserving it; by uniting a society within itself, 
and so increasing its strength ; and, which is particularly to be 
mentioned, uniting it by means of veracity and justice. For as 
these last are principal bonds of union, so benevolence or public 
spirit, undirected, unrestrained by them, is, nobody knows what. 

And suppose the invisible world, and the invisible dispensa- 
tions of Providence, to be, in any sort, analogous to what appears: 
or that both together make up one uniform scheme, the two parts 


-ciiap. in. TIIE MORAL GOVERNMENT OF GOD. K1 

of which, the part which we see, and that which is beyond our 
observation, are analogous to each other : then, there must be a 
like natural tendency in the derived power, throughout the uni- 
verse, under the direction of virtue, to prevail in general over 
that which is not under its direction ; as there is in reason, 
derived reason in the universe, to prevail over brute force. 

But then, in order to the prevalence of virtue, or that it may 
actually produce, what it has a tendency to produce; the like 
concurrences are necessary , as are, to the prevalence of reason. 
There must be some proportion, between the natural power or 
force which is, and that which is not, under the direction of 
virtue : there must be sufficient length of time ; for the complete 
success of virtue, as of reason, cannot, from the nature of the 
thing, be otherwise than gradual : there must be, as one may 
speak, a fair field of trial, a stage large and extensive enough, 
proper occasions and opportunities, for the virtuous to join to- 
gether, to exert themselves against lawless force, and to reap the 
fruit of their united labors. Now indeed it is to be hoped, that 
the disproportion between the good and bad, ^ven here on earth, 
is not so great, but that the former have natural power sufficient 
to their prevailing to a considerable degree, if circumstances 
would permit this power to be united. For, much less, very 
much less, power under the direction of virtue, would prevail 
over much greater not under the direction of it. k However, 
good men over the face of the earth cannot unite; because, 
(among other reasons,) they cannot be sufficiently ascertained of 
each other's characters. And the known course of human things, 
the scene we are now passing through, particularly the shortness 
of life, denies to virtue its full scope in several other respects. 

The natural tendency which we have been considering, though 
real, is hindered from being carried into effect in the present 
state : but these hinderances may be removed in a future one. 
Virtue, to borrow the Christian allusion, is militant here; and 
various untoward accidents contribute to its being often over- 

k [Because, so soon as any community, or collection of persons, conclude a man 
to be wholly vicious in his course, and without any restraint of conscience, he 
is at once shorn of his influence, and will soon be stripped of all power of mis- 
chief. On the other hand, we see the might of virtue unarmed with power, in 
Luther, in Roger Williams, in Win. Penn, and innumerable other instances.] 


122 


THE MORAL GOVERNMENT OF GOD. 


PART I. 


borne : but it may combat with greater advantage hereafter, and 
prevail completely, and enjoy its consequent rewards, in some 
future states. Neglected as it is, perhaps unknown, perhaps 
despised and oppressed here; there maybe scenes in eternity, 
lasting enough, and in every other way adapted, to afford it a 
sufficient sphere of action ; and a sufficient sphere for the natural 
consequences of it to follow in fact. If the soul be naturally 
immortal, and this state be a progress towards a future one, as 
childhood is towards mature age, good men may naturally unite, 
not only among themselves, but also with other orders of vir- 
tuous creatures, in that future state. For virtue, from the very 
nature of it, is a principle and bond of union, in some degree, 
among all who are endued with it, and known to each other; so 
as that by it, a good man cannot but recommend himself to the 
favor and protection of all virtuous beings, throughout the whole 
universe, who can be acquainted with his character, and can 
any way interpose in his behalf in any part of his duration. 

One might add, that suppose all this advantageous tendency of 
virtue to become effect, among one or more orders of creatures, 
in any distant scenes and periods, and to be seen by any orders 
of vicious creatures, throughout the universal kingdom of God ; 
this happy effect of virtue would have a tendency, by way of ex- 
ample, and possibly in other ways, to amend those of them who 
are capable of amendment, and of being recovered to a just sense 
of virtue. If our notions of the plan of Providence were 
enlarged in any sort proportionable to what late discoveries have 
enlarged our views with respect to the material world, representa- 
tions of this kind would not appear absurd or extravagant. They 
are not to be taken as intended for a literal delineation of what 
is in fact the particular scheme of the universe, which cannot be 
known without revelation : for suppositions are not to be looked 
on as true, because not incredible : but they are mentioned to 
show, that our finding virtue to be hindered from procuring to 
itself such superiority and advantages, is no objection against its 
having, in the essential nature of the thing, a tendency to pro- 
cure them. And the suppositions now mentioned do plainly show 
this : for they show, that these hinderances are so far from being 
necessary, that we ourselves can easily conceive, how they may 
be removed in future states, and full scope be granted to virtue 


ciiap. hi. TIIE MORAL GOVERNMENT OF GOD. 123 

And all these advantageous tendencies of it are to he considered 
as declarations of God in its favor. This however is taking a 
pretty large compass : though it is certain, that, as the material 
world appears to be, in a manner, boundless and immense, there 
must be some scheme of Providence vast in proportion to it. 

But let us return to the earth our habitation ; and we shall see 
this happy tendency of virtue, by imagining an instance not so 
vast and remote : by supposing a kingdom or society of men upon 
it, perfectly virtuous, for a succession of many ages ; to which, 
if you please, may be given a situation advantageous for universal 
monarchy. In such a state, there would be no, such thing as 
faction : but men of the greatest capacity would of cour^>, all 
along, have the chief direction of affairs willingly yielded to 
them ; and they would share it among themselves without envy. 
Each of these would have the part assigned him, to which his 
genius was peculiarly adapted ; and others, who had not any dis- 
tinguished genius, would be safe, and think themselves very 
happy, by being under the protection and guidance of those who 
had. Public determinations would really be the result of the 
united wisdom of the community: and they would faithfully be 
executed, by the united strength of it. Some would contribute 
in a higher way, but all in some way, to the public prosperity : 
and in it, each would enjoy the fruits of his own virtue, ^.nd 
as injustice, whether by fraud or force, would be unknown among 
themselves, so they would be sufficiently secured from it in their 
neighbors. For cunning and false self-interest, confederacies in 
injustice, ever slight, and accompanied with faction and intestine 
treachery; these on one hand would be found mere childish folly 
and weakness, when set in opposition against wisdom, public 
spirit, union inviolable, and fidelity on the other : allowing both 
a sufficient length of years to try their force. Add the general 
influence, which such a kingdom would have over the face of the 
earth, by way of example particularly, and the reverence which 
would be paid it. It would plainly be superior to all others, and 
the world must gradually come under its empire; not by means 
of lawless violence ; but partly by what must be allowed to be just 
conquest ; and partly by other kingdoms submitting themselves 
voluntarily to it, throughout a course of ages, and claiming its 
protection, one after another, in successive exigencies. The head 


124 * 


THE MORAL GOVERNMENT OF GOD. 


PART I. 


of it would be a universal monarch, in another sense than any 
mortal has yet been; and the Eastern style would be literally 
applicable to him, that all people, nations, and languages should 
serve him. And though indeed our knowledgesof human nature, 
- and the whole history of mankind, show the impossibility, with- 
out some miraculous interposition, that a number of men, here 
on earth, should unite in one society or government, in the fear 
of God and universal practice of virtue ; and that such a govern- 
ment should continue so united for a succession of ages : yet ad- 
mitting or supposing this, the effect would be as now drawn out. 
Thus for instance, the wonderful power and prosperity promised 
to t$£ Jewish nation in the Scripture, would be, in a great mea- 
sure, the consequence of what is predicted of them ; that the 
people should he all righteous, and inherit the land forever ;* 
were we to understand the latter phrase of a long continuance only, 
sufficient to give things time to work. The predictions of this 
kind, for there are many of them, cannot come to'pass, in the 
present known course of nature ; but suppose them come to pass, 
and then, the dominion and preeminence promised must naturally 
follow, to a very considerable degree. 

Consider now the general system of religion ; that the govern- 
ment of the world is uniform, and one, and moral ; that virtue 
and right shall finally have the advantage, and prevail over fraud 
and lawless force, over the deceits as well as the violence of 
wickedness, under the conduct of one supreme governor : and 
from the observations above made, it will appear that God has, 
by our reason, given us to see a peculiar connection in the 
several parts of this scheme, and a tendency towards the com- 
pletion of it, arising out of the very' nature of virtue : which 
tendency is to be considered as something moral in the essential 
constitution of things. If any one should think all this to be of 
little importance, I desire him to consider, what he would think, 
if vice had, essentially and in its natuib, these advantageous 
tendencies ; or if virtue had essentially the contrary ones. 

It may be objected, that notwithstanding all these natural 
effects and natural tendencies of virtue, yet things may be now 
going on throughout the universe, and may go on hereafter, in 
the same mixed way as here at present upon earth : virtue some- 
• Isa. lx. 21. 


enAP. nr. 


THE MORAL GOVERNMENT OF GOD. 


125 


times prosperous, sometimes depressed ; vice sometimes punished, 
sometimes successful. 

The answer to which is, that it is not the purpose of this 
chapter, nor of this treatise, properly to prove God’s perfect 
moral government over the world, or the truth of religion ; hut 
to observe what there is in the constitution and course of nature, 
to confirm the proper proof of it, supposed to be known : and 
that the weight of the foregoing observations to this purpose may 
be thus distinctly proved. Pleasure and pain are, to a certain 
degree, say to a very high degree, distributed among us without 
any apparent regard to the merit or demerit of characters^fcknd 
were there nothing else concerning this matter discernibl^Uthe 
constitution and course of nature, there would be no ground 
from the constitution and course of nature, to hope or to fear 
that men would be rewarded or punished hereafter according to 
their desert^: which, however, it is to be remarked, implies, that 
even then there would be no ground from appearances to think, 
that vice upon the whole would have the advantage, rather than 
that virtue would. Thus the proof of a future state of retribution 
would rest upon the usual known arguments for it; which are 
I think plainly unanswerable; and would be so, though there 
were no additional confirmation of them from the things above 
insisted on. But these things are a very strong confirmation 
of them. For, 

First , They show that the Author of nature is not indifferent 
to virtue and vice. They amount to a declaration, from him, 
determinate and not to be evaded, in favor of one, and against 
the other ; such a declaration, as there is nothing to be set over 
against or answer, on the part of vice. So that were a man, 
laying aside the proper proof of religion, to determine from the 
course of nature only, whether it were most probable, that the 
righteous or the wicked would have the advantage in a future 
life ; there can be no doubt, but that he would determine the 
probability to be, that the former would. The course of nature 
then, in the view of it now given, furnishes us with a real prac- 
tical proof of the obligations of religion. 

Secondly, When, conformably to what religion teaches us, God 
shall reward and punish virtue and vice as such, so as that every 
one shall, upon the whole, have his deserts; this distributive 

ll* 


128 


THE MORAL GOVERNMENT OF GOD. 


PART I. 


justice will not be a thing different in hind, but only in degree , 
from what we experience in his present government. It will be 
that in effect, towards which we now see a tendency. It will be 
no more than the completion of that moral government, the prin- 
ciples and, beginning of which have been shown, beyond all 
dispute, discernible in the present constitution and course of 
nature. 

Thirdly, As under the natural government of God, our expe- 
rience of those kinds and degrees of happiness and misery, which 
we do experience at present, gives just ground to hope for, and 
to fi^^higher degrees and other kinds of both in a future state, 
supj^ig a future state admitted : so under his moral govern- 
ment our experience, that virtue and vice are, in the manners 
above mentioned, actually rewarded and punished at present, in 
a certain degree, gives just ground to hope and to fear, that they 
may be rewarded and punished in a higher degree hereafter. It 
is acknowledged indeed that this alone is not sufficient ground to 
think, that they actually will be rewarded and punished in a 
higher degree, rather than in a lower : but then, 

Lastly, There is sufficient ground to think so, from the good 
and bad tendencies of virtue and vice. For these tendencies are 
essential, and founded in the nature of things : whereas the 
hinderances to their becoming effect are, in numberless cases, not 
necessary, but artificial only. Now it may be much more strongly 
argued, that these tendencies, as well as the actual rewards and 
punishments, of virtue and vice, which arise directly out of the 
nature of things, will remain hereafter, than that the accidental 
hinderances of them will. And if these hinderances do not 
remain ; those rewards and punishments cannot but be carried 
on much farther towards the perfection of moral government: 
i.e. the tendencies of virtue and vice will become effect; but 
when, or where, or in what particular way, cannot be known at 
all, but by revelation. 

Upon the whole : there is a kind of moral government implied 
in God’s natural government:* virtue and vice are naturally re- 
warded and punished as beneficial and mischievous to society 
and rewarded and punished directly as virtue and vice.| The 
notion of a moral scheme of government is not fictitious, but 
* P.109. fP. 110, Ac. + P. Ill, Ac. 


CI1AP. III. 


THE MORAL GOVERNMENT OF GOD. 


127 


natural ; for it is suggested to our thoughts by the constitution 
and course of nature : and the execution of this scheme is 
actually begun, in the instances here mentioned. And these 
things are to be considered as a declaration of the Author of 
nature, for virtue, and against vice : they give a credibility to 
the supposition of their being rewarded and punished hereafter; 
and also ground to hope and to fear, that they may be rewarded 
and punished in higher degrees than they are here. All this is 
confirmed, and the argument for religion, from the constitution 
and course of nature, is carried on farther, by observing, that 
there are natural tendencies, and, in innumerable cases, onlidfcti- 
ficial hinderances, to this moral scheme’s being carried on Mucih 
farther towards perfection, than it is at present.* 

The notion then of a moral scheme of government, much more 
perfect than what is seen, is not a fictitious, but a natural notion ; 
for it is suggested to our thoughts, by the essential tendencies of 
virtue and vice. These tendencies are to be considered as in- 
timations, as implicit promises and threatenings, from the Author 
of nature, of much greater rewards and punishments to follow 
virtue and vice, than do at present. Indeed, every natural ten- 
dency, which is to continue, but which is hindered from becom- 
ing effect by only accidental causes, affords a presumption, that 
such tendency will, some time or other, become effect : a pre- 
sumption proportionable in degree to the length of the duration, 
through which such tendency will continue. From these things 
together, arises a real presumption, that the moral scheme of 
government established in nature, shall be carried on much 
farther towards perfection hereafter; and, I think, a presumption 
that it will be absolutely completed. From these things, joined 
with the moral nature which God has given us, considered as 
given us by him, arises a practical proof f that it will be com- 
pleted : a proof from fact ; and therefore a distinct one from 
that which is deduced from the eternal and unalterable relations, 
the fitness and unfitness of actions. 


* P. 118, &c. 


f See this proof drawn out briefly, ch. vi. 


128 


PROBATION, AS IMPLYING TRIAL, 


PART I. 


CHAPTER IV. 

PROBATION, AS IMPLYING TRIAL, DIFFICULTIES, AND 
DANGER. 1 

The general doctrine of religion, that our present life is a 
state of probation for a future one, comprehends under it several 
particular things, distinct from each other. The first and most 
common meaning of it seems to be, that our future interest is 
n^^epending, and depending upon ourselves; that we have 
SOTpe and opportunities here, for that good and bad behavior, 
which God will reward and punish hereafter; together with 
temptations to one, as well as inducements of reason to the other. 
And this, in a great measure, is the same as saying, that we are 
under the moral government of God, and to give an account of 
our actions to him. For the notion of a future account and 
general righteous judgment, implies some sort of temptations to 
what is wrong : otherwise there would be no moral possibility of 
doing wrong, nor ground for judgment, or discrimination. But 
there is this difference, that the word probation is more dis- 
tinctly and particularly expressive of allurements to wrong, or 
difficulties in adhering uniformly to what is right, and of the 
danger of miscarrying by such temptations, than the words moral 
government. A state of probation then, as thus particularly im- 
plying in it trial, difficulties, and danger, may require to be 
considered distinctly by itself. b 

As the moral government of God, which religion teaches us, 

a [This chapter is one of many attempts to account for the mixture of suffer- 
ing and enjoyment in this world ; and demands close examination both of its 
theory and its arguments. The student may consult, as he has opportunity, 
MusiEi Disput. : Holtzsfusii Disp. de Lapsu Prim. Hominum : Selden de Laps. 
Angelorum: Stapferi Inst.: Witsii Econom. Feed.: Bate’s Harmony of the 
Divine Attrib. : Calcott on the Fall: Shcckford on the Creation of Man: 
Manton’s Sermons: Sooth’s do.: Toplady’s do.: Pearson on the Creed: 
Le Clerc’s Diss. : Henly’s Dissert. : Kennicott on the Tree of Life : and 
Fabricius de Prinio Peccato Angelorum Lapsorum.] 

b [The evils of life, are not to be regarded as, entering, necessarily, into 
God’s plan of probation ; and they are not here so presented. The Scriptures 
show that all suffering is either punitive, or castigatory. Man at first was to 
be tried by temptations, not by sufferings.] 


CHAP. IV. 


DIFFICULTIES, AND DANGER. 


120 


implies that we are in a state of trial with regard to a future 
world, so also his natural government over us implies that we 
are in a state of trial, in the like sense, with regard to the pre- 
sent world. Natural government by rewards and punishments, 
as much implies natural trial, as moral government does moral 
trial. The natural government of God here meant,* consists in 
his annexing pleasure to some actions, and pain to others, which 
are in our power to do or forbear, and giving us notice of such 
appointment, beforehand. This necessarily implies, that he has 
made our happiness and misery, or our interest, to depend in part 
upon ourselves. So far as men have temptations to any comm of 
action, which will probably occasion them greater temporal incon- 
venience and uneasiness, than satisfaction, so far their temporal 
interest is in danger from themselves; or they are in a state of 
trial with respect to it. Now people often blame others, and even 
themselves, for their misconduct in their temporal concerns. And 
we find many are greatly wanting to themselves, and miss that 
natural happiness, which they might have obtained in the present 
life : perhaps every one does in some degree. But many run 
themselves into great iuconvenience, and into extreme distress 
and misery, not through incapacity of knowing better, and doing 
better, for themselves, which would be nothing to the present 
purpose, but through their own fault. These things necessarily 
imply temptation, and danger of miscarrying, in a greater or less 
degree, with respect to our worldly interest or happiness. Every 
one too, without having religion in his thoughts, speaks of the 
hazards which young people run, upon their setting out in the 
world : hazards from other causes, than merely their ignorance, 
and unavoidable accidents. And some courses of vice, at least, 
being contrary to men’s worldly interest or good ; temptations to 
these must at the same time be temptations to forego our present 
and our future interest. 

Thus in our natural 6r temporal capacity, we are in a state of 
trial, i.e. of difficulty and danger, analogous, or like to our moral 
and religious trial. This will more distinctly appear to any one, 
who thinks it worth while, more distinctly, to consider, what it 
is which constitutes our trial in both capacities, and to observe, 
how mankind behave under it. 

* Chap. ii. 


130 


PROBATION, AS IMPLYING TRIAL, 


PART I. 


That which constitutes this trial, in both these capacities, must 
be something either in our external circumstances, or in our 
nature. For, on the one hand, persons may be betrayed into 
wrong behavior upon surprise, or overcome upon any other very 
singular and extraordinary external occasions, who would, other- 
wise, have preserved their character of prudence and of virtue : 
in which cases, every one, in speaking of the wrong behavior of 
these persons, would impute it to such particular external circum- 
stances. On the other hand, men who have contracted habits of 
vice and folly of any kind, or have some particular passions in 
excess, will seek opportunities, and, as it were, go out of their 
way, to gratify themselves in these respects, at the expense of 
their wisdom and their virtue ) led to it, as every one would say, 
not by external temptations, but by such habits and passions. 
And the account of this last case is, that particular passions are 
no more coincident with" prudence, or that reasonable self-love, 
the end of which is our worldly interest, than they are with the 
principle of virtue and religion ; but often draw contrary ways 
to one, as well as to the other : and so such particular passions 
are as much temptations, to act imprudently with regard to our 
worldly interest, as to act viciously.* When we say, men are 
misled by external circumstances of temptation ) it cannot but be 
understood, that there is somewhat within themselves, to render 
those circumstances temptations, or to render them susceptible of 
impressions from them. So when we say, they are misled by 
passions ) it is always supposed, that there are occasions, circum- 
stances, and objects, exciting these passions, and affording means 
for gratifying them. Therefore, temptations from within, and 
from without, coincide, and mutually imply each other. The 
several external objects of the appetites, passions, and affections, 
being present to the senses, or offering themselves to the mind, 
and so exciting emotions suitable to their nature ; not only in 
cases where they can be gratified consistently with innocence and 
prudence, but also in cases where they cannot, and yet can be 
gratified imprudently and viciously : this as really puts them in 
danger of voluntarily foregoing their present interest or good, as 
their future ; and as really renders self-denial necessary to secure 

* See Sermons preached at the Rolls, 1726, 2d ed. p. 205, &o. Pref. p. 25, &c. 
Serin, p. 21, &c. 


CHAP. IV. 


DIFFICULTIES, AND DANGER. 


131 


one, as the other : i.e. we are in a like state of trial with respect 
to both, by the very same passions, excited by the very same 
means. 

Thus mankind having a temporal interest depending upon 
themselves, and a prudent course of behavior being necessary to 
secure it, passions inordinately excited, whether by means of 
example, or by any other external circumstance, towards such 
objects, at such times, or in such degrees, as that they cannot be 
gratified consistently with worldly prudence, are temptations ; 
dangerous, and too often successful temptations, to forego a 
greater temporal good for a less ; i.e. to forego what is, upon the 
whole, our temporal interest, for the sake of a present gratifica- 
tion. This is a description of our state of trial in our temporal 
capacity. Substitute now the word future for temporal , and 
virtue for prudence ; and it will be just as proper a description 
of our state of trial in our religious capacity; so analogous are 
they to each other . 0 

If, from consideration of this our like state of trial in both capa- 
cities, we go on to observe farther, how mankind behave under it ; 
we shall find there are some, who have so little sense of it, that 
they scarce look beyond the passing day : they are so taken up with 
present gratifications, as to have, in a manner, no feeling of con- 
sequences, no regard to their future ease or fortune in this life ; 
any more than to their happiness in another. Some appear to be 
blinded and deceived by inordinate passion, in their worldly con- 
cerns, as much as in religion. Others are not deceived, but as it 
were forcibly carried away by the like passions, against their 
better judgment, and feeble resolutions too of acting better .* 1 And 
there are men, and truly not a few, who shamelessly avow, not 
their interest, but their mere will and pleasure, to be their law 
of life : and who, in open defiance of every thing reasonable, 

c [“If we persist in our objection, notwithstanding these analogies, then 
should we conclude, either that we are under the regimen of an unrighteous 
Deity, or that there is no Deity at all.” — Dr. Chalmers.] 

d [Shall toe be of such? Shall we forget or disregard the great fact that 
when death has transferred us to other conditions, we, our proper selves, will 
remain? No longer, indeed, united with flesh and blood, surrounded with 
houses, lands, business, or enjoyments* such as the present, but still ourselves. 
Still with wants to be supplied, desires to be gratified, and capacities to be 
employed and developed !] 


132 PROBATION, AS IMPLYING TRIAL, pakt i. 

will go on in a course of vicious extravagance, foreseeing, with 
no remorse and little fear, that it will be their temporal ruin ; 
and some of them, under the apprehension of the consequences 
of wickedness in another state. To speak in the most moderate 
way, human creatures are not only continually liable to go wrong 
voluntarily, but we see likewise that they often actually do so, 
with respect to their temporal interests, as well as with respect 
to religion. 

Thus our difficulties and dangers, or our trials in our temporal 
and our religious capacity, as they proceed from the same causes, 
and have the same effect upon men’s behavior, are evidently ana- 
logous, and of the same kind. 

It may be added, that the difficulties and dangers of miscarry- 
ing in our religious state of trial, are greatly increased, and one 
is ready to think, are in a manner wholly made , by the ill 
behavior of others; by a wrong education, wrong in a moral 
sense, sometimes positively vicious ; by general bad example ; by 
the dishonest artifices which are got into business of all kinds; 
and, in very many parts of the world, by religion’s being cor- 
rupted into superstitions, which indulge men in their vices. In 
like manner, the difficulties of conducting ourselves prudently 
in respect to our present interest, and our danger of being led 
aside from pursuing it, are greatly increased, by a foolish educa- 
tion ; and, after we come to mature age, by the extravagance and 
carelessness of others, with whom we have intercourse : and by 
mistaken notions, very generally prevalent, and taken up from 
common opinion, concerning temporal happiness, and wherein it 
consists. 

Persons, by their own negligence and folly in temporal affairs, no 
less than by a course of vice, bring themselves into new difficulties, 
and, by habits of indulgence, become less qualified to go through 
them : and one irregularity after another, embarrasses things to 
such a degree, that they know not whereabout they are; and 
often makes the path of conduct so intricate and perplexed, that 
it is difficult to trace it out ; difficult even to determine what is 
the prudent or the moral part. Thus, for instance, wrong be- 
havior in one stage of life, youth; wrong, I mean considering 
ourselves only in our temporal capacity, without taking in reli- 
gion ; this, in several ways, increases the difficulties of right 


CHAP. IV. 


DIFFICULTIES, AND DANGER. 


133 


behavior in mature age ; i.e. puts us into a more disadvantageous 
state of trial in our temporal capacity. 

We are an inferior part of the creation of God. There are 
natural appearances of our being in a state of degradation.* We 
certainly are in a condition, which does not seem , by any means, 
the most advantageous we could imagine or desire, either in our 
natural or moral capacity, for securing either our present or 
future interest. However, this condition, low, and careful, and 
uncertain as it is, does not afford any just ground of complaint. 
For, as men may manage their temporal affairs with prudence, 
and so pass their days here on earth in tolerable ease and satis- 
faction, by a moderate degree of care : so likewise with regard to 
religion, there is no more required than what they are well able 
to do, e and what they must be greatly wanting to themselves, if 
they neglect. And for persons to have that put upon them, 
which they are well able to go through, and no more, we natu- 
rally consider as an equitable thing j supposing it done by proper 
authority. Nor have we any more reason to complain of it, with 
regard to the Author of nature, than of his not having given us 
advantages belonging to other orders of creatures. 

[Remarks.] The thing here insisted upon is, that the state 
of trial, which religion teaches us we are in, is rendered credible, 
by its being throughout uniform and of a piece with the general 
conduct of Providence towards us, in all other respects within 
the compass of our knowledge. Indeed if mankind, considered 
in their natural capacity, as inhabitants of this world only, found 
themselves, from their birth to their death, in a settled state of 

* Part II. chap. v. 

e [This is one of those passages, remarked on in our introduction, as a state- 
ment not properly explained or guarded. We cannot suppose the author, to 
have overlooked the great fact of man’s fall and corruption. That the argu- 
ment properly considered, stands good, is the verdict of such a man as Chal- 
mers. After speaking of human helplessness in matters of religion, he says, 
“ There is nothing in this [helplessness] to break the analogies on which to 
found the negative vindication that forms the great and undoubted achieve- 
ment of this volume. The analogy lies here : — that if a man wills to obtain 
prosperity in this life, he may, if observant of the rules which experience and 
wisdom prescribe, in general, make it good. And if he wills to attain blessed- 
ness in the next life, he shall, if observant of what religion prescribes, most 
certainly make it good; in conformity with the declaration, ‘he that seekelh 
findetli.’ ”] 


12 


134 


PROBATION, AS IMPLYING TRIAL, 


PART 1. 


security and happiness, without any solicitude or thought of their 
own : or if they were in no danger of being brought into incon- 
veniences and distress, by carelessness, or the folly of passion, 
through bad example, the treachery of others, or the deceitful 
appearances of things : were this our natural condition, then it 
might seem strange, and he some presumption against the truth 
of religion, that it represents our future and more general in- 
terest, as not secure of course, but as depending upon our be- 
havior, and requiring recollection and self-government to obtain it. 
It then might be alleged, “What you say is our condition, in one 
respect, is not in any wise of a sort with what we find, by expe- 
rience, is our condition in another. Our whole present interest 
is secured to our hands, without any solicitude of ours; and why 
should not our future interest, if we have any such, be so too?” 
But since, on the contrary, thought and consideration, the volun- 
tary denying ourselves many things which we desire, and a course 
of behavior, far from being always agreeable to us, are absolutely 
necessary to our acting even a common decent, and common 
prudent part, so as to pass with any satisfaction through the 
present world, and be received upon any tolerable good terms 
in it : since this is the case, all presumption against self-denial 
and attention being necessary to secure our higher interest/ is 
removed. 

Had we not experience, it might, perhaps speciously, be urged, 
that it is improbable any thing of hazard and danger should be 
put upon us by an infinite being; when every thing which has 
hazard and danger in our manner of conception, and will end in 
error, confusion, and misery, is already certain in his foreknow- 
ledge. Indeed, why any thing of hazard and danger should be 
put upon such frail creatures as we are, may well be thought a 
difficulty in speculation ; and cannot but be so, till we know the 
whole, or at least much more of the case. But still the consti- 
tution of nature is as it is. Our happiness and misery are trusted 
to our conduct, and made to depend upon it. Somewhat, and, 
in many circumstances, a great deal too, is put upon us, either to 

f [It comes to this : — good things, in this life, are not forced upon us ; for we 
may refuse them, or turn any of them into evils. Nor are they offered for our 
mere acceptance : but only as the results of self-control and pains-taking. So 
is it, as to heaven.] 


CITAP. IV. 


DIFFICULTIES, AND DANGER. 


135 


do, or to suffer, as we choose. All the various miseries of life, 
which people briug upon themselves by negligence and folly, 
and might have avoided by proper care, are instances of this : 
which miseries are, beforehand, just as contingent and undeter- 
mined as conduct, and left to be determined by it. 

These observations are an answer 8 to the objections against the 
credibility of a state of trial, as implying temptations, and real 
danger of miscarrying with regard to our general interest, under 
the moral government of God. And they show, that, if we^are 
at all to be considered in such a capacity, and as having such an 
interest, the general analogy of Providence must lead us to ap- 
prehend ourselves in danger of miscarrying, in different degrees, 
as to this interest, by our neglecting to act the proper part be- 
longing to us in that capacity. For we have a present interest 
under the government of God, which we experience here upon 
earth. This interest, as it is not forced upon us, so neither as it 
offered to our acceptance, but to our acquisition ) and in such 
manner, as that we are in danger of missing it, by means of 
temptations to neglect, or act contrary to it ; and without atten- 
tion and self-denial, we must and do miss it. It is then perfectly 
credible, that this may be our case, with respect to that chief and 
final good, which religion purposes to us 

s [They are an answer, but a cavil remains, — viz. : “ the difference between 
temporal and eternal things, is so vast that the cases are not analogous.” 
Fairly considered, the cases are analogous, differing only in degree, and not at 
all in principle. What would be wrong on a great scale, is wrong on a small 
one. / 

Perhaps the analogy may be pressed further. As the happiness and life of 
some animals, may be sacrificed for the benefit of man, why may not the hap- 
piness and life of some men, be sacrificed for the good of innumerable beings 
of a higher order, who witness the affairs of this earth? It would but be 
securing “ the greatest good of the greatest number.” No analogies could 
teach this, for analogies of course teach nothing. But if the Scriptures con- 
tained this doctrine, immensely more repugnant than that which our author is 
here defending, would analogy offer repellant presumptions ?] 


136 


PROBATION AS A DISCIPLINE. 


PART I. 


H 


CHAPTER V. 

PROBATION, AS INTENDED FOR MORAL DISCIPLINE 
AND IMPROVEMENT. 

From the consideration of our being in a probation-state, of 
so much difficulty and hazard, naturally arises the question, how 
we came to be placed in it ? But such a general inquiry as this 
would be found involved in insuperable difficulties. For, though 
some of these difficulties would be lessened, by observing that all 
wickedness is voluntary, as is implied in its very notion ; and 
that many of the miseries of life have apparent good effects: 
yet, when we consider other circumstances belonging to both, 
and what must be the consequence of the former in a life to 
come, it cannot but be acknowledged plain folly and presump- 
tion, to pretend to give an account of the whole reasons of this 
piatter; the whole reasons of our being allotted a condition, out 
of which so much wickedness and misery, so circumstanced, 
would in fact arise. Whether it be not beyond our faculties, not 
only to find out, but even to understand ; or, though we should 
be supposed capable of understanding it, yet, whether it would 
be of service or prejudice to us to be informed of it, is impos- 
sible to say. But as our present condition can in no wise be 
shown to be inconsistent with the perfect moral government of 
God : so religion teaches us we were placed in it, that we might 
qualify ourselves, by the practice of virtue, for another state 
which is to follow it. This, though but a partial answer, a very 
partial one indeed, to the inquiry now mentioned ; is yet a more 
satisfactory answer to another, which is of real, and of the utmost 
importance to us to have answered, — viz. : What is our business 
here ? The know T n end then, why we are placed in a state of so 
much affliction, hazard, and difficulty, is, our improvement in 
virtue and piety, as the requisite qualification for a future state 
of security and happiness. 

The beginning of life, considered as an education for mature 
age in the present world, appears plainly, at first sight, analogous 
to this our trial for a future one : the former being in our tem- 
poral capacity, what the latter is in our religious capacity. Some 


CHAP. V. 


PROBATION AS A DISCIPLINE. 


137 


observations common to both, and a more distinct consideration 
of each, will more distinctly show the extent and force of the 
analogy between them ; and the credibility, which arises from 
hence, as well as from the nature of the thing, that the present 
life was intended to be a state of discipline for a future one. 

I. Every species of creatures is, we see, designed for a par- 
ticular way of life ; to which, the nature, the capacities, temper, 
and qualifications, of each species, are as necessary as their ex- 
ternal circumstances. Both come into the notion of such state, 
or particular way of life, and are constituent parts of it. Change 
a man’s capacities or character, to the degree in which it is con- 
ceivable they may be changed, and he would be altogether in- 
capable of a human course of life, and human happiness; as 
incapable, as if, his nature continuing unchanged, he were placed 
in a world, where he had no sphere of action, nor any objects to 
answer his appetites, passions, and affections of any sort. One 
thing is set over against another, as an ancient writer expresses 
it. a Our nature corresponds to our external condition. With- 
out this correspondence, there would be no possibility of any such 
thing as human life and happiness : which life and happiness are, 
therefore, a result from our nature and condition jointly: mean- 
ing by human life, not living in the literal sense, but the whole 
complex notion commonly understood by those words. So that 
without determining what will be the employment and happiness, 
the particular life, of good men hereafter; there must be some 
determinate capacities, some necessary character and qualifica- 
tions, without which persons cannot but be utterly incapable ofi* 
it : in like manner, as there must be some, without which men 
would be incapable of their present state of life. 

II. The constitution of human creatures, and indeed of all 
creatures which come under our notice, is such, as that they are 
capable of naturally becoming qualified for states of life, for 
which they were once wholly unqualified. In imagination we 
may indeed conceive of creatures, incapable of having any of 
their faculties naturally enlarged, or as being unable naturally 
to acquire aiiy new qualifications. But the faculties of every 

a [That is, the son of Sirac, who says, “All things are double, one against 
another; and He hath made nothing imperfect: one thing established the 
good of another Eeclesiasticus xlii. 24.] 

12 * 


138 


PROBATION AS A DISCIPLINE. 


PART I. 


species known to us, are made for enlargement; for acquirements 
of experience and habits. We find ourselves, in particular, en- 
dued with capacities, not only of perceiving ideas, and of know- 
ledge or perceiving truth, but also of storing up ideas and know- 
ledge by memory. We are capable, not only of acting, and of 
having different momentary impressions made upon us; but of 
getting a new facility in any kind of action, and of settled altera- 
tions in our temper or character. The power of the two last is 
the power of habits. But neither the perception of ideas, nor 
knowledge of any sort, are habits; though absolutely necessary to 
the forming of them. However, apprehension, reason, memory, 
which are the capacities of acquiring knowledge, are greatly im- 
proved by exercise. Whether the word habit is applicable to all 
these improvements, and in particular how far the powers of 
memory and of habits may be powers of the same nature, I shall 
not inquire. But that perceptions come into our minds readily 
and of course, by means of their having been there before, seems 
a thing of the same sort, as readiness in any particular kind of 
action, proceeding from being accustomed to it. Aptness to re- 
collect practical observations, of service in our conduct, is plainly 
habit in many cases. There are habits of perception, and habits 
of action. An instance of the former, is our constant and even 
involuntary readiness, in correcting the impressions of our sight 
concerning magnitudes and distances, so as to substitute judg- 
ment in the room of sensation, imperceptibly to ourselves. It 
seems as if all other associations of ideas not naturally connected, 
might be called passive habits; as properly as our readiness in 
understanding languages upon sight, or hearing of words. Our 
readiness in speaking and writing them, &re instances of active 
habits. 

For distinctness, we may consider habits, as belonging to the 
body, or to the mind : and the latter will be explained by the 
former. Under the former are comprehended all bodily activities 
or motions, whether graceful or unbecoming, which are owing to 
use : under the latter, general habits of life and conduct; such as 
those of obedience and submission to authority, or to any par- 
ticular person; those of veracity, justice, and charity; those of 
attention, industry, self-government, envy, revenge. Habits of 
this latter kind seem produced by repeated acts, as well as the 


CHAP. V. 


PROBATION AS A DISCIPLINE. 


139 


former. And as habits belonging to the body are produced by 
external acts , so habits of the mind are produced by the exertion 
of inward practical principles; i.e .- by carrying them into act, or 
acting upon them ; the principles of obedience, of veracity, justice, 
and charity. Nor can those habits be formed by auy external 
course of action, otherwise than as it proceeds from these princi- 
ples: because it is only these inward principles exerted, which 
are strictly acts of obedience, of veracity, of justice, and of 
charity. 

So likewise habits of attention, industry, self-government, are 
in the same manner acquired by exercise; and habits of envy and 
revenge by indulgence, whether in outward act, or in thought 
and intention; i.e. inward act: for such intention is an act. 
Resolutions to do well, are also properly acts. And endeavoring 
to enforce upon our own minds a practical sense of virtue, or to 
beget in others that practical sense of it, which a man really has 
himself, is a virtuous act. x\ll these, therefore, may and will 
contribute towards forming good habits. But going over the 
theory of virtue in one’s thoughts, talking well, and drawing fine 
pictures, of it; this is so far from necessarily or certainly con- 
ducing to form a habit of it, in him who thus employs himself, that 
it may harden the mind in a contrary course, and render it gradu- 
ally more insensible; i.e. form a habit of insensibility to all moral 
considerations. For, from our very faculty of habits, passive im- 
pressions, by being repeated, grow weaker. Thoughts, by often 
passing through the mind, are felt less sensibly: being accus- 
tomed to danger, begets intrepidity, i.e. lessens fear; to distress, 
lessens the passion of pity; to instances of others’ mortality, 
lessens the sensible apprehension of our own. 

From these two observations together, that practical habits are 
formed and strengthened by repeated acts, and that .passive im- 
pressions grow weaker by being repeated upon us, it must follow, 
that active habits may be gradually forming and strengthening, 
by a course of acting upon such and such motives and excite- 
ments, while these motives and excitements themselves are, by 
proportionable degrees, growing less sensible; i.e. are continually 
less and less sensibly felt, even as the active habits strengthen. 
And experience confirms this : for active principles, at the very 
time that they are less lively in perception than they were, are 


140 


PROBATION AS A DISCIPLINE. 


PAKT r. 


found to be, somehow, wrought more thoroughly into the temper 
and character, and become more effectual in influencing our prac- 
tice. The three things just mentioned may afford instances of it. 
Perception of danger is a natural excitement of passive fear, and 
active caution : and by being inured to danger, habits of the latter 
are gradually wrought, at the same time that the former gradually 
lessens. Perception of distress in others is a natural excitement, 
passively to pity, and actively to relieve it: but let a man set 
himself to attend to, inquire out, and relieve distressed persons, 
and he cannot but grow less and less sensibly affected with the 
various miseries of life, with which he must become acquainted; 
when yet, at the same time, benevolence, considered not as a 
passion, but as a practical principle of action, will strengthen : 
and while he passively compassionates the distressed less, he will 
acquire a greater aptitude actively to assist and befriend them. 
So also at the same time that the daily instances of men’s dying 
around us give us daily a less sensible passive feeling or appre- 
hension of our own mortality, such instances greatly contribute to 
the strengthening a practical regard to it in serious men; i.e. to 
forming a habit of acting with a constant view to it. 

This seems further to show, that passive impressions made 
upon our minds by admonition, experience, or example, though 
they may have a remote efficacy, and a very great one, towards 
forming active habits, yet can have this efficacy no otherwise 
than by inducing us to such a course of action : and that it is not 
being affected so and so, but acting, which forms those habits : 
only it must be always remembered, that real endeavors to enforce 
good impressions upon ourselves are a species of virtuous action. 
Nor do we know how far it is possible, in the nature of things, 
that effects should be wrought in us at once, equivalent to habits; 
i.e. what is wrought by use and exercise. The thing insisted on 

is, not what may be possible, but what is in fact the appointment 
of nature : which is, that active habits are to be formed by exer- 
cise. Their progress may be so gradual, as to be imperceptible 
in its steps : it may be hard to explain the faculty, by which we 
are capable of habits, throughout its several parts; and to trace 
it up to its original, so as to distinguish it from all others in our 
mind: and it seems as if contrary effects were to be ascribed to 

it. But the thing in general, that our nature is formed to yield 


CHAP. v. PROBATION AS A DISCIPLINE. 141 

to use and exercise, in some such manner as this, is matter of 
certain experience. 

Thus, by accustoming ourselves to any course of action, we get 
an aptness to go on, a facility, readiness, and often pleasure, in 
it. The inclinations which rendered us averse to it, grow weaker; 
the difficulties in it, not only the imaginary but the real ones, 
lessen ; the reasons for it offer themselves of course to our thoughts 
upon all occasions; and the least glimpse of them is sufficient to 
make us go on, in a course of action, to which we have been ac- 
customed. Practical principles appear to grow stronger, abso- 
lutely in themselves, by exercise; as well as relatively, with 
regard to contrary principles; which, by being accustomed to 
submit, do so habitually, and of course. Thus a new character, 
in several respects, may be formed; and many habitudes of life, 
not given by nature, but which nature directs us to acquire. 

III. Indeed we may be assured, that we should never have had 
these capacities of improving by experience, acquired knowledge, 
and habits, had they not been necessary, and intended to be made 
use of. And accordingly we find them so necessary, and so much 
intended, that without them we should be utterly incapable of 
that which was the end for which we were made, considered in 
our temporal capacity only : the employments and satisfactions 
of our mature state of life. 

Nature does in no wise qualify us wholly, much less at once, for 
this mature state of life. Even maturity of understanding, and 
bodily strength, not only are arrived at gradually, but are also 
very much owing to the continued exercise of our powers of body 
and mind from infancy. If we suppose' a person brought into 
the world with both these in maturity, as far as this is conceivable, 
he would plainly at first be as unqualified for the human life of 
mature age, as an idiot. He would be in a manner distracted, 
with astonishment, and apprehension, and curiosity, and suspense : 
nor can one guess, how long it would be, before he would be 
familiarized to himself and the objects about him, enough even to 
set himself to any thing. It may be questioned too, whether the 
natural information of his sight and hearing would be of any 
manner of use to him in acting, before experience. And it seems, 
that men would be strangely headstrong and. self-willed, and dis- 
posed to exert themselves with an impetuosity, which would 


142 


PROBATION AS A DISCIPLINE. 


PART I. 


render society insupportable, and the living in it impracticable, 
were it not for some acquired moderation and self-government, some 
aptitude and readiness in restraining themselves, and concealing 
their sense of things. Want of every thing of this kind which 
is learnt would render a man as incapable of society, as want of 
language would ; or as his natural ignorance of any of the par- 
ticular employments of life would render him incapable of pro- 
viding himself with the common conveniences, or supplying the 
necessary wants of it. In these respects, and probably in many 
more of which we have no particular notion, mankind is left by 
nature, an unformed, unfinished creature ; utterly deficient and 
unqualified, before the acquirement of knowledge, experience, 
and habits, for that mature state of life, which was the end of 
his creation, considering him as related only to this world. 

But, as nature has endued us with a power of supplying those 
deficiencies, by acquired knowledge, experience, and habits; so 
likewise we are placed in a condition, in infancy, childhood, and 
youth, fitted for it ; fitted for our acquiring those qualifications 
of all sorts, which we stand in need of in mature age. Hence 
children, from their very birth, are daily growing acquainted 
with the objects about them, with the scene in which they are 
placed, and to have a future part ; and learning something or other, 
necessary to the performance of it. The subordinations, to which 
they are accustomed in domestic life, teach them self-government 
in common behavior abroad, and prepare them for subjection and 
obedience to civil authority. b What passes before their eyes, and 
daily happens to them, gives them experience, caution against 
treachery and deceit, together with numberless little rules of 
action and conduct, which we could not live without; and which 
are learnt so insensibly and so perfectly, as to be mistaken per- 
haps for instinct, though they are the effect of long experience 
and exercise; as much so as language, or knowledge in particular 
business, or the qualifications and behavior belonging to the 
several ranks and professions. Thus the beginning of our days 
is adapted to be, and is, a state of education in the theory and 
practice of mature life. We are much assisted in it by example, 
instruction, and the care of others ; but a great deal is left to 

b [Consult Millman’s Hist, of Christ, vol. i. : Priestley’s Institutes of Nat. 
and Rev. Rel., vol. i. ch. i. : and Whately’s Pol. Econ., see. 5.] 


CHAP. V. 


PROBATION AS A DISCIPLINE. 


143 


ourselves to do. And of this, as part is done easily and of 
course ; so part requires diligence and care, the voluntary fore- 
going many things which we desire, and setting ourselves to what 
we should have no inclination to, but for the necessity or expe- 
dience of it. For that labor and industry, which the station of 
so many absolutely requires, they would be greatly unqualified 
for, in maturity, as those in other stations would be for any other 
sorts of application ; if both were not accustomed to them in 
their youth. And, according as persons behave themselves, in 
the general education which all go through, and in the particular 
ones adapted to particular employments, their character is 
formed, 0 and made to appear; they recommend themselves more 
or less ; and are capable of, and placed in, different stations in 
society. 

The former part of life, then, is to be considered as an im- 
portant opportunity, which nature puts into our hands; and 
which, when lost is not to be recovered. And our being placed 
in a state of discipline throughout this life, for another world, is 
a providential disposition of things, exactly of the same kind, as 
our being placed in a state of discipline during childhood, for 
mature age. Our condition in both respects is uniform and of a 
piece, and comprehended under one and the same general law 
of nature. 

If we were not able at all to discern, how or in what way the 
present life could be our preparation for another ; this would be 
no objection against the credibility of its being so. We do not 
discern, how food and sleep contribute to the growth of the 
body; nor could have any thought that they would, before we 

c [We are too apt to overlook the effect of actions on the actor; (which is 
often the chief effect) in improving or impairing his own powers. A razor 
used to cut wood or stone, is not only put to an improper use, but spoiled for 
the use which is proper. But this is a faint illustration. The razor may be 
sharpened again ; but how shall we restore a blunted sensibility, an enfeebled 
judgment, or a vitiated appetite? Our wrong-doing inflicts worse results on 
ourselves than on our victims; and the evil may spread disaster over our whole 
future. Hence the young make a fatal blunder when they suppose that an 
occasional indulgence in impropriety may be compatible with general welfare, 
and improvement. Instead of balancing the pros and cons of a particular 
act, in the scale of utility or pleasure, they should mark well its effects on 
themselves. See the description of how an upright being may fall; in a 
subsequent part of this chapter.] 


PROBATION AS A DISCIPLINE. 


P \TTT r. 


14 4 


had experience. Nor do children at all think, on the one hand, 
that the sports and exercises, to which they are so much addicted, 
contribute to their health and growth ; nor, on the other, of the 
necessity which there is for their being restrained in them. Nor 
are they capable of understanding the use of many parts of dis- 
cipline, which nevertheless they must be made to go through, in 
order to qualify them for the business of mature age. Were we 
not able then to discover, in what respects the present life could 
form us for a future one; yet nothing would be more supposable 
than that it might, in some respects or other, from the general 
analogy of Providence. And this, for aught I see, might reason- 
ably be said, even though we should not take in the consideration 
of God’s moral government over the world. But, 

IV. Take in this consideration, and consequently, that the 
character of virtue and piety is a necessary qualification for the 
future state, and then we may distinctly see, how, and in what 
respects, the present life may be a preparation for it; since we 
want, and are capable of, improvement in that character , by 
moral and religious habits; and the present life is fit to be a 
state of discipline for such improvement : in like manner as we 
have already observed, how, and in what respects, infancy, child- 
hood, aud youth, are a necessary preparation, and a natural state 
of discipline, for mature age. 

Nothing which wc at present see, would lead us to the thought 
of a solitary inactive state hereafter. If we judge at all from 
the analogy of nature, we must suppose, according to the Scrip- 
ture account of it, that it will be a community. And there is no 
shadow of any thing unreasonable in conceiving, though there 
be no analogy for it, that this community will be, as the Scrip- 
ture represents it, under the more immediate, or, if such an ex- 
pression may be used, the more sensible government of God. 
Nor is our ignorance, what will be the employments of this 
happy community, nor our consequent ignorance, what particular 
scope or occasion there will be for the exercise of veracity, 
justice, and charity, among the members of it with regard to 
each other, any proof, that there will be no sphere of exercise 
for those virtues. Much less, if that were possible, is our igno- 
rance any proof, that there will be no occasion for that frame of 
mind, or character, which is formed by the daily practice of those 


CHAP. V. 


PROBATION AS A DISCIPLINE. 


145 


particular virtues here, aud •which is a result from it. d This at 
least must be owned in general, that, as the government esta- 
blished in the universe is moral, the character of virtue and 
piety must, in some way or other, be the condition of our happi- 
ness or the qualification for it. 

From what is above observed, concerning our natural power of 
habits, it is easy to see, that we are capable of moral improve- 
ment by discipline. And how greatly we want it, need not be 
proved to any one who is acquainted with the great wickedness 
of mankind; or even with those imperfections, which the bes* 
are conscious of. But it is not perhaps distinctly attended to by 
every one, that the occasion which human creatures have for dis- 
cipline, to improve in them this character of virtue and piety, is 
to be traced up higher than to excess in the passions, by indul- 
gence and habits of vice. Mankind, and perhaps all finite 
creatures, from the very constitution of their nature, before 
habits of virtue, are deficient, and in danger of deviating from 
what is right; and therefore stand in need of virtuous habits, for 
a security against this danger. For, together with the general 
principle of moral understanding, we have in our inward frame 
various affections towards particular external objects. These 
affections are naturally, and of right, subject to the government 
of the moral principle, as to the occasions upon which they may 
be gratified; as to the times, degrees, and manner, in which the 
objects of them may be pursued. But the principle of virtue 
can neither excite them, nor prevent their being excited. On the 
contrary, they are naturally felt, when the objects of them are 
present to the mind, not only before all consideration whether 

d [“ It might seem, at first sight, that if our state hereafter presented no 
temptations to falsehood, injustice, Ac., our habit of indulging these vices here 
would be no disqualification for such a state; and our forming the contrary 
habits no qualification. But habits of veracity, justice, Ac. are not merely 
securities against temptations to the contrary, but needful for conserving the 
principleB'oi love of truth, justice, Ac. As our happiness depends upon the 
ratio between our circumstances and our dispositions, our happiness, in a state 
where things are ordered so as to give no scope for the practice of falsehood, 
injustice, Ac., must depend on our having formed a love for their opposites. 

Besides, the circumstances of the future life may be such as only to remove 
temptations from characters formed by such moral discipline as we undergo 
in this life, and not all things that could be temptations to any one.”— Prop. 
Fitzgerald.] 

K 


13 


146 


PROBATION AS A DISCIPLINE. 


PART I. 


they can be obtained by lawful means, but after it is found they 
cannot. The natural objects of affection continue so; the neces- 
saries, conveniences, and pleasures of life, remain naturally de- 
sirable, though they cannot be obtained innocently: nay, though 
they cannot possibly be obtained at all. And when the objects 
of any affection whatever cannot be obtained without unlawful 
means; but may be obtained by them: such affection, though its 
being excited, and its continuing some time in the mind, be as 
innocent as it is natural and necessary, yet cannot but be co’n- 
ceived to have a tendency to incline persons to venture upon such 
unlawful means : and therefore must be conceived as putting 
them in some danger of it. Now what is the general security 
against this danger; against their actually deviating from right? 
As the danger is, so also must the security be, from within : from 
the practical principle of virtue.* The strengthening or improving 
this principle, considered as practical, or as a principle of action, 
will lessen the danger, or increase the security against it. And 
this moral principle is capable of improvement, by proper dis- 
cipline and exercise: by recollecting the practical impressions 
which example and experience have made upon us : and, instead 
of following humor and mere inclination, by continually attending 
to the equity and right of the case, in whatever we are engaged, 
be it in greater or less matters ; and accustoming ourselves always 
to act upon it, as being itself the just and natural motive of action ; 
and as this moral course of behavior must necessarily, under the 
divine government, be our final interest. Thus the principle of 

* It may be thought, that a sense of interest would as effectually restrain 
creatures from doing wrong. But if by a sense of interest is meant a specula- 
tive conviction or belief, that such and such indulgence would occasion them 
greater uneasiness, upon the whole, than satisfaction; it is contrary to present 
experience to say, that this sense of interest is sufficient to restrain them from 
thus indulging themselves. And if by a sense of interest is meant a practical 
regard to what is upon the whole our happiness; this is not only coincident 
with the principle of virtue or moral rectitude, but is a part of the. idea itself. 
And it is evident this reasonable self-love wants to be improved, a^ really as 
any principle in our nature. For we daily see it overmatched, not only by the 
more boisterous passions, but by curiosity, shame, love of imitation, by any 
thing, even indolence : especially if the interest, the temporal interest, suppose, 
which is the end of such self-love, be at a distance. So greatly are profligate 
men mistaken, when they affirm they are wholly governed by interestednesa 
and self-love; and so little cause is there for moralists to disclaim this prin- 
ciple. — See p. 131. 


CHAP. V. 


PROBATION AS A DISCIPLINE. 


147 


virtue , improved into a habit, of which improvement we are thus 
capable, will plain ly be, in proportion to the strength of it, a 
security against the danger ivhich finite creatures are in, from 
the very nature of propension, or particular affections. This 
way of putting the matter, supposes particular affections to re- 
main in a future stato; which it is scarce possible to avoid sup- 
posing. And if they do; we clearly see, that acquired habits of 
virtue and self-government may be necessary for the regulation 
of them. However, though we were not distinctly to take in 
this supposition, but to speak only in general; the thing really 
comes to the same. For habits of virtue, thus acquired by dis- 
cipline, are improvement in virtue : and improvement in virtue 
must be advancement in happiness, if the government of the 
universe be moral. 

From these things we may observe, (and it will further show 
this our natural and original need of being improved by discipline,) 
how it comes to pass, that creatures made upright, fall; and how 
those who preserve their uprightness, raise themselves by so 
doing, to a more secure state of virtue. To say that the former 
is accounted for by the nature of liberty, is to say no more, than 
that an event’s actually happening is accounted for by a mere 
possibility of its happening. But it seems distinctly conceivable 
from the very nature of particular affections or propensions. For, 
suppose creatures intended for such a particular state of life, for 
which such propensions were necessary: suppose them endued 
with such propensions, together with moral understanding, as 
well including a practical sense of virtue as a speculative percep- 
tion of it ; and that all these several principles, both natural and 
moral, forming an inward constitution of mind, were in the most 
exact proportion possible; i.e. in a proportion the most exactly 
adapted to their intended state of life; such creatures would be 
made upright, or finitely perfect. Now particular propensions, 
from their very nature, must be felt, the objects of them being 
present; though they cannot be gratified at all, or not with the 
allowance of the moral principle. If they can be gratified without 
its allowance, or by contradicting it, then they must be conceived 
to have some tendency, in how low a degree soever, yet some 
tendency, to induce persons to such forbidden gratification. This 
tendency, in some one particular propension, may be increased, 


148 


PROBATION AS A DISCIPLINE. 


PATCT I. 


by the greater frequency of occasions naturally exciting it, than 
of occasions exciting others. The least voluntary indulgence in 
forbidden circumstances, 6 though but in thought, will increase 
this wrong tendency; and may increase it further, till, peculiar 
conjunctures perhaps conspiring, it becomes effect; and danger 
of deviating from right, ends in actual deviation from it; a danger 
necessarily arising from the very nature of propension, and which 
therefore could not have been prevented, though it might have 
been escaped, or got innocently through. The case would be, as 
if we were to suppose a straight path marked out for a person, in 
which a certain degree of attention would keep him steady : but 
if he would not attend, in this degree, any one of a thousand 
objects, catching his eye, might lead him out of it. 

Now it is impossible to say, how much even the first full overt 
act of irregularity, might disorder the inward constitution; un- 
settle the adjustments, and alter the proportions, which formed 
it, and in which the uprightness of its make consisted : but repe- 
tition of irregularities would produce habits. Thus the constitu- 
tion would be spoiled; and creatures made upright, become 
corrupt and depraved in their settled character, proportionably to 
their repeated irregularities in occasional acts.*' On the contrary, 

e [Discipline is mainly promoted by a careful regard to acts of small indi- 
vidual moment. The subjecting of trivial acts to moral considerations, is the 
sure, and the only mode of self-culture. These acts are embryo habits, and we 
may often see clearly the moral character of a habit, when the single act seems 
indifferent. Thus viewed, the importance of single acts will seldom seem small. 
A single cigar, one glass of wine for convivial purposes, one story told with 
exaggerations, may change the complexion of our character, and of our whole 
destiny ! 

It is doing or refusing to do, from a law-abiding regard to consequences, 
that constitutes self-discipline. Papists wholly err in teaching the repression 
of bodily desires as in itself virtuous. Indulgence may be either an obstacle or 
an aid to moral progress, according to our reason for indulgence. When we 
can repress an appetite or pass-ion whenever indulgence would be wrong, its 
mastery over us is broken ; and when the passions and appetites act rightly, 
from force of virtuous habit, without direct volition, discipline is complete. 
Ascetic acts are only useful as means, and so long as they are ascetic (askesis) 
are proofs of imperfect obedience. Discipline is good only as discipline; and 
when complete, changes from a struggle between principle and inclination, to 
a spontaneous habit, and permanent mental peace.] 

r [Chalmers objects to this hypothetical fall of man, that it wants harmony 
with the Scripture account. But I do not see the force of the objection. Butler 
of course does not copy the Scripture account, for he would then depart from the 


CHAP. V. 


PROBATION AS A DISCIPLINE. 


149 


these creatures might have improved and raised themselves, to a 
higher and more secure state of virtue, by the contrary behavior : 
by steadily following the moral principle, supposed to be one part 
of their nature : and thus withstanding that unavoidable danger 
of defection, which necessarily arose from propension, the other 
part of it. For, by thus preserving their integrity for some time, 
their danger would lessen ; since propensions, by being inured to 
submit, would do it more easily and of course : and their security 
against this lessening danger would increase; since the moral 
principle would gain additional strength by exercise : both which 
things are implied iu the notion of virtuous habits. 

Thus vicious indulgence is not only criminal in itself, but also 
depraves the inward constitution and character. And virtuous 
self-government is not only right in itself, but also improves the 
inward constitution or character: and may improve it to such a 
degree, that though we should suppose it impossible for particular 
affections to be absolutely coincident with the moral principle; 
and consequently should allow, that such creatures as have been 
above supposed, would forever remain defectible, yet their danger 
of actually deviating from right may be almost infinitely lessened, 
and they fully fortified against what remains of it; if that may 
be called danger, against which there is an adequate, effectual 
security. Still, this their higher perfection may continue to con- 
sist in habits of virtue formed in a state of discipline, and this 
their more complete security remain to proceed from them. 

Thus it is plainly conceivable, that creatures without blemish, 
as they came out of the hands of God, may be in danger of going 
wrong; and so may stand in need of the security of virtuous 
habits, additional to the moral principle wrought into their natures 
by him. That which is the ground of their danger, or their 
want of security, may be considered as a deficiency in themselves, 

aim and nature of his book. The Bible says- man fell suddenly, no less in his 
state than in his character. Butler says that we could not reason out how much 
disorder and damage would ensue from the first sin : and in saying this, avoids 
any incongruity with the Mosaic account, which tells us how much. What B. 
eays of the formation of habit, by repeated transgressions, certainly cannot be 
gainsayed. 

Adam “died,” the very day he ate the forbidden fruit. The sinner ‘‘lives” 
the very day he believes on the only-begotten Son of God. Increase of guilt, 
or growth in grace are predicable in both instances. In both also there is an 
instant transition into a new relationship with God.] 

13 * 


150 


PROBATION AS A DISCIPLINE. 


PART I. 


to which virtuous habits are the natural supply. And as they 
are naturally capable of being raised and improved by discipline, 
it may be a thing fit and requisite, that they should be placed 
in circumstances with an eye to it : in circumstances peculiarly 
fitted to be to them a state of discipline for their improvement in 
virtue. 

But how much more strongly must this hold with respect to 
those who have corrupted their natures, are fallen from their 
original rectitude, and whose passions are become excessive by 
repeated violations of their inward constitution ! Upright crea- 
tures may want to be improved : depraved creatures want to be 
renewed. Education and discipline, which may be in all degrees 
and sorts of gentleness and of severity, are expedient for those : 
but must be absolutely necessary for these. For these, discipline 
of the severer sort too, and in the higher degrees of it, must be 
necessary, in order to wear out vicious habits ; to recover their 
primitive strength of self-government, which indulgence must 
have weakened ; to repair, as well as raise into a habit, the moral 
principle, in order to their arriving at a secure state of virtuous 
happiness. 

Whoever will consider the thing, may clearly see that the 
present world is 'peculiarly jit to be a state of discipline for this 
purpose, to such as will set themselves to mend and improve. 
For, the various temptations with which we are surrounded ; our 
experience of the deceits of wickedness ; having been in many 
instances led wrong ourselves; the great viciousness of the world; 
the infinite disorders consequent upon it; our being made ac- 
quainted with pain and sorrow, either from our own feeling of it, 
or from the sight of it in others ; these things, though some of 
them may indeed produce wrong effects upon our minds, yet 
when duly reflected upon, have, all of them, a direct tendency 
to bring us to a settled moderation and reasonableness of temper: 
the contrary both to thoughtless levity, and also to that unre- 
strained self-will, and violent bent to follow present inclination, 
which may be observed in undisciplined minds. 

Such experience, as the present state affords, of the frailty 
of our nature; of the boundless extravagance of ungoverned 
passion ; of the power which an infinite being has over us, by 
the various capacities of misery which he has given us; in short, 


CHAP. V. 


PROBATION AS A DISCIPLINE. 


151 


that kind and degree of experience, which the present state 
affords us, that the constitution of nature is such as to admit 
the possibility, the danger, and the actual event, of creatures 
losing their innocence and happiness, and becoming vicious and 
wretched- has a tendency to give us a practical sense of things 
very different from a mere speculative knowledge, that we are 
liable to vice, and capable of misery. And who knows, whether 
the security of creatures in the highest and most settled state of 
perfection, may not in part arise, from their having had such a. 
sense of things as this, formed, and habitually fixed within them, 
in some state of probation. And passing through the present 
world with that moral attention, which is necessary to the acting 
a right part in it, may leave everlasting impressions of this sort 
upon our minds. 

To be a little more distinct : allurements to what is wrong:, 
difficulties in the discharge of our duty, our not being able to act 
a uniform right part without some thought and care, and the 
opportunities which we have, or imagine we have, of avoiding 
what we dislike or obtaining what we desire, by unlawful means, 
when we either cannot do it at all, or at least not so easily, by 
lawful ones, these things, i.e. the snares and temptations of vice, 
are what render the present world peculiarly fit to be a state of 
discipline, to those who will preserve their integrity: because 
they render being upon our guard, resolution, and the denial of 
our passions, necessary in order to that end. The exercise of 
such particular recollection, intention of mind, and self-govern- 
ment, in the practice of virtue, has, from the make of our nature, 
a peculiar tendency to form habits of virtue ; as implying, not 
only a real, but also a more continued, and a more intense exer- 
cise of the virtuous principle, or a more constant and a stronger 
effort of virtue exerted into act. Thus suppose a person to know 
himself to be in particular danger, for some time, of doing any 
thing wrong, which yet he fully resolves not to do; continued 
recollection and keeping upon his guard, in order to make good 
his resolution, is a continued exerting of that act of virtue 
in a high degree , which need have been, and perhaps would 
have been, only instantaneous and weak , had the temptation 
been so. 

It is indeed ridiculous to assert, that self-denial is essential to 


152 


PROBATION AS A DISCIPLINE. 


PART r. 


virtue and piety: 8 but it would have been nearer the truth, 
though not strictly the truth itself, to have said, that it is essen- 
tial to discipline and improvement. For though actions ma- 
terially virtuous, which have no sort of difficulty, but are per- 
fectly agreeable to our particular inclinations, may possibly be 
done only from these particular inclinations, and so may not be 
any exercise of the principle of virtue, i.e. not be virtuous actions 
at all ; yet, on the contrary, they may be an exercise of that 
principle : and when they are, they have a tendency to form and 
fix the habit of virtue. But when the exercise of the virtuous 
principle is more continued, oftener repeated, and more intense; 
as it must be in circumstances of danger, temptation, and diffi- 
culty, of any kind and in any degree; this tendency is increased 
proportionably, and a more confirmed habit is the consequence. 

This undoubtedly holds to a certain length : but how far it 
may hold, I know not. Neither our intellectual powers, nor our 
bodily strength can be improved beyond a certain degree : and 
both may be overwrought. Possibly there may be something 
analogous to this, with respect to the moral character; which is 
scarce worth considering. I mention it only, lest it should come 
into some persons' thoughts, not as an exception to the foregoing 
observations, which perhaps it is ; but as a confutation of them, 
which it is not. And there may be several other exceptions. 
Observations of this kind cannot be supposed to hold minutely, 
and in every case. It is enough that they hold in general. And 
these plainly hold so far, as that from them may be seen dis- 
tinctly, (which is all that is intended by them,) that the present 
world is peculiarly jit to be a state of discipline , for our im- 
provement in virtue and piety : in the same sense as some 
sciences, by requiring and engaging the attention, not to be sure 
of such persons as will not, but of such as will, set themselves 
to them, are fit to form the mind to habits of attention. 

s [A forced or reluctant obedience is wholly incompatible with earthly hap- 
piness ; but may, in the highest degree promote our future happiness. It will 
not long mar our happiness, even here ; because being based on principle, and 
established by habit, it will, in process of time, be superseded by prompt and 
pleasurable submission. Thus a person habitually virtuous, is hardly conscious 
of self-denial; a fact noticed by Aristotle. “He who abstains from bodily 
pleasures and delights, is virtuous in this very abstinence ; but he who is 
troubled by it, is undisciplined.” Ethic. Nic. ii. 3.] 


PHAP. V. 


PROBATION AS A DISCIPLINE. 


153 


Indeed the present state is so far from proving, in event, a dis- 
cipline of virtue to the generality of men, that on the contrary 
they seem to make it a discipline of vice. And the viciousness 
of the world is, in different ways, the great temptation which 
renders it a state of virtuous discipline, in the degree it is, to 
good men. The whole end, and the whole occasion, of man- 
kind’s being placed in such a state as the present, is not pre- 
tended to be accounted for. That which appears amidst the 
general corruption, is, that there are some persons, who, having 
within them the principle of amendment and recovery, attend to 
and follow the notices of virtue and religion, be they more clear 
or more obscure, which are afforded them ; and that the present 
world is not only an exercise of virtue in these persons, hut an 
exercise of it in ways and degrees, peculiarly apt to improve it : 
apt to improve it, in some respects, even beyond what would be, 
by the exercise of it, required in a perfectly virtuous society, or 
in a society of equally imperfect virtue with themselves. But 
that the present world does not actually become a state of moral 
discipline to many, even to the generality, i.e. that they do not 
improve or grow better in it, cannot be urged as a proof, that it 
was not intended for moral discipline, by any who at all observe 
the analogy of nature. For, of the numerous seeds of vegetables 
and bodies of animals, which are adapted and put in the way to 
improve to such a point or state of natural maturity and perfec- 
tion, we do not see perhaps that one in a million actually does. 
Far the greatest part of them decay before they are improved to 
it ; and appear to be absolutely destroyed. Yet no one, who does 
not deny all final causes, will deny, that those seeds and bodies, 
which do attain to that point of maturity and perfection, answer 
the end for which they were really designed by nature; and 
therefore that nature designed them for such perfection. I can- 
not forbear adding, though it is not to the present purpose, that 
the appearance of such an amazing icaste in nature, with respect 
to these seeds and bodies, by foreign causes, is to us as unaccount- 
able, as, what is much more terrible, the present and future ruin 
of so many moral agents by themselves, i.e. by vice. 

Against this whole notion of moral discipline, it may be ob- 
jected, in another way; that so far as a course of behavior, 
materially virtuous, proceeds from hope and fear, so far it is only 


154 


PROBATION AS A DISCIPLINE. 


PART I. 


a discipline and strengthening of self-love. But doing what God 
commands, because he commands it, is obedience, though it pro- 
ceeds from hope or fear. A course of such obedience will form 
habits of it. And a constaut regard to veracity, justice, and 
charity, may form distinct habits of these particular virtues ; and 
will certainly form habits of self-government, and of denying our 
inclinations, whenever veracity, justice, or charity requires it. 
Nor is there any foundation for this great nicety, with which 
some affect to distinguish in this case, in order to depreciate all 
religion proceeding from hope or fear. For, veracity, justice, 
and charity, regard to God’s authority, and to our own chief in- 
terest, are not only all three coincident; but each of them is, in 
itself, a just and natural motive or principle of action. He who 
begins a good life from any one of them, and perseveres in it, as 
he is already in some degree, so he cannot fail of becoming more 
and more, of that character which is correspondent to the con- 
stitution of nature as moral; and to the relation which God 
stands in to us as moral governor of it : nor consequently can he 
fail of obtaining that happiness, which this constitution and rela- 
tion necessarily suppose connected with that character. 

These several observations, concerning the active principle of 
virtue and obedience to Godls commands, are applicable to pas- 
sive submission or resignation to his will : which is another es- 
sential part of a right character, connected with the former, and 
very much in our power to form ourselves to. It may be imagined, 
that nothing but afflictions can give occasion for or require this 
virtue; that it can have no respect to, nor be any way necessary 
to qualify for, a state of perfect happiness : but it is not expe- 
rience which can make us think thus. Prosperity itself, while 
any thing supposed desirable is not ours, begets extravagant and 
unbounded thoughts. Imagination is altogether as much a source 
of discontent, as any thing in our external condition. It is in- 
deed true, that there can be no scope for patience , when sorrow 
shall be no more; but there may be need of a temper of mind, 
which shall have been formed by patience. For, though self- 
love, considered merely as an active principle leading us to pur- 
sue our chief interest, cannot but be uniformly coincident with 
the principle of obedience to God’s commands, our interest being 
rightly understood; because this obedience, and the pursuit of 


CHAP. V. 


PROBATION AS A DISCIPLINE. 


155 


our own chief interest, must be in every case one and the same 
thing: yet it may be questioned, whether self-love, considered 
merely as the desire of our own interest or happiness, can, from 
its nature, be thus absolutely and uniformly coincident with the 
will of God; any more than particular affections can:* coincident 
in such sort, as not to be liable to be excited upon occasions and 
in degrees, impossible to be gratified consistently with the consti- 
tution of things, or the divine appointments. So that habits of 
resignation may, upon this account, be requisite for all creatures : 
habits, I say; which signify what is formed by use. However, 
in general it is obvious that both self-love and particular affection 
in human creatures considered only as passive feelings, distort 
and rend the mind ; and therefore stand in need of discipline. 
Now denial of those particular affections, in a course of active 
virtue and obedience to 'God’s will, has a tendency to moderate 
them; and seems also to have a tendency to habituate the mind, 
to be easy and satisfied with that degree of happiness which is 
allotted us, i.e. to moderate self-love. But the proper discipline 
for resignation is affliction. A right behavior under that trial ; 
recollecting ourselves so as to consider it in the view, in which 
religion teaches us to consider it, as from the hand of God, re- 
ceiving it as what he appoints, or thinks proper to permit, in his 
world and under his government; this will habituate the mind to 
a dutiful submission. Such submission, together with the active 
principle of obedience, make up the temper and character in us, 
which answers to his sovereignty; and which absolutely belongs 
to the condition of our being, as dependent creatures. Nor can 
it be said, that this is only breaking the mind to a submission to 
mere power; for mere power may be accidental, and precarious, 
and usurped: but it is forming within ourselves the temper of 
resignation to His rightful authority, who is, by nature, supreme 
over all. 

Upon the whole: such a character, and such qualifications, are 
necessary for a mature state of life in the present world, as nature 
alone does in no wise bestow; but has put it upon us, in great 
part, to acquire, in our progress from one stage of life to another, 
from childhood to mature age; put it upon us to acquire them, 
by giving us capacities of doing it, and by placing us, in the 

* P. 145. 


156 


PROBATION AS A DISCIPLINE. 


TART I. 


beginning of life, in a condition fit for it. And this is a general 
analogy to our condition in the present world, as in a state of 
moral discipline for another. 

It is in vain to object against the credibility of the present 
life’s being intended for this purpose, that all the trouble and the 
danger unavoidably accompanying such discipline, might have 
been saved us, by our being made at once the creatures and the 
characters, which we were to be. For we experience, that what 
we were to be, was to be the effect of what we would do : and 
that the general conduct of nature is, not to save us trouble or 
danger, but to make us capable of going through them, and to 
put it upon us to do so. Acquirements of our own, experience 
and habits, are the natural supply to our deficiencies, and secu- 
rity against our dangers : since it is as plainly natural to set our- 
selves to acquire the qualifications, as the external things, which 
we stand in need of. In particular, it is as plainly a general law 
of nature, that we should with regard to our temporal interest, 
form and cultivate practical principles within us, by attention, 
use, and discipline, as any thing whatever is a natural law; chiefly 
in the beginning of life, but also throughout the whole course of 
it. The alternative is left to our choice: either to improve our- 
selves, and better our condition; or, in default of such improve- 
ment, to remain deficient and wretched. It is therefore perfectly 
credible, from the analogy of nature, that the same may be our 
case, with respect to the happiness of a future state, and the 
qualifications necessary for it. 

There is a third thing, which may seem implied in the present 
world’s being a state of probation; that it is a theatre of action , 
for the manifestation of persons’ characters, with respect to a 
future one : not, to be sure, to an all-knowing Being, but to his 
creation or part of it. This may, perhaps, be only a consequence 
of our being in a state of probation in the other senses. How- 
ever, it is not impossible, that men’s showing and making mani- 
fest, what is in their heart, what their real character is, may have 
respect to a future life, in ways and manners with which we are 
not acquainted : particularly it may be a means, (for the x\uthor 
of nature does not appear to do any thing without means,) of 
their being disposed of suitably to their characters; and of its 
being known to the creation, by way of example, that they are 


CHAP. VI. 


THE OPINION OF NECESSITY. 


157 


thus disposed of. But not to enter upon any conjectural account 
of this; one may just mention, that the manifestation of persons’ 
characters contributes very much, in various ways, to the carrying 
on a great part of that general course of nature, respecting man- 
kind, which comes under our observation at present. I shall 
only add, that probation, in both these senses, as well as in that 
treated of in the foregoing chapter, is implied in moral govern- 
ment; since by persons’ behavior under it, their characters can- 
not but be manifested, and if they behave well, improved. 


CHAPTER YI. 

THE OPINION OF NECESSITY, CONSIDERED AS INFLUENCING 
PRACTICE. 

Throughout the foregoing treatise it appears, that the con- 
dition of mankind, considered as inhabitants of this world only, 
and under the government of God which we experience, is greatly 
analogous to our condition, as designed for another world, or as 
under that farther government, which religion teaches us. If 
therefore any assert, as a fatalist must, that the opinion of uni- 
versal necessity is reconcilable with the former; there immediately 
arises a question in the way of analogy, whether he must not also 
own it to be reconcilable with the latter, i.e. with the system of 
religion itself, and the proof of it. The reader then will observe, 
that the question now before us is not absolute, i.e. whether the 
opinion of fate be reconcilable with religion ; but hypothetical, 
whether, upon supposition of its being reconcilable with the con- 
stitution of nature, it be not reconcilable with religion also. Or, 
what pretence a fatalist, not other persons, but a fatalist, has to 
conclude from his opinion, that there can be no such thing as 
religion. And as the puzzle and obscurity, which must unavoid- 
ably arise from arguing upon so absurd a supposition as that of 
universal necessity, will, I fear, easily be seen; it will, I hope, as 
easily be excused.® 

a [The student should learn to distinguish between the hinds of necessity. 
There is — 1. “ Logical necessity , ” which requires the admission of a consequent 
to a premise. 2. “ Moral necessity,” which requires means in order to ends. 

14 


158 


THE OPINION OF NECESSITY, 


PART I. 


Since it has been all along taken for granted, as a thing proved, 
that there is an intelligent Author of nature, or natural Governor 
of the world; and since an objection may be made against the 
proof of this, from the opinion of universal necessity, as it may 
be supposed, that such necessity will itself account for the origin 
and preservation of all things; it is requisite, that this objection 
be distinctly answered ; or that it be shown, that a fatality sup- 
posed consistent with what we certainly experience, does not 
destroy the proof of an intelligent Author and Governor of 
nature; before we proceed to consider, whether it destroys the 
proof of a moral Governor of it, or of our being in a state of 
religion. 

When it is said by a fatalist, that the whole constitution of 
nature, the actions of men, every thing, and every mode and 
circumstance of every thing, is necessary, and could not possibly 
have been otherwise; it is to be observed, that this necessity does 
not exclude deliberation, choice, preference, and acting from cer- 
tain principles, and to certain ends : because all this is matter of 
undoubted experience, acknowledged by all, and what every man 
may, every moment, be conscious of. Hence it follows, that 
necessity, alone and of itself, is in no sort an account of the con- 
stitution of nature, and how things came to be and to continue as 
they are ; but only an account of this circumstance relating to 
their origin and continuance, that they could not have been other- 
wise, than they are and have been. The assertion, that every 
thing is by necessity of nature, is not an answer to the question ; 
Whether the world came into being as it is, by an intelligent 
Agent forming it thus, or not : but to quite another question ; 
Whether it came into being as it is, in that way and manner 
which we call necessarily , or in that way and manner which we call 

3. “Physical necessity,” which is the compulsory connection of sequences to 
antecedents, in the material world. 4. “Metaphysical necessity,” which be- 
longs to God only, as existing eternally and immutably. All these exist and 
operate, and by them we govern ourselves. 

But there are various other kinds of necessity, erroneous and pernicious, 
which may be grouped under two beads: — 1. “Atheistic,” sometimes called 
the Democritic, which ascribes all things to the mechanical laws of matter. 
2. “ Theistic,” which admits the existence of God, but denies to him moral 
character, and makes him the arbitrary and only agent in the universe, and 
creatures not responsible. See Collings on Providence, Price’s Dissertations, 
Rutherford on Providence, Charnock’s Sermons, and Whately’s Logic.] 


chap. vi. 


AS INFLUENCING PRACTICE. 


159 


freely? For suppose farther, that one who was a fatalist, and 
one who kept to his natural sense of things, and believed him- 
self a free agent, were disputing together, and vindicating their 
respective opinions; and they should happen to instance a 
house; they would agree that it was built by an architect. Their 
difference concerning necessity and freedom would occasion no 
difference of judgment concerning this; but only concerning an- 
other matter ; whether the architect built it necessarily or freely. 

Suppose they should proceed to inquire concerning the consti- 
tution of nature. In a lax way of speaking, one of them might 
say, it was by necessity; and the other, by freedom : but if they 
had any meaning to their words, as the latter must mean a free 
agent, so the former must at length be reduced to mean an agent, 
whether he would say one or more, acting by necessity : for ab- 
stract notions can do nothing. We indeed ascribe to God a neces- 
sary existence, uncaused by any agent. For we find within our- 
selves the idea of infinity, i.e. immensity and eternity, impossible, 
even in imagination, to be removed out of being. We seem to 
discern intuitively, that there must, and cannot but be, some- 
thing, external to ourselves, answering this idea, or the archetype 
of it. Hence, (for this abstract, as much as any other, implies 
a concrete') we conclude, that there is, and cannot but be, an in- 
finite and immense eternal being, existing prior to all design con- 
tributing to his existence, and exclusive of it. From the scanti- 
ness of language, a manner of speaking has been introduced ; 
that necessity is the foundation, the reason, the account of the 
existence of God. But it is not alleged, nor can it be at all 
intended, that every thing exists as it does, by this kind of neces- 
sity: a necessity antecedent in nature to design: it cannot, I 
say, be meant that every thing exists as it does, by this kind of 
necessity, upon several accounts; and particularly because it is 
admitted, that design, in the actions of men, contributes to many 
alterations in nature. If any deny this, I shall not pretend to 
reason with them. 

From these things it follows; First , That when a fatalist 
asserts, that every thing is by necessity, he must mean, by an 
agent acting necessarily ; he must, I say, mean this, for I am 
very sensible he would not choose to mean it. Secondly, That 
the necessity, by which such an agent is supposed to act, does 


160 THE OPINION OF NECESSITY, part i. 

not exclude intelligence and design. So that, were the system 
of fatality admitted, it would just as much account for the for- 
mation of the world, as for the structure of a house, and no 
more. Necessity as much requires and supposes a necessary 
agent, as freedom requires and supposes a free agent, to be the 
former of the world. And the appearances of design and of final 
causes in the constitution of nature as really prove this acting 
agent to be an intelligent designer , or to act from choice ; upon 
the scheme of necessity, supposed possible, as upon that of 
freedom. 

It appearing thus, that the notion of necessity does not destroy 
the proof that there is an intelligent Author of nature and 
natural Governor of the world ; the present question, which the 
analogy before mentioned suggests,* and which, I think, it will 
answer, is this : Whether the opinion of necessity, supposed con- 
sistent with possibility, with the constitution of the world, and 
the natural government which we experience exercised over it, 
destroys all reasonable ground of belief, that we are in a state of 
religion : or whether that opinion be reconcilable with religion ; 
with the system, and the proof of it. 

Suppose then a fatalist to educate any one, from his youth up, 
in his own principles; that the child should reason upon them, 
and conclude, that since he cannot possibly behave otherwise 
than he does, he is not a subject of blame or commendation, nor 
can deserve to be rewarded or punished. Imagine him to eradi- 
cate the very perceptions of blame and commendation out of his 
mind, by means of this system ; to form his temper, and cha- 
racter, and behavior to it; and from it to judge of the treatment 
he was to expect, say, from reasonable men, upon his coming 
abroad into the world: as the fatalist judges from this system, 
what he is to expect from the Author of nature, and with regard 
to a future state. I cannot forbear stopping here to ask, whether 
any one of common sense would think fit, that a child should be 
put upon these speculations, and be left to apply them to prac- 
tice. And a man has little pretence to reason, who is not 
sensible, that we are all children in speculations of this kind. 
However, the child would doubtless be highly delighted to find 
himself freed from the restraints of fear and shame, with which 
* P. 157. 


CHAP. vr. 


AS INFLUENCING PRACTICE. 


161 


his play-fellows were fettered and embarrassed ; and highly con- 
ceited in his superior knowledge, so far beyond his years. But 
conceit and vanity would be the least bad part of the influence, 
which these principles must have, when thus reasoned and acted 
upon, during the course of his education. He must either be 
allowed to go on and be the plague of all about him, and himself 
too, even to his own destruction, or else correction must be con- 
tinually made use of, to supply the want of those natural percep- 
tions of blame and commendation, which we have supposed to 
be removed ; and to give him a practical impression, of what he 
had reasoned himself out of the belief of, that he was in fact an 
accountable child, and to be punished for doing what he was 
forbid. It is therefore in reality impossible, but that the correc- 
tion which he must meet with, in the course of his education, 
must convince him, that if the scheme he was instructed in were 
not false, yet that he reasoned inconclusively upon it, and some- 
how or other misapplied it to practice and common life ; as what 
the fatalist experiences of the conduct of Providence at present, 
ought in all reason to convince him, that this scheme is mis- 
applied, when applied to the subject of religion.* But supposing 
the child’s temper could remain still formed to the system, and 
his expectation of the treatment he was to have in the world, be 
regulated by it ; so as to expect that no reasonable man would 
blame or punish him, for any thing which he should do, because 
he could not help doing it : upon this supposition it is manifest 
he would, upon his coming abroad into the world, be insupport- 
able to society, and the treatment which he would receive from it 
would render it so to him ; and he could not fail of doing some- 
thing very soon, for which he would be delivered over into the 
hands of civil justice. And thus, in the end, he would be con- 
vinced of the obligations he was under to his wise instructor. 

Suppose this scheme of fatality, in any other way, applied to 
practice, such practical application of it will be found equally 
absurd; equally fallacious in a practical sense. For instance, that 
if a man be destined to live such a time, he shall live to it, 
though he take no care of his own preservation ; or if he be 
destined to die before that time, no care can prevent it, there- 
fore all care about preserving one’s life is to be neglected: which 

* P. 158. 

14 * 


L 


162 


THE OPINION OF NECESSITY, 


PART I. 


is the fallacy instanced in by the ancients. On the contrary, 
none of these practical absurdities can be drawn from reasoning, 
upon the supposition that we are free; but all such reasoning 
with regard to the common affairs of life is justified by experience. 
Therefore, though it were admitted that this opinion of necessity 
were speculatively true; yet, with regard to practice, it is as if it 
were false, so far as our experience reaches : that is, to the whole 
of our present life. For, the constitution of the present world, 
and the condition in which we are actually placed, is, as if we 
were free. And it may perhaps justly be concluded, that since 
the whole process of action, through every step of it, suspense, 
deliberation, inclining one way, determining, and at last doing as 
we determine, is as if we were free, therefore we are so. b 

The thing here insisted upon is, that under the present natural 
government of the world, we find we are treated and dealt with, 
as if we were free, prior to all consideration whether we are so or 
not. Were this opinion therefore of necessity admitted to be 
ever so true; yet such is in fact our condition and the natural 
course of things, that whenever we apply it to life and practice, 
this application of it always misleads us, and cannot but mislead 
us, in a most dreadful manner, with regard to our present interest. 
How then can people think themselves so very secure, that the 
same application of the same opinion may not mislead them also, 
in some analogous manner, with respect to a future, a more 
general, and more important interest? For, religion being a 
practical subject; and the analogy of nature showing us, that we 
have not faculties to apply this opinion, were it a true one, to 
practical subjects; whenever we do apply it to the subject of re- 
ligion, and thence conclude, that we are free from its obligations, 
it is plain this conclusion cannot be depended upon. There will 
still remain just reason to think, whatever appearances are, that 
we deceive ourselves; in somewhat of a like manner, as when 
people fancy they can draw contradictory conclusions from the 
idea of infinity. 

b [Hume says, “ though man, in truth, is a Accessary agent, having all his 
actions determined by fixed and immutable lawMtet, this being concealed from 
him, he acts with the conviction of being a free-zagent." 

Which is the same as to say that God intended to conceal from men an 
important fact, involving the whole subject of right and wrong, but Mr. Hume 
found him out ! ] 


CHAP. VI. 


AS INFLUENCING PRACTICE. 


163 


From these things together, the attentive reader will see it 
follows, that if upon supposition of freedom the evidence of reli- 
gion be conclusive, it remains so, upon supposition of necessity, 
because the notion of necessity is not applicable to practical sub- 
jects: i.e. with respect to them, is as if it were not true. Nor 
does this contain any reflection upon reason, but only upon what 
is unreasonable. For to pretend to act upon reason, in opposition 
to practical principles, which the Author of our nature gave us to 
act upon; and to pretend to apply our reason to subjects, with 
regard to which, our own short views, and even our experience, 
will show us, it cannot be depended upon; and such, at best, the 
subject of necessity must be; this is vanity, conceit, and un- 
reasonableness. 

But this is not all. We find within ourselves a will, and are 
conscious of a character. Now if this, in us, be reconcilable with 
fate, it is reconcilable with it in the Author of nature. Besides, 
natural government and final causes imply a character and a will 
in the Governor and Designer;* a will concerning the creatures 
whom he governs. The Author of nature then being certainly 
of some character or other, notwithstanding necessity; it is evi- 
dent this necessity is as reconcilable with the particular character 
of benevolence, veracity, and justice, in him, which attributes 
are the foundation of religion, as with any other character : since 
we find this necessity no more hinders men from being benevo- 
lent, than cruel; true, than faithless; just, than unjust; or, if 
the fatalist pleases, what we call unjust. It is said indeed, that 
what, upon supposition of freedom, would be just punishment, 
upon supposition of necessity, becomes manifestly unjust : because 
it is punishment inflicted for doing that which persons could not 
avoid doing. As if the necessity, which is supposed to destroy 
the injustice of murder, for instance, would not also destroy the 
injustice of punishing it! However, as little to the purpose as 
this objection is in itself, it is very much to the purpose to ob- 
serve from it, how the notions of justice and injustice remain, 
even while we endeavor to suppose them removed; how they 


* By will and character is meant that which, in speaking of men, we shoifld 
express, not only by these words, but also by the words temper, taste, disjio- 
sitions, practical principles : that whole frame of mind, from whence we act in 
one manner rather than another. 


164 


THE OPINION OF NECESSITY, 


PART I. 


force themselves upon the mind, even while we are making suppo- 
sitions destructive of them : for there is not, perhaps, a man in 
the world, but would be ready to make this objection at first 
thought. 

But though it is most evident, that universal necessity, if it be 
reconcilable with any thing, is reconcilable with that character in 
the Author of nature, which is the foundation of religion ; “ Yet, 
does it not plainly destroy the 'proof that he is of that character, 
and consequently the proof of religion V* By no means. For 
we find, that happiness and misery are not our fate , in any such 
sense as not to be the consequences of our behavior; but that 
they are the consequences of it.* We find God exercises the 
same kind of government over us, which a father exercises over 
his children, and a civil magistrate over his subjects. Now, 
whatever becomes of abstract questions concerning liberty and 
necessity, it evidently appears to us, that veracity and justice 
must be the natural rule and measure of exercising this authority 
or government, to a Being who can have no competitions, or in- 
terfering of interests, with his creatures and his subjects. 

But as the doctrine of liberty, though we experience its truth, 
may be perplexed with difficulties, which run up into the most 
abstruse of all speculations ; and as the opinion of necessity seems 
to be the very basis upon which infidelity grounds itself; it may 
be of some use to offer a more particular proof of the obligations 
of religion, which may distinctly be shown not to be destroyed 
by this opinion. 

The proof from final causes of an intelligent Author of nature 
is not affected by the opinion of necessity; supposing necessity a 
thing possible in itself, and reconcilable with the constitution of 
things.'}' It is a matter of fact, independent on this or any other 
speculation, that he governs the world by the method of rewards 
and punishments and also that he hath given us a moral faculty, 
by which we distinguish between actions, and approve some as 
virtuous and of good desert, and disapprove others as vicious and 
of ill desert. § This moral discernment implies, in the notion of 
it, a rule of action, and a rule of a very peculiar kind : for it 
carries in it authority and a right of direction; authority in such 
a sense, as that we cannot depart from it without being self-con- 

* Chap. ii. t P. 157, &c. + Chop. ii. 0 Diesert. II. 


CHAP. VI. 


AS INFLUENCING PRACTICE. 


165 


demned.* And that the dictates of this moral faculty, which are 
by nature a rule to us, are moreover the laws of God, laws in a 
sense including sanctions; may be thus proved. Consciousness 
of a rule or guide of action, in creatures who are capable of con- 
sidering it as given them by their Maker, not only raises imme- 
diately a sense of duty, but also a sense of security in following 
it, and of danger in deviating from it. A direction of the Author 
of nature, given to creatures capable of looking upon it as such, 
is plainly a command from him : and a command from him neces- 
sarily includes in it, at least, an implicit promise in case of obe- 
dience, or threatening in case of disobedience. But then the 
sense or perception of good and ill desert, *(■ which is contained in 
the moral discernment, renders the sanction explicit, and makes 
it appear, as one may say, expressed. For since his method of 
government is to reward and punish actions, his having annexed 
to some actions an inseparable sense of good desert, and to others 
of ill, this surely amounts to declaring, upon whom his punish- 
ments shall be inflicted, and his rewards be bestowed. He must 
have given us this discernment and sense bf things, as a presenti- 
ment of what is to be hereafter: that is, by way of information 
beforehand, what we are finally to expect in this world. There 
is then most evident ground to think, that the government of 
God, upon the whole, will be found to correspond to the nature 
■which he has given us : and that, in the upshot and issue of 
things, happiness and misery shall, in fact and event, be made 
to follow virtue and vice respectively; as he has already, in so 
peculiar a manner, associated the ideas of them in our minds. 
And hence might easily be deduced the obligations of religious 
worship, were it only to be considered as a means of preserving 
upon our minds a sense of this moral government of God, and 
securing our obedience to it : which yet is an extremely imper- 
fect view of that most important duty. 

No objection from necessity can lie against this general proof 
of religion. None against the proposition reasoned upon, that 
we have such a moral faculty and discernment; because this is a 
mere matter of fact, a thing of experience, that human kind is 
thus constituted : none against the conclusion ; because it is 
immediate and wholly from this fact. For the conclusion, that 

f Dissert. II. 


* Serm. 2, at the Rolls. 


166 


THE OPINION OF NECESSITY, 


PART I. 


God will finally reward tbe righteous and punish the wicked, is 
not here drawn, from its appearing to us fit* that he should ; but 
from its appearing, that he has told us, he will. And this he 
hath certainly told us, in the promise and threatening, which it 
hath been observed the notion of a command implies, and the 
sense of good and ill desert which he has given us, more dis- 
tinctly expresses. This reasoning from fact is confirmed, and in 
some degree even verified, by other facts ; by the natural tenden- 
cies of virtue and of vicejj* and by this, that God, in the natural 
course of his providence, punishes vicious actions as mischievous 
to society; and also vicious actions as such in the strictest sense.]; 
So that the general proof of religion is unanswerably real, even 
upon the wild supposition which we are arguing upon. 

It must be observed further, that natural religion has, besides 
this, an external evideuce; which the doctrine of necessity, if it 
could be true, would not affect. For suppose a person, by the 
observations and reasoning above, or by any other, convinced of 
the truth of religion ; that there is a God, who made the world, 
who is the moral governor and judge of mankind, and will upon 
the whole deal with every one according to his works : I say, 
suppose a person convinced of this by reason, but to know 
nothing at all of antiquity, or the present state of mankind : it 
would be natural for such a one to be inquisitive, what was the 
history of this system of doctrine; at what time, and in what 
manner, it came first into the world; and whether it were be- 
lieved by any considerable part of it. Were he upon inquiry to 

* However, I am far from intending to deny, that the will of God is deter- 
mined, by what is fit, by the right and reason of the case; though one chooses 
to decline matters of such abstract speculation, and to speak with caution when 
one does speak of them. But if it be intelligible to say, that it is Jit and 
reasonable for every one to consult his own happiness , then fitness of action, or 
the right and reason of the case, is an intelligible manner of speaking. And 
it seems as inconceivable, to suppose God to approve one course of action, or 
one end, preferably to another, which yet his acting at all from design implies 
that he does, without supposing somewhat prior in that end, to be the ground 
of the preference; as to suppose him to discern an abstract proposition to be 
true, without supposing somewhat prior in it, to be the ground of the discern- 
ment. It doth not therefore appear, that moral right is any more relative to 
perception, than abstract truth is ; or that it is any more improper to speak of 
the fitness and rightness of actions and ends, as founded in the nature of things, 
than to speak of abstract truth, as thus founded, 
f P. 118. 


X P. HO, &c. 


CHAP. VI. 


AS INFLUENCING PRACTICE. 


167 


find, that a particular person, in a late age, first of all proposed 
it, as a deduction of reason, and that mankind were before 
wholly ignorant of it; then, though its evidence from reason 
would remain, there would be no additional probability of its 
truth, from the account of its discovery. 

But instead of this being the fact, he would find, on the con- 
trary, what could not but afford him a very strong confirmation 
of its truth : First , That somewhat of this system, with more or 
fewer additions and alterations, hath been professed in all ages 
and countries, of which we have any certain information relating 
to this matter. Secondly , That it is certain historical fact, so 
far as we can trace things up, that this whole system of belief, 
that there is one God, the creator and moral governor of the 
world, and that mankind is in a state of religion, was received 
in the first ages. And Thirdly , That as there is no hint or in- 
timation in history, that this system was first reasoned out; so 
there is express historical or traditional evidence, as ancient as 
history, that it was taught first' by revelation. 

Now these things must be allowed to be of great weight. The 
first of them, general consent, shows this system to be conform- 
able to the common sense of mankind. The second, namely, 
that religion was believed in the first ages of the world, especially 
as it does not appear that there were then any superstitious or 
false additions to it, cannot but be a further confirmation of its 
truth. For it is a proof of this alternative : either that it came 
into the world by revelation ; or that it is natural, obvious, and 
forces itself upon the mind. The former of these is the conclu- 
sion of learned men. And whoever will consider, how unapt for 
speculation rude and uncultivated minds are, will, perhaps from 
hence alone, be strongly inclined to believe it the truth. And 
as it is shown in the second part* of this treatise, that there is 
nothing of such peculiar presumption against a revelation in the 
beginning of the world, as there is supposed to be against subse- 
quent ones ; a sceptic could not, 1 think, give any account, which 
would appear more probable even to himself, of the early pre- 
tences to revelation ; than by supposing some real original one, 
from whence they were copied. 

And the third thing above mentioned, that there is express 
* Chap. ii. 


168 


THE OPINION OF NECESSITY, 


PART I. 


historical or traditional evidence, as ancient as history, of the 
system of religion being taught mankind by revelation, this must 
be admitted as some degree of real proof, that it was so taught. 
For why should not the most ancient tradition be admitted as 
some additional proof of a fact, against which there is no pre- 
sumption ? This proof is mentioned here, because it has its 
weight to show, that religion came into the world by revelation, 
prior to all consideration of the proper authority of any book 
supposed to contain it; and even prior to all consideration, 
whether the revelation itself be uncorruptly handed down, or 
mixed and darkened with fables. Thus the historical account, 
which we have of the origin of religion, taking in all circum- 
stances, is a real confirmation of its truth, no way affected by 
the opinion of necessity. And the external evidence, even of 
natural religion, is by no means inconsiderable. 

It is carefully to be observed, and ought to be recollected after 
all proofs of virtue and religion, which are only general, that as 
speculative reason may be neglected, prejudiced, and deceived, 
so also may our moral understanding be impaired and perverted, 
and the dictates of it not impartially attended to. This indeed 
proves nothing against the reality of our speculative or practical 
faculties of perception ; against their being intended by nature, 
to inform us in the theory of things, and instruct us how we are 
to behave, and what we are to expect in consequence of our 
behavior. Yet our liableness, in the degree we are liable, to 
prejudice and perversion, is a most serious admonition to us to be 
upon our guard, with respect to what is of such consequence, as 
our determinations concerning virtue and religion ; and par- 
ticularly not to take custom, and fashion, and slight notions of 
honor, or imaginations of present ease, use, and convenience to 
mankind, for the only moral rule.* 

The foregoing observations, drawn from the nature of the 
thing, and the history of religion, amount, when taken together , 
to a real practical proof of it, not to be confuted : such a proof 
as, considering the infinite importance of the thing, I apprehend, 
would be admitted fully sufficient, in reason, to influence the 
actions of men, who act upon thought and reflection, if it were ad- 
mitted that there is no proof of the contrary. But it may be said; 

* Dissertation II. 


CHAP. VI. 


AS INFLUENCING PRACTICE. 


169 


u There are many probabilities, which cannot indeed be confuted, 
i.e. shown to be no probabilities, and yet may be overbalanced by 
greater probabilities, on the other side ; much more by demon- 
stration. And there is no occasion to object against particular 
arguments alleged for an opinion, when the opinion itself may be 
clearly shown to be false, without meddling with such arguments 
at all, but leaving them just as they are.* Now the method of 
government by rewards and punishments, and especially reward- 
ing and punishing good and ill desert as such respectively, must 
go upon supposition, that we are free and not necessary agents. 
And it is incredible, that the Author of nature should govern us 
upon a supposition as true, which he knows to be false; and 
therefore absurd to think, he will reward or punish us for our 
actions hereafter; especially that he will do it under the notion, 
that they are of good or ill desert.” 

Here then the matter is brought to a point. And the answer 
is full, and not to be evaded, — viz. : that the whole constitution 
and course of things, the whole analogy of Providence, shows 
beyond possibility of doubt, that the conclusion from this reason- 
ing is false; wherever the fallacy lies. The doctrine of freedom 
indeed clearly shows where: in supposing ourselves necessary, 
when in truth we are free agents. But, upon the supposition of 
necessity, the fallacy lies in taking for granted, that it is in- 
credible necessary agents should be rewarded and punished. 
That, somehow or other, the conclusion now mentioned is false, 
is most certain. For it is fact, that God does govern even brute 
creatures by the method of rewards and punishments, in the 
natural course of things. Men are rewarded and punished for 
their actions, punished for actions mischievous to society as being 
so, punished for vicious actions as such ; by the natural instru- 
mentality of each other, under the present conduct of Provi- 
dence. Nay, even the affection of gratitude, and the passion of 
resentment, and the rewards and punishments following from 
them, which in general are to be considered as natural, i.e. from 
the Author of nature ; these rewards and punishments, being 
naturally f annexed to actions considered as implying good inten- 
tion and good desert, ill intention and ill desert; these natural 
rewards and punishments, I say, are as much a contradiction to 
* Pp. 68, 71. f Serm. 8th, at the Rolls . 


15 


170 


NECESSITY, AS INFLUENCING PRACTICE. 


PART t. 


the conclusion above, and show its falsehood, as a more exact and 
complete rewarding and punishing of good and ill desert as such. 
So that if it be incredible, that necessary agents should be thus 
rewarded and punished; then, men are not necessary but free; 
since it is matter of fact, that they are thus rewarded and 
punished. If, on the contrary, which is the supposition we have 
been arguing upon, it be insisted that men are necessary agents; 
then, there is nothing incredible in the further supposition of 
necessary agents being thus rewarded and punished : since we 
ourselves are thus dealt with. 

From the whole therefore it must follow, that a necessity sup- 
posed possible, and reconcilable with the constitution of things, 
does in no sort prove that the Author of Nature will not, nor 
destroy the proof that he will, finally and upon the whole, in his 
eternal government, render his creatures happy or miserable, by 
some means or other, as they behave well or ill. Or, to express 
this conclusion in words conformable to the title of the chapter, 
the analogy of nature shows us, that the opinion of necessity, con- 
sidered as practical, is false. And if necessity, upon the suppo- 
sition above mentioned, doth not destroy the proof of natural 
religion, it evidently makes no alteration iu the proof of revealed. 

From these things likewise we may learn, in what sense to 
understand that general assertion, that the opinion of necessity is 
essentially destructive of all religion. First, in a practical sense; 
that by this notion, atheistical men pretend to satisfy and encou- 
rage themselves in vice, and justify to others their disregard to 
all religion. And secondly, in the strictest sense ; that it is a 
contradiction to the whole constitution of nature,, and to what we 
may every moment experience in ourselves, and so overturns 
every thing. But by no means is this assertion to be understood, 
as if necessity, supposing it could possibly be reconciled with the 
constitution of things, and with what we experience, were not 
also reconcilable with religion: for upon this supposition, it 
demonstrably is so. 0 

c [Consult, in favor of the doctrine of necessity, atheistical writers gene- 
rally ; such as Fichte, Hegel, D’Holback, Comte, Crousse, Martineau, Leroux, 
and Holyoake — also, Belsham’s Essays, Collins on Liberty, Crombie on 
Phil. Necessity, Hobbes’ Liberty and Necessity, and Leviathan, Priestley on 
Liberty, Hartley on Man, and Edwards on the Will. 

Against the doctrine, see Beattie’s Works, Part 2 ; Replies to Hobbes by 


chap. vii. GOVERNMENT OF GOD, INCOMPREHENSIBLE. 171 


CHAPTER VII. 

THE GOVERNMENT OF GOD, CONSIDERED AS A SCHEME OR 
CONSTITUTION, IMPERFECTLY COMPREHENDED. 

Though it be acknowledged, as it cannot but be, that the ana- 
logy of nature gives a strong credibility to the general doctrine of 
religion, and to the several particular things contained in it, con- 
sidered as so many matters of fact; and likewise that it shows 
this credibility not to be destroyed by any notions of necessity : 
still, objections may be insisted upon, against the wisdom, equity, 
and goodness of the divine government implied in the notion of 
religion, and against the method by which this government is 
conducted ; to which objections analogy can be no direct answer. 
For the credibility, or the certain truth, of a matter of fact, does 
not immediately prove any thing concerning the wisdom or good- 
ness of it ; and analogy can do no more, immediately or directly, 
than show such and such things to be true or credible, considered 
only as matters of fact. But if, upon supposition of a moral con- 
stitution of nature and a moral government over it, analogy sug- 
gests and makes it credible, that this government must be a 
scheme, system, or constitution of government, as distinguished 
from a number of single unconnected acts of distributive justice 
and goodness; and likewise, that it must be a scheme, so imper- 
fectly comprehended, and of such a sort in other respects, as to 
afford a direct general answer to all objections against the justice 
and goodness of it : then analogy is, remotely, of great service in 
answering those objections ; both by suggesting the answer, and 
showing it to be a credible one. 

Now this, upon inquiry, will be found to be the case. For, 
First , Upon supposition that God exercises a moral government 
over the world, the analogy of his natural government suggests 
and makes it credible, that his moral government must be a 
scheme, quite beyond our comprehension : and this affords a 

Bramhall and Lawson; Replies to Priestley by Palmer and Bryant ; Grove 
on Liberty ; Clarke's Sermons at the Boyle Lectures ; Gibb’s Contemplations ; 
King’s Origin of Evil; Reid on the Mind; Watts on Liberty; Harris’ Boyle 
Lectures; Jackson’s Defence; Butterworth on Moral Government.] 


172 


THE GOVERNMENT OF GOD, 


PART I. 


general answer to all objections against the justice and goodness 
of it. Secondly , A more distinct observation of some particular 
things contained in God’s scheme of natural government, the like 
things being supposed, by analogy, to be contained in his moral 
government, will further show, how little weight is to be laid 
upon these objections. 

I. Upon supposition that God exercises a moral government 
over the world, the analogy of his natural government suggests 
and makes it credible, that his moral government must be a 
scheme, quite beyond our comprehension; and this affords a 
general answer to all objections against the justice and goodness 
of it. It is most obvious, analogy renders it highly credible, that, 
upon supposition of a moral government, it must be a scheme. 
For the world, and the whole natural government of it, appears 
to be so : to be a scheme, system, or constitution, whose parts 
correspond to each other, and to a whole, as really as any work of 
art, or as any particular model of a civil constitution and govern- 
ment. In this great scheme of the natural world, individuals 
have various peculiar relations to other individuals of their own 
species. Whole species are, we find, variously related to other 
species, upon this earth. Nor do we know, how much further 
these kinds of relations may extend. And, as there is not any 
action or natural event, which we are acquainted with, so single 
and unconnected, as not to have a respect to some other actions 
and events; so possibly each of them, when it has not an imme- 
diate, may yet have a remote, natural relation to other actions 
and events, much beyond the compass of this present world. 
There seems indeed nothing, from whence we can so much as 
make a conjecture, whether all creatures, actions, and events, 
throughout the whole of nature, have relations to each other. 
But, as it is obvious, that all events have future unknown conse- 
quences; so if we trace any event, as far as we can, into what is 
connected with it, we shall find, that if it were not connected 
with something farther in nature, unknown to us, something 
both past and present, such event could not possibly have been 
at all. Nor can we give the whole account of any one thing 
whatever; of all its causes, ends, and necessary adjuncts; those 
adjuncts, I mean, without which it could not have been. By 
this most astonishing connection, these reciprocal correspondences 


CHAP. VII. 


A SCHEME INCOMPREHENSIBLE. 


173 


and mutual relations, every thing which we see in the course of 
nature is actually brought about. Things seemingly the most 
insignificant imaginable, are perpetually observed to be necessary 
conditions to other things of the greatest importance; so that 
any one thing whatever, may for aught we know to the contrary, 
be a necessary condition to any other. 

The natural world then, and natural government of it, being 
such an incomprehensible scheme; so incomprehensible, that a 
man must, really in the literal sense, know nothing at all, who is 
not sensible of his ignorance in it; this immediately suggests, 
and strongly shows the credibility, that the moral world and 
government of it may be so too. a Indeed the natural and moral 
constitution and government of the world are so connected, as to 
make up together but one scheme : and it is highly probable, 
that the first is formed and carried on merely in subserviency to 
the latter; as the vegetable world is for the animal, and organized 
bodies for minds. But the thing intended here is, without in- 
quiring how far the administration of the natural world is sub- 
ordinate to that of the moral, only to observe the credibility, that 
one should be analogous or similar to the other : that therefore 
every act of divine justice and goodness may be supposed to look 
much beyond itself, and its immediate object; may have some 
reference to other parts of God’s moral administration, and to a 
general moral plan ; and that every circumstance of this his moral 
government may be adjusted beforehand with a view to the whole 
of it. For example: the determined length of time, and the 
degrees and ways, in which virtue is to remain in a state of war- 
fare and discipline, and in which wickedness is permitted to have 

a [Maimonides makes use of the following similitude. “ Suppose one of good 
understanding, whose mother had died soon alter he was born to be brought 
up on an island, where he saw no human being but his father nor the female 
of any beast. This person when grown up inquires how men are produced. 
He is told that they are bred in the womb of one of the same species and that 
while in the womb we are very small and there move and are nourished. The 
young man inquires whether when thus in the womb we did not cat, and drink, 
and breathe, as we do now, and is answered. No. Then he denies it, and offers 
demonstration that it could not be so. For says he, if either of us ceaso to 
breathe our life is gone ; and how could we have lived close shut up in a womb 
for months ? So if we cease to eat and drink, we die, and how could the child 
live so for months ? and thus he satisfies himself that it is impossible man 
should come into existence in such a manner.”] 


174 


THE GOVERNMENT OF GOD, 


I’AItT I. 


its progress; the times appointed for the execution of justice; 
the appointed instruments of it; the kinds of rewards and punish- 
meiits, and the manners of their distribution ; all particular in- 
stances of divine justice and goodness, and every circumstance of 
them, may have such respects to each other, as to make up alto- 
gether a whole, connected and related in all its parts ; a scheme 
or system, which is as properly such, as the natural world is, and 
of the like kind. Supposing this to be the case, it is most evi- 
dent, that we are not competent judges of this scheme, from the 
small parts of it which come within our view in the present life : 
therefore no objections against any of these parts can be insisted 
upon by reasonable men. b 

This our ignorance, and the consequence here drawn from it, 
are universally acknowledged upon other occasions; and though 
scarce denied, yet are universally forgot, when persons come to 
argue against religion. And it is not perhaps easy, even for the 
most reasonable men, always to bear in mind the degree of our 
ignorance, and make due allowances for it. Upon these accounts, 
it may not be useless to go a little further, in order to show more 
distinctly, how just an answer our ignorance is, to objections 
against the scheme of Providence. Suppose then a person boldly 
to assert , 0 that the things complained of, the origin and continu- 
ance of evil, might easily have been prevented by repeated inter- 
positions;* interpositions so guarded and circumstanced, as would 

b [Let us imagine a person to be taken to view some great historical painting, 
before which hangs a thick curtain. The attendant raises the curtain a few 
inches. Can the spectator, from the unmeaning strip of foreground, derive 
any conception of the figures yet concealed ? Much less is he able to criticize 
their proportions, or beauty, or perspective, or even the design of the artist ? 
The small fragment of a tree, or flower, or animal, or building, may seem quite 
unmeaning and even ugly, though the whole would present beauty, fitness, or 
grandeur. Now the portion of God's dominions within our survey, is as utterly 
insignificant, compared to the universe, and its interminable duration, as an 
atom compared to a planet or a man’s age to eternity. 

The concluding observations of this chapter, abundantly remove every diffi- 
culty as to such ignorance being as valid against the proofs of religion, as it is 
against objections to it.] 

c [No truly philosophical mind can be arrogant ; because the wider the range 
of thought, the greater are the discoveries of our ignorance. The young stu- 
dent may well hesitate to decide points, on which the profoundest thinkers 
take opposite sides, and when conscious of inability intrust himself to the 
guidance of those whose lives are best. 

* Pp. 177, 178. 


CHAP. VII. 


A SCHEME INCOMPREHENSIBLE. 


175 


preclude all mischief arising from them. Or, if this were im- 
practicable, that a scheme of government is itself an imperfection, 
since more good might have been produced, without any scheme, 
system, or constitution at all, by continued single unrelated acts 
of distributive justice and goodness; because these would have 
occasioned no irregularities. Farther than this, it is presumed, 
the objections will not be carried. Yet the answer is obvious : 
that were these assertions true, still the observations above, con- 
cerning our ignorance in the scheme of divine government and 
the consequence drawn from it, would hold, in great measure; 
enough to vindicate religion, against all objections from the dis- 
orders of the present state. Were these assertions true, yet the 
government of the world might be just and good notwithstanding; 
for, at the most, they would infer nothing more than that it 
might have been better. But they are mere arbitrary assertions; 
no man being sufficiently acquainted with the possibilities of 
things, to bring any proof of them to the lowest degree of proba- 
bility. For however possible what is asserted may seem, yet 
many instances may be alleged, in things much less out of our 
reach, of suppositions absolutely impossible, and reducible to the 
most palpable self contradictions, which, not every one would per- 
ceive to be such; nor perhaps any one, at first sight suspect. 

From these things, it is easy to see distinctly, how our igno- 
rance, as it is the common, so it is really a satisfactory answer, 
to all objections against the justice and goodness of Providence. 
If a man, contemplating any one providential dispensation, which 
had no relation to any others, should object, that he discerned in 
it a disregard to justice, or a deficiency of goodness ; nothing 
would be less an answer to such objection, than our ignorance in 
other parts of providence, or in the possibilities of things, no way 
related to what he was contemplating. But when we know not 
but the part objected against may be relative to other parts un- 
known to us; and when we are unacquainted with what is, in 
the nature of the thing, practicable in the case before us; then 
our ignorance is a satisfactory answer; because, some unknown 
relation, or some unknown impossibility, may render what is 
objected against, just and good; nay good in the highest practi- 
cable degree. 

II. How little weight is to be laid upon such objections, will 


176 


THE GOVERNMENT OF GOD, 


PART I. 


further appear, by a more distinct observation of some particular 
things contained in the natural government of God, the like to 
which may be supposed, from analogy, to be contained in his 
moral government. 

First, As in the scheme of the natural world, no ends appear 
to be accomplished without means : so we find that means very 
undesirable, often conduce to bring about ends in such a measure 
desirable, as greatly to overbalance the disagreeableness of the 
means. And in cases where such means are conducive to such 
ends, it is not reason, but experience , which shows us, that they 
are thus conducive. Experience also shows many means to be 
conducive and necessary to accomplish ends, which means, before 
experience, we should have thought, would have had even a con- 
trary tendency. From these observations relating to the natural 
scheme of the world, the moral being supposed analogous to it, 
arises a great credibility, that the putting our misery in each 
other’s power to the degree it is, and making men liable to vice 
to the degree we are; and in general, that those things which 
are objected against the moral scheme of Providence, may be, 
upon the whole, friendly and assistant to virtue, and productive 
of an overbalance of happiness: i.e. the things objected against 
may be means, by which an overbalance of good, will in the end, 
be found produced. And from the same observations, it appears 
to be no presumption against this, that we do not, if indeed we 
do not, see those means to have any such tendency, or that they 
seem to us to have a contrary one. Thus those things, which we 
call irregularities, may not be so at all; because they may be 
means of accomplishing wise and good ends more considerable. 
It may be added, as above, that they may also be the only means, 
by which these wise and good ends are capable of being accom- 
plished. 

It may be proper to add, in order to obviate an absurd and 
wicked conclusion from any of these observations, that though 
the constitution of our nature, from whence we are capable of 
vice and misery, may, as it undoubtedly does, contribute to the 
perfection and happiness of the world; and though the actual 
permission of evil may be beneficial to it : (i.e. it would have 
been more mischievous, not that a wicked person had himself 
abstained from his own wickedness, but that any one had forcibly 


CHAP. VII. 


A SCHEME INCOMPREHENSIBLE. 


177 


prevented it, than that it was permitted :) yet notwithstanding, 
it might have been much better for the world, if this very evil 
had never been done. Nay it is most clearly conceivable, that 
the very commission of wickedness may be beneficial to the world, 
and yet, that it would be infinitely more beneficial for men to re- 
frain from it. For thus, in the wise and good constitution of the 
natural world, there are disorders which bring their own cures ; 
diseases, which are themselves remedies. Many a man would 
have died, had it not been for the gout or a fever; yet it would 
be thought madness to assert, that sickness is a better or more 
perfect state than health; though the like, with regard to the 
moral world, has been asserted. 

Secondly , The natural government of the world is carried on 
by general laws. For this there may be wise and good reasons : 
the wisest and best, for aught we know to the contrary. And 
that there are such reasons, is suggested to our thoughts by the 
analogy of nature ; by our being made to experience good ends 
to be accomplished, as indeed all the good which we enjoy is 
accomplished, by this means, — viz. : that the laws, by which the 
world is governed, are general. We have scarce any kind of 
enjoyments, but what we are, in some way or other, instrumental 
in procuring ourselves, by acting in a manner which we foresee 
likely to procure them : now this foresight could not be at all, 
were not the government of the world carried on by general laws. 
And though, for aught we know to the . contrary, every single 
case may be, at length, found to have been provided for even by 
these : yet to prevent all irregularities, or remedy them as they 
arise, by the wisest and best general laws, may be impossible in 
the nature of things ; as we see it is absolutely impossible in civil 
government. 

But then we are ready to think, that, tRe constitution of nature 
remaining as it is, and the course of things being permitted to go 
on, in other respects, as it does, there might be interpositions to 
prevent irregularities; though they could not have been pre- 
vented, or remedied by any general laws. There would indeed 
be reason to wish, which, by-the-way, is very different from a 
right to claim, that all irregularities were prevented or remedied 
by present interpositions, if these interpositions would have no 
other effect than this. But it is plain they would have some 
M 


178 


THE GOVERNMENT OF GOD, 


PART I. 


visible and immediate bad effects : for instance, they would 
encourage idleness and negligence; and they would render 
doubtful the natural rule of life, which is ascertained by this 
very thing, that the course of the world is carried on by general 
laws. And further, it is certain they would have distant effects, 
and very great ones too ; by means of the wonderful connections 
before mentioned.* So that we cannot so much as guess, what 
would be the whole result of the interpositions desired. It may 
be said, any bad result might be prevented by further interposi- 
tions, whenever there was occasion for them : but this again is 
talking quite at random, and in the dark.')' 

Upon the whole then, we see wise reasons, why the course of 
the world should be carried on by general laws, and good ends 
accomplished by this means : and for aught we know, there 
may be the wisest reasons for it, and the best ends accomplished 
by it. We have no ground to believe, that all irregularities could 
be remedied as they arise, or could have been precluded, by gene- 
ral laws. We find that interpositions would produce evil, and 
prevent good : and, for aught we know, they would produce 
greater evil than they would prevent; and prevent greater good 
than they would produce. And if this be the case, then the not 
interposing is so far from being a ground of complaint, that it is 
an instance of goodness. This is intelligible and sufficient : and 
going further, seems beyond the utmost reach of our faculties. 

It may be said, that “after all, these supposed impossibilities 
and relations are what we are unacquainted with; and we must 
judge of religion, as of other things, by what we do know, and 
look upon the rest as nothing : or however, that the answers here 
given to what is objected against religion, may equally be made 
use of to invalidate the proof of it; since their stress lies so 
very much upon our ignorance.” But, 

First, Though total ignorance in any matter does indeed 
equally destroy, or rather preclude, all proof concerning it, and 
objections against it; yet partial ignorance does not. For we 
may in any degree be convinced, that a person is of such a cha- 
racter, and consequently will pursue such ends ; though we are 
greatly ignorant, what is the proper way of acting, in order the 
most effectually to obtain those ends : and in this case, objections 
* P. 173, &c. f P. 175. 


CHAP. VII. 


A SCHEME INCOMPREHENSIBLE. 


179 


against his manner of acting, as seemingly not conducive to ob- 
tain them, might be answered by our ignorance ; though the 
proof that such ends were intended, might not at all be invali- 
dated by it. Thus, the proof of religion is a proof of the moral 
character of God, and consequently that his government is moral, 
and that every one upon the whole shall receive according to his 
deserts ; a proof that this is the designed end of his government. 
But we are not competent judges, what is the proper way of 
acting, in order the most effectually to accomplish this end.* 
Therefore our ignorance is an answer to objections against the 
conduct of Providence, in permitting irregularities, as seeming 
contradictory to this end. Now, since it is so obvious, that our 
ignorance may be a satisfactory answer to objections against a 
thing, and yet not affect the proof of it ; till it can be shown, it 
is frivolous to assert, that our ignorance invalidates the proof of 
religion, as it does the objections against it. 

Secondly, Suppose unknown impossibilities, and unknown rela- 
tions, might justly be urged to invalidate the proof of religion, 
as well as to answer objections against it; and that, in conse- 
quence of this, the proof of it were doubtful. Still, let the 
assertion be despised, or let it be ridiculed, it is undeniably true, 
that moral obligations w r ould remain certain, though it were not 
certain what would, upon the whole, be the consequences of 
observing or violating them. For, these obligations arise, im- 
mediately and necessarily, from the judgment of our own mind, 
unless perverted, which we cannot violate without being self- 
condemned. And they would be certain too, from considerations 
of interest. For though it were doubtful, what will be the future 
consequences of virtue and vice ; yet it is, however, credible, 
that they may have those consequences, which religion teaches 
us they will : and this credibility is a certain')' obligation in point 
of prudence, to abstain from all wickedness, and to live in the 
conscientious practice of all that is good. 

Thirdly, The answers above given to the objections against 
religion cannot be made use of to invalidate the proof of it. 
For, upon suspicion that God exercises a moral government over 
the world, analogy does most strongly lead us to conclude, that 
this moral government must be a scheme, or constitution, beyond 
* Pp. 72, 73. t P* 68, and Part II. chap. vi. 


180 


CONCLUSION. 


PAttT I. 


our comprehension. A thousand particular analogies show us, 
that parts of such a scheme, from their relation to other parts, 
may conduce to accomplish ends, which we should have thought 
they had no tendency to accomplish : nay ends, which before ex- 
perience, we should have thought such parts were contradictory 
to, and had a tendency to prevent. Therefore all these analogies 
show, that the way of arguing made use of in objecting against 
religion is delusive : because they show it is not at all incredible, 
that, could we comprehend the whole, we should find the per- 
mission of the disorders objected against to be consistent with 
justice and goodness; and even to be instances of them. Now 
this is not applicable to the proof of religion, as it is to the 
objections against it;* and therefore cannot invalidate that proof, 
as it does these objections. 

Lastly , From the observation now made, it is easy to see, that 
the answers above given to the objections against Providence, 
though, in a general way of speaking, they may be said to be 
taken from our ignorance ; yet are by no means taken merely 
from that, but from something which analogy shows us concern- 
ing it. For analogy shows us positively, that our ignorance in 
the possibilities of things, and the various relations in nature, 
renders us incompetent judges, and leads us to false conclusions, 
in cases similar to this, in which we pretend to judge and to 
object. So that the things above insisted upon are not mere 
suppositions of unknown impossibilities and relations : but they 
are suggested to our thoughts, and even forced upon the observa- 
tion of serious men, and rendered credible too, by the analogy of 
nature. Therefore to take these things into the account, is to 
judge by experience and what we do know : and it is not judg- 
ing so, to take no notice of them. 


CONCLUSION. 

The observations of the last chapter lead us to consider this 
little scene of human life, in which we are so busily engaged, as 
having a reference, of some sort or other, to a much larger plan 
of things. Whether we are, any way, related to the more dis- 
* Serm. at the Rolh, p. 312, 2d ed. 


CHAT. VII. 


CONCLUSION. 


181 


tant parts of the boundless universe, into which we are brought, 
is altogether uncertain. But it is evident, that the course of 
things, which comes within our view, is connected with some 
things, past, present, and future, beyond it.* So that wc are 
placed, as one may speak, in the middle of a scheme, not fixed 
but progressive, every way incomprehensible : incomprehensible, 
in a manner equally, with respect to what has been, what now is, 
and what shall be. This scheme cannot but contain in it some 
things as wonderful, and as much beyond our thought and con- 
ception,^ as any thing in that of religion. For, will any man in 
his senses say, that it is less difficult to conceive, how the world 
came to be and to continue as it is, without, than with, an intelli- 
gent Author and Governor of it? Or, admitting an intelligent 
Governor of it, that there is some other rule of government more 
natural, and of easier conception, than that which we call moral? 
Indeed, without an intelligent Author and Governor of nature, 
no account at all can be given, how this universe, or the part of 
it particularly in which we are concerned, came to be, and the 
course of it to be carried on, as it is : nor any, of its general end 
and design, without a moral governor of it. That there is an 
intelligent Author of nature, and natural Governor of the world, 
is a principle gone upon in the foregoing treatise ; as proved, and 
generally known, and confessed to be proved. And the very 
notion of an intelligent Author of nature, proved by particular 
final causes, implies a will and a character. | 

Now, as our whole nature, the nature which he has given us, 
leads us to conclude his will and character to be moral, just, and 
good : so we can scarce in imagination conceive, what it can be 
otherwise. However, in consequence of this his will and cha- 
racter, whatever it be, he formed the universe as it is, and carries 
on the course of it as he does, rather than in any other manner; 
and has assigned to us, and to all living creatures, a part and a 
lot in it. Irrational creatures act this their part, and enjoy and 
undergo the pleasures and the pains allotted them, without any 
reflection. But one would think it impossible, that creatures 
endued with reason could avoid reflecting sometimes upon all 
this; reflecting, if not from whence we came, yet, at least, 
whither we are going; and what the mysterious scheme, in the 

* P. 172, <fcc. t See Parfc IL ch - “• t p * H3. 

16 


182 


CONCLUSION. 


paut i. 


midst of which we find ourselves, will, at length, come out and 
produce : a scheme in which it is certain we are highly interested, 
and in which we may be interested even beyond conception. 4 

For many things prove it palpably absurd to conclude, that 
we shall cease to be, at death. Particular analogies do most 
sensibly show us, that there is nothing to be thought strange, in 
our being to exist in another state of life. And that we are now 
living beings, affords a strong probability that we shall continue 
so; unless there be some positive ground, and there is none from 
reason or analogy, to think death will destroy us. Were a per- 
suasion of this kind ever so well grounded, there would, surely, 
be little reason to take pleasure in it. Indeed it can have no 
other ground, than some such imagination, as that of our gross 
bodies being ourselves; which is contrary to experience. Expe- 
rience too most clearly shows us the folly of concluding, from the 
body and the living agent affecting each other mutually, that the 
dissolution of the former is the destruction of the latter. And 
there are remarkable instances of their not affecting each other, 
which lead us to a contrary conclusion. The supposition, then, 
which in all reason we are to go upon, is, that our living nature 
will continue after death. And it is infinitely unreasonable to 
form an institution of life, or to act, upon any other supposition. 

All expectation of immortality, whether more or less certain, 
opens an unbounded prospect to our hopes and our fears : since 
we see the constitution of nature is such, as to admit of misery, 
as well as to he productive of happiness, and experience ourselves 
to partake of both in some degree; and since we cannot but know, 
what higher degrees of both we are capable of. And there is no 
presumption against believing further, that our future interest 
depends upon our present behavior : for we see our present in- 
terest doth; and that the happiness and misery, which are natu- 
rally annexed to our actions, very frequently do not follow, till 
long after the actions are done, to which they are respectively 
annexed. So that were speculation to leave us uncertain, whether 
it were likely, that the Author of nature, in giving happiness 
and misery to his creatures, hath regard to their actions or not: 
yet, since we find by experience that he hath such regard, the 

d [The remainder of this chapter is a recapitulation of the whole argument 
from the beginning; and should be carefully conned.] 


CIIAP. VII. 


CONCLUSION. 


183 


whole sense of things which he has given us, plainly leads us, at 
once and without any elaborate inquiries, to think that it may, 
indeed must, be to good actions chiefly that he hath annexed 
happiness, and to bad actions misery; or that he will, upon the 
whole, reward those who do well, and punish those who do evil. 

To confirm this from the constitution of the world, it has been 
observed, that some sort of moral government is necessarily im- 
plied in that natural government of God, which we experience 
ourselves under; that good and bad actions, at present, are natu- 
rally rewarded and punished, not only as beneficial and mischievous 
to society, but also as virtuous and vicious : and that there is, in 
the very nature of the thing, a tendency to their being rewarded 
and puuished in a much higher degree than they are at present. 
And though this higher degree of distributive justice, which 
nature thus points out and leads towards, is prevented for a time 
from taking place; it is by obstacles, which the state of this world 
unhappily throws in its way, and which therefore are in their 
nature temporary. Now, as these things in the natural conduct 
of Providence are observable on the side of virtue; so there is 
nothing to be set against them on the side of vice. A moral 
scheme of government then is visibly established, and, in some 
degree, carried into execution: and this, together with the essen- 
tial tendencies of virtue and vice duly considered, naturally raise 
in us an apprehension, that it will be carried on further towards 
perfection iu a future state, and that every one shall there receive 
according to his deserts. 

And if this be so, then our future and general interest, under 
the moral government of God, is appointed to depend upon our 
behavior; notwithstanding the difficulty, which this may occasion, 
of securing it, and the danger of losing it : just in the sape man- 
ner as our temporal interest, under his natural government, is 
appointed to depend upon our behavior; notwithstanding the 
like difficulty and danger. For, from our original constitution, 
and that of the world which we inhabit, we are naturally trusted 
with ourselves; with our own conduct and our own interest. 
And from the same constitution of nature, especially joined with 
that course of things which is owing to men, we have temptations 
to be unfaithful in this trust; to forfeit this interest, to neglect 
it, and run ourselves into misery and ruin. From these tempta- 


184 


CONCLUSION. 


PART I. 


tions arise the difficulties of behaving so as to secure our temporal 
interest, and the hazard of behaving so as to miscarry in it. 
There is therefore nothing incredible in supposing there may be 
the like difficulty and hazard with regard to that chief and final 
good, which religion lays before us. 

The whole account, how it came to pass that we were placed 
in such a condition as this, must indeed be beyond our compre- 
hension. But it is in part accounted for by what religion teaches 
us, that the character of virtue and piety must be a necessary 
qualification for a future state of security and happiness, under 
the moral government of God; in like manner, as some certain 
qualifications or other are necessary for every particular condition 
of life, under his natural government : and that the present state 
was intended to be a school of discipline, for improving in our- 
selves that character. Now this intention of nature is rendered 
highly credible by observing; that we are plainly made for im- 
provement of all kinds; that it is a general appointment of Provi- 
dence, that we cultivate practical principles, and form within 
ourselves habits of action, in order to become fit for what we were 
wholly unfit for before; that in particular, childhood and youth 
is naturally appointed to be a state of discipline for mature age; 
and that the present world is peculiarly fitted for a state of moral 
discipline. And, whereas objections are urged against the whole 
notion of moral government and a probationary state, from the 
opinion of necessity; it has been shown, that God has given us 
the evidence, as it were, of experience, that all objections against 
religion, on this head, are vain and delusive. He has also, in 
his natural government, suggested an answer to all our short- 
sighted objections, against the equity and goodness of his moral 
government; and in general he has exemplified to us the latter 
by the former. 

These things, which it is to be remembered, are matters of 
fact, ought, in all common sense, to awaken mankind; to induce 
them to consider in earnest their condition, and what they have 
to do. It is absurd, absurd to the degree of being ridiculous, if 
the subject were not of so serious a kind, for men to think them- 
selves secure in a vicious life; or even in that immoral thought- 
lessness, into which far the greatest part of them are fallen. The 
credibility of religion, arising from experience and facts here con- 


CHAP. VII. 


CONCLUSION. 


185 


sidered, is fully sufficient, in reason, to engage them to live in 
the general practice of all virtue and piety; under the serious 
apprehension, though it should be mixed with some doubt,* of a 
righteous administration established in nature, and a future judg- 
ment in consequence of it: especially when we consider, how 
very questionable it is, whether any thing at all can be gained by 
vice,f how unquestionably little as well as precarious, the pleasures 
and profits of it are at the best, and how soon they must be parted 
with at the longest. For, in the deliberations of reason, concern- 
ing what we are to pursue and what to avoid, as temptations to 
any thing from mere passion are supposed out of the case, so in- 
ducements to vice, from cool expectations of pleasure and interest 
so small and uncertain and short, are really so insignificant, as, in 
the view of reason to be almost nothing in themselves; and in 
comparison with the impprtance of religion they quite disappear 
and are lost. 

Mere passion may indeed be alleged, though not as a reason, 
yet as an excuse, for a vicious course of life. And how sorry an 
excuse it is, will be manifest by observing, that we are placed in 
a condition in which we are unavoidably inured to govern our 
passions, by being necessitated to govern them : and to lay our- 
selves under the same kind of restraints, and as great ones too, 
from temporal regards, as virtue and piety, in the ordinary course 
of things, require. The plea of ungovernable passion then, on 
the side of vice, is the poorest of all things; for it is no reason, 
and a poor excuse. The proper motives to religion are the proper 
proofs of it, from our moral nature, from the presages of con- 
science, and our natural apprehension of God under the character 
of a righteous Governor and Judge: a nature, and conscience, 
and apprehension, given us by him; and from the confirmation 
of the dictates of reason, by life and immortality brought to light 
by the Gospel ; and the wrath of God revealed from heaven 
against all ungodliness and unrighteousness of men. 

* Part II. ch. vi. f P. 108. 


END OF THE FIRST PART. 


16 * 


PART II 


$t&taltlr HHigimt. 


CHAPTER I. 

THE IMPORTANCE OP CHRISTIANITY.® 

Some persons, upon pretence of the sufficiency of the light 
of nature, avowedly reject all revelation, as in its very notion in- 
credible, and what must be fictitious. And indeed it is certain, 
no revelation would have been given, had the light of nature 
been sufficient in such a sense, as to render one not wanted and 
useless. But no man, in seriousness and simplicity of mind, can 
possibly think it so, who considers the state of religion in the 
heathen world before revelation, and its present state in those 
places which have borrowed no light from it : particularly the 
doubtfulness of some of the greatest men, concerning things of 
the utmost importance, as well as the natural inattention and 
ignorance of mankind in general. It is impossible to say, who 
would have been able to have reasoned out that whole system, 
which we call Natural Religion, in its genuine simplicity, clear 

a [There is a slight indication in this chapter that Butler falls into the old 
plan of settling the necessity of Christianity, before determining its truth. 
Paley discards this order of arrangement, in his very first sentence ; and with 
good reason. The necessity of revelation is an abstraction ; the proofs of it 
are patent facts. To hold in abeyance the credentials presented by Chris- 
tianity, till we first satisfy ourselves that God could or would make any such 
announcements, is unphilosophical and irreverent. This chapter discusses the 
importance rather than the necessity of revelation; and so is a fitting com- 
mencement of the discussion. Every truth disclosed in revelation, over and 
above the truths which natural religion furnishes, proves the necessity of 
revelation, if we would know any thing of such truths. And it is such truths 
which constitute the very peculiarities of revelation, and teach the icay of 
hnlcation, for the sinful and helpless.] 

186 


CHAP. I. 


IMPORTANCE OF CHRISTIANITY. 


187 


of superstition : but there is certainly no ground to affirm that 
the generality could. If they could, there is no sort of proba- 
bility that they would. Admitting there were, they would highly 
want a standing admonition to remind them of it, and inculcate 
it upon them. 

And further, were they as much disposed to attend to religion, 
as the better sort of men are ; yet even upon this supposition, 
there would be various occasions for supernatural instruction and 
assistance, and the greatest advantages might be afforded by 
them. b So that to say revelation is a thing superfluous, what 
there was no need of, and what can be of no service, is, I think, to 
talk quite wildly and at random. Nor would it be more extrava- 
gant to affirm, that mankind is so entirely at ease in the present 
state, and life so completely happy, that it is a contradiction to 
suppose our condition capable of being, in any respect, better. 

There are other persons, not to be ranked with these, who 
seem to be getting into a way of neglecting, and as it were, over- 
looking revelation, as of small importance provided natural reli- 
gion be kept to. With little regard either to the evidence of 
the former, or to the objections against it, and even upon sup- 
position of its truth; “the only design of it,” say they, “must 
be, to establish a belief of the moral system of nature, and to 
enforce the practice of natural piety and virtue. The belief and 
practice of these were, perhaps, much promoted by the first pub- 
lication of Christianity : but whether they are believed and prac- 
tised, upon the evidence and motives of nature or of revelation, 
is no great matter.”* This way of considering revelation, though 

b [No one can read the writings of the great sages of antiquity without a 
full and sad conviction that in relation to the character of God, the sinful- 
ness of man, the future state, and the rules of living, those prime points on 
which we need knowledge, they were almost profoundly ignorant. See on this 
point, Leland’s Adv. and Necess. : Chalmers’ Nat. Theol. : McCosh’s Div. 
Gov. : Pascal’s Thoughts : Warburton’s Div. Legation.] 

* Invenis multos propterea nolle fieri Christianos, quia quasi sufficiunt 

sibi de bona vita sua. Bene vivere opus est, ait. Quid mihi praecepturus est 
Christus? Ut bene vivam? Jam bene vivo. Quid mihi necessarius est 
Christus; nullum homicidium, nullum furtum, nullam rapinam facio, res 
alienas non concupisco, nullo adulterio contaminor? Nam inveniatur in vita 
mea aliquid quod reprehendatur, et qui reprehenderit faciat Christianum. Aug. 
in Peal. xxxi. [You find many who refuse to become Christians, because 
they feel sufficient of themselves to lead a good life. “We ought to live well.” 


188 


IMPORTANCE OF CHRISTIANITY. 


TART II. 


it is not the same with the former, yet borders nearly upon it, 
and very much, at length runs up into it : and requires to be 
particularly considered, with regard to the persons who seem to 
be getting into this way. The consideration of it will likewise 
further show the extravagance of the former opinion, and the 
truth of the observations in answer to it, just mentioned. And 
an inquiry into the importance of Christianity, cannot be an 
improper introduction to a treatise concerning the credibility 
of it. 

Now, if God has given a revelation to mankind, and com- 
manded those things which are commanded in Christianity; it is 
evident, at first sight, that it cannot in any wise be an indifferent 
matter, whether we obey or disobey those commands : unless we 
are certainly assured, that we know all the reasons for them, and 
that all those reasons are now ceased, with regard to mankind in 
general, or to ourselves in particular. It is absolutely impossible 
we can be assured of this.® For our ignorance of .these reasons 
proves nothing in the case: since the whole analogy of nature 
shows, what is indeed in itself evident, that there may be infinite 
reasons for things, with which we are not acquainted. 

But the importance of Christianity will more distinctly appear, 
by considering it more distinctly : First , as a republication, and 
external institution, of natural or essential religion, adapted to 
the present circumstances of mankind, and intended to promote 
natural piety and virtue : Secondly , as containing an account of 
a dispensation of things, not discoverable by reason, in conse- 
quence of which several distinct precepts are enjoined us. For 
though natural religion is the foundation .and principal part of 
Christianity, it is not in any sense the whole of it. 

I. Christianity is a republication of Natural religion. It in- 
structs mankind in the moral system of the world : that it is the 
work of an infinitely perfect Being, and under his government, 
that virtue is his law, and that he will finally judge mankind in 

says one. “What will Christ teach me? To live well? I do live well, what 
need then have I of Christ? I commit no murder, no theft, no robbery. I 
covet no man’s goods, and am polluted by no adultery. Let some one find in 
me any thing to censure, and he who can do so, may make me a Christian.”] 
c [The true mode of distinguishing a temporary, local, or individual com- 
mand from such as are of universal and perpetual obligation, is well laid down 
by Wayland, Mar. Sci. ch. ix. sec. 2.] 


ciiAr. i. 


IMPORTANCE OF CHRISTIANITY. 


189 


righteousness, and render to all according to their works, in a 
future state. And, which is very material, it teaches natural 
religion in its genuine simplicity; free from those superstitions, 
with which it was totally corrupted, and under which it was in a 
manner lost. 

Revelation is, further, an authoritative publication of natural 
religion, and so affords the evidence of testimony for the truth 
of it. Indeed the miracles and prophecies recorded in Scripture, 
were intended to prove a particular dispensation of Providence, 
i.e. the redemption of the world by the Messiah : but this does not 
hinder, but that they may also prove God’s general providence 
over the world, as our moral governor and judge. And they 
evidently do prove it; because this character of the Author of 
nature, is necessarily connected with and implied in that par- 
ticular revealed dispensation of things : it is likewise continually 
taught expressly, and insisted upon, by those persons who 
wrought the miracles and delivered the prophecies. So that 
indeed natural religion seems as much proved by the Scripture 
revelation, as it would have been, had the design of revelation 
been nothing else than to prove it. 

But it may possibly be disputed, how far miracles can prove 
natural religion ; and notable objections may be urged against 
this proof of it, considered as a matter of speculation : but 
considered as a practical thing, there can be none. For 
suppose a person to teach natural religion to a nation, who 
had lived in total ignorance or forgetfulness of it; and to 
declare that he was commissioned by God so to do ; suppose him, 
in proof of his commission, to foretell things future, which no 
human foresight could have guessed at ; to divide the sea with a 
word ; feed great multitudes with bread from heaven ; cure all 
manner of diseases; and raise the dead, even himself, to life; 
would not this give additional credibility to his teaching, a credi- 
bility beyond what that of a common man would have ; and be 
an authoritative publication of the law of nature, i.e. a new 
proof of it ? It would be a practical one, of the strongest kind, 
perhaps, which human creatures are capable of having given 
them. The Law of Moses then, and the Gospel of Christ, are 
authoritative publications of the religion of nature; they afford 
a proof of God’s general providence, as moral Governor of the 


190 


IMPORTANCE OF CHRISTIANITY. 


PART II. 


world, as well as of his particular dispensations of providence 
towards sinful creatures, revealed in the Law and the Gospel. 
As they are the only evidence of the latter, so they are an addi- 
tional evidence of the former. 

To show this further, let us suppose a man of the greatest and 
most improved capacity, who had never heard of revelation, con- 
vinced upon the whole, notwithstanding the disorders of the 
world, that it was under the direction and moral government of 
an infinitely perfect Being; but ready to question, whether he 
were not got beyond the reach of his faculties: suppose him 
brought, by this suspicion, into great danger of being carried 
away by the universal bad example of almost every one around 
him, who appeared to have no sense, no practical sense at least, 
of these things : and this, perhaps, would be as advantageous a 
situation with regard to religion, as nature alone ever placed any 
man in. What a confirmation now must it be to such a person, 
all at once, to find, that this moral system of things was revealed 
to mankind, in the name of that infinite Being, whom he had 
from principles of reason believed in : and that the publishers of 
the revelation proved their commission from him, by making it 
appear, that he had intrusted them with a power of suspending 
and changing the general laws of nature. 

Nor must it by any means be omitted, for it is a thing of the 
utmost importance, that life and immortality are eminently 
brought to light by the Gospel. The great doctrines of a future 
state, the danger of a course of wickedness* and the efficacy of 
repentance, are not only confirmed in the Gospel, but are taught, 
especially the last is, with a degree of light, to which that of 
nature is but darkness. 

Further. As Christianity served these ends and purposes, 
when it was first published, by the miraculous publication itself, 
so it was intended to serve the same purposes in future ages, by 
means of the settlement of a visible church : e of a society, dis- 

d [Natural religion shows us the danger of sin ; but not the infinite danger 
of eternal retribution, and the hopelessness of restoration after death. And as 
to the efficacy of repentance, it rather opposes that doctrine than teaches it. 
At least it does not teach that repentance may be accepted, so as not only to 
cancel guilt, but restore to the favor of God.] 

e [“ Christianity was left with Christians, to be transmitted, in like manner 
as the religion of nature had been left, with mankind in general. There was 


CHAP. I. 


IMPORTANCE OF CHRISTIANITY. 


191 


tinguished from common ones, and from the rest of the world, by 
peculiar religious institutions; by an instituted method of instruc- 
tion, and an instituted form of external religion. Miraculous 
powers were given to the first preachers of Christianity, in order 
to their introducing it into the world : a visible church was esta- 
blished, in order to continue it, and carry it on successively 
throughout all ages. Had only Moses and the prophets, Christ 
and his apostles, taught, and by miracles proved, religion to their 
contemporaries; the benefits of their instructions would have 
reached but a small part of mankind. Christianity must have 
bBen, in a great degree, sunk and forgot in a very few ages. To 
prevent this, appears to have been one reason why a visible 
church was instituted; to be like a city upon a hill, a standing 
memorial to the world of the duty which we owe our Maker : to 
call men continually, both by example and instruction, to attend 
to it, and, by the form of religion, ever before their eyes, remind 
them of the reality; to be the repository of the oracles of God; 
to hold up the light of revelation in aid to that of nature, and to 
propagate it, throughout all generations, to the end of the world — 
the light of revelation, considered here in no other view, than as 
designed to enforce natural religion. And in proportion as 
Christianity is professed and taught in the world, religion, natural 
or essential religion, is thus distinctly and advantageously laid 
before mankind, and brought again and again to their thoughts, 
as a matter of infinite importance. 

A visible church has also a further tendency to promote natural 
religion, as being an instituted method of education, originally 
intended to be of peculiar advantage to those who conform to it. 
For one end of the institution was, that, by admonition and re- 
proof, as well as instruction, by a general regular discipline, and 
public exercises of religion, the body of Christ, as the Scripture 
speaks, should be edified ; i.e. trained up in piety and virtue for 
a higher and better state. This settlement, then, appearing thus 

however this difference that by an institution of external religion with a stand- 
ing ministry for instruction and discipline, it pleased God to unite Christians 
into visible churches , and all along to preserve them over a great part of the 
world, and thus perpetuate a general publication of the Gospel.” Butler’s 
sermon before the Soc. for Prop, the Gospel. He goes on to show, in that dis- 
course, that these churches, however corrupt any may become, are repositories 
for the written oracles of God, and so carry the antidote to their heresies.] 


192 


IMPORTANCE OF CHRISTIANITY. 


TART II. 


beneficial, tending in the nature of the thing to answer, and, in 
some degree, actually answering, those ends, it is to be remem- 
bered, that the very notion of it implies positive institutions; for 
the visibility of the church consists in them. Take away every 
thing of this kind, and you lose the very notion itself. So that 
if the things now mentioned are advantages, the reason and im- 
portance of positive institutions in general is most obvious; since 
without them these advantages could not be secured to the world. 
And it is mere idle wantonness, to insist upon knowing the 
reasons, v;hy such particular ones were fixed upon rather than 
others. 

The benefit arising from this supernatural assistance, which 
Christianity affords to natural religion, is what some persons are 
very slow in apprehending. And yet it is a thing distinct in 
itself, and a very plain obvious one. For will any in good earnest 
really say, that the bulk of mankind in the heathen world were 
in as advantageous a situation, with regard to natural religion, as 
they are now among us : that it was laid before them, and en- 
forced upon them, in a manner as distinct, and as much tending 
to influence their practice 

The objections against all this, from the perversion of Chris- 
tianity, and from the supposition of its having had but little good 
influence, how r ever innocently they may be proposed, cannot be 
insisted upon as conclusive, upon any principles, but such as lead 
to downright Atheism; because the manifestation of the law of 
nature by reason, which, upon all principles of Theism, must 
have been from God, has been perverted and rendered ineffectual 
in the same manner. It may indeed, I think, truly be said, that 
the good effects of Christianity have not been small; nor its sup- 
posed ill effects, any effects at all of it, properly speaking. Per- 
haps, too, the things done have been aggravated; and if not, 
Christianity hath been often only a pretence, and the same evils 
in the main would have been done upon some other pretence. 
However, great and shocking as the corruptions and abuses of it 
have really been, they cannot be insisted upon as arguments 
against it, upon principles of Theism. For one cannot proceed 
one step in reasoning upon natural religion, any more than upon 
Christianity, without laying it down as a first principle, that the 
dispensations of Providence are not to be judged of by their per- 


CHAP. T. 


IMPORTANCE OF CHRISTIANITY. 


193 


versions, but by their genuine tendencies : not by what they do 
actually seem to effect, but by what they would effect if mankind 
did their part; that part which is justly put and left upon them. 
It is altogether as much the language of one as of the other : He 
that is unjust , let him he unjust still : and he that is holy , let him 
he holy still* The light of reason does not, any more than that 
of revelation, force men to submit to its authority; both admonish 
them of what they ought to do and avoid, together with the con- 
sequences of each ; and after this, leave them at full liberty to 
act just as they please, till the appointed time of judgment. 
Every moment’s experience shows, that this is God’s general rule 
of government. 1 

To return then : Christianity being a promulgation of the law 
of nature; being moreover an authoritative promulgation of it; 
with new light, and other circumstances of peculiar advantage, 
adapted to the wants of mankind; these things fully show its 
importance. 

It is to be observed further, that as the nature of the case re- 
quires, so all Christians are commanded to contribute, by their 
profession of Christianity, to preserve it in the world, and render 
it such a promulgation and enforcement of religion. For it is 
the very scheme of the Gospel, that each Christian should, in his 
degree, contribute towards continuing and carrying it on : all by 
uniting in the public profession and external practice of Chris- 
tianity; some by instructing, by having the oversight and taking 
care of this religious community, the church of God. Now this 
further shows the importance of Christianity; and, which is what 
I chiefly intend, its importance in a practical sense : or the high 
obligations we are under, to take it into our most serious considera- 
tion ; and the danger there must necessarily be, not only in treating 

* Rev. xxii. 11. 

f [“ It is no real objection to this, though it may seem so at first sight, to say 
that since Christianity is a remedial system, designed to obviate those very 
evils which have been produced by the neglect and abuse of the light of nature, 
it ought not to be liable to the same perversions. Because — 1. Christianity is 
not designed primarily to remedy the defects of nature, but of an unnatural 
state of ruin into which men were brought by the Fall. And 2. It is remedial 
of the defects of nature in a great degree, by its giving additional advantages. 
3. It might be impossible that it should bo remedial in a greater degree than 
it is, without destroying man’s free agency; which would be to destroy its own 
end, the practice of virtue.”— Fitzgerald’s Notes.] 

N 17 


194 


IMPORTANCE OF CHRISTIANITY. 


PART II. 


it despitefully, which I am not now speaking of, but in dis- 
regarding and neglecting it. For this is neglecting to do what 
is expressly enjoined us, for continuing those benefits to the 
world, and transmitting them down to future times. And all 
this holds, even though the only thing to be considered in Chris- 
tianity were its subserviency to natural religion. 

II. Christianity is to be considered in a further view; as con- 
taining an account of a dispensation of things, not at all dis- 
coverable by reason, in consequence of which several distinct 
precepts are enjoined us. Christianity is not only an external 
institution of natural religion, and a new promulgation of God’s 
general providence, as righteous governor and judge of the world; 
but it contains also a revelation of a particular dispensation of 
Providence, carrying on by his Son and Spirit, for the recovery 
and salvation of mankind, who are represented in Scripture to 
be in a state of ruin. And in consequence of this revelation 
being made, we are commanded to be baptized, not only in the 
name of the Father , but also, of the Son , and of the Holy 
Ghost: and other obligations of duty, unknown before, to the 
Son and the Holy Ghost, are revealed. Now the importance of 
these duties may be judged of, by observing that they arise, not 
from positive command merely, but also from the offices which 
appear, from Scripture, to belong to those divine persons in the 
Gospel dispensation ; or from the relations, which we are there 
informed, they stand in to us. By reason is revealed the rela- 
tion, which God the Father stands in to us. Hence arises the 
obligation of duty which we are under to him. In Scripture are 
revealed the relations, which the Son and Holy Spirit stand in 
to us. Hence arise the obligations of duty, 8 which we are under 
to them. The truth of the case, as one may speak, in each of 
these three respects being admitted : that God is the governor 
of the world, upon the evidence of reason; that Christ is the 
mediator between God and man, and the Holy Ghost our guide 
and sanctifier, upon the evidence of revelation: the truth of the 

8 [Chalmers (Nat. Theol., b. v. ch. iv.) makes this very plain. He shows 
the ethics of natural religion to be one thing and its objects another. Natural 
religion discloses no Redeemer or Sanctifier; but it teaches how we should 
regard such a person, if there be one. It teaches love and conformity to such 
a being by the relation in which we of course stand to him. How we are to 
express that love and obedience it cannot teach.] 


CHAP. I. 


IMPORTANCE OF CHRISTIANITY. 


195 


case, I say, in each of these respects being admitted, it is no 
more a question, why it should be commanded, that we be bap- 
tized in the name of the Son and of the Holy Ghost, than that 
we be baptized in the name of the Father. This matter seems 
to require to be more fully stated.* 

Let it be remembered then, that religion comes under the 
twofold consideration of internal and external : for the latter is 
as real a part of religion, of true religion, as the former. Now, 
when religion is considered under the first notion, as an inward 
principle, to be exerted in such and such inward acts of the mind 
and heart, the essence of natural religion may be said to consist 
in religious regards to God the Father Almighty: and the essence 
of revealed religion, as distinguished from natural, to consist in 
religious regards to the Son , and to the Holy Ghost. The obliga- 
tion we are under, of paying these religious regards to each of 
these divine persons respectively, arises from the respective rela- 
tions which they each stand in to us. How these relations are 
made known, whether by reason or revelation, makes no alteration 
in the case : because the duties arise out of the relations them- 
selves, not out of the manner in which we are informed of them. 
The Son and Spirit have each his proper office in that great dis- 
pensation of Providence* the redemption of the world ; the one 
our Mediator, the other our Sanctifier. Hoes not then the duty 
of religious regards to both these divine persons, as immediately 
arise to the view of reason, out of the very nature of these offices 
and relations ; as the good-will and kind intention, which we owe 
to our fellow-creatures, arise out of the common relations be- 
tween us and them? But it will be asked, “What are the in- 
ward religious regards, appearing thus obviously due to the Son 
and Holy Spirit ; as arising, not merely from command in Scrip- 
ture, but from the very nature of the revealed relations, which 
they stand in to us?” I answer, the religious regards of reve- 
rence, honor, love, trust, gratitude, fear, hope. 

In what external manner this inward worship is to be ex- 
pressed, is a matter of pure revealed command, as perhaps the 
external manner, in which God the Father is to be worshipped, 
may be more so than we are ready to think. But the worship, 

* See The Nature, Obligation, and Efficacy, of the Christian Sacraments, 
&c., [by Waterland,] and Colliber of Revealed Religion, as there quoted. 


196 IMPORTANCE OF CHRISTIANITY. part ii. 

the internal worship itself, to the Son and Holy Ghost, is no 
furthei .matter of pure revealed command, than as the relations 
they sljjjd in to us are matter of pure revelation : for the rela- 
tions lljjg known, the obligations to such internal worship are 
obligatioHfcof reason, arising out of those relations themselves. 
In short^®B| history of the gospel as immediately shows us the 
reason of they e obligations, as it shows us the meaning of the 
words, Son a£\l Holy Ghost. 

If this accotht of the Christian religion be just, those persons 
who can speak' Hghtly of it, as of little consequence, provided 
natural religion be 'kept to, plainly forget, that Christianity, even 
what is peculiarly so called, as distinguished from natural reli- 
gion, has yet somewhat very important, even of a moral nature. 
For the office of our Lord being made known, and the relation 
he stands in to us, the obligation of religious regards to him is 
plainly moral, as much as charity to mankind is ; since this obli- 
gation arises, before external command, immediately out of that 
his office and relation itself. Those persons appear to forget, 
that revelation is to be considered, as informing us of somewhat 
new, in the state of mankind , 11 and in the government of the 
world : as acquainting us with some relations we stand in, which 
could not otherwise have been known. These relations being real 
(though before revelation we could be under no obligations from 
them, yet upon their being revealed), there is no reason to think, 
but that neglect of behaving suitably to them will be attended 
with the same kind of consequences under God’s government, as 
neglecting to behave suitably to any other relations, made known 
to us by reason. Ignorance, whether unavoidable or voluntary, 
so far as we can possibly see, will just as much, and just as little, 
excuse in one case as in the other : the ignorance being supposed 
equally unavoidable, or equally voluntary, in both cases. 

If therefore Christ be indeed the mediator between God and 
man, i.e. if Christianity be true ; if he be indeed our Lord, our 
Savior, and our God, no one can say, what may follow, not only 

h [If Christianity were but “a ^publication of natural religion/' or as 
Tindall says, “as old as creation,” why do deists oppose it? It does indeed 
republish natural religion, but it adds stupendous truths beside. If it gave us 
no new light, no new motives, it would be but a tremendous curse, making us 
all the more responsible, and none the more instructed or secure.] 


cnAP. i. 


IMPORTANCE OP CHRISTIANITY. 


197 


the obstinate, hut the careless disregard to him, in those high 
relations. Nay, no one can say, what may follow such disregard, 
even in the way of natural consequence.* For, as the natural 
consequences of vice in this life are doubtless to be considered as 
judicial punishments inflicted by God, so for aught we know, the 
judicial punishments of the future life may be, in a like way or 
a like sense, the natural consequence of vice :f of men’s violating 
or disregarding the relations which God has placed them in here, 
and made known to them. 

If mankind are corrupted and depraved in their moral cha- 
racter, and so are unfit for that state, which Christ is gone to 
prepare for his disciples ; and if the assistance of God’s Spirit 
be necessary to renew their nature, in the degree requisite to 
their being qualified for that state ; (all which is implied in the 
express, though figurative declaration, Except a man be born of 
the Spirit , he cannot enter into the kingdom of God: J) supposing 
this, is it possible any serious person can think it a slight matter, 
whether or no he makes use of the means, expressly commanded 
by God, for obtaining this divine assistance ? Especially since 
the whole analogy of nature shows, that we are not to expect 
any benefits, without making use of the appointed means for 
obtaining or enjoying them. Now reason shows us nothing, of 
the particular immediate means of obtaining either temporal or 
spiritual benefits. This therefore we must learn, either from 
experience or revelation. And experience, the present case does 
not admit of. 

The conclusion from all this evidently is, that Christianity 
being supposed either true or credible, it is unspeakable irreve- 
rence, and really the most presumptuous rashness, to treat it as a 
light matter. It can never justly be esteemed of little conse- 
quence, till it be positively supposed false. Nor do I know a 
higher and more important obligation which we are under, than 
that of examining most seriously into its evidence, supposing 
its credibility; and of embracing it, upon supposition of its 
truth. 

The two following deductions may be proper to be added, in 
order to illustrate the foregoing observations, and to prevent their 
being mistaken. 

* P. 94. 


f Ch. v. 


f John iii. 5. 


198 


IMPORTANCE OF CHRISTIANITY. 


TAUT IT. 


First , Hence we may clearly see, where lies the distinction 
between what is positive and what is moral in religion. Moral 
precepts, are precepts the reasons of which we see : positive pre- 
cepts, are precepts the reasons of which we do not see.* Moral 
duties arise out of the nature of the case itself, prior to external 
command. Positive duties do not arise out of the nature of the 
case, but from external command; nor would they be duties at 
all, were it not for such command, received from Him whose 
creatures and subjects we are. But the manner in which the 
nature of the case or the fact of the relation, is made known, this 
doth not denominate any duty either positive or moral. That we 
be baptized in the name of the Father is as much a positive duty, 
as that we be baptized in the name of the Son, because both arise 
equally from revealed command : though the relation which we 
stand in to God the Father is made known to us by reason, and 
the relation we stand in to Christ, by revelation only. On the 
other hand, the dispensation of the Gospel being admitted, grati- 
tude as immediately becomes due to Christ, from his being the 
voluntary minister of this dispensation, as it is due to God the 
Father, from his being the fountain of all good; though the first 
is made known to us by revelation only, the second by reason. 
Hence also we may see, and, for distinctness’ sake, it may be 
worth mentioning, that positive institutions come under a twofold 
consideration. They are either institutions founded on natural 
religion, as baptism in the name of the Father; (though this has 
also a particular reference to the gospel dispensation, for it is in 
the name of God, as the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ:) or 
they are external institutions founded on revealed religion; as 
baptism in the name of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost. 

Secondly, From the distinction between what is moral and 
what is positive in religion, appears the ground of that peculiar 
preference, which the Scripture teaches us to be due to the 
former. 

The reason of positive institutions in general, is very obvious; 

* This is the distinction between moral and positive precepts considered re- 
spectively as such. But yet, since the latter have somewhat of a moral nature, 
we may see the reason of them, considered in this view. Moral and positive 
precepts are in some respects alike, in other respects different. So far as they 
are alike, we discern the reasons of both ; so far as they are different, we discern 
the reasons of the former, but not of the latter. See p. 189, <fce. 


CHAP. I. 


IMPORTANCE OF CHRISTIANITY. 


199 


though we should not see the reason, why particular ones are 
pitched upon rather than others. Whoever, therefore, instead 
of cavilling at words, will attend to the thing itself, may clearly 
see, that positive institutions in general, as distinguished from 
this or that particular one, have the nature of moral commands; 
since the reasons of them appear. Thus, for instance, the external 
worship of God is a moral duty, though no particular mode of it 
be so. Care then is to be taken, when a comparison is made be- 
tween positive and moral duties, that they be compared no further 
than as they are different; no further than as the former are 
positive, or arise out of mere external command, the reasons of 
which we are not acquainted with; and as the latter are moral, 
or arise out of the apparent reason of the case, without such ex- 
ternal command. Unless this caution be observed, we shall run 
into endless confusion. 

Now this being premised, suppose two standing precepts en- 
joined by the same authority; that, in certain conjunctures, it is 
impossible to obey both; that the former is moral, i.e. a precept 
of which we see the reasons, and that they hold in the particular 
case before us; but that the latter is positive, i.e. a precept of 
which we do not see the reasons : it is indisputable that our obli- 
gations are to obey the former; because there is an apparent 
reason for this preference, and none against it. Further, positive 
institutions, all those I suppose which Christianity enjoins, are 
means to a moral end : and the end must be acknowledged more 
excellent than the means. 1 Nor is observance of these institutions 
any religious obedience at all, or of any value, otherwise than as 
it proceeds from a moral principle. This seems to be the strict 
logical way of stating and determining this matter; but will, per- 
haps, be found less applicable to practice, than may be thought 
at first sight. 

Therefore, in a more practical, though more lax way of con- 


1 [Without offering the least objection to what is here said of the comparative 
value of moral and positive institutions, it should not bo overlooked that some- 
times, obedience to a positive rite is more indicative of an obedient spirit, than 
obedience to a moral rule. The latter is urged by its intrinsic propriety, over 
and above the command, and appeals to several of our finer impulses. The 
former rests singly on our reverence for the will of God. There are many who 
would repel a temptation to steal, or to lie, who yet are insensible to the duty 
of baptism or the Lord’s supper.] 


200 


IMPORTANCE OF CHRISTIANITY. 


TART II. 


sideration, and taking the words, moral law and positive institu- 
tions , in the popular sense, I add, that the whole moral law is as 
much matter of revealed command, as positive institutions are: 
for the Scripture enjoins every moral virtue. In this respect 
then they are both upon a level. But the moral law is, moreover, 
written upon our hearts; interwoven into our very nature. And 
this is a plain intimation of the Author of it, which is to be 
preferred, when they interfere. 

But there is not altogether so much necessity for the determi- 
nation of this question, as some persons seem to think. Nor are 
we left to reason alone to determine it. For, First, Though 
mankind have, in all ages, been greatly prone to place their reli- 
gion in peculiar positive rites, by way of equivalent for obedience 
to moral precepts; yet, without making any comparison at all 
between them, and consequently without determining which is to 
have the preference, the nature of the thing abundantly shows all 
notions of that kind to be utterly subversive of true religion, as 
they are, moreover, contrary to the whole general tenor of Scrip- 
ture; and likewise to the most express particular declarations of 
it, that nothing can render us accepted of God, without moral 
virtue. 

Secondly, Upon the occasion of mentioning together positive 
and moral duties, the Scripture always puts the stress of religion 
upon the latter, and never upon the former. This, though no 
sort of allowance to neglect the former, when they do not interfere 
with the latter, is yet a plain intimation, that when they do, the 
latter are to be preferred. And as mankind are for placing the 
stress of their religion anywhere, rather than upon virtue; lest 
both the reason of the thing, and the general spirit of Christi- 
anity, appearing in the intimation now mentioned, should be in- 
effectual against this prevalent folly, our Lord himself, from 
whose command alone the obligation of positive institutions arises, 
has taken occasion to make the comparison between them and 
mqral precepts; when the Pharisees censured him, for eating 
with publicans and sinners; and also when they censured his 
disciples, for plucking the ears of corn on the Sabbath day. 
Upon this comparison, he has determined expressly, and in form, 
which shall have the preference when they interfere. And by 
delivering his authoritative determination in a proverbial manner 


ciiap. i. 


IMPORTANCE OF CHRISTIANITY. 


201 


of expression, he has made it general : I will have mercy , and 
not sacrifice* The propriety of the word proverbial , is not the 
thing insisted upon : though I think the manner of speaking is 
to be called so. But that the manner of speaking very remark- 
ably renders the determination general, is surely indisputable. 
For, had it been said only, that God preferred mercy to the rigid 
observance of the Sabbath, even then, by parity of reason, most 
justly might we have argued, that he preferred mercy likewise, 
to the observance of other ritual institutions; and in general, 
moral duties, to positive ones. And thus the determination 
would have been general; though its being so were inferred and 
not expressed. But as the passage really stands in the Gospel, 
it is much stronger. For the sense and the very literal words of 
our Lord’s answer, are as applicable to any other instance of a 
comparison, between positive and moral duties, as to that upon 
which they were spoken. And if, in case of competition, mercy 
is to be preferred to positive institutions, it will scarce be thought, 
that justice is to give place to them. It is remarkable too, that, 
as the words are a quotation from the Old Testament, they are 
introduced, on both the forementioned occasions, with a declara- 
tion, that the Pharisees did not understand the meaning of them. 
This, I say, is very remarkable. For, since it is scarce possible, 
for the most ignorant person, not to understand the literal sense 
of the passage in the prophet;")* and since understanding the 
literal sense would not have prevented their condemning the guilt- 
less ,J it can hardly be doubted, that the thing which our Lord 
really intended in that declaration was, that the Pharisees had 
not learned from it, as they might, wherein the general spirit of 
religion consists: that it consists in moral piety and virtue, as 
distinguished from ritual observances. However, it is certain we 
may learn this from his divine application of the passage, in the 
Gospel. 

But, as it is one of the peculiar weaknesses of human nature, 
when, upon a comparison of two things, one is found to be of 
greater importance than the other, to consider this other as of 
scarce any importance at all : it is highly necessary that we re- 
mind ourselves, how great presumption it is, to make light of any 
institutions of divine appointment; that our obligations to obey 

* Matt. ix. 13, and xii. 7. f Hosea vi. 6. J See Matt. xii. 7. 


202 


REVELATION CONSIDERED AS MIRACULOUS. part ii. 


all God’s commands whatever are absolute and indispensable; 
and that commands merely positive, admitted to be from him, 
lay us under a moral obligation to obey them : an obligation 
moral in the strictest and most proper sense. 

To these things I cannot forbear adding, that the account now 
given of Christianity most strongly shows and enforces upon us 
the obligation of searching the Scriptures, in order to see, what 
the scheme of revelation really is ; instead of determining before- 
hand, from reason, what the scheme of it must be.* Indeed if 
in revelation there be found any passages, the seeming meaning 
of which is contrary to natural religion ; we may most certainly 
conclude, such seeming meaning not to be the real one. j But it 
is not any degree of a presumption against an interpretation of 
Scripture, that such interpretation contains a doctrine, which the 
light of nature cannot discover ;■)• or a precept, which the law 
of nature does not oblige to. 


CHAPTER II. 

SUPPOSED PRESUMPTION AGAINST A REVELATION CONSIDERED 
AS MIRACULOUS. 

Having shown the importance of the Christian revelation, 
and the obligations which we are under seriously to attend to it, 
upon supposition of its truth, or its credibility, the next thing in 

*• See ch. iii. 

i [Dr. Angus judiciously remarks on this sentence, "This sentiment, as un- 
derstood by Butler, is just, but very liable to abuse. Clearly, the Bible must be 
so interpreted as to agree with all known truth, whether of natural religion or 
natural science. At the same time, to correct the theology of the Bible by the 
theology of nature, as finite and guilty men understand it, may involve the 
rejection of Bible theology entirely; and of the very light and teaching it was 
intended to supply. The converse of Butler’s statement is equally true, and 
even more important. If in natural theology there be found any facts, the 
seeming lesson of which is contrary to revealed religion, such seeming lesson 
is not the real one.” Practically, it will be found that seeming meanings of 
Scripture, really erroneous, are corrected by other parts of Scripture itself. I 
understand Butler as only affirming that we must interpret Scripture according 
to immutable principles, and lenoion truth. The infidel rejects it for not con- 
forming to his assumed hypothesis.'] 
f P. 203. 

/A. 


t'HAP. ii. REVELATION CONSIDERED AS MIRACULOUS. 


203 


order, is to consider the supposed presumptions against revelation 
in general; which shall be the subject of this chapter: and the 
objections against the Christian in particular, which shall be the 
subject of some following ones.* For it seems the most natural 
method, to remove the prejudices against Christianity, before we 
proceed to the consideration of the positive evidence for it, and 
the objections against that evidence.*)" 

It is, I think, commonly supposed, that there is some peculiar 
presumption, from the analogy of nature, against the Christian 
scheme of things, at least against miracles; so as that stronger 
evidence is necessary to prove the truth and reality of them, than 
would be sufficient to convince us of other events, or matters of 
fact. Indeed the consideration of this supposed presumption 
cannot but be thought very insignificant, by many persons. Yet, 
as it belongs to the subject of this treatise; so it may tend to 
open the mind, and remove some prejudices, however needless 
the consideration of it be, upon its own account. 

I. I find no appearance of a presumption, from the analogy of 
nature, against the general scheme of Christianity, that God 
created and invisibly governs the world by Jesus Christ; and by 
him also will hereafter judge it in righteousness, i.e. render to 
every one according to his works ; and that good men are under 
the secret influence of his Spirit. Whether these things are, or 
are not, to be called miraculous, is perhaps only a question about 
words; or however, is of no moment in the case. If the analogy 
of nature raises any presumption against this general scheme of 
Christianity, it must be, either because it is not discoverable by 
reason or experience ; or else, because it is unlike that course of 
nature, which is. But analogy raises no presumption against the 
truth of this scheme, upon either of these accounts. 

First , There is no presumption, from analogy, against the truth 
of it, upon account of its not being discoverable by reason or expe- 
rience. Suppose one who never heard of revelation, of the most 
improved understanding, and acquainted with our whole system of 
natural philosophy and natural religion ; such a one could not but 
be sensible, that it was but a very small part of the natural and 
moral system of the universe, which he was acquainted with. 
He could not but be sensible, that there must be innumerable 
Chaps, iii., iv., v., vi. t Chap. vit. 


204 


REVELATION CONSIDERED AS MIRACULOUS. part ii. 


things, in the dispensations of Providence past, in the invisible 
government over the world at present carrying on, and in what 
is to come ; of which he was wholly ignorant,* and which could 
not be discovered without revelation. Whether the scheme of 
nature be, in the strictest sense, infinite or not; it is evidently 
vast, even beyond all possible imagination. And doubtless that 
part of it, which is open to our view, is but as a point in com- 
parison of the whole plan of Providence, reaching throughout 
eternity past and future; in comparison of what is even now 
going on, in the remote parts of the boundless universe, nay, in 
comparison of the whole scheme of this world. And therefore, 
that things lie beyond the natural reach of our faculties, is no 
sort of presumption against the truth and reality of them ; be- 
cause it is certain, there are innumerable things, in the constitu- 
tion and government of the universe, which are thus beyond the 
natural reach of our faculties. 

Secondly , Analogy raises no presumption against any of the 
things contained in this general doctrine of Scripture now men- 
tioned, upon account of their being unlike the known course of 
nature. For there is no presumption at all from analogy, that 
the whole course of things, or divine government naturally un- 
known to us, and every thing in it, is like to any thing in that 
which is known ; and therefore no peculiar presumption against 
any thing in the former, upon account of its being unlike to any 
thing in the latter. And in the constitution and natural govern- 
ment of the world, as well as in the moral government of it, we 
see things, in a great degree, unlike one another : and therefore 
ought not to wonder at such unlikeness between things visible 
and invisible. However, the scheme of Christianity is by no 
means entirely unlike the scheme of nature; as will appear in 
the following part of this treatise. 

The notion of a miracle, considered as a proof of a divine 
mission, has been stated with great exactness by divines ; and is, 
I think, sufficiently understood by every one. There are also 
invisible miracles/ the Incarnation of Christ, for instance, which, 

* P. 172. 

a [Papists urge that the actual conversion of the bread and wine in the 
Eucharist is an invisible miracle. But an invisible miracle is such because 
wrought under circumstances which exclude examination : while transubstan- 


chap. ii. REVELATION CONSIDERED AS MIRACULOUS. 205 

being secret, cannot be alleged as a proof of such a mission ; but 
require themselves to be proved by visible miracles. Revelation 
itself too is miraculous ; and miracles are the proof of it ; and 
the supposed presumption against these shall presently be con- 
sidered. All which I have been observing here is, that, whether 
we choose to call every thing in the dispensations of Providence, 
not discoverable without revelation, nor like the known course of 
things, miraculous; and whether the general Christian dispensa- 
tion now mentioned is to be called so, or not ; the foregoing 
observations seem certainly to show, that there is no presumption 
against it from the analogy of nature. 

II. There is no presumption, from analogy, against some opera- 
tions, which we should now call miraculous; particularly none 
against a revelation at the beginning of the world : nothing of 
such presumption against it, as is supposed to be implied or ex- 
pressed in the word, miraculous . b A miracle, in its very notion, 
is relative to a course of nature; and implies something differ- 
ent from it, considered as being so. Now, either there was no 
course of nature at the time which we are speaking of; or if 
there were, we are not acquainted what the course of nature is, 
upon the first peopling of worlds. Therefore the question, 
whether mankind had a revelation made to them at that time, is 
to be considered, not as a question concerning a miracle, but as a 
common question of fact. And we have the like reason, be it 
more or less, to admit the report of tradition, concerning this 
question, and concerning common matters of fact of the same 
antiquity; for instance, what part of the earth was first peopled. 

Or thus : When mankind was first placed in this state, there 
was a power exerted, totally different from the present course of 
nature. Now, whether this power, thus wholly different from the 
present course of nature, (for we cannot properly apply to it the 
word miraculous;') whether this power stopped immediately after 
it had made man, or went on, and exerted itself further in giving 
him a revelation, is a question of the same kind, as whether an 

tiation invites and facilitates examination. " It is wrought publicly, and con- 
stantly, and yet cannot be discovered to be a miracle. Indeed it supposes the 
working of a second miracle, to make the first invisible/'] 

b [Paley shows conclusively that a denial of miracles leads not only to 
a denial of revelation,, but a denial of the existence of God, all of whoso 
extraordinary acts are necessarily miraculous.] 

18 


206 


REVELATION CONSIDERED AS MIRACULOUS, part ii. 


ordinary power exerted itself in such a particular degree and 
manner, or not. 

Or suppose the power exerted in the formation of the world be 
considered as miraculous, or rather, be called by that name; the 
case will not be different : since it must be acknowledged, that 
such a power was exerted. For supposing it acknowledged, that 
our Savior spent some years in a course of working miracles 
there is no more presumption, worth mentioning, against his 
haring exerted this miraculous power, in a certain degree greater, 
than in a certain degree less; in one or two more instances, than 
in one or two fewer; in this, than in another manner. 

It is evident then, that there can be no peculiar presumption, 
from the analogy of nature, against supposing a revelation, when 
man was first placed upon earth. d 

Add, that there does not appear the least intimation in history 
or tradition, that religion was first reasoned out : but the whole 
of history and tradition makes for the other side, that it came 
into the world by revelation. Indeed the state of religion, in the 
first ages of which we have any account, seems to suppose and 
imply, that this was the original of it among mankind.® And 
these reflections together, without taking in the peculiar authority 
of Scripture, amount to real and a very material degree of evi- 
dence, that there was a revelation at the beginning of the world. 


c [Whately, in his Logic, b. iii., has shown the folly of the Deistical at- 
tempts to explain our Savior’s miracles as mere natural events. Having 
labored to show this of some one of the miracles, they then do so as to another, 
and thence infer that all were accidental conjunctures of natural circumstances. 
He says, they might as well argue “that because it is not improbable one may 
throw sixes once in a hundred throws, therefore it is no more improbable that 
one may throw sixes a hundred times running.” 

Fitzgerald says, “the improbability of a whole series of strange natural 
events, taking place unaccountably, one after another, amounts to a far greater 
improbability than is involved in the admission of miracles.”] 

d [That man, at first, must have had supernatural instructions, or in other 
words some revelations, is shown by Archbishop Whately in his “ Origin of 
Civilization.” Rev. Samuel Stanhope Smith expresses his conviction, both 
from reason and history, that man in his savage state could not even have pre- 
served life without instruction from his Creator.] 

e [The maintenance by the Jews, of a system of pure Theism, through so 
many and so rude ages, without being superior, or even equal to their neighbors, 
in science and civilization, can only be accounted for on the presumption of a 
revelation.] 


chap. ii. REVELATION CONSIDERED AS MIRACULOUS. 


207 


Now this, as it is a confirmation of natural religion, and therefore 
mentioned in the former part of this treatise;* so likewise it 
has a tendency to remove any prejudices against a subsequent 
revelation. 

III. But still it may be objected, that there is some peculiar 
presumption, from analogy, against miracles; particularly against 
revelation, after the settlement and during the continuance of a 
course of nature. 

Now with regard to this supposed presumption, it is to be ob- 
served in general, that before we can have ground for raising 
what can, with any propriety, be called an argument from analogy, 
for or against revelation considered as something miraculous, we 
must be acquainted with a similar or parallel case. But the his- 
tory of some other world, seemingly in like circumstances with 
our own, is no more than a parallel case: and therefore nothing 
short of this can be so. Yet, could we come at a presumptive 
proof, for or against a revelation, from being informed, whether 
such world had one, or not; such a proof, being drawn from 
one single instance only, must be infinitely precarious. More 
particularly : 

First. There is a very strong presumption against common 
speculative truths, and against the most ordinary facts, before the 
proof f of them; which yet is overcome by almost any proof. 

* P. 166, <fcc. 

f [Mills (Logic, chap. 24, § 5 ,) points out what he deems a mistake of “some 
of the writers against Hume on Miracles,” in confounding the improbability of 
an event, before its occurrence, with the improbability afterwards; that is, con- 
sidering them equal in degree. He fully proves that the great Laplace fell 
into this error, and the student should consult the passage. 

Prof. Fitzgerald holds Butler to have fallen into the mistake adverted to 
by Mills; and quotes the latter author in a way which seems to make him say 
that such is his opinion also. I do not so understand Mills, nor do I see that 
Butler has confounded these meanings; but the very contrary. He expressly 
affirms, and most truly, that the strongest presumption may lie against “the 
most ordinary facts before the 'proof which yet is overcome by almost any 
proof.” Butler’s position here, may be thus illustrated. Suppose a hundred 
numbers to be put in a box, and it is proposed to draw out the number 42. 
Now there are 99 chances to 1 against drawing that, or any other given number. 
But suppose a child tells you he put the hundred numbers into a box, and drew 
out one, and it proved to be 42; you at once believe, for that was as likely to 
come as any other. 

The proof of Christianity from prophecy becomes amazingly strong, thus 
viewed. There are many predictions, for instance that Christ should be bom 


208 


REVELATION CONSIDERED AS MIRACULOUS. part it. 


There is a presumption of millions to one, against the story of 
Caesar, or of any other man. For suppose a number of common 
facts so and so circumstanced, of which we had no kind of proof, 
should happen to come into one’s thoughts; every one would, 
without any possible doubt, conclude them to be false. And the 
like may be said of a single common fact. Hence it appears, 
that the question of importance, as to the matter before us, is, 
concerning the degree of the peculiar presumption supposed 
against miracles; not whether there be any peculiar presumption 
at all against them. For, if there be the presumption of millions 
to one, against the most common facts; what can a small pre- 
sumption, additional to this, amount to, though it be peculiar? 
It cannot be estimated, and is as nothing. The only material 
question is, whether there be any such presumptions against 
miracles, as to render them in any sort incredible. 

Secondly, If we leave out the consideration of religion, we are 
in such total darkness, upon what causes, occasions, reasons, or 
circumstances, the present course of nature depends; that there 
does not appear any improbability for or against supposing, that 
five or six thousand years may have given scope 8 for causes, 
occasions, reasons, or circumstances, from whence miraculous 
interpositions may have arisen. And from this, joined with the 
foregoing observation, it will follow, that there must be a pre- 
sumption, beyond all comparison greater, against the particular 
common facts just now instanced in, than against miracles in 
general ; before any evidence of either. 

Thirdly, Take in the consideration of religion, or the moral 
system of the world, and then we see distinct particular reasons 
for miracles : to afford mankind instruction additional to that of 
nature, and to attest the truth of it. This gives a real credibility 
to the supposition, that it might be part of the original plan of 
things, that there should be miraculous interpositions. 


at a certain time, and place, and under certain very particular circumstances. 
The probabilities against such a conjuncture of events are almost infinite; yet 
they happened exactly as foretold.] 

8 [For instance, a mass of ice or snow, may imperceptibly accumulate for an 
age, and then suddenly fall and overwhelm a village. Or a planet, or comet, 
may have been gradually nearing our earth for a million of years, without pro- 
ducing, ns yet, any effect on our orbit; but in process of time, its proximity 
may work great changes in our condition.] 


chap. iii. REVELATION LIABLE TO OBJECTIONS. 209 

Lastly , Miracles must not be compared to common natural 
events, or to events which, though uncommon, are similar to 
what we daily experience : but to the extraordinary phenomena 
of nature. And then the comparison will be between the pre- 
sumption against miracles, and the presumption against such 
uncommon appearances, suppose, as comets, and against there 
being any such powers in nature as magnetism and electricity, so 
contrary to the properties of other bodies not endued with these 
powers. And before any one can determine, whether there be 
any peculiar presumption against miracles, more than against 
other extraordinary things ; he must consider, what, upon first 
hearing, would be the presumption against the last mentioned 
appearances and powers, to a person acquainted only with the 
daily, monthly, and annual course of nature respecting this earth, 
and with those common powers of matter which we every day see. 

Upon all this I conclude; that there certainly is no such pre- 
sumption against miracles, as to render them in any wise in- 
credible : that, on the contrary, our being able to discern reasons 
for them, gives a positive credibility to the history of them, in 
cases where those reasons hold : and that it is by no means cer- 
tain, that there is any peculiar presumption at all, from analogy, 
even in the lowest degree, against miracles, as distinguished from 
other extraordinary phenomena : though it is not worth while to 
perplex the reader with inquiries into the abstract nature of evi- 
dence, in order to determine a question, which, without such in- 
quiries, we see* is of no importance. 


CHAPTER III. 

OUR INCAPACITY OF JUDGING, WHAT WERE TO BE EXPECTED 
IN A REVELATION; AND THE CREDIBILITY, FROM ANALOGY, 
THAT IT MUST CONTAIN THINGS LIABLE TO OBJECTIONS. 

Besides the objections against the evidence for Christianity, 
many are alleged against, the scheme of it; against the whole 
manner in which it is put and left with the world; as well as 
against several particular relations in Scripture: objections drawn 

* p. 20s. 

18 * 


0 


210 REVELATION LIABLE TO OBJECTIONS. part ii. 

from the deficiencies of revelation : from things in it appearing 
to men foolishness ;* from its containing matters of offence, 
which have led, and it must have been foreseen would lead, into 
strange enthusiasm and superstition, and be made to serve the 
purposes of tyranny and wickedness; from its not being universal; 
and, w T hich is a thing of the same kind, from its evidence not 
being so convincing and satisfactory as it might have been : for 
this last is sometimes turned into a positive argument against its 
truth, f 

It would be tedious, indeed impossible, to enumerate the 
several particulars comprehended under the objections here re- 
ferred to; they being so. various, according to the different 
fancies of men. There are persons who think it a strong objec- 
tion against the authority of Scripture, that it is not composed by 
rules of art, agreed upon by critics, for polite and correct writing. 
And the scorn is inexpressible, with which some of the prophetic 
parts of Scripture are treated: partly through the rashness of 
interpreters ; but very much also, on account of the hieroglyphical 
and figurative language, in which they are left us. 

Some of the principal things of this sort shall be particularly 
considered in the following chapters. But my design at present 
is to observe in general, with respect to this whole way of arguing, 
that, upon supposition of a revelation, it is highly credible before- 
hand, that we should be incompetent judges of it to a great de- 
gree: and that it would contain many things appearing to us 
liable to great objections; in case we judge of it otherwise, than 
by the analogy of nature. Therefore, though objections against 
the evidence of Christianity are most seriously to be considered, 
yet objections against Christianity itself are, in a great measure, 
frivolous: almost all objections against it, excepting those which 
are alleged against the particular proofs of its coming from God. 

I express myself with caution, lest I should be mistaken to vilify 
reason; which is indeed the only faculty we have wherewith to 
judge concerning any thing, even revelation itself : or be mis- 
understood to assert, that a supposed revelation cannot be proved 
false, from internal characters. For, it may contain clear immo- 
ralities or contradictions ; and either of these would prove it false. 
Nor will I take upon me to affirm, that nothing else can possibly 

f See Cbo.p. vi. 


* 1 Cor. i. 28. 


CHAP. III. 


REVELATION LIABLE TO OBJECTIONS. 


211 


render any supposed revelation incredible. Yet still the observa- 
tion above, is, I think, true beyond doubt; that objections against 
Christianity, as distinguished from objections against its evidence, 
are frivolous. To make out this, is the general design of the 
present chapter. 

With regard to the whole of it, I cannot but particularly wish, 
that the proofs might be attended to; rather than the assertions 
cavilled at, upon account of any unacceptable consequences , real 
or supposed, which may be drawn from them. For, after all, 
that which is true, must be admitted, though it should show us 
the shortness of our faculties: and that we are in no wise judges 
of many things, of which we are apt to think ourselves very 
competent ones. Nor will this be any objection with reasonable 
men; at least upon second thought it will not be any objection 
with such, against the justness of the following observations. 

As God governs the world and instructs his creatures, accord- 
ing to certain laws or rules, in the known course of nature; 
known by reason together with experience: so the Scripture 
informs us of a scheme of divine Providence, additional to this. 
It relates, that God has, by revelation, instructed men in things 
concerning his government, which they could not otherwise have 
known; and reminded them of things, which they might other- 
wise know; and attested the truth of the whole by miracles. 
Now if the natural and the revealed dispensation of things are 
both from God, if they coincide with each other' and together 
make up one scheme of Providence; our being incompetent 
judges of one, must render it credible, that we may be incompe- 
tent judges also of the other. Upon experience, the acknow- 
ledged constitution and course of nature is found to be greatly 
different from what, before experience, would have been ex- 
pected; and such as, men fancy, there lie great objections 
against. This renders it beforehand highly credible, that they 
may find the revealed dispensation likewise, if they judge of it as 
they do of the constitution of nature, very different from expec- 
tations formed beforehand; and liable, in appearance, to great 
objections: objections against the scheme itself, and against the 
degrees and manners of the miraculous interpositions by which 
it was attested and carried on. Thus, suppose a prince to govern 
his dominions in the wisest manner possible, by common known 


212 


REVELATION LIABLE TO OBJECTIONS. 


PART II. 


laws; and that upon some exigencies he should suspend these 
laws; and govern, in several instances, in a different manner. 
If one of his subjects were not a competent judge beforehand, bj 
what common rules the government should or would be carried 
on; it could not be expected, that the same person would be a 
competent judge, in what exigencies, or in what manner, or to 
what degree, those laws commonly observed would be suspended 
or deviated from. If he were not a judge of the wisdom of the 
ordinary administration, there is no reason to think he would be 
a judge of the wisdom of the extraordinary. If he thought he 
had objections against the former; doubtless, it is highly sup- 
posable, he might think also, that he had objections against the 
latter. And thus, as we fall into infinite follies and mistakes, 
whenever we pretend, otherwise than from experience and ana- 
logy, to judge of the constitution and course of nature; it is evi- 
dently supposable beforehand, that we should fall into as great, 
in pretending to judge in like manner concerning revelation. 
Nor is there any more ground to expect that this latter should 
appear to us clear of objections, than that the former should. 

These observations, relating to the whole of Christianity, are 
applicable to inspiration in particular. As we are in no sort 
judges beforehand, by what laws or rules, in what degree, or by 
what means, it were to have been expected, that God would natu- 
rally instruct us; so upon supposition of his affording us light and 
instruction by revelation, additional to what he has afforded us 
by reason and experience, we are in no sort judges, by what 
methods, and in what proportion, it were to be expected that this 
supernatural light and instruction would be afforded us. We 
know not beforehand, what degree or kind of natural information 
it were to be expected God would afford men, each by his own 
reason and experience: nor how far he would enable and effectu- 
ally dispose them to communicate it, whatever it should be, to 
each other; nor whether the evidence of it would be certain, 
highly probable, or doubtful; nor whether it would be given with 
equal clearness and conviction to all. Nor could we guess, upon 
any good ground I mean, whether natural knowledge, or even the 
faculty itself, by which we are capable of attaining it, reason, 
would be given us at once, or gradually. 

In like manner, we are wholly iguorant, what degree of new 


ciiap. hi. REVELATION LIABLE TO OBJECTIONS. 213 

knowledge, it were to be expected, God would give mankind by 
revelation, upon supposition of his affording one : or how far, or 
in what way, he would interpose miraculously, to qualify them, to 
whom he should originally make the revelation, for communi- 
cating the knowledge given by it; and to secure their doing it to 
the age in which they should live ; and to secure its being trans- 
mitted to posterity. We are equally ignorant, whether the evi- 
dence of it would be certain or highly probable, or doubtful :* or 
whether all who should have any degree of instruction from it, 
and any degree of evidence of its truth, would have the same : 
or whether the scheme would be revealed at once, or unfolded 
gradually. 4 Nay we are not in any sort able to judge, whether 
it were to have been expected, that the revelation should have 
been committed to writing; or left to be handed down, and 
consequently corrupted, by verbal tradition, and at length sunk 
under it, if mankind so pleased, and during such time as 
they are permitted, in the degree they evidently are, to act as 
they will. 

But it may be said, “ that a revelation in some of the above- 
mentioned circumstances, one, for instance, which was not com- 
mitted to writing, and thus secured against danger of corruption, 
would not have answered its purpose.” I ask, what purpose ? It 
would not have answered all the purposes, which it has now 
answered, and in the same degree : but it would have answered 
others, or the same in different degrees. And which of these 
were the purposes of God, and best fell in with his general 
government, we could not at all have determined beforehand. 

Now since we have no principles of reason, upon which to judge 
beforehand, how it were to be expected that revelation should 
have been left, or what was most suitable to the divine plan of 
government, in any of the forementioned respects; it must be 
quite frivolous to object afterwards as to any of them, against its 
being left in one way, rather than another: for this would be to 
object against things, upon account of their being different from 
expectations, which has been shown to be without reason. 

Thus we see, that the only question concerning the truth of 
Christianity is, whether it be a real revelation ; not whether it 
be attended with every circumstance which we should have 
* See Chap. vi. a [See note, page 218.] 


214 


REVELATION LIABLE TO OBJECTIONS. 


PART ir. 


looked for : and concerning the authority of Scripture, whether 
it he what it claims to be ; not whether it be a book of such sort, 
and so promulged, as weak men are apt to fancy a book contain- 
ing a divine revelation should be. Therefore, neither obscurity, 
nor seeming inaccuracy of style, nor various readings, nor early 
disputes about the authors of particular parts, nor any other 
things of the like kind, though they had been much more con- 
siderable in degree than they are, could overthrow the authority 
of the Scripture : unless the prophets, apostles, or our Lord, 
had promised, that the book containing the divine revelation 
should be exempt from those things. Nor indeed can any objec- 
tions overthrow such a kind of revelation as the Christian claims 
to be, (since there are no objections against the morality of it,*) 
but such as can show, that there is no proof of miracles wrought 
originally in attestation of it ; no appearance of any thing mira- 
culous in its obtaining in the world ; nor any of prophecy, that 
is, of events foretold, which human sagacity could not foresee. 
If it can be shown, that the proof alleged for all these is abso- 
lutely none at all, then is revelation overturned. But were it 
allowed, that the proof of any one or all of them is lower than 
is allowed; yet, whilst any proof of them remains, revelation 
will stand upon much the same foot it does at present, as to all the 
purposes of life and practice, and ought to have the like influence 
upon our behavior. 

From the foregoing observations too, it will follow, and those 
who will thoroughly examine into revelation will find it worth 
remarking, that there are several ways of arguing, which though 
just with regard to other writings, are not applicable to Scrip- 
ture : at least not to its prophetic parts. We cannot argue, for in- 
stance, that such and such cannot be the sense or intent of a passage 
of Scripture, for, if it had, it would have been expressed more 
plainly, or represented under a more apt figure or hieroglyphic. 
Yet we may justly argue thus, with respect to common books. 
And the reason of this difference is very evident. In Scripture 
we are not competent judges, as we are in common books, how 
plainly it were to have been expected, that the sense should 
have been expressed, or under how apt an image figured. The 
only question is, what appearance there is, that this is the sense; 

* P. 220. 


chap. in. REVELATION LIABLE TO OBJECTIONS. 215 

and scarce at all, how much more determinately or accurately it 
might have been expressed or figured . 15 

“But is it not self-evident, that internal improbabilities of all 
kinds weaken external probable proof ?” Doubtless. But to 
what practical purpose can this be alleged here, when it has been 
proved before,* that real internal improbabilities, which rise even 
to moral certainty, are overcome by the most ordinary testimony; 
and when it now has been made to appear, that we scarce know 
what are improbabilities, as to the matter we are here consider- 
ing : as it will further appear from what follows. 

From the observations made above it is manifest, that we are 
not in any sort competent judges, what supernatural instruction 
were to have been expected; and it is self-evident, that the 
objections of an incompetent judgment must be frivolous. Yet 
it may be proper to go one step further, and observe, that if men 
will be regardless of these things, and pretend to judge of the 
Scripture by preconceived expectations ; the analogy of nature 
shows beforehand, not only that it is highly credible they may, 
but also probable that they will, imagine they have strong objec- 
tions against it, however really unexceptionable. For so, prior to 
experience, they would think they had, against the circumstances, 
and degrees, and the whole manner of that instruction, which is 
afforded by the ordinary course of nature. Were the instruction 
which God affords to brute creatures by instincts and mere pro- 
pensions, and to mankind by these together with reason, matter 
of probable proof, and not of certain observation ; it would be 
rejected as incredible, in many instances of it, only upon account 
of the means by which this instruction is given, the seeming dis- 
proportions, the limitations, necessary conditions, and circum- 
stances of it. For instance : would it not have been thought 
highly improbable, that men should have been so much more 

b [It is not to be understood that Butler would not have the ordinary rules 
of interpretation applied to the Holy Scriptures. Because the interpretation, 
“if not gathered out of the words, must be brought into them.” We cannot 
interpret them as if we knew beforehand, what the Holy Ghost meant to say ; 
as Spinoza proposes to do, in his Philosophia Scripturae Interpretes. The 
student will do well to consult Benson’s Hulsean Lectures on Scripture Diffi- 
culties : King’s Morsels of Criticism : Storr, Exertationes Exeget. : Michaelis, 
Introd. ad. Nov. Test. : and Eeatley’s Key.] 

* Pp. 207, 208. 


216 


REVELATION LIABLE TO OBJECTIONS. 


PART II. 


capable of discovering, even to certainty, the general laws of 
matter, and the magnitudes, paths, and revolutions, of heavenly 
bodies; than the occasions and cures of distempers, and many 
other things in which human life seems so much more nearly con- 
cerned, than in astronomy ? How capricious and irregular a way 
of information would it be said, is that of invention , by means 
of which nature instructs us in matters of science, and in many 
things, upon which the affairs of the world greatly depend : that 
a man should, by this faculty, be made acquainted with a thing 
in an instant, (when perhaps he is thinking of something else,) 
which he has in vain been searching after, it may be, for years. 

So likewise the imperfections attending the only method, by 
which nature enables and directs us to communicate our thoughts 
to each other, are innumerable. Language is, in its very nature, 
inadequate, ambiguous, liable to infinite abuse, even from negli- 
gence ; and so liable to it from design, that every man can deceive 
and betray by it. And, to mention but one instance more ; that 
brutes, without reason, should act, in many respects, with a 
sagacity and foresight vastly greater than what men have in those 
respects, would be thought impossible. Yet it is certain they do 
act with such superior foresight : whether it be their own, indeed, 
is another question. From these things, it is highly credible 
beforehand, that upon supposition that God should afford men 
some additional instruction by revelation, it would be with cir- 
cumstances, in manners, degrees, and respects, against the credi- 
bility of which we should be apt to fancy we had great objections. 
Nor are the objections against the Scripture, nor against Chris- 
tianity in general, at all more or greater, than the analogy of 
nature would beforehand — not perhaps give ground to expect; 
(for the analogy may not be sufficient, in some cases, to ground 
an expectation upon;) but no more nor greater, than analogy 
would show it, beforehand, to be supposable and credible , that 
there might seem to lie against revelation. 

By applying these general observations to a particular objec- 
tion, it will be more distinctly seen, how they are applicable to 
others of the like kind; and indeed to almost all objections 
against Christianity, as distinguished from objections against its 
evidence. It appears from Scripture, that, as it was not unusual 
in the apostolic age, for persons, upon their conversion to Chris- 


CHAT. III. 


REVELATION LIABLE TO OBJECTIONS. 


217 


tianity, to be endued with miraculous gifts; so, some of those 
persons exercised these gifts in a strangely irregular and dis- 
orderly manner; 0 and this is made an objection against their 
being really miraculous. Now the foregoing observations quite 
remove this objection, how considerable soever it may appear at 
first sight. For, consider a person endued with any of these 
gifts, for instance that of tongues : it is to be supposed, that he 
had the same power over this miraculous gift, as he would have 
had over it, had it been the effect of habit, of study and use, as it 
ordinarily is ; or the same power over it, as he had over any other 
natural endowment. Consequently, he would use it in the same 
manner as he did any other; either regularly, and upon proper 
occasions only, or irregularly, and upon improper ones : accord- 
ing to his sense of decency, and his character of prudence. 4 
Where then is the objection ? Why, if this miraculous power 
was indeed given to the world to propagate Christianity, and 
attest the truth of it, we might, it seems, have expected, that 
other sort of persons should have been chosen to be invested 
with it; or that these should, at the same time, have been 
endued with prudence; or that they should have been con- 
tinually restrained and directed in the exercise of it : i.e. that 
God should have miraculously interposed, if at all, in a different 
manner, or higher degree. But, from the observations made 
above, it is undeniably evident, that we are not judges in what 
degrees and manners it were to have been expected he should 
miraculously interpose ; upon supposition of his doing it in some 
degree and manner. Nor, in the natural course of Providence, 
are superior gifts of memory, eloquence, knowledge, and other 
talents of great influence, conferred only on persons of prudence 
and decency, or such as are disposed to make the properest use 


c [See 1 Cor. xii. 1-10 : xiii. 1 : and xiv. 1-19.] 

d [“ The power of healing, or working miracles, is, during the whole course 
of its operation, one continued arrest or diversion of the general laws of matter 
and motion. It was therefore fit that this power should be given occasionally. 
But the speaking with tongues, when once the gift was conferred, became thence- 
forth a natural power; just as the free use of members of the body, after being 
restored, by miracle, to the exercise of their natural functions. In healing, the 
apostles are to be considered as the workers of a miracle; in speaking strange 
tongues, as persons on whom a miracle is performed.” — Warburton, Doct. of 
Grace, b. i. ch. iii.] 


19 


218 


REVELATION LIABLE TO OBJECTIONS. 


PART II. 


of them. Nor is the instruction and admonition naturally 
afforded us for the conduct of life, particularly in our education, 
commonly given in a manner the most suited to recommend it; 
hut often with circumstances apt to prejudice us against such 
instruction. 

One might go on to add, there is a great resemblance between 
the light of nature and of revelation, in several other respects. 
Practical Christianity, or that faith and behavior which renders 
a man a Christian, is a plain and obvious thing : like the common 
rules of conduct, with respect to ordinary temporal affairs. The 
more distinct and particular knowledge of those things, the study 
of which the apostle calls going on unto perfection,* and of the 
prophetic parts of revelation, like many parts of natural and even 
civil knowledge, may require very exact thought, and careful 
consideration. The hinderances too, of natural, and of super- 
natural light and knowledge, have been of the same kind. And 
as it is owned the whole scheme of Scripture is not yet under- 
stood; so, if it ever comes to be understood, before the restitution 
of all things,^ and without miraculous interpositions, it must be 
in the same way as natural knowledge is come at : by the con- 
tinuance and progress of learning and of liberty;* and by par- 
ticular persons attending to, comparing, and pursuing, intimations 
scattered up and down it, which are overlooked and disregarded 
by the generality of the world. For this is the way in which all 
improvements are made ; by thoughtful men’s tracing on obscure 
hints, dropped us by nature . as it were, accidentally, or which 
seem to come into our minds by chance. Nor is it at all incredible, 
that a book which has been so long in the possession of man- 
kind, should contain many truths as yet undiscovered. For, all 
the same phenomena, and the same faculties of investigation, 

* Heb. vi. 1. f Acts iii. 21. 

e [The doctrine of “ development” has of late been popular in some quarters. 
Butler here shows the only safe notion we may entertain on that subject. 
“ Exact thought, and careful consideration” may show us how to confute 
specious heresies, expound embarrassing passages, dissipate painful doubts, 
and remove many prejudices or misapprehensions. But revelation is complete 
as it stands. 

We may hope for progress in theology as in other sciences; not in the 
development of new facts or faith, as Papists and Socinians pretend, but in 
the increase of sound wisdom, aided by a more perfect interpretation of God’s 
word.] 


CHAP. III. 


REVELATION LIABLE TO OBJECTIONS. 


219 


from which such great discoveries in natural knowledge have 
been made in the present and last age, were equally in the pos- 
session of mankind, several thousand years before. And possibly 
it might be intended, that events, as they come to pass, should 
open and ascertain the meaning of several parts of Scripture. 

It may be objected, that this analogy fails in a material re- 
spect : for that natural knowledge is of little or no consequence. 
But I have been speaking of the general instruction which nature 
does or does not afford us. And besides, some parts, of natural 
knowledge, in the more common restrained sense of the words, 
are of the greatest consequence to the ease and convenience of 
life. But suppose the analogy did, as it does not, fail in this 
respect; yet it might be abundantly supplied, from the whole 
constitution and course of nature : which shows, that God does 
not dispense his gifts according to our notions of the advantage 
and consequence they would be of to us. And this in general, 
with his method of dispensing knowledge in particular, would 
together make out an analogy full to the point before us. 

But it may be objected still further and more generally; “The 
Scripture represents the world as in a state of ruin, and Chris- 
tianity as an expedient to recover it, to help in these respects 
where nature fails : in particular, to supply the deficiencies of 
natural light. Is it credible then, that so many ages should have 
been let pass, before a matter of such a sort, of so great and so 
general importance, was made known to mankind; and then that 
it should be made known to so small a part of them ? Is it con- 
ceivable, that this supply should be so very deficient, should have 
the like obscurity and doubtfulness, be liable to the like perver- 
sions, in short, lie open to all the like objections, as the light of 
nature itself?* 

Without determining how far this, in fact, is so, I answer ; it 
is by no means incredible, that it might be so, if the light of 
nature and of revelation be from the same hand. Men are 
naturally liable to diseases: for which God, in his good provi- 
dence, has provided natural remedies, f But remedies existing 
in nature have been unknown to mankind for many ages ; are 
known but to few now; probably many valuable ones are not 
known yet. Great has been and is the obscurity and difficulty, 
■*' Chap. vi. f Chap. v. 


220 


REVELATION LIABLE TO OBJECTIONS. 


PART II. 


in the nature and application of them. Circumstances seem 
often to make them very improper, where they are absolutely 
necessary. It is after long labor and study, and many unsuccess- 
ful endeavors, that they are brought to be as useful as they are; 
after high contempt and absolute rejection of the most useful we 
have; and after disputes and doubts, which have seemed to be 
endless. The best remedies too, when unskilfully, much more 
when dishonestly applied, may produce new diseases ; and with 
the rightest application the success of them is often doubtful. 
In many cases they are not effectual : where they are, it is often 
very slowly: and the application of them, and the necessary 
regimen accompanying it, is not uncommonly so disagreeable, 
that some will not submit to them; and satisfy themselves with 
the excuse, that if they would, it is not certain whether it would 
be successful. And many persons, who labor under diseases, for 
which there are known natural remedies, are not so happy as to 
be always, if ever, in the way of them. In a word, the remedies 
which nature has provided for diseases are neither certain, per- 
fect, nor universal. And indeed the same principles of arguing, 
which would lead us to conclude, that they must be so, would 
lead us likewise to conclude, that there could be no occasion for 
them ; i.e. that there could be no diseases at all. And therefore 
our experience that there are diseases, shows that it is credible 
beforehand, upon supposition nature has provided remedies for 
them, that these remedies may be, as by experience we find they 
are, neither certain, nor perfect, nor universal ; because it shows, 
that the principles upon which we should expect the contrary are 
fallacious. 

And now, what is the just consequence from all these things ? 
Not that reason is no judge of what is offered to us as being of 
divine revelation. For this would be to infer that we are unable 
to judge of any thing, because we are unable to judge of all 
things. Reason can, and it ought to judge, not only of the 
meaning, but also of the morality and the evidence of revelation. 

First, It is the province of reason to judge of the morality of 
the Scripture; i.e. not whether it contains things different from 
what we should have expected from a wise, just, and good Being; 
(for objections from hence have been now obviated:) but whether 
it contains things plainly contradictory to wisdom, justice, or 


chap. hi. REVELATION LIABLE TO OBJECTIONS. 221 

goodness; to what the light of nature teaches us of God. And 
I know nothing of this sort objected against Scripture, excepting 
such objections as are formed upon suppositions, which would 
equally conclude, that the constitution of nature is contradictory 
to wisdom, justice, or goodness; which most certainly it is not. 
There are, indeed, some particular precepts in Scripture, given 
to particular persons, requiring actions, which would be immoral 
and vicious, were it not for such precepts. But it is easy to see, 
that all these are of such a kind, as that the precept changes the 
whole nature of the case and of the action ; and both constitutes 
and shows that not to be unjust or immoral, which, prior to the 
precept, must have appeared and really been so : which may well 
be, since none of these precepts are contrary to immutable 
morality. If it were commanded, to cultivate the principles , 
and act from the spirit of treachery, ingratitude, cruelty; the 
command would not alter the nature of the case or of the action, 
in any of these instances. But it is quite otherwise in precepts, 
which require only the doing an external action : for instance, 
taking away the property, or life of any. For men have no 
right, either to life or property, but what arises solely from the 
grant of God. When this grant is revoked, they cease to have 
any right at all in either : and when this revocation is made 
known, as surely it is possible it may be, it must cease to be un- 
just to deprive them of either. And though a course of ex- 
ternal acts, which without command would be immoral, must 
make an immoral habit; yet a few detached commands have no 
such natural tendency. I thought proper to say thus much of 
the few Scripture precepts, which require, not vicious actions, 
hut actions which would have been vicious, but for such pre- 
cepts; because they are sometimes weakly urged as immoral, and 
great weight is laid upon objections drawn from them. 

To me there seems no difficulty at all in these precepts, but 
what arises from their being offences : i.e. from their being liable 
to be perverted, as indeed they are, by wicked designing men, 
to serve the most horrid purposes; and perhaps to mislead the 
weak and enthusiastic. And objections from this head are not 
objections against revelation; but against the whole notion of re- 
ligion, as a trial : and against the general constitution of nature. 

Secondly, Reason is able to judge, and must, of the evidence 

19 * 


222 REVELATION LIABLE TO OBJECTIONS. part ir. 

of revelation, and of the objections urged against that evidence: 
which shall be the subject of a following chapter.* 

The consequence of the foregoing observations is, that the 
question upon which the truth of Christianity depends, is scarcely 
at all what objections there are against its scheme, since there 
are none against the morality of it, but what objections there are 
against its evidence ; or, what 'proof there remains of it, after 
due allowances are made for the objections against that proof ; 
because it has been shown, that the objections against Chris- 
tianity, as distinguished from objections against its evidence, are 
frivolous. For surely very little weight, if any at all, is to be 
laid upon a way of arguing and objecting, which, when applied 
to the general constitution of nature, experience shows not to be 
conclusive : and such, I think, is the whole way of objecting 
treated of throughout this chapter. It is resolvable into princi- 
ples, and goes upon suppositions, which mislead us to think, that 
the Author of nature would not act, as we experience he does; 
or would act, in such and such cases, as we experience he does 
not in like cases. But the unreasonableness of this way of ob- 
jecting will appear yet more evidently from hence, that the chief 
things thus objected against are justified, as shall be further 
shown,*)* by distinct, particular, and full analogies, in the consti- 
tution and course of nature. 

It is to be remembered, that, as frivolous as objections of the 
foregoing sort against revelation are, yet, when a supposed reve- 
lation is more consistent with itself, and has a more general and 
uniform tendency to promote virtue, than, all circumstances con- 
sidered, could have been expected from enthusiasm and political 
views, this is a presumptive proof of its not proceeding from 
them, and so of its truth : because we are competent judges, what 
might have been expected from enthusiasm and political views/ 

* Chap. vii. f Chap. iv. latter part, and v. vi. 

f [This pregnant paragraph should receive very full attention. We know 
much of men, little of God. What men are likely to do, or say, in certain 
circumstances, is often very clear; and generally may be guessed at. But 
what God would do or say in new contingencies, who shall attempt to prescribe 
or predict? We are poorly qualified to assert that such and such declarations 
could not havo come from infinite wisdom; but we are quite competent to af- 
firm that such and such things could not have come from human contrivance 
or enthusiasm.] 


CHAP. IV. 


CHRISTIANITY, A SCHEME, ETC. 


223 


CHAPTER IV. 

CHRISTIANITY, CONSIDERED AS A SCHEME OR CONSTITUTION, 
IMPERFECTLY COMPREHENDED. 

As hath been now shown,* the analogy of nature renders it 
highly credible beforehand, that, supposing a revelation to be 
made, it must contain many things very different from what we 
should have expected, and such as appear open to great objections : 
and that this observation, in good measure, takes off the force of 
those objections, or rather precludes them. It may be alleged, 
that this is a very partial answer to such objections, or a very 
unsatisfactory way of obviating them : because it does not show 
at all, that the things objected against can be wise, just, and 
good ; much less, that it is credible they are so. It will there- 
fore be proper to show this distinctly; by applying to these 
objections against the wisdom, justice, and goodness of Chris- 
tianity, the answer abovef given to the like objections against 
the constitution of nature : before we consider the particular 
analogies in the latter, to the particular things objected against 
in the former. Now that which affords a sufficient answer to 
objections against the wisdom, justice, and goodness of the con- 
stitution of nature, is its being a constitution, a system, or 
scheme, imperfectly comprehended; 4 a scheme in which means 
are made use of to accomplish ends ; and which is carried on by 
general laws. For from these things it has been proved, not 
only to be possible, but also to be credible, that those things 
which are objected against may be consistent with wisdom, 
justice, and goodness; nay, may be instances of them : and even 

* In the foregoing chapter. 

■J- Part I. ch. vii., to which this all along refers. 

a [“It is the last step of reason to know there is an infinity of things 
which surpass it.” — Pascal. “The wall of adamant which bounds human 
inquiry, has scarcely ever been discovered by any adventurer, till he was 
aroused by the shock that drove him back.”— Sir Jas. Mackintosh. « Of the 
dark parts of revelation there are two sorts : one which may be cleared up by 
the studious; the other which will always reside within the shadow of God's 
throne where it would be impiety to intrude.” — Warburton. “A Christianity 
without mystery is as unphilosophical as it is unscriptural.” — Angus.] 


224 


CHRISTIANITY A SCHEME 


PART II. 


that the constitution and government of nature may be perfect 
in the highest possible degree. If Christianity then be a scheme, 
and of the like kind; it is evident, the like objections against it 
must admit of the like answer. And, 

I. Christianity is a scheme, quite beyond our comprehension. 

, The moral government of God is exercised, by gradually con- 
ducting things so in the course of his providence, that every one, 
at length and upon the whole, shall receive according to his 
deserts; and neither fraud nor violence, but truth and right, 
shall finally prevail. Christianity is a particular scheme under 
this general plan of Providence, and a part of it, conducive to 
its completion, with regard to mankind : consisting itself also of 
various parts, and a mysterious economy, which has been carry- 
ing on from the time the world came into its present wretched 
state, and is still carrying on, for its recovery, by a divine per- 
son, the Messiah ; who is to gather together in one the children 
of God, that are scattered, abroad ,* and establish an everlasting 
kingdom , wherein dwelleth righteousness. \ In order to it; after 
various manifestations of things, relating to this great and gene- 
ral scheme of Providence, through a succession of many ages : 
(For the Spirit of Christ which was in the prophets, testified be- 
forehand his sufferings, and the glory that should follow : unto 
whom it was revealed, that not junto themselves, but unto us they 
did minister the things which are now reported unto us by them 
that have preached the Gospel ; which things the angels desire to 
look into :|) — after various dispensations looking forward and pre- 
paratory to, this final salvation : in the fulness of time, when in- 
finite wisdom thought fit ; He, being in the form of God, — made 
himself of no reputation, and took upon him the form of a \ 
servant , and was made in the likeness of men : and being found 
in fashion as a man, he humbled himself, and became obedient 
to death, even the death of the cross. Wherefore God also hath 
highly exalted him, and given him a name , which is above every 
name : that at the name of Jesus every knee should bow, of 
things in heaven, and things in the earth, and things under the 
earth : and that every tongue should confess, that Jesus Christ is 
Lord, to the glory of God the Father . § Parts likewise of this 
economy are the miraculous mission of the Holy Ghost, and his 
* John si. 52. f 2 Peter iii. 13. J 1 Peter i. 11, 12. § Phil. ii. [6-11.] 


CHAP. IV. 


IMPERFECTLY COMPREHENDED. 


225 


ordinary assistances given to good men : b the invisible govern- 
ment, which Christ at present exercises over his church : that 
which he himself refers to in these words : In my Father’s house 
are many mansions — I go to prepare a place for you :* and his 
future return to judge the world in righteousness , and completely 
re-establish the kingdom of God. For the Father judgeth no 
man; hut hath committed all judgment unto the Son: that all 
men should honor the Son, even as they honor the Father. j* All 
power is given unto him in heaven and in earth. \ And he must 
■reign, till he hath put all enemies under his feet. Then cometh 
the end, when he shall have delivered up the kingdom to God, 
even the Father ; when he shall have put down all rule, and all 
authority and power. And when all things shall be subdued 
unto him, then shall the Son also himself be subject unto him that 
put all things under him, that God may be all in all.§ Surely 
little need be said to show, that this system, or scheme of things, 
is but imperfectly comprehended by us. The Scripture expressly 
asserts it to be so. And indeed one cannot read a passage re- 
lating to this great mystery of godliness, || but what immediately 
runs up into something which shows us our ignorance in it; as 
every thing in nature shows us our ignorance in the constitu- 
tion of nature. And whoever will seriously consider that part 
of the Christian scheme, which is revealed in Scripture, will find 
so much more unrevealed, as will convince him, that, to all the 
purposes of judging aud objecting, we know as little of it, as of 
the constitution of nature. Our ignorance, therefore, is as much 
an answer to our objections against the perfection of one, as 
against the perfection of the other.^f 

II. It is obvious too, that in the Christian dispensation, as 
much as in the natural scheme of things, means are made use of 
to accomplish ends. 

The observation of this furnishes us with the same answer, to 
objections against. the perfection of Christianity, as to objections 
of the like kind, against the constitution of nature. It shows 

b [The influences of the Holy Spirit are not only “ given to good men/’ but 
are sent upon many who live unmindful of eternity, quickening their con- 
sciences, enlightening their understandings and arresting their passions, and 
thus it is they are converted unto the truth in Christ.] 

* John xiv. 2. f John v. 22, 23. J Matt, xxviii. 18. 

3 1 Cor. xv. 28. [I 1 Tim. iii. 16. % P. 174, <fcc. 

P 


226 


CHRISTIANITY A SCHEME 


PART II. 


the credibility, that the things objected against, how foolish * 
soever they appear to men, may be the very best means of ac- 
complishing the very best ends. And their appearing foolish- 
ness is no presumption against this, in a scheme so greatly beyond 
our comprehension, j* 

III. The credibility, that the Christian dispensation may have 
been, all along, carried on by general laws,! no ^ ess ^ an the 
course of nature, may require to be more distinctly made out. 

Consider then, upon what ground it is we say, that the whole 
common course of nature is carried on according to general fore- 
ordained laws. We know indeed several of the general laws of 
matter; and a great part of the natural behavior of living agents 
is reducible to general laws. But we know in a manner nothing, 
by what laws, storms, tempests, earthquakes, famine, pestilence, 
become the instruments of destruction to mankind. And the 
laws by which persons born into the world at such a time and 
place are of such capacities, geniuses, tempers; the laws by 
which thoughts come into our mind, in a multitude of cases; 
and by which innumerable things happen, of the greatest influ- 
ence upon the affairs and state of the world. These laws are so 
wholly unknown to us, that we call the events which come to 
pass by them, accidental; though all reasonable men know cer- 
tainly, that there cannot, in reality, be any such thing as chance; 
and conclude that the things which have this appearance are the 
result of general laws, and may be reduced to them. It is but 
an exceeding little way, and in but a very few respects, that we 
can trace up the natural course of things before us, to general 
laws. It is only from analogy, that we conclude the whole of it 
to be capable of being reduced to them : only from our seeing 
that part is so. It is from our finding, that the course of nature, 
in some respects and so far, goes on by general laws, that we con- 
clude this of the rest. 

If that be a just ground for such a conclusion, it is a just 
ground also, if not to conclude, yet to apprehend, to render it 
supposable and credible, which is sufficient for answering objec- 
tions, that God’s miraculous interpositions may have been, all 
along in like manner, by general laws of wisdom. Thus, that 
miraculous powers should be exerted, at such times, upon such 
* 1 Cor. i. [18-25.] f Pp. 178, 179. J Pp. ISO, 181. 


CHAP. IV. 


IMPERFECTLY COMPREHENDED. 


227 


occasions, in such degrees and manners, and with regard to such 
persons, rather than others; that the affairs of the world, being 
permitted to go on in their natural course so far, should, just at 
such a point, have a new direction given them by miraculous in- 
terpositions; that these interpositions should be exactly in such 
degrees and respects only; all this may have been by general 
laws. These laws are indeed unknown to us : but no more un- 
known than the laws from whence it is, that some die as soon as 
they are born, and others live to extreme old age ; that one man 
is so superior to another in understanding; with innumerable 
more things, which, as was before observed, we cannot reduce to 
any laws or rules, though it is taken for granted, they are as 
much reducible to general ones, as gravitation. If the revealed 
dispensations of Providence, and miraculous interpositions, be 
by general laws, as well as God’s ordinary government in the 
course of nature, made known by reason and experience; there 
is no more reason to expect that every exigence, as it arises, 
should be provided for by these general laws or miraculous inter- 
positions, than that every exigence in nature should he, by the 
general laws of nature. Yet there might be wise and good 
reasons, why miraculous interpositions should be by general laws ; 
aud why these laws should not be broken in upon, or deviated 
from, by other miracles. 

Upon the whole then, the appearance of deficiencies and ir- 
regularities in nature is owing to its being a scheme but in part 
made known, and of such a certain particular kind in other re- 
spects. We see no more reason why the frame and course of 
nature should be such a scheme, than why Christianity should. 
And that the former is such a scheme, renders it credible, that 
the latter, upon supposition of its truth, may be so too. And as 
it is manifest, that Christianity is a scheme revealed but in part, 
and a scheme in which means are made use of to accomplish 
ends, like to that of nature : so the credibility, that it may have 
been all along carried on by general laws, no less than the course 
of nature, has been distinctly proved. From all this it is before- 
hand credible that there might, I think probable that there 
would, be the like appearance of deficiencies aud irregularities 
in Christianity, as in nature: i.e. that Christianity would be 
liable to the like objections, as the frame of nature. And these 


2*28 


CHRISTIANITY A SCHEME 


PART ir. 


objections are answered by these observations concerning Chris- 
tianity; as the like objections against the frame of nature are 
answered by the like observations, concerning the frame of 
nature. 

The objections against Christianity, considered as a matter of 
fact,* having, in general, been obviated in the preceding chapter; 
and the same, considered as made against the wisdom and good- 
ness of it, having been obviated in this : the next thing, accord- 
ing to the method proposed, is to show, that the principal objec- 
tions, in particular, against Christianity, may be answered, by 
particular and full analogies in nature. And as one of them is 
made against the whole scheme of it together, as just now de- 
scribed, I choose to consider it here, rather than in a distinct 
chapter by itself. 

The thing objected against this scheme of the gospel is, “that 
it seems to suppose God was reduced to the necessity of a long 
series of intricate means, in order to accomplish his ends, the 
recovery and salvation of the world: in like sort as men, for 
want of understanding or power, not being able to come at their 
ends directly, are forced to go roundabout ways, and make use 
of many perplexed contrivances to arrive at them.” Now every 
thing which we see shows the folly of this, considered as an ob- 
jection against the truth of Christianity. For, according to our 
manner of conception, God makes use of variety of means, what 
we often think tedious ones, in the natural course of providence, 
for the accomplishment of all his ends. Indeed it is certain 
there is somewhat in this matter quite beyond our comprehen- 
sion : but the mystery is as great in nature as in Christianity. 
We know what we ourselves aim at, as final ends: and what 
courses we take, merely as means conducing to those ends. But 
we are greatly ignorant how far things are considered by the 
Author of nature, under the single notion of means and ends; 
so as that it may be said, this is merely an end, and that merely 
a means, in his regard. And whether there be not some peculiar 
absurdity in our very manner of conception, concerning this 
matter, something contradictory arising from our extremely im- 
perfect views of things, it is impossible to say. 

* P. 172, &c. 


ciiap. iv. 


IMPERFECTLY COMPREHENDED. 


229 


However, this much is manifest, that the whole natural world 
and government of it, is a scheme or system; not a fixed, but a 
progressive one: a scheme in which the operation of various 
means takes up a great length of time, before the ends they tend 
to can be attained. The change of seasons, the ripening of 
fruits, the very history of a flower, are instances of this : and so 
is human life. Thus vegetable bodies, and those of animals, 
though possibly formed at once, 3 7 et grow up by degrees to a 
mature state. And thus rational agents, who animate these 
latter bodies, are naturally directed to form each his own manners 
and character, by the gradual gaining of knowledge and expe- 
rience, and by a long course of action. Our existence is not only 
successive, as it must be of necessity; but one state of our life 
and being is appointed by God, to be a preparation for another; 
arid that to be the means of attaining to another succeeding one : 
infancy to childhood; childhood to youth; youth to mature age. 
Men are impatient, and for precipitating things: but the Author 
of nature appears deliberate throughout his operations; accom- 
plishing his natural ends by slow successive steps. 0 And there 
is a plan of things beforehand laid out, which, from the nature 
of it, requires various systems of means, as well as length of 
time, in order to the carrying on its several parts into execution. 

Thus, in the daily course of natural providence, God operates 
in the very same manner, as in the dispensation of Christianity; 
making one thing subservient to another; this, to something 
further ; and so on, through a progressive series of means, which 
extend, both backward and forward, beyond our utmost view. 
Of this manner of operation, every thing we see in the course 
of nature is as much an instance, as any part of the Christian 
dispensation. 

o [“ Providence hurries not himself to display to-day the consequence of tho 
principle he yesterday announced. He will draw it out in the lapse of ages. 
Even according to our reasoning logic is none the less sure, because it is slow.” 
— Guizot on Civilization, Lect. I. 

How impressively is this sentiment sustained by modern geology, and as- 
tronomy !] 


20 


230 


THE APPOINTMENT OF 


PART II. 


CHAPTER Y. 

THE PARTICULAR SYSTEM OF CHRISTIANITY j THE APPOINT- 
MENT OF A MEDIATOR, AND THE REDEMPTION OF THE 
WORLD BY HIM. 

There is not, I think, any thing relating to Christianity, which 
has been more objected against, than the mediation of Christ, in 
some or other of its parts. Yet upon thorough consideration, 
there seems nothing less justly liable to it. a For, 

I. The whole analogy of nature removes all imagined presump- 
tion against the general notion of a Mediator between God and 
man.* For we find all living creatures are brought into the 
world, and their life in infancy is preserved, by the instrument- 
ality of others : and every satisfaction of it, some way or other, is 
bestowed by the like means. So that the visible government, 
which God exercises over the world, is by the instrumentality 
and mediation of others. How far his invisible government be 
or be not so, it is impossible to determine at all by reason. The 
supposition, that part of it is so, appears, to say the least, alto- 
gether as credible, as the contrary. There is then no sort of ob- 
jection, from the light of nature, against the general notion of a 
mediator between God and man, considered as a doctrine of Chris- 
tianity, or as an appointment in this dispensation : since we find 
by experience, that God does appoint mediators, to be the instru- 
ments of good and evil to us : the instruments of his justice and 
his mercy. And the objection here referred to is urged, not 
against mediation in that high, eminent, and peculiar sense, in 

a [“ Philosophers make shameful and dangerous mistakes, when they judge 
of the Divine economy. He cannot, they tell us, act thus, it would be contrary 
t,o his wisdom, or his justice, Ac. But while they make these peremptory as- 
sertions they show themselves to be unacquainted with the fundamental rules 
of their own science, and with the origin of all late improvements. True 
philosophy would begin the other way, with observing the constitution of the 
world, how God has made us, and in what circumstances he has placed us, and 
then from what he has done, form a sure judgment what he would do. Thus 
might they learn ‘the invisible things of God from those which are clearly 
seen’ the things which are not accomplished from those which are/’ — Powell’s 
Use and Abuse of Philosophy.'] 

* 1 Tim. ii. 5. 


CHAP. y. A MEDIATOR AND REDEEMER. 231 

which Christ is our mediator; but absolutely against the whole 
notion itself of a mediator at all. 

II. As we must suppose, that the world is under the proper 
moral government of God, or in a state of religion, before we can 
enter into consideration of the revealed doctrine, concerning the 
redemption of it by Christ : so that supposition is here to be dis- 
tinctly noticed. Now the divine moral government which reli- 
gion teaches us, implies that the consequence of vice shall be 
misery, in some future state, by the righteous judgment of God. 
That such consequent punishment shall take effect by his appoint- 
ment, is necessarily implied. But, as it is not in any sort to be 
supposed, that we are made acquainted with all the ends or 
reasons, for which it is fit that future punishments should be in- 
flicted, or why God has appointed such and such consequent 
misery to follow vice; and as we are altogether in the dark, how 
or in what manner it shall follow, by what immediate occasions, 
or by the instrumentality of what means; so there is no absurdity 
in supposing it may follow in a way analogous to that in which 
many miseries follow such and such courses of action at present; 
poverty, sickness, infamy, untimely death by diseases, death from 
the hands of civil justice. There is no absurdity in supposing 
future punishment may follow wickedness of course , as we speak, 
or in the way of natural consequence from God’s original consti- 
tution of the world; from the nature he has given us, and from 
the condition in which he places us; or in a like manner, as a 
person rashly trifling upon a precipice, in the way of natural con- 
sequence, falls down ; in the way of natural consequence of this, 
breaks his limbs, and in the way of natural consequence, without 
help, perishes. 

Some good men may perhaps be offended with hearing it spoken 
of as a supposable thing that future punishments of wickedness 
may be in the way of natural consequence : as if this were taking 
the execution of justice out of the hands of God, and giving it to 
nature. But they should remember, that when things come to 
pass according to the course of nature, this does not hinder them 
from being his doing, who is the God of nature: and that the 
Scripture ascribes those punishments to divine justice, which are 
known to be natural; and which must be called so, when dis- 
tinguished from such as are miraculous. After all, this suppo- 


232 


THE APPOINTMENT OF 


part rr. 


sition, or rather this way of speaking, is here made use of only 
by way of illustration of the subject before us. For since it must 
be admitted, that the future punishment of wickedness is not a 
matter of arbitrary appointment, but of reason, equity, and justice ; 
it comes for aught I see, to the same thing, whether it is sup- 
posed to be inflicted in a way analogous to that in which the 
temporal punishments of vice and folly are inflicted, or in any 
other way. And though there were a difference, it is allowable, 
in the present ease, to make this supposition, plainly not an in- 
credible one, that future punishment may follow wickedness in 
the way of natural consequence, or according to some general 
laws of government already established in the universe. 

III. Upon this supposition, or even without it, we may observe 
somewhat, much to the present purpose, in the constitution of 
nature or appointments of Providence: the provision which is 
made, that all the bad natural consequences of men’s actions 
should not always actually follow; or that such bad consequences, 
as, according to the settled course of things, would inevitably 
have followed if not prevented, should, in certain degrees, be pre- 
vented. We are apt presumptuously to imagine, that the world 
might have been so constituted, as that there would not have 
been any such thing as misery or evil. On the contrary we find 
the Author of nature permits it but then he has provided reliefs, 
and in many cases perfect remedies for it, after some pains and 
difficulties; reliefs and remedies even for that evil, which is the 
fruit of our own misconduct; and which, in the course of nature, 
would have continued, and ended in our destruction, but for such 
remedies. And this is an instance both of severity and of in- 
dulgence, in the constitution of nature. Thus all the bad conse- 
quences, now mentioned, of a man’s trifling upon a precipice, 
might be prevented. And though all were not, yet some of them 
might, by proper interposition, if not rejected : b by another’s 
coming to the rash man’s relief, with his own laying hold on that 
relief, in such sort as the case required. Persons may do a great 

b [The interposition of a man of known probity and worth often saves the 
thoughtless or the guilty from punishment. Mediation is seen in a thousand 
forms in the arrangements of social life; and the common sense of all mankind 
approves of it. The release of the offending, by the intercession of the good, 
and all the benefits of advice, caution, example, instruction, persuasion, and 
authority, are instances of mediation.] 


CHAr. V. 


A MEDIATOR AND REDEEMER. 


233 


deal themselves towards preventing the bad consequences of their 
follies : and more may be done by themselves, together with the 
assistance of others their fellow-creatures; which assistance nature 
requires and prompts us to. This is the general constitution of 
the world. 

Now suppose it had been so constituted, that after such actions 
were done, as were foreseen naturally to draw after them misery 
to the doer, it should have been no more in human power to have 
prevented that naturally consequent misery, in any instance, than 
it is in all : no one can say, whether such a more severe constitu- 
tion of things might not yet have been really good. But, on the 
contrary, provision being made by nature, that we may and do, 
to so great degree, prevent the bad natural effects of our follies; 
this may be called mercy or compassion in the original constitu- 
tion of the world : compassion, as distinguished from goodness in 
general. And, the whole known constitution and course of things 
affording us instances of such compassion, it would be according 
to the analogy of nature, to hope, that however ruinous the 
natural consequences of vice might be, from the general laws of 
God’s government over the universe; yet provision might be 
made, possibly might have been originally made, for preventing 
those ruinous consequences from inevitably following: at least 
from following universally, and in all cases. 

Many, I am sensible, will wonder at finding this made a question, 
or spoken of as in any degree doubtful. The generality of man- 
kind are so far from having that awful sense of things, w r hich the 
present state of vice and misery and darkness seems to make but 
reasonable, that they have scarce any apprehension or thought at 
all about this matter, any way : and some serious persons may 
have spoken unadvisedly concerning it. But let us observe, 
what we experience to be, and what, from the very constitution 
of nature cannot but be, the consequences of irregular and dis- 
orderly behavior: even of such rashness, wilfulness, neglects, as 
we scarce call vicious. Now it is natural to apprehend, that the 
bad consequences of irregularity will be greater, in proportion as 
the irregularity is so. And there is no comparison between these 
irregularities, ^ and the greater instances of vice, or a dissolute 
profligate disregard to all religion; if there be any thing at all in 
religion. For consider what it is for creatures, moral agents, 


234 


THE APPOINTMENT OF 


PART II. 


presumptuously to introduce that confusion and misery into the 
kingdom of God, which mankind have in fact introduced : to 
blaspheme the Sovereign Lord of all; to contemn his authority; 
to be injurious, to the degree they are, to their fellow- creatures, 
the creatures of God. Add that the effects of vice in the present 
world are often extreme misery, irretrievable ruin, and even 
death : and upon putting all this together, it will appear, that as 
no one can say, in what degree fatal the unprevented consequences 
of vice may be, according to the general rule of divine govern- 
ment; so it is by no means intuitively certain, how far these 
consequences could possibly, in the nature of the thing, be pre- 
vented, consistently with the eternal rule of right, or with what 
is, in fact, the moral constitution of nature. However, there 
would be large ground to hope, that the universal government 
was not so severely strict, but that there was room for pardon, or 
for having those penal consequences prevented. Yet, 

IY. There seems no probability, that any thing we could do 
would alone and of itself prevent them : prevent their following, 
or being inflicted. But one would think at least, it were impos- 
sible that the contrary should be thought certain. For we are 
not acquainted with the whole of the case. We are not informed 
of all the reasons, which render it fit that future punishments 
should be inflicted: and therefore cannot know, whether any 
thing we could do would make such an alteration, as to render it 
fit that they should be remitted. We do not know what the 
whole natural or appointed consequences of vice are ; nor in what 
way they would follow, if not prevented : and therefore can in no 
sort say, whether we could do any thing which would be sufficient 
to prevent them. Our ignorance being thus manifest, let us 
recollect the analogy of nature or Providence. For, though this 
may be but a slight ground to raise a positive opinion upon, in 
this matter; yet it is sufficient to answer a mere arbitrary asser- 
tion, without any kind of evidence, urged by way of objection 
against a doctrine, the proof of which is not reason, but revela- 
tion. Consider then : people ruin their fortunes by extravagance; 
they bring diseases upon themselves by excess; they incur the 
penalties of civil laws; and surely civil government is natural; 
will sorrow for these follies past, and behaving well for the future, 
alone and of itself prevent the natural consequences of them ? 


CHAP. y. 


A MEDIATOR AND REDEEMER. 


235 


On the contrary, men’s natural abilities of helping themselves 
are often impaired ; or if not, yet they are forced to be beholden 
to the assistance of others, upon several accounts, and in differ- 
ent ways; assistance which they would have had no occasion for, 
had it not been for their misconduct; but which, in the disad- 
vantageous condition they have reduced themselves to, is abso- 
lutely necessary to their recovery, and retrieving their affairs. 
Since this is our case, considering ourselves merely as inhabitants 
of this world, and as having a temporal interest here, under the 
natural government of God, which however has a great deal 
moral in it; why is it not supposable that this may be our case 
also, in our more important capacity, as under his perfect moral 
government, and having a more general and future interest 
depending ?° If we have misbehaved in this higher capacity, 
and rendered ourselves obnoxious to the future punishment, 
which God has annexed to vice : it is plainly credible, that 
behaving well for the time to come may be — not useless, God 
forbid — but wholly insufficient, alone and of itself, to prevent 
that punishment : or to put us in the condition which we should 
have been in, had we preserved our innocence. 

Though we ought to reason with all reverence, whenever we 
reason concerning the divine conduct : yet it may be added, that 
it is clearly contrary to all our notions of government, as well as 
to what is, in fact, the general constitution of nature, to suppose, 
that doing well for the future should, in all cases, prevent all the 
judicial bad consequences of having done evil, or all the punish- 
ment annexed to disobedience. We have manifestly nothing 
from whence to determine, in what degree, and in what cases, 
reformation would prevent this punishment, even supposing that 
it would in some. And though the efficacy of repentance itself 

0 [Mr. Newman notices a distinction between the facts of revelation, and its 
principles ; and considers the argument from analogy more concerned with its 
principles than with its facts. “ The revealed facts are special and singular, 
from the nature of the case, but the revealed principles are common to all the 
works of God ; and if the Author of nature be the author of grace, it may be 
expected that the principles displayed in them will be the same, and form a 
connecting link between them. In this identity of principle, lies the analogy 
of natural and revealed religion, in Butler’s sense of the word. The Incarna- 
tion is a fact, and cannot be paralleled by any thing in nature : the doctrine 
of mediation is a principle, and is abundantly exemplified in nature .” — Essay 
on Developments .] 


236 


TIIE APPOINTMENT OF 


PART IT. 


alone, to prevent what mankind had rendered themselves ob- 
noxious to, and recover what they had forfeited, is now insisted 
upon, in opposition to Christianity; yet, by the general preva- 
lence of propitiatory sacrifices over the heathen world, this notion 
of repentance alone being sufficient to expiate guilt, appears to 
be contrary to the general sense of mankind. d 

Upon the whole then ; had the laws, the general laws of God’s 
government been permitted to operate, without any interposition 
in our behalf, the future punishment, for aught we know to 
the contrary, or have any reason to think, must inevitably have 
followed, notwithstanding any thing we could have done to pre- 
vent it. 

Y. In this darkness, or this light of nature, call it which you 
please, revelation comes in; and confirms every doubting fear, 
which could enter into the heart of man, concerning the future 
unprevented consequence of wickedness. It supposes the world 
to be in a state of ruin (a supposition which seems the very 
ground of the Christian dispensation, and which, if not provable 
by reason, yet is in no wise contrary to it ;) and teaches us too, 
that the rules of divine government are such, as not to admit of 
pardon immediately and directly upon repentance, or by the sole 
efficacy of it. But teaches at the same time, what nature might 
justly have hoped, that the moral government of the universe 
was not so rigid, but that there was room for an interposition, to 
avert the fatal consequences of vice; which therefore, by this 
means, does admit of pardon. Revelation teaches us, that the 
unknown laws of God’s more general government, no less than 
the particular laws by which we experience he governs us at 
present, are compassionate,* as well as good in the more general 
notion of goodness : and that he hath mercifully provided, that 
there should be an interposition to prevent the destruction of 
human kind ; whatever that destruction unprevented would have 
been. God so loved the world , that he gave his only begotten 
Son , that whosoever believeth , not, to be sure, in a speculative, 
but in a practical sense, that whosoever believeth in him , should 

a [The student will find the inadequacy of repentance to cancel guilt, beauti- 
fully exhibited by Wayland, Mor. Science: Magee, Atonement: Howe, 
Living Temple.] 

* P. 232, &c. 


CHAP. V. 


A MEDIATOR AND REDEEMER. 


237 


not perish ;* gave his Son in the same way of goodness to the 
world, as he affords particular persons the friendly assistance of 
their fellow-creatures, when, without it, their temporal ruin would 
be the certain consequence of their follies : in the same way of 
goodness, I say, though in a transcendent and infinitely higher 
degree. And the Son of God loved us , and gave himself for us, 
with a love, which he himself compares to that of human friend- 
ship : though, in this case, all comparisons must fall infinitely 
short of the thing intended to he illustrated by them. He inter- 
posed in such a manner as was necessary and effectual to prevent 
that execution of justice upon sinners, which God had appointed 
should otherwise have been executed upon them ; or in such a 
manner, as to prevent that punishment from actually following, 
which, according to the general laws of divine government, must 
have followed the sins of the world, had it not been for such 
interposition. •)* 

If any thing here said should appear, upon first thought, in- 
consistent with divine goodness ; a second, I am persuaded, will 
entirely remove that appearance. For were we to suppose the 
constitution of things to be such, as that the whole creation must 


* John iii. 16. 

f It cannot, I suppose, be imagined, even by the most cursory reader, that 
it is, in any sort, affirmed or implied in any thing said in this chapter, that 
none can have the benefit of the general redemption, but such as have the 
advantage of being made acquainted with it in the present life. But it may 
be needful to mention, that several questions, which have been brought into 
the subject before us, and determined, are not in the least entered into here : 
questions which have been, I fear, rashly determined, and perhaps with equal 
rashness contrary ways. For instance, whether God could have saved the 
world by other means than the death of Christ, consistently with the gene- 
ral laws of his government. And had not Christ come into the world, what 
would have been the future condition of the better sort of men; those just per- 
sons over the face of the earth, for whom Manasses in his prayer® asserts, re- 
pentance was not appointed. The meaning of the first of these questions is 
greatly ambiguous : and neither of them can properly be answered, without 
going upon that infinitely absurd supposition, that we know the whole of the 
case. And perhaps the very inquiry, What would have followed, if God had 
not done as he has, may have in it some very great impropriety : and ought 
not to be carried on any further than is necessary to help our partial and 
inadequate conceptions of things. 

e [The “prayer of Manasses” is one of the apocryphal books of the Old Testament, which 
next precedes “ Maccabees.”] 


238 


THE APPOINTMENT OF 


PART II. 


have perished, had it not been for something, which God had 
appointed should be, in order to prevent that ruin : even this 
supposition would not be inconsistent, in any degree, with the 
most absolutely perfect goodness. Still it may be thought, that 
this whole manner of treating the subject before us supposes 
mankind to be naturally in a very strange state. And truly so 
it does. But it is not Christianity which has put us into this 
state. Whoever will consider the manifold miseries, and the 
extreme wickedness of the world; that the best have great 
wrongnesses within themselves, which they complain of, and 
endeavor to amend ; but that the generality grow more profligate 
and corrupt with age ; that even moralists thought the present 
state to be a state of punishment : and, that the earth our habi- 
tation has the appearances of being a ruin : whoever, I say, will 
consider all these, and some other obvious things, will think he 
has little reason to object against the Scripture account, that 
mankind is in a state of degradation; against this being the 
fact: how difficult soever he may think it to account for, or even 
to form a distinct conception of the occasions and circumstances 
of it. But that the crime of our first parents was the occasion 
of our being placed in a more disadvantageous condition, is a 
thing throughout and particularly analogous to what we see in 
the daily course of natural providence; as the recovery of the 
world by the interposition of Christ has been shown to be so in 
general. 

VI. The particular manner in which Christ interposed in the 
redemption of the world, or his office as Mediator , in the largest 
sense, between God, and man , is thus represented to us in the 
Scripture. He is the light of the world ;* the revealer of the 
will of God in the most eminent sense. He is a propitiatory 
sacrifice;'|* the Lamb of God'f and, as he voluntarily offered 
himself up, he is styled our High Priest.§ And, which seems 
of peculiar weight, he is described beforehand in the Old Testa- 
ment, under the same characters of a priest, and an expiatory 
victim. || And whereas it is objected, that all this is merely by 

* John i., and viii. 12. 

f Rom. iii. 25, v. 11 : 1 Cor. v. 7 : Eph. v. 2 : 1 John ii. 2 : Matt. xxvi. 28. 

J John i. 29, 36, and throughout the book of Revelation. 

§ Throughout the epistle to the Hebrews. 

|| Isa. liii. Dan. ix. 24: Ps. cx. 4. 


CHAT. V. 


A MEDIATOR AND REDEEMER. 


239 


way of allusion to the sacrifices of the Mosaic law, the Apostle 
on the contrary affirms, that the law was a shadow of good things 
to come, and not the very image of the things ;* and that the 
priests that offer gifts according to the law — serve unto the ex- 
ample and shadow of heavenly things, as Moses was admonished 
of God, when he was about to make the tabernacle. For see, 
saith he, that thou make all things according to the pattern 
showed to thee in the mount:' j* i.e. the Levitical priesthood was a 
shadow of the priesthood of Christ; in like manner as the taber- 
nacle made by Moses was according to that showed him in the 
mount. The priesthood of Christ, and the tabernacle in the 
mount, were the originals ; of the former of which the Levitical 
priesthood was a type; and of the latter the tabernacle made by 
Moses was a copy. The doctrine of this epistle then plainly is, 
that the legal sacrifices were allusions to the great and final 
atonement to be made by the blood of Christ; and not that this 
was an allusion to those. Nor can any thing be more express 
and determinate than the following passage. It is not possible 
that the blood of bulls and of goats should take away sin. 

Wherefore when he cometh into the world, he saith, Sacrifice 
and offering, i.e. of bulls and of goats, thou wouldest not, but a 
body hast thou prepared me. Lo ! I come to do thy will, 0 God. 
By which will we are sanctified, through the offering of the body 
of Jesus Christ once for all.% And to add one passage more of 
the like kind : Christ was once offered to bear the sins of many : 
and unto them that look for him shall he appear the second time, 
without sin ; i.e. without bearing sin, as he did at his first 
coming, by being an offering for it ; without having our iniqui- 
ties again laid upon him, without being any more a sin-offering : 
— unto them that look for him shall he appear the second time, 
without sin, unto salvation .§ Nor do the inspired writers at all 
confine themselves to this manner of speaking concerning the 
satisfaction of Christ; but declare an efficacy in what he did and 
suffered for us, additional to and beyond mere instruction, ex- 
ample, and government, in great variety of expression: That 
Jesus should die for that nation, the Jews: and not for that 
nation only , but that also, plainly by the efficacy of his death, 

* Heb. x. 1. t Heb. viii - 4 > 5 - 

X Hob. x. 4, 5, 7, 9, 10. \ Hrb. ix. 28. 


240 


THE APPOINTMENT OF 


TART II. 


he should gather together in one the children of God that were 
scattered abroad ;* that he suffered for sins, the just for the un- 
just that he gave his life, himself, a ransom that we are 
bought, bought with a price :§ that he redeemed us with his 
blood: redeemed us from the curse of the law, being made a 
curse for us :|| that he is our advocate , intercessor, and propitia- 
tion .*![ that he was made perfect, or consummate, through suffer- 
ings ; and being thus made perfect, he became the author of sal- 
vation ;** that God was in Christ reconciling the world to him- 
self; by the death of his Son, by the cross; not imputing their 
trespasses unto them and lastly, that through death he destroyed 
him that had the power of death . || Christ having thus humbled 
himself, and become obedient to death, even the death of the cross; 
God also hath highly exalted him, and given him a name, which 
is above every name : hath given all things into his hands : hath 
committed all judgment unto him ; that all men should, honor the 
Son, even as they honor the Father .§§ For, worthy is the Lamb 
that was slain, to receive power, and riches, and wisdom, and 
strength, and honor, and. glory, and blessing. And every crea- 
ture which is in heaven, and on the earth, heard I, saying, Bless- 
ing, and honor, and glory, and power, be unto him that sitteth 
upon the throne, and unto the Lamb forever and ei;er.|||| 

These passages of Scripture .seem to comprehend and express 
the chief parts of Christ’s office, as Mediator between God and 
man, so far, I mean, as the nature of this his office is revealed; 
and it is usually treated of by divines under three heads. 

First, He was, by way of eminence, the Prophet: that Pro- 
phet that should come into the world, to declare the divine 
will. He published anew the law of nature, which men had 
corrupted; and the very knowledge of which, to some degree, 
was lost among them. ' He taught mankind, taught us authorita- 
tively, to live soberly, righteously, and godly in this present world, 
in expectation of the future judgment of God. He confirmed 

* John xi. 51, 52. f 1 Pet. iii. 18. 

J Matt xx. 28 : Mark x. 45 : 1 Tim. ii. 6. 
g 2 Pet. ii. 1 : Rev. xiv. 4 : 1 Cor. vi. 20. 

|| 1 Pet. i. 19 : Rev. v. 9: Gal. iii. 13. Heb. vii. 25 : 1 John ii. 1, 2. 

** Heb. ii. 10. : v. 9. -f-f 2 Cor. v. 19 : Rom. v. 10 : Eph. ii. 16. 

H Heb. ii. 14. See also a remarkable passage in the book of Job, xxxiii. 24. 

Phil. ii. 8, 9 : John iii. 35, and v. 22, 23. |||| Rev. v. 12, 13. f John vi. 14. 


CHAP. V. 


A MEDIATOR AND REDEEMER. 


241 


the truth of this moral system of nature, and gave us additional 
evidence of it; the evidence of testimony.* He distinctly 
revealed the manner, in which God would be worshipped, the 
efficacy of repentance, and the rewards and punishments of a 
future life. Thus he was a prophet in a sense in which no other 
ever was. To which is to be added, that he set us a perfect ex- 
ample, that we should follow his steps. 

Secondly , He has a kingdom which is not of this world. He 
founded a Church, to be to mankind a standing memorial of 
religion, and invitation to it; which he promised to be with 
always even to the end. He exercises an invisible government 
over it, himself, and by his Spirit : over that part of it which is 
militant here on earth, a government of discipline, for the per- 
fecting of the saints, for the edifying his body: till we all come 
in the unity of the faith , and of the knowledge of the Son of 
God , unto a perfect man , unto the measure of the stature of the 
fulness of Christ.^ Of this Church, all persons scattered over 
the world, who live in obedience to his laws, are members. For 
these he is gone to prepare a place, and will come again to re- 
ceive them unto himself, that where he is, there they may be also ; 
and reign with him forever and ever:\ and likewise to take 
vengeance on them that know not God, and obey not his 
Gospel.§ 

Against these parts of Christ’s office I find no objections, but 
what are fully obviated in the beginning of this chapter. 

Lastly, Christ offered himself a propitiatory sacrifice, and 
made atonement for the sins of the world; which is mentioned 
last, in regard to what is objected against it. Sacrifices of expia- 
tion were commanded the Jews, and obtained among most other 
nations, from tradition, whose original probably was revelation. 
And they were continually repeated, both occasionally, and at the 
returns of stated times : and made up great part of the external 
religion of mankind. But now once in the end of the world 
Christ appeared to put away sin by the sacrifice of himself \\ 
This sacrifice was, in the highest degree and with the most ex- 
tensive influence, of that efficacy for obtaining pardon of sin, 
which the heathens may be supposed to have thought their sacri- 

* p. 188, &c. f Eph. iv. 12, 13. t John xiv - 2 > 3: Rev - iiL 21 > and xi - 15 ‘ 

g 2 Thess. i. 8. || Heb. ix. 26. 

Q - 21 


242 


THE APPOINTMENT OF 


PART II. 


fices to have been, and which the Jewish sacrifices really were 
in some degree, and with regard to some persons. 1 

How and in what particular way it had this efficacy, there are 
not wanting persons who have endeavored to explain : but I do 
not find that the Scripture has explained it. We seem to be 
very much in the dark concerning the manner in which the 
ancients understood atonement to be made, i.e. pardon to be 
obtained by sacrifices. And if the Scripture has, as surely it 
has, left this matter of the satisfaction of Christ mysterious, left 
somewhat in it unrevealed, all conjectures about it must be, if 
not evidently absurd, yet at least uncertain. Nor has any one 
reason to complain for want of further information, unless he can 
show his claim to it. 

Some have endeavored to explain the efficacy of what Christ 
has done and suffered for us, beyond what the Scripture has 
authorized : others, probably because they could not explain it, 
have been for taking it away, and confining his office as Re- 
deemer of the world, to his instruction, example, and government 
of the church. Whereas the doctrine of the Gospel appears to 
be, not only that he taught the efficacy of repentance, but ren- 
dered it of the efficacy of which it is, by what he did and 
suffered for us : that he obtained for us the benefit of having our 
repentance accepted unto eternal life : not only that he revealed 
to sinners, that they were in a capacity of salvation, and how 
they might obtain it; but moreover that he put them into this 
capacity of salvation, by what he did and suffered for them; put 
us into a capacity of escaping future punishment, and obtaining 
future happiness. And it is our wisdom thankfully to accept 
the benefit, by performing the conditions, upon which it is 
offered, on our part, without disputing how it was procured on 
his. For, 

VII. Since we neither know by what means punishment in a 
future state would have followed wickedness in this : nor in what 
manner it would have been inflicted, had it not been prevented; 
nor all the reasons why its infliction would have been needful, 
nor the particular nature of that state of happiness, which Christ 
is gone to prepare for his disciples : and since we are ignorant 

f [Consult Magee, on Atonement: Stapferi Institutiones : Turretin, De 
Satisfactione : Chalmers, Discourses : Owen, Satis, of Christ.] 


CHAP. Y. 


A MEDIATOR AND REDEEMER. 


243 


how far any thing which we could do, would, alone and of itself, 
have been effectual to prevent that punishment to which we were 
obnoxious, and recover that happiness which we had forfeited; 
it is most evident we are not judges, antecedently to revelation, 
whether a mediator was or was not necessary, to obtain those 
ends: to prevent that future punishment, and bring mankind to 
the final happiness of their nature. For the very same reasons, 
upon supposition of the necessity of a mediator, we are no more 
judges, antecedently to revelation, of the whole nature of his 
office, or of the several parts of which it consists; or of what was 
fit and requisite to be assigned him, in order to accomplish the 
ends of divine Providence in the appointment. Hence it follows, 
that to object against the expediency or usefulness of particular 
things, revealed to have been done or suffered by him, because 
we do not see how they were conducive to those ends, is highly 
absurd. Yet nothing is more common to be met with, than this 
absurdity. If it be acknowledged beforehand, that we are not 
judges in the case, it is evident that no objection can, with any 
shadow of reason, be urged against any particular part of Christ’s 
mediatorial office revealed in Scripture, till it can be shown posi- 
tively not to be requisite or conducive to the ends proposed to be 
accomplished; or that it is in itself unreasonable. 

There is one objection made against the satisfaction of Christ, 
which looks to be of this positive kind : that the doctrine of his 
being appointed to suffer for the sins of the world, represents 
God as being indifferent whether he punished the innocent or 
the guilty. Now from the foregoing observations we may see 
the extreme slightness of all such objections; and (though it is 
most certain all who make them do not see the consequence) that 
they conclude altogether as much against God’s whole original 
constitution of nature, and the whole daily course of divine Provi- 
dence in the government of the world, (i.e. against the whole 
scheme of Theism and the whole notion of religion,) as against 
Christianity. For the world is a constitution or system, whose 
parts have a mutual reference to each other : and there is a 
scheme of things gradually carrying on, called the course of na- 
ture, to the carrying on of which God has appointed us, in various 
ways, to contribute. And when, in the daily course of natural 
providence, it is appointed that innocent people should suffer for 


244 


THE APPOINTMENT OF 


PART II. 


the faults of the guilty, this is liable to the very same objection, 
as the instance we are now considering. The infinitely greater 
importance of that appointment of Christianity, which is objected 
against, does not hinder but it may be, as it plainly is, an ap- 
pointment of the very same hind, with what the world affords us 
daily examples of. Nay, if there were any force at all in the ob- 
jection, it would be stronger, in one respect, against natural 
providence, than against Christianity: because under the former 
we are in many cases commanded, and even necessitated whether 
we will or no, to suffer for the faults of others; whereas the suffer- 
ings of Christ were voluntary. 

The world’s being under the righteous government of God 
does indeed imply, that finally, and upon the whole, every one 
shall receive according to his personal deserts : and the general 
doctrine of the whole Scripture is, that this shall be the comple- 
tion of the divine government. But during the progress, and, 
for aught we know, even in order to the completion of this moral 
scheme, vicarious punishments may be fit, and absolutely neces- 
sary. Men by their follies run themselves into extreme distress; 
into difficulties which would be absolutely fatal to them, were it 
not for the interposition and assistance of others. God commands 
by the law of nature, that we afford them this assistance, in many 
cases where we cannot do it without very great pains, and labor, 
and sufferings to ourselves. We see in what variety of ways one 
person’s sufferings contribute to the relief of another: and how, 
or by what particular means, this comes to pass, or follows, from 
the constitution and laws of nature, which came under our notice : 
and, being familiarized to it, men are not shocked with it. So 
that the reason of their insisting upon objections of the foregoing 
kind against the satisfaction of Christ is, either that they do not 
consider God’s settled and uniform appointments as his appoint- 
ments at all; or else they forget that vicarious punishment is a 
providential appointment of every day’s experience. And then, 
from their being unacquainted with the more general laws of 
nature or divine government over the world, and not seeing how 
the sufferings of Christ could contribute to the redemption of it, 
unless by arbitrary and tyrannical will, they conclude his suffer- 
ings could not contribute to it any other way. And yet, what 
has been often alleged in justification of this doctrine, even from 


CHAP. V. 


A MEDIATOR AND REDEEMER. 


245 


the apparent natural tendency of this method of our redemption; 
its tendency to vindicate the authority of God’s laws, and deter 
his creatures from sin; this has never yet been answered, and is 
I think plainly unanswerable : though I am far from thinking it 
an account of the whole of the case. But, without taking this 
into consideration, it abundantly appears, from the observations 
above made, that this objection is not an objection against Chris- 
tianity, but against the whole general constitution of nature. 
And if it were to be considered as an objection against Chris- 
tianity, or considering it as it is, an objection against the consti- 
tution of nature; it amounts to no more in conclusion than this, 
that a divine appointment cannot be necessary or expedient, be- 
cause the objector does not discern it to be so: though he must 
own that the nature of the case is such, as renders him incapable 
of judging, whether it be so or not; or of seeing it to be neces- 
sary, though it were so ! 

It is indeed a matter of great patience to reasonable men, to 
find people arguing in this manner: objecting against the credi- 
bility of such particular things revealed in Scripture, that they 
do not see the necessity or expediency of them. For though it 
is highly right, and the most pious exercise of our understanding, 
to inquire with due reverence into the ends and reasons of God’s 
dispensations : yet when those reasons are concealed, to argue from 
our ignorance, that such dispensations cannot be from God, is in- 
finitely absurd. The presumption of this kind of objections 
seems almost lost in the folly of them. And the folly of them 
is yet greater, when they are urged, as usually they are, against 
things in Christianity analogous or like to those natural dispensa- 
tions of Providence, which are matter of experience. Let reason 
be kept to : and if any part of the Scripture account of the re- 
demption of the world by Christ can be shown to be really con- 
trary to it, let the Scripture, in the name of God, be given up. 
But let not such poor creatures as we are, go on objecting against 
an infinite scheme, that we do not see the necessity or usefulness 
of all its parts, and call this reasoning; and, which still further 
heightens the absurdity in the present case, parts which we are 
not actively concerned in. For it may be worth mentioning, 

Lastly , That not only the reason of the thing, but the whole 
analogy of nature, should teach us, not to expect to have the like 


246 


THE APPOINTMENT, ETC. 


PART II. 


information concerning the divine conduct, as concerning our 
own duty. God instructs us by experience, (for it is not reason, 
but experience which instructs us,) what good or bad conse- 
quences will follow from our acting in such and such manners : 
and by this he directs us how we are to behave ourselves. But, 
though we are sufficiently instructed for the common purposes of 
life : yet it is but an almost infinitely small part of natural provi- 
dence, which we are at all let into. The case is the same with 
regard to revelation. The doctrine of a mediator between God 
and man, against which it is objected, that the expediency of 
some things in it is not understood, relates only to what was done 
on God’s part in the appointment, and on the Mediators in the 
execution of it. For what is required of us, in consequence of 
this gracious dispensation, is another subject, in which none can 
complain for want of information. The constitution of the world, 
and God’s natural government over it, is all mystery, as much as 
the Christian dispensation. Yet under the first he has given 
men all things pertaining to life; and under the other all things 
pertaining unto godliness. And it may be added, that there is 
nothing hard to be accounted for in any of the common precepts 
of Christianity : though if there were, surely a divine command 
is abundantly sufficient to lay us under the strongest obligations 
to obedience. But the fact is, that the reasons of all the Chris- 
tian precepts are evident. Positive institutions are manifestly 
necessary to keep up and propagate religion among mankind. 
And our duty to Christ, the internal and external worship of 
him; this part of the religion of the Gospel manifestly arises 
out of what he has done and suffered, his authority and 
dominion, and the relation which he is revealed to stand in 
to us.* 


* P. 194, Ac. 


CHAPTER VI. 


THE WANT OF UNIVERSALITY IN REVELATION; AND THE 
SUPPOSED DEFICIENCY IN THE PROOF OF IT. 

It has been thought by some persons, that if the evidence of 
revelation appears doubtful, this itself turns into a positive argu- 
ment against it : because it cannot be supposed, that, if it were 
true, it would be left to subsist 'upon doubtful evidence. And 
the objection against revelation from its not being universal is 
often insisted upon as of great weight. 

The weakness of these opinions may be shown, by observing 
the suppositions on which they are founded : which are really 
such as these ; that it cannot be thought God would have be- 
stowed any favor at all upon us, unless in the degree which we 
think he might, and which, we imagine, would be most to our 
particular advantage; and also that it cannot be thought he 
would bestow a favor upon any, unless he bestowed the same 
upon all ; suppositions, which we find contradicted, not by a few 
instances in God’s natural government of the world, but by the 
general analogy of nature together. 

Persons who speak of the evidence of religion as doubtful, 
and of this supposed doubtfulness as a positive argument against 
it, should be put upon considering, what that evidence is, which 
thej 7 act upon with regard to their temporal interests. It is not 
only extremely difficult, but in many cases absolutely impossible, 
to balance pleasure and pain, satisfaction and uneasiness, so as to 
be able to say on which side is the overplus. There are the like 
difficulties and impossibilities in making the due allowances for a 
change of temper and taste, for satiety, disgusts, ill health : any 
of which render men incapable of enjoying, after they have ob- 
tained what they most eagerly desired. Numberless too are the 
accidents, besides that one of untimely death, which may even 
probably disappoint the best-concerted schemes : and strong 
objections are often seen to lie against them, not to be removed 
or answered, but which seem overbalanced by reasons on the 
other side ; so as that the certain difficulties and dangers of the 
pursuit are, by every one, thought justly disregarded, upon 

247 


248 


REVELATION NOT UNIVERSAL : 


PART II. 


account of the appearing greater advantages in case of success, 
though there be but little probability of it. Lastly, every one 
observes our liableness, if we be not upon our guard, to be 
deceived by the falsehood of men, and the false appearances of 
things : and this danger must be greatly increased, if there be a 
strong bias within, suppose from indulged passion, to favor the 
deceit. Hence arises that great uncertainty and doubtfulness of 
proof, wherein our temporal interest really consists ; what are the 
most probable means of attaining it ; and whether those means 
will eventually be successful. And numberless instances there 
are, in the daily course of life, in which all men think it reason- 
able to engage in pursuits, though the probability is greatly 
against succeeding ; and to make such provision for themselves, 
as it is supposable they may have occasion for, though the plain 
acknowledged probability is, that they never shall. 

Those who think the objection against revelation, from its light 
not being universal, to be of weight, a should observe, that the 
Author of nature, in numberless instances, bestows that upon 
some, which he does not upon others, who seem equally to stand 
in need of it. Indeed he appears to bestow all his gifts with the 
most promiscuous variety among creatures of the same species : 
health and strength, capacities of prudence and of knowledge, 
means of improvement, riches,- and all external advantages. As 
there are not any two men found, of exactly like shape and 
features ; so it is probable there are not any two, of an exactly 
like constitution, temper, and situation, with regard to the goods 
and evils of life. Yet, notwithstanding these uncertainties and 
varieties, God does exercise a natural government over the world ; 
and there is such a thing as a prudent and imprudent institution 
of life, with regard to our health and our affairs, under that his 
natural government. 

As neither the Jewish nor Christian revelation have been uni- 
versal ; and as they have been afforded to a greater or less part 

a [This objection is ably urged by Tindall. The answer of our author is 
complete. We should remember, that twice in the history of mankind, revela- 
tion has been universal. The first pair, and the occupants of the ark, com- 
prised the whole population. But how soon was light rejected ! Christianity 
is universal, in nature and intention; is to become so in fact; and according 
to a very probable construction of prophecy, will continue to be universal, for 
three hundred and sixty thousand years.] 


thap. vi. SUPPOSED DEFICIENCY IN ITS PROOF. 249 

of the world, at different times ; so likewise at different times, 
both revelations have had different degrees of evidence. The 
Jews who lived during the succession of prophets, that is, from 
Moses till after the Captivity, had higher evidence of the truth 
of their religion, than those had, who lived in the interval be- 
tween the last-mentioned period, and the coming of Christ. And 
the first Christians had higher evidence of the miracles wrought 
in attestation of Christianity, than what we have now. They 
had also a strong presumptive proof of the truth of it, perhaps 
of much greater force, in way of argument, than many think, of 
which we have very little remaining; I mean the presumptive 
proof of its truth, from the influence which it had upon the lives 
of the generality of its professors. And we, or future ages, may 
possibly have a proof of it, which they could not have, from the 
conformity between the prophetic history, and the state of the 
world b and of Christianity. 

And further : if we were to suppose the evidence, which some 
have of religion, to amount to little more than seeing that it may 
be true; but that they remain in great doubts and uncertainties 
about both its evidence and its nature, and great perplexities con- 
cerning the rule Of life : others to have a full conviction of the 
truth of religion, with a distinct knowledge of their duty; and 
others severally to have all the intermediate degrees of religious 
light and evidence, which lie between these two — if we put the 
case, that for the present, it was intended 'that revelation should be 
no more than a small light, in the midst of a world greatly over- 
spread, notwithstanding it, with ignorance and darkness: that 
certain glimmerings of this light should extend, and be directed, 
to remote distances, in such a manner as that those who really 
partook of it should not discern whence it originally came : that 
some in a nearer situation to it should have its light obscured, 
and, in different ways and degrees, intercepted : and that others 
should be placed within its clearer influence, and be much more 
enlivened, cheered, and directed by it ; but yet that even to these 

b [May not this be a principal object of the Apocalypse ? As the book of 
Daniel furnished a constant and powerful support to the faith of the Jew, by 
the constant development of prophecy, so the Apocalypse, rightly studied must 
powerfully, and through all time, support the faith of the Christian by the 
continual unfolding and verification of its predictions.] 


250 


REVELATION NOT UNIVERSAL: 


PART II. 


it should be no more than a light shining in a dark place: all 
this would be perfectly uniform, and of a piece with the conduct 
of Providence, in the distribution of its other blessings. If the 
fact of the case really were, that some have received no light at 
all from the Scripture ; as many ages and countries in the heathen 
world : that others, though they have, by means of it, had essen- 
tial or natural religion enforced upon their consciences, yet have 
never had the genuine Scripture revelation, with its real evidence, 
proposed to their consideration ; and the ancient Persians and 
modern Mahometans may possibly be instances of people in a 
situation somewhat like to this; that others, though they have 
had the Scripture laid before them as of divine revelation, yet 
have had it with the system and evidence of Christianity so in- 
terpolated, the system so corrupted, the evidence so blended with 
false miracles, as to leave the mind in the utmost doubtfulness 
and uncertainty about the whole; which may be the state of 
some thoughtful men, in most of those nations who call them- 
selves Christian : and lastly, that others have had Christianity 
offered to them in its genuine simplicity, and with its proper 
evidence, as persons in countries and churches of civil and of 
Christian liberty; but that even these persons are left in great 
ignorance in many respects, and have by no means light afforded 
them enough to satisfy their curiosity, but only to regulate their 
life, to teach them their duty, and encourage them in the careful 
discharge of it. I say, nf we were to suppose this somewhat of 
a general true account of the degrees of moral and religious light 
and evidence, which were intended to be afforded mankind, and 
of what has actually been and is their situation, in their moral 
and religious capacity; there would be nothing in all this igno- 
rance, doubtfulness, and uncertainty, in all these varieties, and 
supposed disadvantages of some in comparison of others, respect- 
ing religion, but may be paralleled by manifest analogies in the 
natural dispensations of Providence at present, considering our- 
selves merely in our temporal capacity. 

Nor is there any thing shocking in all this, or which would 
seem to bear hard upon the moral administration in nature, if we 
would really keep in mind, that every one shall be dealt equitably 
with : instead of forgetting this, or explaining it away, after it is 
acknowledged in words. All shadow of injustice, and indeed all 


CHAP. VI. 


SUPPOSED DEFICIENCY IN ITS PROOF. 


251 


harsh appearances, in this various economy of Providence, would 
be lost, if we would keep in mind, that every merciful allowance 
shall be made, and no more be required of any one, than what 
might have been equitably expected of him, from the circum- 
stances in which he was placed; and not what might have been 
expected, had he been placed in other circumstances : i.e. in 
Scripture language, that every man shall be accepted according 
to what he had , not according to what he had not .* This how- 
ever does not by any means imply, that all persons’ condition 
here is equally advantageous with respect to futurity. And 
Providence’s designing to place some in greater darkness with 
respect to religious knowledge, is no more a reason why they 
should not endeavor to get out of that darkness, and others to 
bring them out of it, than why ignorant and slow people in 
matters of other knowledge should not endeavor to learn, or 
should not be instructed. 

It is not unreasonable to suppose, that the same wise and good 
principle, whatever it was, which disposed the Author of nature 
to make different kinds and orders of creatures, disposed him also 
to place creatures of like kinds in different situations. And that 
the same principle which disposed him to make creatures of 
different moral capacities, disposed him also to place creatures of 
like moral capacities in different religious situations; and even 
the same creatures, in different periods of their being. The ac- 
count or reason of this is also most probably the account why the 
constitution of things is such, as that creatures of moral natures 
or capacities, for a considerable part of that duration in which 
they are living agents, are not at all subjects of morality and reli- 
gion ; but grow up to be so, and grow up to be so more and more, 
gradually from childhood to mature age. 

What, in particular, is the account or reason of these things, 
we must be greatly in the dark, were it only that we know so 
very little even of our own case. Our present state may possibly 
be the consequence of something past, of which we are wholly 
ignorant : as it has a reference to somewhat to come, of which 
we know scarce any more than is necessary for practice. A 
system or constitution, in its notion, implies variety; and so 
complicated a one as this world, very great variety. So that 

+ 2 Cor. viii. 12. 


252 


REVELATION NOT UNIVERSAL: 


PART II. 


were revelation universal, yet, from men’s different capacities of 
understanding, from the different lengths of their lives, their 
different educations and other external circumstances, and from 
their difference of temper and bodily constitution, their religious 
situations would be widely different, and the disadvantage of some 
in comparison of others, perhaps, altogether as much as at present. 
The true account, whatever it be, why mankind, or such a part 
of mankind, are placed in this condition of ignorance, must be 
supposed also the true account of our further ignorance, in not 
knowing the reasons why, or whence it is, that they are placed 
in this condition. 

The following practical reflections may deserve the serious con- 
sideration of those persons, who think the circumstances of man- 
kind or their own, in the forementioned respects, a ground of 
complaint. 

First , The evidence of religion not appearing obvious, may 
constitute one particular part of some men’s trial in the religious 
sense : as it gives scope, for a virtuous exercise, or vicious neglect 
of their understanding, in examining or not examining into that 
evidence. There seems no possible reason to be given, why we 
may not be in a state of moral probation, with regard to the exer- 
cise of our understanding upon the subject of religion, as we are 
with regard to our behavior in common affairs. The former is as 
much a thing within our power and choice as the latter. And I 
suppose it is to be laid down for certain, that the same character, 
the same inward principle, which, after a man is convinced of 
the truth of religion, renders him obedient to the precepts of it, 
would, were he not thus convinced, set him about an examination 
of it, upon its system and evidence being offered to his thoughts : 
and that in the latter state his examination would be with an 
impartiality, seriousness, and solicitude, proportionable to what 
his obedience is in the former. And as inattention, negligence, 
want of all serious concern, about a matter of such a nature and 
such importance, when offered to men’s consideration, is, before 
a distinct conviction of its truth, as real depravity and dissolute- 
ness, as neglect of religious practice after such conviction: so 
active solicitude about it, and fair impartial consideration of its 
evidence before such conviction, is as really an exercise of a 
morally right temper; as is religious practice after. Thus, that 


CHAP. VI. 


SUPPOSED DEFICIENCY IN ITS PROOF. 


253 


religion is not intuitively true, but a matter of deduction and 
inference; that a conviction of its truth is not forced upon every 
one, but left to be, by some, collected with heedful attention to 
premises; this as much constitutes religious probation, as much 
affords sphere, scope, opportunity, for right and wrong behavior, 
as any thing whatever does. And their manner of treating this 
subject, when laid before them, shows what is in their heart, and 
is an exertion of it. 

Secondly , It appears to be a thing as evident, though it is not 
so much attended to, that if, upon consideration of religion, the 
evidence of it should seem to any persons doubtful, in the highest 
supposable degree; even this doubtful evidence will, however, 
put them into a general state of probation in the moral and reli- 
gious sense. For, suppose a man to be really in doubt, whether 
such a person had not done him the greatest favor; or, whether 
his whole temporal interest did not depend upon that person; no 
one, who had any sense of gratitude and of prudence, could 
possibly consider himself in the same situation, with regard to 
such person, as if he had no such doubt. In truth, it is as just 
to say, that certainty and doubt are the same, as to say the situa- 
tions now mentioned would leave a man as entirely at liberty in 
point of gratitude or prudence, as he would be, were he certain 
he had received no favor from such person; or that he no way 
depended upon him. Thus, though the evidence of religion 
which is afforded to some men should be little more than they 
are given to see, the system of Christianity, or religion in general, 
to be supposable and credible; this ought in all reason to beget a 
serious practical apprehension, that it may be true. And even 
this will afford matter of exercise for religious suspense and de- 
liberation, for moral resolution and self-government; because the 
apprehension that religion may be true does as really lay men 
under obligations, as a full conviction that it is true. It gives 
occasion and motives to consider further the important subject; 
to preserve attentively upon their minds a general implicit sense 
that they may be under divine moral government, an awful solici- 
tude about religion, whether natural or revealed. Such appre- 
hension ought to turn men’s eyes to every degree of new light 
which may be had, from whatever side it comes; and induce 
them to refrain, in the mean time, from all immoralities, and live 

22 


254 


REVELATION NOT UNIVERSAL: 


PART II. 


in the conscientious practice of every common virtue. Especially 
are they bound to keep at the greatest distance from all dissolute 
profaneness, for this the very nature of the case forbids; and to 
treat with highest reverence a matter, upon which their own 
whole interest and being, and the fate of nature, depend. This 
behavior, and an active endeavor to maintain within themselves 
this temper, is the business, the duty, and the wisdom of those 
persons, who complain of the doubtfulness of religion: is what 
they are under the most proper obligations to. And such beha- 
vior is an exertion of, and has a tendency to improve in them, 
that character, which the practice of all the several duties of reli- 
gion, from a full conviction of its truth, is an exertion of, and 
has a tendency to improve in others: others, I say, to whom God 
has afforded such conviction. Nay, considering the infinite im- 
portance of religion, revealed as well as natural, I think it may 
be said in general, that whoever will weigh the matter thoroughly 
may see, there is not near so much difference, as is commonly 
imagined, between what ought in reason to be the rule of life, to 
those persons who are fully convinced of its truth, and to those 
who have only a serious doubting apprehension, that it may be 
true. Their hopes, and fears, and obligations, will be in various 
degrees: but, as the subject-matter of their hopes and fears is 
the same, so the subject-matter of their obligations, what they 
are bound to do and to refrain from, is not so very unlike. 

It is to be observed further, that, from a character of under- 
standing, or a situation of influence in the world, some persons 
have it in their power to do infinitely more harm or good, by 
setting an example of profaneness and avowed disregard to all 
religion, or, on the contrary, of a serious, though perhaps doubt- 
ing, apprehension of its truth, and of a reverent regard to it 
under this doubtfulness; than they can do, by acting well or ill 
in all the common intercourses among mankind. Consequently 
they are most highly accountable for a behavior, which, they may 
easily foresee, is of such importance, and in which there is most 
plainly a right and a wrong; even admitting the evidence of reli- 
gion to be as doubtful as is pretended. 

The ground of these observations, and that which renders them 
just and true, is, that doubting necessarily implies some degree 
of evidence for that, of which we doubt. For no person would 


chap. vi. SUPPOSED DEFICIENCY IN ITS PROOF. 255 

be in doubt concerning the truth of a number of facts so and so 
circumstanced, which should accidentally come into his thoughts, 
and of which he had no evidence at all. And though in the 
case of an even chance, and where consequently we were in 
doubt, we should in common language say, that we had no evi- 
dence at all for either side; yet that situation of things, which 
renders it an even chance and no more, that such an event will 
happen, renders this case equivalent to all others, where there is 
such evidence on both sides of a question,* as leaves the mind in 
doubt concerning the truth. Indeed in all these cases, there is 
no more evidence on one side than on the other; but there is 
(what is equivalent to) much more for either, than for the truth 
of a number of facts, which come into one’s thoughts at random. 
Thus, in all these cases, doubt as much presupposes evidence, in 
lower degrees, as belief presupposes higher, and certainty higher 
still. Any one, who will a little attend to the,nature of evidence, 
will easily carry this observation on, and see, that between no 
evidence at all, and that degree of it which affords ground of 
doubt, there are as many intermediate degrees, as there are, be- 
tween that degree which is the ground of doubt, and demonstra- 
tion. And though we have not faculties to distinguish these 
degrees of evidence with any sort of exactness; yet, in proportion 
as they are discerned, they ought to influence our practice. It 
is as real an imperfection in the moral character, not to be in- 
fluenced in practice by a lower degree of evidence when discerned, 
as it is in the understanding, not to discern it. And as, in all 
subjects which men consider, they discern the lower as well as 
higher degrees of evidence, proportionably to their capacity of 
understanding; so, in practical subjects, they are influenced in 
practice, by the lower as well as higher degrees of it, proportion- 
ably to their fairness and honesty. And as, in proportion to de- 
fects in the understanding, men are unapt to see lower degrees 
of evidence, are in danger of overlooking evidence when it is not 
glaring, and are easily imposed upon in such cases; so, in pro- 
portion to the corruption of the heart, they seem capable of satis- 
fying themselves with having no regard in practice to evidence 
acknowledged to be real, if it be not overbearing. From these 
things it must follow, that doubting concerning religion implies 
* Introduction. 


256 


REVELATION NOT UNIVERSAL; 


PART IT. 


such a degree of evidence for it, as, joined with the consideration 
of its importance, unquestionably lays men under the obligations 
before mentioned, to have a dutiful regard to it in all their 
behavior. 

Thirdly , The difficulties in which the evidence of' religion is 
involved, which some complain of, is no more a just ground of 
complaint, than the external circumstances of temptation, which 
others are placed in; or than difficulties in the practice of it, 
after a full conviction of its truth. Temptations render our state 
a more improving state of discipline,* than it would be other- 
wise : as they give occasion for a more attentive exercise of the 
virtuous principle, which confirms and strengthens it more, than 
an easier or less attentive exercise of it could. Speculative diffi- 
culties are, in this respect, of the very same nature with these 
external temptations. For the evidence of religion not appearing 
obvious, is to some persons a temptation to reject it, without any 
consideration at all; and therefore requires such an attentive 
exercise of the virtuous principle, seriously to consider that evi- 
dence, as there would be no occasion for, but for such temptation. 
And the supposed doubtfulness of its evidence, after it has been 
in some sort considered, affords opportunity to an unfair mind of 
explaining away, and deceitfully hiding from itself, that evidence 
which it might see; and also for men’s encouraging themselves 
in vice, from hopes of impunity, though they do clearly see thus 
much at least, that these hopes are uncertain. In like manner 
the common temptation to many instances of folly, which end in 
temporal infamy and ruin, is the ground for hope of not*being 
detected, and of escaping with impunity; i.e. the doubtfulness 
of the proof beforehand, that such foolish behavior will thus end 
in infamy and ruin. On the contrary, supposed doubtfulness in 
the evidence of religion calls for a more careful and attentive 
exercise of the virtuous principle, in fairly yielding themselves 
up to the proper influence of any real evidence, though doubtful ; 
and in practising conscientiously all virtue, though under some 
uncertainty, whether the government in the universe may not 
possibly be such, as that vice may escape with impunity. And 
in general, temptation, meaning by this word the lesser allure- 
ments to wrong and difficulties in the discharge of our duty, as 
* Part I. chap. v. 


chap. vi. SUPPOSED DEFICIENCY IN ITS PROOF. 257 

well as tlie greater ones; temptation, I say, as such and of every 
kind and degree, as it calls forth some virtuous efforts, additional 
to what would otherwise have been wanting, cannot but be an 
additional discipline and improvement of virtue, as well as proba- 
tion of it in the other senses of that word.* So that the very 
same account is to be given, why the evidence of religion should 
be left in such a manner, as to require, in some, an attentive, 
solicitous, perhaps painful exercise of their understanding about 
it; as why others should be placed in such circumstances, as that 
the practice of its common duties, after a full conviction of the 
truth of it, should require attention, solicitude, and pains: or, 
why appearing doubtfulness should be permitted to afford matter 
of temptation to some; as why external difficulties and allure- 
ments should be permitted to afford matter of temptation to others. 
The same account also is to be given, why some should be exer- 
cised with temptations of both these kinds; as why others should 
be exercised with the latter in such very high degrees, as some 
have been, particularly as the primitive Christians were. 

Nor does there appear any absurdity in supposing, that the 
speculative difficulties, in which the evidence of religion is in- 
volved, may make even the principal part of some persons’ trial. 
For as the chief temptations of the generality of the world are 
the ordinary motives to injustice, or unrestrained pleasure, or to 
live in the neglect of religion, from that frame of mind which 
renders many persons almost without feeling as to any thing dis- 
tant, or which is not the object of their senses; so there are 
other -persons without this shallowness of temper, persons of a 
deeper sense as to what is invisible and future; who not only see, 
but have a general practical feeling, that what is to come will be 
present, and that things are not less real for their not being the 
objects of sense; and who, from their natural constitution of 
body and of temper, and from their external condition, may have 
small temptations to behave ill, small difficulty in behaving well, 
in the common course of life. Now when these latter persons 
have a distinct full conviction of the truth of religion, without 
any possible doubts or difficulties, the practice of it is to them 
unavoidable, unless they do a constant violence to their own 

minds; and religion is scarce any more a discipline to them, than 

* 

* Part I. chap. iv. and pp. 15G, 157. 

22 * 


R 


258 


REVELATION NOT UNIVERSAL: 


PART II. 


it is to creatures in a state of perfection. Yet these persons may 
possibly stand in need of moral discipline and exercise, in a higher 
degree than they would have by such an easy practice of religion. 
Or it may be requisite, for reasons unknown to us, that they 
should give some further manifestation* what is their moral cha- 
racter, to the creation of God, than such a practice of it would 
he. Thus in the great variety of religious situations in which 
men are placed, what constitutes, what chiefly and peculiarly 
constitutes, the probation, in all senses, of some persons, may be 
the difficulties in which the evidence of religion is involved : and 
their principal and distinguished trial may be, how they will 
behave under apd with respect to these difficulties. Circum- 
stances in men’s situation in their temporal capacity, analogous 
in good measure to this respecting religion, are to be observed. 
We find some persons are placed in such a situation in the world, 
as that their chief difficulty with regard to conduct, is not the 
doing what is prudent when it is known; for this, in numberless 
cases, is as easy as the contrary : but to some the principal exer- 
cise is, recollection and being upon their guard against deceits, 
the deceits suppose of those about them ; against false appear- 
ances of reason and prudence. To persons in some situations, 
the principal exercise with respect to conduct is, attention in 
order to inform themselves what is proper, what is really the 
reasonable and prudent part to act. 

[Fourthly .] As I have hitherto gone upon supposition, that 
men’s dissatisfaction with the evidence of religion is not owing 
to their neglects or prejudices; it must be added, on the other 
hand, in all common reason, and as what the truth of the case 
plainly requires should be added, that such dissatisfaction pos- 
sibly may be owing to those, possibly may be men’s own fault. 
For, 

If there are any persons, who never set themselves heartily 
and in earnest to be informed in religion : if there are any, who 
secretly wish it may not prove true; and are less attentive to 
evidence than to difficulties, and more to objections than to what 
is said in answer to them : these persons will scarce be thought 
in a likely way of seeing the evidence of religion, though it were 
most certainly true, and capable of being ever so fully proved. 

* Pp. 156, 157. 


CHAP. VI. 


SUPPOSED DEFICIENCY IN ITS PROOF. 


259 


If any accustom themselves to consider this subject in the 
way of mirth and sport : if they attend to forms and repre- 
sentations, and inadequate manners of expression, instead of the 
real things intended by them : (for signs often can be no more 
than inadequately expressive of the things signified :) or if they 
substitute human errors in the room of divine truth ; why may 
not all, or any of these things, hinder some men from seeing that 
evidence, which really is seen by others; as a like turn of mind, 
with respect to matters of common speculation and practice, does, 
we find by experience, hinder them from attaining that knowledge 
and right understanding, in matters of common speculation and 
practice, which more fair and attentive minds attain to? And 
the effect will be the same, whether their neglect of seriously 
considering the evidence of religion, and their indirect behavior 
with regard to it, proceed from mere carelessness, or from the 
grosser vices; or whether it he owing to this, that forms and 
figurative manners of expression, as well as errors, administer 
occasions of ridicule, when the things intended, and the truth 
itself, would not. Men may indulge a ludicrous turn so far as to 
lose all sense of conduct and prudence in worldly affairs, and even, 
as it seems, to impair their faculty of reason. And in general, 
levity, carelessness, passion, and prejudice do hinder us from 
being rightly informed, with respect to common things : and they 
may , in like manner, and perhaps, in some further providential 
manner, with respect to moral and religious subjects : may hinder 
evidence from being laid before us, and from being seen when it 
is. The Scripture* does declare, that every one shall not under- 
stand. And it makes no difference, by what providential con- 
duct this comes to pass : whether the evidence of Christianity 
was, originally and with design, put and left so, as that those who 
are desirous of evading moral obligations should not see it ; and 


* Dan. xii. 10. See also Isa. xxix. 13, 14 : Matt. vi. 23, and xi. 25, and xiii. 
11, 12 : John iii. 19, and v. 44: 1 Cor. ii. 14, and 2 Cor. iv. 4 : 2 Tim. iii. 13: 
and that affectionate as well as authoritative admonition, so very many times 
inculcated, He that hath ears to hear, let him hear. Grotius saw so strongly the 
thing intended in these and other passages of Scripture of the like sense, as 
to say, that the proof given us of Christianity was less than it might have been, 
for this very purpose: Ut ita sermo Evangelii tanquam lapis esset Lydius ad 
quem ingenia sanabilia explorarentur. De Ver. R. C. lib. ii. [So that the 
Gospel should be a touchstone, to test the honesty of men’s dispositions.] 


260 


REVELATION NOT UNIVERSAL: 


PART ir. 


that honest-minded persons should : or, whether it comes to pass 
by any other means. 

Further : [ Fifthly .] The general proof of natural religion and 
of Christianity does, I think, lie level to common men : even 
those, the greatest part of whose time, from childhood to old age, 
is taken up with providing for themselves and their families the 
common conveniences, perhaps necessaries, of life : those I mean, 
of this rank, who ever think at all of asking after proof, or 
attending to it. Common men, were they as much in earnest 
about religion, as about their temporal affairs, are capable of 
being convinced upon real evidence, that there is a God who 
governs the world : and they feel themselves to be of a moral 
nature, and accountable creatures. And as Christianity entirely 
falls in with this their natural sense of things, so they are capa- 
ble, not only of being persuaded, but of being made to see, that 
there is evidence of miracles wrought in attestation of it, and 
many appearing completions of prophecy. 

This proof, though real and conclusive, is liable to objections, 
and may be run up into difficulties ; which however persons who 
are capable not only of talking of, but of really seeing, are capa- 
ble also of seeing through : i.e. not of clearing up and answering 
them, so as to satisfy their curiosity, for of such knowledge we 
are not capable with respect to any one thing in nature ; but 
capable of seeing that the proof is not lost in these difficulties, 
or destroyed by these objections. But then a thorough examina- 
tion into religion with regard to these objections, which cannot 
be the business of every man, is a matter of pretty large compass, 
and, from the nature of it, requires some knowledge, as well as 
time and attention; to see, how the evidence comes out, upon 
balancing one thing with another, and what, upon the whole, is 
the amount of it. If persons who pick up these objections from 
others, and take for granted they are of weight, upon the word 
of those from whom they received them, or, by often retailing of 
them, come to see or fancy they see them to be of weight ; will 
not prepare themselves for such an examination, with a com- 
petent degree of knowledge; or will not give that time and 
attention to the subject, which, from the nature of it, is neces- 
sary for attaining such information : in this case, they must 
remain in doubtfulness, ignorance, or error : in the same way as 


chap. vi. SUPPOSED DEFICIENCY IN ITS PROOF. 261 

they must, with regard to common sciences, and matters of com- 
mon life, if they neglect the necessary means of being informed 
in them. 

Perhaps it will still he objected, that if a prince or com- 
mon master were to send directions to a servant, he would take 
care, that they should always bear the certain marks, who they 
came from, and that their sense should be always plain : so as 
that there should be no possible doubt if he could help it, con- 
cerning the authority or meaning of them. The proper answer 
to all this kind of objections is, that, wherever the fallacy lies, it 
is even certain we cannot argue thus with respect to Him who is 
the Governor of the world : and that he does not afford us such 
information, with respect to our temporal affairs and interests, 
experience abundantly shows. 

However, there is a full answer to this objection, from the very 
nature of religion. The reason why a prince would give his 
directions in this plain manner is, that he absolutely desires an 
external action done, without concerning himself with the motive 
or principle upon which it is done : i.e. he regards only the ex- 
ternal event, or the thing’s being done; and not at all, properly 
speaking, the doing of it, or the action. Whereas the whole 
of morality and religion consisting merely in action itself, there 
is no sort of parallel between the cases. But if the prince be 
supposed to regard only the action ; i.e. only to desire to exercise, 
or in any sense prove, the understanding or loyalty of a servant ; 
he would not always give his orders in such a plain manner. It 
may be proper to add, that the will of God, respecting morality 
and religion, may be considered either as absolute, or as only con- 
ditional. If it be absolute, it can only be thus, that we should 
act virtuously in such given circumstances ; not that we should be 
brought to act so, by this changing of our circumstances. And if 
God’s will be thus absolute, then it is in our power, in the highest 
and strictest sense, to do or to contradict his will ; which is a 
most weighty consideration. Or his will may be considered only 
as conditional, that if we act so and so, we shall be rewarded ; if 
otherwise, punished : of which conditional will of the Author 
of nature, the whole constitution of it affords most certain 
instances. 

Upon the whole : that we are in a state of religion necessarily 


262 


REVELATION NOT UNIVERSAL. 


PART II. 


implies, that we are in a state of probation : and tne credibility 
of our being at all in such a state being admitted, there seems no 
peculiar difficulty in supposing our probation to be, just as it is, 
in those respects which are above objected against. There seems 
no pretence, from the reason of the thing , to say, that the trial 
cannot equitably be any thing, but whether persons will act 
suitably to certain information, or such as admits no room for 
doubt; so as that there can be no danger of miscarriage, but 
either from their not attending to what they certainly know, or 
from overbearing passion hurrying them on to act contrary to it. 
For, since ignorance and doubt, afford scope for probation in all 
senses, as really as intuitive conviction or certainty; and since 
the two former are to be put to the same account as difficulties in 
practice ; men’s moral probation may also be, whether they will 
take due care to inform themselves by impartial consideration, 
and afterwards whether they will act as the case requires, upon 
the evidence which they have, however doubtful. And this, we 
find by experience , is frequently our probation,* in our temporal 
capacity. For, the information which we want with regard to 
our worldly interests is by no means always given us of course, 
without any care of our own. And we are greatly liable to self- 
deceit from inward secret prejudices, and also to the deceits of 
others. So that to be able to judge what is the prudent part, 
often requires much and difficult consideration. Then after we 
have judged the very best we can, the evidence upon which we 
must act, if we will live and act at all, is perpetually doubtful to 
a very high degree. And the constitution and course of the 
world in fact is such, as that want of impartial consideration 
what we have to do, and venturing upon extravagant courses be- 
cause it is doubtful what will be the consequence, are often natu- 
rally, i.e. providentially, altogether as fatal, as misconduct occa- 
sioned by heedless inattention to what we certainly know, or 
disregarding it from overbearing passion. 

Several of the observations here made may well seem strange, 
perhaps unintelligible, to many good men. But if the persons 
for whose sake they are made think so, (persons who object as 
above, and throw off all regard to religion under pretence of want 
of evidence ;) I desire them to consider again, whether their think- 
* Pp. 100, 257, Ac. 


chap. vii. PARTICULAR EVIDENCE FOR CHRISTIANITY. 


263 


ing so be owing to any thing unintelligible in these observations, 
or to their own not having such a sense of religion and serious 
solicitude about it, as even their state of scepticism does in all 
reason require ? It ought to be forced upon the reflection of 
these persons, that our nature and condition necessarily require 
us, in the daily course of life, to act upon evidence much lower 
than what is commonly called probable : to guard, not only against 
what we fully believe will, but also against what we think it sup- 
posable may, happen ; and to engage in pursuits when the proba- 
bility is greatly against success, if it even be credible, that 
possibly we may succeed in them. 


CHAPTER VII. 

THE PARTICULAR EVIDENCE FOR CHRISTIANITY. 

The presumptions against revelation, and objections against 
the general scheme of Christianity, and particular things relating 
to it, being removed, there remains to be considered, what posi- 
tive evidence we have for the truth of it ; chiefly in order to see, 
what the analogy of nature suggests with regard to that evidence, 
and the objections against it : or to see what is, and is allowed 
to be, the plain natural rule of judgment and of action, in our 
temporal concerns, in cases where we have the same kind of 
evidence, and the same kind of objections against it, that we 
have in the case before us. 

In the evidence of Christianity there seem to be several things 
of great weight, not reducible to the head, either of miracles, or 
the completion of prophecy, in the common acceptation of the 
words. But these two are its direct and fundamental proofs : 
and those other things, however considerable they are, yet ought 
never to be urged apart from its direct proofs, but always to be 
joined with them. Thus the evidence of Christianity will be a 
long series of things, reaching, as it seems, from the beginning 
of the world to the present time, of great variety and compass, 
taking in both the direct and also the collateral, proofs, and 
making up, all of them together, one argument. The conviction 
arising from this kind of proof may be compared to what they 


204 


THE PARTICULAR EVIDENCE 


PART II. 


call the effect, in architecture or other works of art; a result from 
a great number of things, so and so disposed, and taken into one 
view. I shall therefore, first , make some observations relating 
to miracles, and the appearing completions of prophecy; and 
consider what analogy suggests, in answer to the objections 
brought against this evidence. And, secondly , I shall endeavor 
to give some account of the general argument now mentioned, 
consisting both of the direct and collateral evidence, considered 
as making up one argument : this being the kind of proof, upon 
which we determine most questions of difficulty, concerning 
common facts, alleged to have happened, or seeming likely to 
happen ; especially questions relating to conduct. 

First, I shall make some observations upon the direct proof of 
Christianity from miracles and prophecy, and upon the objections 
alleged against it. a 

I. Now the following observations relating to the historical 
evidence of miracles wrought in attestation of Christianity ap- 
pear to be of great weight. 

1. The Old Testament affords us the same historical evidence 
of the miracles of Moses and of the prophets, as of the common 
civil history of Moses and the kings of Israel; or, as of the 
affairs of the Jewish nation. And the Gospels and the Acts 
afford us the same historical evidence of the miracles of Christ 
and the apostles, as of the common matters related in them. 
This indeed could not have been affirmed by any reasonable man, 
if the authors of these books, like many other historians, had 
appeared to aim at an entertaining manner of writing, and hence 
interspersed miracles in their works, at proper distances and upon 
proper occasions. These might have animated a dull relation, 
amused the reader, and engaged his attention. And the same 
account would naturally have been given of them, as of the 
speeches and descriptions given by such authors : the same ac- 
count, in a manner, as is to be given, why the poets make use of 
wonders and prodigies. But the facts, both miraculous and 
natural, in Scripture, are related in plain unadorned narratives, 

a [See Witsii Meletemeta, Diss. IV. : Pfafii Disput: Campbell on Miracles : 
Douglass’ Criterion : Farmer’s Dissertations : Paley’s Evid. : Taylor’s Apol. 
of Ben Mordecai : Tucker’s Light of Nat. : Watson’s Tracts, vol. iv. : Jortjn’s 
Sermons : Bp. Fleetwood’s Essays : Boyle Lectures : Lardner’s Credibility.] 


CHAP. VII. FOR CHRISTIANITY. 265 

and both of them appear, in all respects, to stand upon the same 
foot of historical evidence . 13 

Further: some parts of Scripture, containing an account of 
miracles fully sufficient to prove the truth of Christianity, are 
quoted as genuine, from the age in which they are said to be 
written, down to the present: and no other parts of them, 
material in the present question, are omitted to be quoted in such 
manner, as to afford any sort of proof of their not being genuine. 
And, as common history, when called in question in any instance, 
may often be greatly confirmed by contemporary or subsequent 
events more known and acknowledged; and as the common 
Scripture history, like many others, is thus confirmed; so like- 
wise is the miraculous history of it, not only in particular in- 
stances, but in general. For, the establishment of the Jewish 
and Christian religions, which were events contemporary with the 
miracles related to be wrought in attestation of both, or subse- 
quent to them, these events are just what we should have ex- 
pected f, upon supposition such miracles were really wrought to 
attest the truth of those religions. These miracles are a satis- 
factory account of those events : of which no other satisfactory 
account can be given; nor any account at all, but what is merely 
imaginary and invented 

It is to be added, that the most obvious, the most easy and 
direct account of this history, how it came to be written, and to 
be received in the world as a true history, is that it really is so; 
nor can any other account of it be easy and direct. Now, though 
an account, not at all obvious, but very far-fetched and indirect, 
may be and often is, the true account of a matter, yet it cannot 
be admitted on the authority of its being asserted. Mere guess, 
supposition, and possibility, when opposed to historical evidence, 
prove nothing, but that historical evidence is not demonstrative. 

The just consequence from all this, I think is, that the Scrip- 
ture history in general is to be admitted as an authentic genuine 
history, till something positive be alleged sufficient to invalidate 

b [“ The miracles of the Jewish historian, are intimately connected with all 
the civil affairs, and make a necessary and inseparable part. The whole 
history is founded in them; it consists of little else; and if it were not a 
history of them, it would be a history of nothing.” — Bolingbroke, Posthumous 
Works, vol. iii. p. 279.] 


23 


266 


THE PARTICULAR EVIDENCE 


PART II. 


it. No man will deny the consequence to be, that it cannot be 
rejected, or thrown by as of no authority, till it can be proved to 
be of none; even though the evidence now mentioned for its 
authority were doubtful. This evidence may be confronted by 
historical evidence on the other side, if there be any : or general 
incredibility in the things related, or inconsistence in the general 
turn of the history, would prove it to be of no authority. But 
since, upon the face of the matter, upon a first and general view, 
the appearance is, that it is an authentic history, it cannot be 
determined to be fictitious, without some proof that it is so. 
The following observations in support of these, and coincident 
with them, will greatly confirm the historical evidence for the 
truth of Christianity. 

2. The Epistles of Paul, from the nature of epistolary writing, 
and moreover from several of them being written, not to particu- 
lar persons but to churches, carry in them evidences of their 
being genuine, beyond what can be in a mere historical narrative, 
left to the world at large. This evidence, 0 joined with that 
which they have in common with the rest of the New Testament, 
seems not to leave so much as any particular pretence for deny- 
ing their genuineness, considered as an ordinary matter of fact, 
or of criticism: I say particular pretence, for denying it; be- 
cause any single fact, of such a kind and such antiquity, may 
have general doubts raised concerning it, from the very nature of 
human affairs and human testimony. There is also to be men- 
tioned a distinct and particular evidence of the genuineness of 
the epistle chiefly referred to here, the first to the Corinthians; 
from the manner in which it is quoted by Clemens Romanus, in 
an epistle of his own to that church.* Now these epistles afford 

c [An admirable work on this recondite mode of proving the truth of the New 
Testament narrative, is Paley’s Horae Paulinae. The same department of evi- 
dence is ably handled by Birk, in his Horae Evangelicae, and Horae Apostolicae : 
Graves on the Pentateuch: and Blunt in his “Undesigned Coincidences both 
of the Old and New Testament.” Grotius, De Veritate, has some excellent 
passages on the same subject.] 

* [Clem. Rom. Ep. 1. c. 47. Clem*ent, who is here quoted, lived in the first 
century, and is mentioned Phil. iv. 3. His epistle to the Corinthians, written 
in Greek, contains the passage here referred to, which may be thus translated : 
“Take the letter of the blessed Paul the Apostle. What did he write to yon, 
in the first beginning of the Gospel ? Truly he sent you a divinely inspired 
letter about himself, and Cephas, and Apollos.” 


chap. vii. 


FOR CHRISTIANITY. 


267 


a proof of Christianity, detached from all others, which is, I 
think, a thing of weight; and also a proof of a nature and kind 
peculiar to itself. For, 

In them the author declares, that he received the (gospel in 
general, and the institution of the Communion in particular, not 
from the rest of the apostles, or jointly together with them, but 
alone, from Christ himself; whom he declares likewise, conform- 
ably to the history in the Acts, that he saw after his ascension.* 
So that the testimony of Paul is to be considered, as detached 
from that of the rest of the apostles. 

He declares further, that he was endued with a power of work- 
ing miracles, as what was publicly known to those very people, 
speaks of frequent and great variety of miraculous gifts as then 
subsisting in those very churches, to which he was writing; 
which he was reproving for several irregularities, and where he 
had personal opposers. He mentions these gifts incidentally, in 
the most easy manner, and without effort; by way of reproof to 
those who had them, for their indecent use of them; and by 
way of depreciating them, in comparison of moral virtues. In 
short he speaks to these churches, of these miraculous powers, 
in the manner any one would speak to another of a thing, which 
was as familiar, and as much known in common to them both, as 
any thing in the world.f And this, as hath been observed by 
several persons, is surely a very considerable thing. 

3. It is an acknowledged historical fact, that Christianity 
offered itself to the world, and demanded to be received, upon 
the allegation, (i.e. as unbelievers would speak, upon the pre- 
tence,) of miracles, publicly wrought to attest the truth of it, in 
such an age; and that it was actually received by great numbers 
in that very age, and upon the professed belief of the reality of 
these miracles. And Christianity, including the dispensation of 
the Old Testament, seems distinguished by this from all other 
religions. I mean, that this does not appear to be the case with 
regard to any other; for surely it will not be supposed to lie 
upon any person, to prove by positive historical evidence, that it 
was not. It does in no sort appear that Mahometanism was first 

* Gal. i. : 1 Cor. xi. 23, Ac. : 1 Cor. xv. 8. 

f Rom. xv. 19 : 1 Cor. xii. 8, 9, 10-28, Ac., and xiii. 1, 2, 8, and the whole 
14th chapter : 2 Cor. xii. 12, 13 : Gal. iii. 2, 5. 


268 


THE PARTICULAR EVIDENCE 


TART II. 


received in the world upon the foot of supposed miracles,* i.e. 
public ones : d for, as revelation is itself miraculous, all pretence 
to it must necessarily imply some pretence of miracles. And it 
is a known fact, that it was immediately, at the very first, pro- 
pagated by other means. And as particular institutions, whether 
in Paganism or Popery, said to be confirmed by miracles after 
those institutions had obtained, are not to the purpose: so, were 
there what might be called historical proof, that any of them 
were introduced by a supposed divine command, believed to be 
attested by miracles; these would not be in any wise parallel. 
For single things of this sort are easy to be accounted for, after 
parties are formed, and have power in their hands; and the 
leaders of them are in veneration with the multitude; and politi- 
cal interests are blended with religious claims, and religious dis- 
tinctions. But before any thing of this kind, for a few persons, 
and those of the lowest rank, all at once, to bring over such great 
numbers to a new religion, and get it to be received upon the 
particular evidence of miracles; this is quite another thing. 

I think it will be allowed by any fair adversary, that the fact 
now mentioned, taking in all the circumstances, is peculiar to the 
Christian religion. However, the fact itself is allowed, that 
Christianity obtained, i.e. was professed to be received in the 
world, upon the belief of miracles, immediately in the age in 
which it is said those miracles were wrought: or that this is 
what its first converts would have alleged, as the reason for 
their embracing it. It is not to be supposed that such numbers 
of men, in the most distant parts of the world, should forsake the 
religion of their country, in which they had been educated; 
separate themselves from their friends, particularly in their 
festival shows and solemnities, to which the common people are 
so greatly addicted, and which were of a nature to engage them 
much more, than any thing of that sort among us : and embrace 

* See the Koran, chap. xiii. and chap. xvii. 

d [Mahomet expressly declares that he worked no public miracles in con- 
firmation of his mission, “because the former nations have charged them with 
imposture.” He claims, however, to have had private miraculous assurances 
of his mission, and most preposterous they were. 

Whately, in his Christian Evidences, has handled this aspect of miracles 
with great ability. See also Paley’s Evidences, sec. 3 : and Gibbon’s Decline 
and Fall, chap. 1.] 


CHAP. VII. 


FOR CHRISTIANITY. 


269 


a religion, which could not hut expose them to many incon- 
veniences, and indeed must have been a giving up the world in a 
great degree, even from the very first, and before the empire en- 
gaged in form against them: it cannot be supposed, that such 
numbers should make so great, and to say the least, so incon- 
venient a change in their whole institution of life, unless they 
were really convinced of the truth of those miracles, upon the 
knowledge or belief of which they professed to make it. And 
it will, I suppose, readily be acknowledged, that the generality 
of the first converts to Christianity must have believed them : 
that as by becoming Christians they declared to the world, they 
were satisfied of the truth of those miracles; so this declaration 
was to be credited. And this their testimony is the same kind 
of evidence for those miracles, as if they had put it in writing, 
and these writings bad come down to us. And it is real evi- 
dence, because it is of facts, which they had capacity and full 
opportunity to inform themselves of. 

It is also distinct from the direct or express historical evidence, 
though it is of the same kind : and would be allowed to be dis- 
tinct in all cases. For were a fact expressly related by one or 
more ancient historians, and disputed in after ages; that this 
fact is acknowledged to have been believed by great numbers of 
the age in which the historian says it was done, would be allowed 
an additional proof of such fact, quite distinct from the express 
testimony of the historian. The credulity of mankind is acknow- 
ledged : and the suspicions of mankind ought to be acknowledged 
too; and their backwardness even to believe, and greater still to 
practise, what makes against their interest. And it must par- 
ticularly be remembered, that education, and prejudice, and 
authority, were against Christianity, in the age I am speaking 
of. So that the immediate conversion of such numbers is a real 
presumption of somewhat more than human in this matter. 6 I 

e [Alexander, in his Evidences, and several other writers have placed this 
argument in a very convincing light. Arnobitts, one of the earliest Christian 
writers, asks, “Shall we say that the men of those times were inconsiderate, 
deceitful, stupid, and brutish enough to feign having seen what they never 
saw ? and that when they might have lived in peace and comfort, they chose 
gratuitous hatred and obloquy?” 

The rejection of Christianity by so many in the first age was the result of 
the continued action of personal and hereditary prejudice and depravity; 


270 


THE PARTICULAR EVIDENCE 


PART ir. 


say presumption, for it is not alleged as a proof alone and by 
itself. Nor need any one of the things mentioned in this 
chapter be considered as a proof by itself: and yet all of them 
together may be one of the strongest.* 

Upon the whole: as there is large historical evidence, both 
direct and circumstantial, of miracles wrought in attestation of 
Christianity, collected by those who have writ upon the subject; 
it lies upon unbelievers to show why this evidence is not to be 
credited. This way of speaking is, I think, just; and what per- 
sons who write in defence of religion naturally fall into. Yet, in 
a matter of such unspeakable importance, the proper question is, 
not whom it lies upon, according to the rules of argument, to 
maintain or confute objections : but whether there really are any, 
against this evidence, sufficient, in reason, to destroy the credit 
of it. However, unbelievers seem to take upon them the part 
of showing that there are. 

They allege, that numberless enthusiastic people, in different 
ages and countries, expose themselves to the same difficulties 
which the primitive Christians did; and are ready to give up 
their lives for the most idle follies imaginable. It is not very 
clear, to what purpose this objection is brought. For surely, 
every one, m every case, must distinguish between opinions and 
facts. And though testimony is no proof of enthusiastic opinions, 
or of any opinion at all; yet it is allowed, in all other cases, to 
be a proof of facts. A person’s laying down his life in attesta- 
tion of facts or of opinions, is the strongest proof of his believ- 
ing them. And if the apostles and their contemporaries did be- 
lieve the facts, in attestation of which they exposed themselves 
to sufferings and death; this their belief, or rather knowledge, 
must be a proof of those facts: for they were such as came 
under the observation of their senses. And though it is not of 
equal weight, yet it is of weight, that the martyrs of the next 
age, notwithstanding they were not eye-witnesses of those facts, 


capable of resisting any supposable evidence. The reception of Christianity 
by multitudes, under the same evidences, and to their immediate personal 
damage, shows strongly that there was enough evidence to produce those 
effects. Thus the rejection by some does not countervail the acceptance by 
others.] 

* P. 294, Ac. 


CHAP. YU. 


FOR CHRISTIANITY. 


271 


as were the apostles and their contemporaries, had, however, full 
opportunity to inform themselves whether they were true or not, 
and gave equal proof of their believing them to be true. 

But enthusiasm, it is said, greatly weakens the evidence of 
testimony even for facts, in matters relating to religion : some 
seem to think it totally and absolutely destroys the evidence of 
testimony upon this subject. The powers of enthusiasm, and of 
diseases too, which operate in a like manner, are indeed very 
wonderful, in particular instances. But if great numbers of 
men, not appearing in any peculiar degree weak, nor under any 
peculiar suspicion of negligence, affirm that they saw and heard 
such things plainly, with their eyes and their ears, and are 
admitted to be in earnest; such testimony is evidence of the 
strongest kind we can have, for any matter of fact. Possibly it 
may be overcome, strong as it is, by incredibility in the things 
thus attested, or by contrary testimony. And in an instance 
where one thought it was so overcome, it might be just to consider, 
how far such evidence could be accounted for by enthusiasm; for 
it seems as if no other imaginable account were to be given of it. 
But till such incredibility be shown, or contrary testimony pro- 
duced, it cannot surely be expected, that so far-fetched, so in- 
direct and wonderful an account of such testimony, as that of 
enthusiasm must be ; an account so strange, that the generality 
of mankind can scarce be made to understand what is meant by 
it; it cannot, I say, be expected that such an account will be 
admitted of such evidence; when there is this direct, easy, and 
obvious account of it, that people really saw and heard a thing 
not incredible, which they affirm, sincerely and with full as- 
surance, they did see and hear. 

Granting then that enthusiasm is not (strictly speaking) an 
absurd, but a possible account of such testimony, it is manifest, 
that the very mention of it goes upon the previous supposition, 
that the things so attested are incredible : and therefore need not 
be considered, till they are shown to be so. Much less need it 
be considered, after the contrary has been proved. And I think 
it has been proved, to full satisfaction, that there is no incredi- 
bility in a revelation, in general; or in such a one as the Chris- 
tian, in particular. However, as religion is supposed peculiarly 
liable to enthusiam, it may just be observed, that prejudices 


272 


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PART II. 


almost without number, and without name, such as romance, 
affection, humor, a desire to engage attention, or to surprise, 
party spirit, custom, little competitions, unaccountable likings 
and dislikings; these influence men strongly in common matters. 
And as these prejudices are often scarce known or reflected upon 
by the persons themselves who are influenced by them, they are 
to be considered as influences of a like kind to enthusiasm. Yet 
human testimony, in common matters, is naturally and justly 
believed, notwithstanding. 

It is intimated further, in a more refined way of observation, 
that though it should be proved, that the apostles and first Chris- 
tians could not, in some respects, be deceived themselves, and 
in other respects, cannot be thought to have intended to impose 
upon the world, yet it will not follow that their general testi- 
mony is to be believed, though truly handed down to us : because 
they might still in part, i.e. in other respects, be deceived them- 
selves, and in part also designedly impose upon others ; which, 
it is added, is a thing very credible, from that mixture of real 
enthusiasm, and real knavery, to be met with in the same 
characters/ 

I must confess, I think the matter of fact contained in this 
observation upon mankind is not to be denied ) and that some- 
thing very much akin to it is often supposed in Scripture as a 
very common case, and most severely reproved. But it were to 
have been expected, that persons capable of applying this obser- 
vation as applied in the objection, might also frequently have 
met with the like mixed character, in instances where religion 
was quite out of the case. The thing plainly is, that mankind 
are naturally endued with reason, or a capacity of distinguishing 
between truth and falsehood ; and as naturally they are endued 
with veracity, or a regard to truth in what they say : but from 
many occasions they are liable to be prejudiced and biassed and 
deceived themselves, and capable of intending to deceive others, 
in every degree : insomuch that, as we are all liable to be de- 
ceived by prejudice, so likewise it seems to be not an uncommon 
thing, for persons who, from their regard to truth, would not 
invent a lie entirely without any foundation at all, to propagate 
it with heightening circumstances, after it is once invented and 
f [Compare Butler’s Sermons; on Balaam, and on Self-deceit.] 


CHAP. VII. 


FOR CHRISTIANITY. 


278 


set a-going. And others, though they would not propagate a lie, 
yet, which is a lower degree of falsehood, will let it pass without 
contradiction. But notwithstanding all this, human testimony 
remains still a natural ground of assent; and this assent a 
natural principle of action. 

It i& objected further, that however it has happened, the fact 
is, that mankind have, in different ages, been strangely deluded 
with pretences to miracles and wonders. But it is by no means 
to be admitted, that they have been oftener, or are at all more 
liable to be deceived by these than by other pretences. 

It is added, that there is a very considerable degree of his- 
torical evidence for miracles, which are, on all hands, acknow- 
ledged to be fabulous. But suppose there were even the like 
historical evidence for these, to what there is for those alleged in 
proof of Christianity, which yet is in no wise allowed, but sup- 
pose this ; the consequence would not be, that the evidence of 
the latter is not to be admitted. Nor is there a man in the 
world, who in common cases, would conclude thus. For what 
would such a conclusion really amount to but this, that evidence, 
confuted by contrary evidence, or any way overbalanced, destroys 
the credibility of other evidence, neither confuted nor over- 
balanced ? To argue that because there is, if there were, like 
evidence from testimony, for miracles acknowledged false, as for 
those in attestation of Christianity, therefore the evidence in the 
latter case is not to be credited ; this is the same as to argue, that 
if two men of equally good reputation had given evidence in 
different cases no way connected, and one of them had been 
convicted of perjury, this confuted the testimony of the other ! 

Upon the whole then, the general observation, that human 
creatures are so liable to be deceived, from enthusiasm in reli- 
gion, and principles equivalent to enthusiasm in common matters, 
and in both from negligence ; and that they are so capable of 
dishonestly endeavoring to deceive others; this does indeed 
weaken the evidence of testimony in all cases, but does not 
destroy it in any. And these things will appear, to different 
men, to weaken the evidence of testimony, in different degrees: 
in degrees proportionable to the observations they have made, or 
the notions they have any way taken up, concerning the weak- 
ness and negligence and dishonesty of mankind ; or concerning 
S 


274 


THE PARTICULAR EVIDENCE 


PART n. 


the powers of enthusiasm, and prejudices equivalent to it. But 
it seems to me, that people do not know what they say, who affirm 
these things to destroy the evidence from testimony which we 
have, of the truth of Christianity. Nothing can destroy the 
evidence of testimony in any case, but a proof or probability, 
that persons are not competent judges of the facts to which they 
give testimony ; or that they are actually under some indirect 
influence in giving it, in such particular case. Till this be made 
out, the natural laws of human actions require, that testimony 
be admitted. It can never be sufficient to overthrow direct 
historical evidence, indolently to say, that there are so many prin- 
ciples, from whence men are liable to be deceived themselves, 
and disposed to deceive others, especially in matters of religion, 
that one knows not what to believe. And it is surprising per- 
sons can help reflecting, that this very manner of speaking sup- 
poses they are not satisfied that there is nothing in the evidence, 
of which they speak thus ; or that they can avoid observing, if 
they do make this reflection, that it is on such a subjeot, a very 
material one.* 

Over against all these objections is to be set the importance of 
Christianity, as what must have engaged the attention of its first 
converts, so as to have rendered them less liable to be deceived 
from carelessness, than they would in common matters ; and like- 
wise the strong obligations to veracity , which their religion laid 
them under : so that the first and most obvious presumption is, 
that they could not be deceived themselves nor deceive others. 
And this presumption, in this degree, is peculiar to the testimony 
we have been considering. 

In argument, assertions are nothing in themselves, and have 
an air of positiveness which sometimes is not very easy: yet they 
are necessary, and necessary to be repeated ; in order to connect 
a discourse, and distinctly to lay before the view of the reader, 
what is proposed to be proved, and what is left as proved. Now 
the conclusion from the foregoing observations is, I think, beyond 
all doubt, this : that unbelievers must be forced to admit the ex- 
ternal evidence for Christianity, i.e. the proof of miracles wrought 
to attest it, to be of real weight and very considerable ; though 
they cannot allow it to be sufficient, to convince them of the 
*' See the foregoing chapter. 


ciiap. vii. 


FOR CHRISTIANITY. 


275 


reality of those miracles. And as they must, in all reason, admit 
this ; so it seems to me, that upon consideration they would, in 
fact, admit it; those of them, I mean, who know any thing at 
all of the matter ; in like manner as persons, in many cases, own 
they see strong evidence from testimony, for the truth of things, 
which yet they cannot he convinced are true : cases, suppose, 
where there is contrary testimony; or things which they think, 
whether with or without reason, to be incredible. But there is 
tio testimony contrary to that which we have been considering : 
and it has been fully proved, that there is no incredibility in 
Christianity in general, or in any part of it. 

II. As to the evidence for Christianity from prophecy, I shall 
only make some few general observations, which are suggested 
by the analogy of nature ; i.e. by the acknowledged natural rules 
of judging in common matters, concerning evidence of a like 
kind to this from prophecy. 

1. The obscurity or unintelligibleness of one part of a prophecy 
does not, in any degree, invalidate the proof of foresight, arising 
from the appearing completion of those other parts, which are 
understood. For the case is evidently the same, as if those parts 
which are not understood were lost, or not written at all, or 
written in an unknown tongue. Whether this observation be 
commonly attended to or not, it is so evident, that one can scarce 
bring oneself to set down an instance in common matters, to 
exemplify it. However, suppose a writing, partly in cipher, and 
partly in plain words at length; and that in the part one under- 
stood, there appeared mention of several known facts ; it would 
never come into any man’s thoughts to imagine, that if he under- 
stood the whole, perhaps he might find, that those facts were not 
in reality known by the writer. Indeed, both in this example 
and in the thing intended to be exemplified by it, our not under- 
standing the whole (the whole, suppose, of a sentence or a para- 
graph) might sometimes occasion a doubt, whether one understood 
the literal meaning of such a part : but this comes under another 
consideration. 

For the same reason, though a man should be incapable, for 
want of learning, or opportunities of inquiry, or from not having 
turned his studies this way, even so much as to judge whether 
particular prophecies have been throughout completely fulfilled ; 


276 


THE PARTICULAR EVIDENCE 


PART II. 


yet he may see, in general, that they have been fulfilled to such 
a degree, as, upon very good ground, to be convinced of foresight 
more than human in such prophecies, and of such events being 
intended by them. For the same reason also, though, by means 
of the deficiencies in civil history, and the different accounts of 
historians, the most learned should not be able to make out to 
satisfaction, that such parts of the prophetic history have been 
minutely and throughout fulfilled; yet a very strong proof of 
foresight may arise, from that general completion of them, which 
is made out. As much perhaps, as the giver of prophecy in- 
tended should ever be afforded by such parts of prophecy. 

2. A long series of prophecy being applicable to such and such 
events, is itself a proof that it was intended of them : as the rules 
by which we naturally judge and determine, in common cases 
parallel to this, will show. 8 This observation I make in answer 
to the common objection against the application of the prophe- 
cies, that, considering each of them distinctly by itself, it does 
not at all appear, that they were intended of those particular 
events to which they are applied by Christians; and therefore it 
is to be supposed, that if they meant any thing, they were in- 
tended of other events unknown to us, and not of these at all. 

Now there are two kinds of writing, which bear a great re- 
semblance to prophecy, with respect to the matter before us : the 
mythological, and the satirical, where the satire is to a certain 
degree concealed. And a man might be assured, that he under- 
stood what an author intended by a fable or parable related with- 
out any application or moral, merely from seeing it to be easily 
capable of such application, and that such a moral might natu- 
rally be deduced from it. And he might be fully assured, that 
such persons and events were intended in a satirical writing, 
merely from its being applicable to them. And, agreeable to the 
last observation, he might be in a good measure satisfied of it, 

8 [“ Whenever a general scheme is known to be pursued by a writer, that 
scheme becomes the true key in the hands of his reader, for unlocking the 
meaning of particular parts, which would otherwise not be seen clearly to refer 
to such scheme. The inspired writers had one common and predominant 
scheme in view, which was to bear testiuiony to Jesus. Whatever passages 
occur in their writings, which bear an apt and easy resemblance to the history 
of Jesus, may, or rather must in all reasonable construction, be applied to 
him.” — Hurd on the Proph., p. 117.] 


CHAP. VII. 


FOR CHRISTIANITY. 


277 

though he were not enough informed in affairs, or in the story 
of such persons to understand half the satire. For, his satisfac- 
tion that he understood the meaning, the intended meaning, of 
these writings, would be greater or less in proportion as he saw 
the general turn of them to be capable of such application ; and 
in proportion to the number of particular things capable of it. 
And thus, if a long series of prophecy is applicable to the present 
state of the church, and to the political situations of the king- 
doms of the world, some thousand years after these prophecies 
were delivered ; and a long series of prophecy delivered before 
the coming of Christ is applicable to him; these things are in 
themselves a proof, that the prophetic history was intended of 
him, and of those events : in proportion as the general turn of it 
is capable of such application, and to the number and variety of 
particular prophecies capable of it. And though, in all just way 
of consideration, the obvious completion of prophecies is to be 
allowed to be thus explanatory of, and to determine, their mean- 
ing; yet it is to be remembered further, that the ancient Jews 
applied the prophecies to a Messiah before his coming, h in much 
the same manner as Christians do now : and that the primitive 
Christians interpreted the prophecies respecting the state of the 
church and of the world in the last ages, in the sense which the 
event seems to confirm and verify. From these things it may be 
made appear: 

3. That the showing even to a high probability, if that could 
be, that the prophets thought of some other eveuts, in such and 
such predictions, and not those which Christians allege to be 
completions of those predictions; or that such and such prophe- 
cies are capable of being applied to other events than those, to 
which Christians apply them — that this would not confute or 
destroy the force of the argument from prophecy, even with re- 
gard to those very instances. For, observe how this matter really 
is. If one knew such a person to be the sole author of such a 
book, and was certainly assured, or satisfied to any degree, that 
one knew the whole of what he intended in it; one should be 
assured or satisfied to such degree, that one knew the whole 

b [Consult on this point, Gulick, Theologia Prophetica: Vitringa, Observa- 
tiones: IIengstenburg, Christologia: Horsley’s Tracts and Sermons: King’s 
Morsels of Criticism : Waugh’s Dissertations : Lyall’s Propoedia Prophetica.] 

24 


278 


THE PARTICULAR EVIDENCE 


PART II. 


meaning of that book : for the meaning of a book is nothing but 
the meaning of the author. But if one knew a person to have 
compiled a book out of memoirs, which he received from another, 
of vastly superior knowledge in the subject of it, especially if it 
were a book full of great intricacies and difficulties; it would in 
no wise follow, that one knew the whole meaning of the book, 
from knowing the whole meaning of the compiler: for the original 
author of them, might have, and there would be no presumption, 
in many cases, against supposing him to have, some further 
meaning than the compiler saw. To say then that the Scrip- 
tures, and the things contained in them, can have no other or 
further meaning than those persons had, who first recited or 
wrote them, is evidently saying, that those persons were the 
original, proper, and sole authors of those books, i.e. that they 
are not inspired : which is absurd, while the authority of these 
books is under examination ; i.e. till you have determined they 
are of no divine authority at all. Till this be determined, it 
must in all reason be supposed, not indeed that they have, (for 
this is taking for granted that they are inspired;) but that they 
may have, some further meaning than what the compilers saw or 
understood. And, upon this supposition, it is supposable also, 
that this further meaning may be fulfilled. 

Events corresponding to prophecies, interpreted in a different 
meaning from that, in which the prophets are supposed to have 
understood them; affords in a manner, the same proof, that this 
different sense was originally intended, as it would have afforded, 
if the prophets had not understood their predictions in the sense 
it is supposed they did : because there is no presumption of their 
sense of them being the whole sense of them. And it has been 
already shown, that the apparent completions of prophecy must 
be allowed to be explanatory of its meaning. So that the ques- 
tion is, whether a series of prophecy has been fulfilled, in a 
natural or proper, i.e. in any real sense of the words of it. For 
such completion is equally a proof of foresight more than human, 
whether the prophets are, or are not, supposed to have under- 
stood it in a different sense. I say, supposed: for, though I 
think it clear, that the prophets did not understand the full 
meaning of their predictions, it is another question, how far they 
thought they did; and in what sense they understood them. 


CHAP. VII. 


FOR CHRISTIANITY. 


279 


Hence may be seen, to bow little purpose those persons busy 
themselves, who endeavor to prove, that the prophetic history is 
applicable to events of the age in which it was written, or of ages 
before it. To have proved this, before there was any appearance 
of a further completion of it, might have answered some purpose; 
for it might have prevented the expectation of any such further 
completion. Thus could Porphyry have shown, that some prin- 
cipal parts of the book of Daniel, for instance the seventh verse 
of the seventh chapter, which the Christians interpreted of the 
latter ages, was applicable to events, which happened before or 
about the age of Antioch us Epiphanes; this might have prevented 
them from expecting any further completion of it. And, unless 
there was then, as I think there must have been, external evi- 
dence concerning that book, more than is come down to us; such 
a discovery might have been a stumbling-block in the way of 
Christianity itself: considering the authority which our Savior 
has given to the book of Daniel, and how much the general 
scheme of Christianity presupposes the truth of it. But even 
this discovery, had there been any such,* would be of very little 
weight with reasonable men now; if this passage, thus applicable 
to events before the age of Porphyry, appears to be applicable 
also to events, which succeeded the dissolution of the Roman 
empire. I mention this, not at all as intending to insinuate, that 
the division of this empire into ten parts, for it plainly was 
divided into about that number, were, alone and by itself, of any 
moment in verifying the prophetic history : but only as an ex- 
ample of the thing I am speaking of. Thus upon the whole, the 
matter of inquiry evidently must be, as above put, Whether the 
prophecies are applicable to Christ, and to the present state of 
the world, and of the church; applicable in such a degree, as to 
imply foresight : not whether they are capable of any other appli- 

* It appears that Porphyry did nothing worth mentioning in this way. For 
Jerome on the place says : Ducts posterior es bestias — in uno Macedonum regno 
ponit. And as to the ten kings; Decern reges enumerat, qui fuernnt scevissimi : 
ipsosque reges non unim ponit regni, verbi gratia, Macedonia ?, Syrice, Asice, et 
./Egypt i / sed de diver sis regnis unum efficit regum orclinem. [“The two latter 
beasts he places in one of the Macedonian kingdoms.” “ He reckons up ten kings 
who had been excessively cruel and these not kings of one country, as Mace- 
donia, for instance, or Syria, or Asia, or Egypt; but makes up his set of kings 
out of different kingdoms.”] In this way of interpretation, any thing may be 
made of any thing. 


280 


THE PARTICULAR EVIDENCE 


PART II. 


cation. Though I know no pretence for saying the general turn 
of them is capable of any other. 

These observations are, I think, just, and the evidence referred 
to in them real : though there may be people who will not accept 
of such imperfect information from Scripture. Some too have 
not integrity and regard enough to truth, to attend to evidence, 
which keeps the mind in doubt, perhaps perplexity, and which 
is much of a different sort from what they expected. It plainly 
requires a degree of modesty and fairness, beyond what every 
one has, for a man to say, not to the world but to himself, that 
there is a real appearance of great weight in this matter, though 
he is not able thoroughly to satisfy himself about it; but that it 
shall have its influence upon him, in proportion to its apparent 
reality and weight. It is much more easy, and more falls in with 
the negligence, presumption, and wilfulness of the generality, to 
determine at once, with a decisive air, There is nothing in it. 
The prejudices arising from that absolute contempt and scorn, 
with which this evidence is treated in the world, I do not men- 
tion. For what can be said to persons, who are weak enough in 
their understandings to think this any presumption against it; 
or, if they do not, are yet weak enough in their temper to be in- 
fluenced by such prejudices, upon such a subject? 

Secondly , I shall endeavor to give some account of the general 
argument for the truth of Christianity, consisting both of the 
direct and circumstantial evidence considered as making up one 
argument. To state and examine this argument fully, would be 
a work much beyond the compass of this whole treatise; nor is so 
much as a proper abridgment of it to be expected here. Yet the 
present subject requires to have some brief account of it given. 
For it is the kind of evidence, upon which most questions of diffi- 
culty, in common practice, are determined : evidence arising from 
various coincidences, which support and confirm each other, and 
in this manner prove, with more or less certainty, the point under 
consideration. I choose to do it also: First, because it seems to 
be of the greatest importance, and not duly attended to by every 
one, that the proof of revelation is not some direct and express 
things only, but a great variety of circumstantial things also; 
and that though each of these direct and circumstantial things is 
indeed to be considered separately, yet they are afterwards to be 


CHAP. VII. 


FOR CHRISTIANITY. 


281 


joined together; for that the proper force of the evidence con- 
sists in the result of those several things, considered in their 
respects to each other, and united into one view. In the next 
place, because it seems to me, that the matters of fact here set 
down, which are acknowledged by unbelievers, must be acknow- 
ledged by them also to contain together a degree of evidence of 
great weight, if they could be brought to lay these several things 
before themselves distinctly, and then with attention consider 
them together; instead of that cursory thought of them, to which 
we are familiarized. For being familiarized to the cursory thought 
of things as really hinders the weight of them from being seen, 
as from having its due influence upon practice. 

The thing asserted, and the truth of which is to be inquired 
into, is this: That over and above our reason and affections, 
which God has given us for the information of our judgment and 
the conduct of our lives, he has also, by external revelation, given 
us an account of himself and his moral government over the world, 
implying a future state of rewards and punishments; i.e. hath 
revealed the system of natural religion : (for natural religion may 
be externally* revealed by God, as the ignorant may be taught it 
by their fellow-creatures) — that God, I say, has given us the evi- 
dence of revelation, as well as the evidence of reason, to ascertain 
this moral system; together with an account of a particular dis- 
pensation of Providence, which reason could no way have dis- 
covered, and a particular institution of religion founded on it, for 
the recovery of mankind out of their present wretched condition, 
and raising them to the perfection and final happiness of their 
nature. 

This revelation, whether real or supposed, may be considered 
as wholly historical. For prophecy is nothing but the history of 
events before they come to pass; doctrines also are matters of 
fact; and precepts come under the same notion. The general 
design of Scripture, which contains in it this revelation, thus 
considered as historical, may be said to be, to give us an account 
of the world in this one single view, as God’s world: by which 
it appears essentially distinguished from all other books, so far as 
I have found, except such as are copied from it. It begins with 
an account of God’s creation of the world, in order to ascertain, 

* P. 189, Ac. 

24* 


282 


THE PARTICULAR EVIDENCE 


PART II. 


and distinguish from all others, who is the object of our worship, 
by what he has done: in order to ascertain, who he is, concerning 
whose providence, commands, promises, and threatenings, this 
sacred book, all along, treats; [viz.] the Maker and Proprietor 
of the world, he whose creatures we are, the God of nature : in 
order likewise to distinguish him from the idols of the nations, 
which are either imaginary beings, i.e. no beings at all; or else 
part of that creation, the historical relation of which is here given. 
And John, not improbably with an eye to this Mosaic account 
of the creation, begins his Gospel with an account of our Savior’s 
pre-existence, and that all things were made by him ; and with- 
out him was not any thing made that was made ;* agreeably to 
the doctrine of Paul, that God created all things by Jesus Christ. \ 
This being premised, the Scripture, taken together, seems to pro- 
fess to contain a kind of an abridgment of the history of the 
world, in the view just now mentioned: that is, a general account 
of the condition of religion and its professors, during the continu- 
ance of that apostasy from God, and state of wickedness, which 
it everywhere supposes the world to lie in. And this account 
of the state of religion carries with it some brief account of the 
political state of things, as religion is affected by it. Revelation 
indeed considers the common affairs of this world, and what is 
going on in it, as a mere scene of distraction ; and cannot be sup- 
posed to -concern itself with foretelling at what time Rome, or 
Babylon, or Greece, or any particular place, should be the most 
conspicuous seat of that tyranny and dissoluteness, which all 
places equally aspire to be; cannot, I say, be supposed to give 
any account of this wild scene for its own sake. But it seems to 
contain some very general account of the chief governments of 
the world, as the general state of religion has been, is, or shall 
be, affected by them, from the first transgression, and during the 
whole interval of the world’s continuing in its present state, to a 
certain future period, spoken of both in the Old and New Testa- 
ment, very distinctly, and in great variety of expression: The 
times of the restitution of all things when the mystery of God 
shall be finished , as he hath declared to his servants the prophets ;§ 
when the God of heaven shall set up a kingdom , which shall 
never be destroyed : and the kingdom shall not be left to other 
* John i. 3. f Eph. iii. 9. J Acts iii. 21. § Rev. x. 7. 


CHAP. VII. 


FOR CHRISTIANITY. 


283 


people,* as it is represented to be during this apostasy, but judg- 
ment shall he given to the saints,' j* aud they shall reign and the 
kingdom and dominion, and the greatness of the kingdom under 
the 'whole heaven , shall he given to the people of the saints of the 
Most High.% 

Upon this general view of the Scripture, I would remark, how 
great a length of time the whole relation takes up, near six thou- 
sand years of which are past; and how great a variety of things 
it treats of; the natural and moral system or history of the world, 
including the time when it was formed, all contained in the very 
first book, and evidently written in a rude and unlearned age; 
and in subsequent books, the various common and prophetic his- 
tory, and the particular dispensation of Christianity. Now all 
this together gives the largest scope for criticism; and for the 
confutation of what is capable of being confuted, either from 
reason, or from common history, or from any inconsistence in its 
several parts. And it deserves, I think, to be mentioned, that 
whereas some imagine the supposed doubtfulness of the evidence 
for revelation implies a positive argument that it is not true; it 
appears, on the contrary, to imply a positive argument that it is 
true. For, could any common relation of such antiquity, extent, 
and variety (for in these things the stress of what I am now ob- 
serving lies) be proposed to the examination of the world : that 
it could not, in an age of knowledge and liberty, be confuted, or 
shown to have nothing in it, to the satisfaction of reasonable 
men; would be thought a strong presumptive proof of its truth. 
Indeed it must be a proof of it, just in proportion to the proba- 
bility, that if it were false, it might be shown to be so: which, I 
think, is scarce pretended to be shown, but upon principles and 
in ways of arguing, which have been clearly obviated. || Nor 
does it at all appear, that any set of men, who believe natural 
religion, are of the opinion, that Christianity has been thus 
confuted. But to proceed : 

Together with the moral system of the world, the Old Testa- 
ment contains a chronological account of the beginning of it, 
and from thence, an unbroken genealogy of mankind for many 
ages before common history begins; and carried on as much 

* Dan. ii. 44. f Dan. vii. 22. J Rev. xi. 17, 18 ; xx. 6. 

§ Dan. vii. 27. || Chap. ii. iii. <fcc. 


284 


THE PARTICULAR EVIDENCE 


PART II. 


farther as to make up a continued thread of history, of the 
length of between three and four thousand years. It contains 
an account of God’s making a covenant with a particular nation, 
that they should be his people, and he would be their God, in a 
peculiar sense; of his often interposing miraculously in their 
affairs; giving them the promise, and long after, the possession, 
of a particular country; assuring them of the greatest national 
prosperity in it, if they would worship him, in opposition to the 
idols which the rest of the world worshipped, and obey his com- 
mands; and threatening them with unexampled punishments if 
they disobeyed him, and fell into the general idolatry : insomuch 
that this one nation should continue to be the observation and 
the wonder of all the world. It declares particularly, that God 
would scatter them among all people , from one end of the earth 
unto the other ; but that when they should return unto the Lord 
their God , he would have compassion upon them , and gather 
them from all the nations , whither he had scattered them : that 
Israel should he saved in the Lord, with an everlasting salvation ; 
and not he ashamed or confounded world without end.* And as 
some of these promises are conditional, others are as absolute as 
any thing can be expressed : that the time should come, when 
the people should he all righteous, and inherit the land forever : 
that though God would make a full end of all nations whither 
he had scattered them , yet would he not make a full end of 
them : that he would bring again the captivity of his people 
Israel, and plant them upon their land, and they should be no 
more pulled up out of their land : that the seed of Israel should 
not cease from being a nation forever .*j* It foretells, that God 
would raise them up a particular person, in whom all his promises 
should finally be fulfilled ; the Messiah, who should be, in a high 
and eminent sense, their anointed Prince and Savior. This was 
foretold in such a manner, as raised a general expectation of such 
a person in the nation, as appears from the New Testament, and 
is an acknowledged fact ; an expectation of his coming at such a 
particular time, before any one appeared claiming to be that per- 
son, and when there was no ground for such an expectation, but 
from the prophecies : which expectation, therefore, must in all 

* Deut. xxviii. 64 ; xxx. 2, 3 : Isa. xlv. 17. 

f Isa. lx. 21 : Jer. xxx. 11 ; xlvi. 28: Amos ix. 14, 15 : Jer. xxxi. 36. 


ClIAP. VII. 


FOR CHRISTIANITY. 


285 


reason be presumed to be explanatory of those prophecits, if 
there were any doubt about their meaning. It seems moreover 
to foretell, that this person should be rejected by the nation to 
whom lie had been so long promised, though he was so much 
desired by them.* And it expressly foretells, that he should be 
the Savior of the Gentiles; and that the completion of the 
scheme contained in this book, and then begun, and in its pro- 
gress, should be something so great, that in comparison with it, 
the restoration of the Jews alone would be but of small account. 
It is a light thing that thou shouldest be mg servant to raise up 
the tribes of Jacob , and to restore the preserved of Israel: I will 
also give thee for a light to the Gentiles , that thou mayest be for 
salvation unto the end of the earth. And, In the last days , the 
mountain of the Lord’s house shall be established in the top of 
the mountains , and shall be exalted above the hills ; and all na- 
tions shall flow into it — for out of Zion shall go forth the law , 
and the word of the Lord from Jerusalem. And he shall judge 
among the nations — and the Lord alone shall be exalted in that 
day , and the idols he shall utterly abolish, j* 

The Scripture further contains an account, that at the time 
the Messiah was expected, a person rose up in this nation, claim- 
ing to be that Messiah, to be the person to whom all the pro- 
phecies referred, and in whom they should center : that he spent 
some years in a continued course of miraculous works ; and 
endued his immediate disciples and followers with a power of 
doing the same, as a proof of the truth of that religion, which 
he commissioned them to publish : that invested with this au- 
thority and power, they made numerous converts in the remotest 
countries, and settled and established his religion in the world • 
to the end of which the Scripture professes to give a prophetic 
account of the state of this religion among mankind. 1 

Let us now suppose a person utterly ignorant of history, to have 

# Isa. viii. 14, 15; xlix. 5; chap. liii. : Mai. i. 10, 11, and chap. iii. 

f Isa. xlix. 6, chap, ii., chap, xi., chap. lvi. 7 : Mai. i. 11. To which must 
be added, the other prophecies of the like kind, several in the New Testament, 
and very many in the Old ; which describe what shall be the completion of the 
revealed plan of Providence. 

1 [See Davidson’s Disc, on Proph. : Blaney on Daniel’s LXX. Weeks : 
Hurd’s Introd. to the Study of Proph.: Jortin’s Ser. at Boyle Lect. : Ful- 
ler’s Gosp. its own Witness, part ii. : Waugh’s Diss. : Apthorpe’s Discourses.] 


286 


THE PARTICULAR EVIDENCE 


PART II. 


all this related to him out of the Scripture. Or suppose such 
an one, having the Scripture put into his hands, to remark these 
things in it, not knowing but that the whole, even its civil his- 
tory, as well as the other parts of it, might he, from beginning 
to end, an entire invention ; and to ask, What truth was in it, 
and whether the revelation here related was real, or a fiction ? 
And, instead of a direct answer, suppose him, all at once, to be 
told the following confessed facts ; and then to unite them into 
one view. 

Let him first be told, in how great a degree the profession and 
establishment of natural religion, the belief that there is one 
God to be worshipped, that virtue is his law, and that mankind 
shall be rewarded and punished hereafter, as they obey and dis- 
obey it here ; in how very great a degree, I say, the profession 
and establishment of this moral system in the world is owing to 
the revelation, whether real or supposed, contained in this book : 
the establishment of this moral system, even in those countries 
which do not acknowledge the proper authority of the Scripture.* 
Let him be told also, what number of nations do acknowledge its 
proper authority. Let him then take in the consideration, of 
what importance religion is to mankind. And upon these things 
he might, I think, truly observe, that this supposed revelation’s 
obtaining and being received in the world, with all the circum- 
stances and effects of it, considered together as one event, is the 
most conspicuous and important event in the history of mankind : 
that a book of this nature, and thus promulged and recommended 
to our consideration, demands, as if by a voice from heaven, to 
have its claims most seriously examined ; and that, before such 
examination, to treat it with any kind of scoffing and ridicule, is 
an offence against natural piety. It is to be remembered, that 
how much soever the establishment of natural religion in the 
world is owing to the Scripture revelation, this does not destroy 
the proof of religion from reason, any more than the proof of 
Euclid’s Elements is destroyed, by a man’s knowing or thinking, 
that he should never have seen the truth of the several proposi- 
tions contained in it, nor had those propositions come into his 
thoughts, but for that mathematician. 

Let such a person as we are speaking of be, in the next place, 
* P. 250. 


criAP. vii. 


FOR CHRISTIANITY. 


287 


informed of the acknowledged antiquity of the first parts of this 
book; and that its chronology, its account of the time when the 
earth, and the several parts of it, were first peopled with human 
creatures, is no way contradicted, but is really confirmed, by the 
natural and civil history of the world, collected from common 
historians, from the state of the earth, and from the late inven- 
tion of arts and sciences. 

And as the Scripture contains an unbroken thread of common 
and civil history, from the creation to the captivity, for between 
three and four thousand years ; let the person we are speaking 
of be told, in the next place, that this general history, as it is 
not contradicted, but confirmed by profane history k as much as 
there would be reason to expect, upon supposition of its truth ; so 
there is nothing in the whole history itself, to give any reasonable 
ground of suspicion of its not being, in the general, a faithful 
and literally true genealogy of men, and series of things. I 
speak here only of the common Scripture history, or of the 
course of ordinary events related iu it, as distinguished from 
miracles, and from the prophetic history. In all the Scripture 
narrations of this kind, following events arise out of foregoing 
ones, as in all other histories. There appears nothing related as 
done in any age, not conformable to the manners of that age : 
nothing in the account of a succeeding age, which one would 
say could not be true, or was improbable, from the account of 
things in the preceding one. There is nothing in the characters, 
which would raise a thought of their being feigned ; but all the 
internal marks imaginable of their being real. It is to be added 
also, that mere genealogies, bare narratives of the number of 

k [Hundreds of instances might be adduced, in which profane historians 
corroborate the statements of the Scriptures. The following are merely speci- 
mens : Diodorus Siculus, Strabo, Tacitus, Pliny, and Solinus, speak of 
the destruction of Sodom and Gomorrah. The lives of David and Solomon are 
given in the remains of the Phoenician Annals, in Daiaascenus, and Euro- 
lejius. Menander describes the carrying away of the Ten Tribes by Sal- 
manasor. Suetonius, Tacitus, Pliny the younger, and Numenius, speak of 
Jesus Christ. His miracles are owned by Celsus, Porphyry, Julian, and 
Jewish writers opposed to Christianity. Suetonius, Tacitus, Pliny, Julian, 
and others describe his being put to death ; and Tacitus says that many were 
put to death for adhering to his religion. Phlegon mentions the miracles of 
Peter; and Paul is enumerated among eminent authors, in a fragment of 
Longinus.] 


288 


THE PARTICULAR EVIDENCE 


PART II. 


years, which persons called by such and such names lived, do not 
carry the face of fiction; perhaps do carry some presumption of 
veracity: and all unadorned narratives, which have nothing to 
surprise, may be thought to carry somewhat of the like presump- 
tion too. And the domestic and the political history is plainly 
credible. There may be incidents in Scripture, which, taken 
alone in the naked way they are told, may appear strange; espe- 
cially to persons of other manners, temper, education : but there 
are also incidents of undoubted truth, in many or most persons' 
lives, which, in the same circumstances, would appear to the full 
as strange . 1 There may be mistakes of transcribers, there may 
be other real or seeming mistakes, not easy to be particularly ac- 
counted for : but there are certainly no more things of this kind 
in the Scripture, than what were to have been expected in books 
of such antiquity; and nothing, in any wise, sufficient to dis- 
credit the general narrative. 

Now, that a history, claiming to commence from the creation, 
and extending in one continued series, through so great a length 
of time, and variety of events, should have such appearances of 
reality and truth in its whole contexture, is surely a very remark- 
able circumstance in its favor. And as all this is applicable to 
the common history of the New Testament, so there is a further 
credibility, and a very high one, given to it by profane authors : 
mauy of these writing of the same times, and confirming the truth 
of customs and events, which are incidentally as well as more 
purposely mentioned in it. And this credibility of the common 
Scripture-history, gives some credibility to its miraculous history : 

1 [This thought is elaborated with skill by Whately in his “ Historic Doubts.” 
He takes up all the popular infidel objections as to the life of Christ, and applies 
them with undiminished or even increased force against the evidences that such 
a man as Buonaparte ever existed. 

Johnson in a lively sally once said — “ It is easy to be on the negative side. 
I deny that Canada is taken. The French are a much more numerous people 
than we ; and it is not likely they would allow us to take it.’ ‘ But the Govern- 
ment have announced the fact.’ ‘Very true. But the ministry have put us to 
an enormous expense by the war in America, and it is their interest to persuade 
us that we have got something for our money.’ ‘But the fact is confirmed by 
thousands who were at the taking of it.’ ‘ Aye, but these men have an interest 
in deceiving us : they don’t want you should think the French have beat them. 
Now suppose you go over and find it so, that would only satisfy yourself ; for 
when you come back we will not believe you. We will say you have been 
bribed.’ ” — Boswell.] 


CHAP. VII. 


FOR CHRISTIANITY. 


289 


especially as this is interwoven with the common, so as that they 
imply each other, and both together make up one relation. 

Let it then be more particularly observed to this person, that 
it is an acknowledged matter of fact, which is indeed implied in 
the foregoing observation, that there was such a nation as the 
Jews, of the greatest antiquity, whose government and general 
polity was founded on the law, here related to be given them by 
Moses as from heaven : that natural religion, with rites additional 
yet no way contrary to it, was their established religion, which 
cannot be said of the Gentile world : and that their very being 
as a nation, depended upon their acknowledgment of one God, 
the God of the universe. For, suppose in their captivity in 
Babylon, they had gone over to the religion of their conquerors, 
there would have remained no bond of union, to keep them a 
distinct people. And while they were under their own kings, in 
their own country, a total apostasy from God would have been 
the dissolution of their whole government. They in such a sense 
nationally acknowledged and worshipped the Maker of heaven 
and earth, when the rest of the world were sunk in idolatry, as 
rendered them, in fact, the peculiar people of God. This re- 
markable establishment and preservation of natural religion 
among them, seems to add peculiar credibility to the historical 
evidence for the miracles of Moses and the prophets. Because 
these miracles are a full satisfactory account of this event, which 
plainly needs to be accounted for, and cannot be otherwise. 

Let this person, supposed wholly ignorant of history, be ac- 
quainted further, that one claiming to be the Messiah, of Jewish 
extraction, rose up at the time when this nation, from the pro- 
phecies above mentioned, expected the Messiah : that he. was 
rejected, as it seemed to have been foretold he should, by the 
body of the people, under the direction of their rulers : that in 
the course of a very few years, he was believed on and acknow- 
ledged as the promised Messiah, by great numbers among the 
Gentiles, agreeably to the prophecies of Scripture, yet not upon 
the evidence of prophecy, but of miracles,* of which miracles we 
have also strong historical evidence; (by which I mean here no 
more than must be acknowledged by unbelievers; for let pious 
frauds and follies be admitted to weaken, it is absurd to say they 
* P. 267, Ac. 

T 25 


290 


THE PARTICULAR EVIDENCE 


PART il. 


destroy our evidence of miracles wrought in proof of Christianity :)* 
that this religion approving itself to the reason of mankind, and 
carrying its own evidence with it, so far as reason is a judge of 
its system, and being no way contrary to reason in those parts of 
it which require to be believed upon the mere authority of its 
Author; that this religion, I say, gradually spread and supported 
itself for some hundred years, not only without any assistance 
from temporal power, but under constant discouragements, and 
often the bitterest persecutions from it; and then became the 
religion of the world : that in the mean time the Jewish nation 
and government were destroyed in a very remarkable manner, 
and the people carried away captive and dispersed through the 
most distant countries; in which state of dispersion they have 
remained fifteen hundred years : and that they remain a numerous 
people, united among themselves, and distinguished from the rest 
of the world, as they were in the days of Moses, by the profession 
of his law; and everywhere looked upon in a manner, which 
one scarce knows how distinctly to express, but in the words 
of the prophetic account of it, given so many ages before it 
came to pass: Thou shalt become an astonishment , a proverb, 
and a byword , among all nations whither the Lord shall lead 
thee, j* 

The appearance of a standing miracle, in the Jews remaining 
a distinct people in their dispersion, and the confirmation which 
this event appears to give to the truth of revelation, may be 
thought to be answered, by their religion’s forbidding them inter- 
marriages with those of other nations, and prescribing them many 
peculiarities in their food, by which they are debarred from in- 
corporating with the people in whose countries they live. This 
is not, I think, a satisfactory account of that which it pretends to 
account for. But what does it pretend to account for? The 
correspondence between this event and the prophecies; or the 
coincidence of both, with a long dispensation of Providence, of a 
peculiar nature, towards that people ? No. It is only the event 
itself, which is offered to be thus accounted for: which single 
event, taken alone, abstracted from all such correspondence and 
coincidence, perhaps would not have appeared miraculous: but 
that correspondence and coincidence may be so, though the event 
* P. 270, &c. f Deut. xxviii. 37. 


CHAP. VII. 


FOR CHRISTIANITY. 


291 


itself be supposed not. Thus the concurrence of our Saviour’s 
being born at Bethlehem, with a long foregoing series of prophecy 
and other coincidences, is doubtless miraculous; the series of 
prophecy, and other coincidences, and the event, being admitted : 
though the event itself appears to have been brought about in a 
natural way; of which, however, no one can be certain. 

As several of these events seem, in some degree expressly, to 
have verified the prophetic history already, so likewise they may 
be considered further, as having a peculiar aspect towards the 
full completion of it; as affording some presumption that the 
whole of it shall, one time or other, be fulfilled. Thus, that the 
Jews have been so wonderfully preserved in their long and wide 
dispersion ; which is indeed the direct fulfilling of some prophe- 
cies, but is now mentioned only as looking forward to somewhat 
yet to come: that natural religion came forth from Judea, and 
spread, in the degree it has done over the world, before lost in 
idolatry; which, together with some other things, have distin- 
guished that very place, in like manner as the people of it are 
distinguished : that this great change of religion over the earth 
was brought about under the profession and acknowledgment, 
that Jesus was the promised Messiah: things of this kind natu- 
rally turn the thoughts of serious men towards the full completion 
of the prophetic history, concerning the final restoration of that 
people; concerning the establishment of the everlasting kingdom 
among them, the kingdom of the Messiah; and the future state 
of the world, under this sacred government. Such circumstances 
and events, compared with these prophecies, though no comple- 
tions of them, yet would not, I think, be spoken of as nothing in 
the argument, by a person upon his first being informed of them. 
They fall in with the prophetic history of things still future, give 
it some additional credibility, and have the appearance of being 
somewhat in order to the full completion of it. 

Indeed it requires a good degree of knowledge, and great 
calmness and consideration, to be able to judge thoroughly of 
the evidence for the truth of Christianity, from that part of the 
prophetic history which relates to the situation of the kingdoms 
of the world, and to the state of the church, from the establish- 
ment of Christianity to the present time. But it appears from a 
general view of it, to be very material. And those persons who 


292 


THE PARTICULAR EVIDENCE 


PART II. 


have thoroughly examined it, and some of them were men of the 
coolest tempers, greatest capacities, and least liable to imputations 
of prejudice, insist upon it as determinately conclusive. 

[Conclusion.] Suppose now a person quite ignorant of his- 
tory, first to recollect the passages above mentioned out of Scrip- 
ture, without knowing but that the whole was a late fiction, then 
to be informed of the correspondent facts now mentioned, and to 
unite them all into one view : that the profession and establish- 
ment of natural religion in the world is greatly owing, in differ- 
ent ways, to this book, and the supposed revelation which it 
contains; that it is acknowledged to be of the earliest antiquity; 
that its chronology and common history are entirely credible; 
that this ancient nation, the Jews, of whom it chiefly treats, 
appear to have been, in fact, the people of God, in a distin- 
guished sense ; that, as there was a national expectation among 
them, raised from the prophecies, of a Messiah to appear at such 
a time, so one at this time appeared claiming to be that Messiah; 
that he was rejected by this nation, but received by the Gentiles, 
not upon the evidence of prophecy, but of miracles; that the 
religion he taught supported itself under the greatest difficulties, 
gained ground, and at length became the religion of the world ; 
that in the mean time the Jewish polity was utterly destroyed, 
and the nation dispersed over the face of the earth ; that not- 
withstanding this, they have remained a distinct numerous people 
for so many centuries, even to this day; which not only appears 
to be the express completion of several prophecies concerning 
them, but also renders it, as one may speak, a visible and easy 
possibility that the promises made to them as a nation, may yet 
be fulfilled. 

To these acknowledged truths, let the person we have been 
supposing add, as I think he ought, whether every one will allow 
it or no, the obvious appearances which there are, of the state 
of the world, in other respects besides what relates to the Jews, 
and of the Christian church, having so long answered, and still 
answering to the prophetic history. Suppose, I say, these facts 
set over against the things before mentioned out of the Scrip- 
ture, and seriously compared with them; the joint view of both 
together must, I think, appear of very great weight to a con- 
siderate reasonable person : of much greater indeed, upon having 


CHAP. VII. 


FOR CHRISTIANITY. 


293 


them first laid before him, than is easy for us, who are so familiar- 
ized to them, to conceive, without some particular attention for 
that purpose. 

All these things, and the several particulars contained under 
them, require to be distinctly and most thoroughly examined 
into ; that the weight of each may be judged of, upon such exa- 
mination, and such conclusion drawn, as results from their united 
force. But this has not been attempted here. I have gone no 
further than to show, that the general imperfect view of them 
now given, the confessed historical evidence for miracles, and the 
many obvious appearing completions of prophecy, together with 
the collateral things* here mentioned, and there are several 
others of the like sort.; that all this together, which, being fact, 
must be acknowledged by unbelievers, amounts to real evidence of 
somewhat more than human in this matter : evidence much more 
important, than careless men, who have been accustomed only to 
transient and partial views of it, can imagine ; and indeed abun- 
dantly sufficient to act upon. And these things, I apprehend, 
must be acknowledged by unbelievers. For though they may 
say, that the historical evidence of miracles wrought in attesta- 
tion of Christianity, is not sufficient to convince them, that such 
miracles were really wrought : they cannot deny, that there is 
such historical evidence, it being a known matter of fact that 
there is. They may say, the conformity between the prophecies 
and events is by accident : but there are many instances in which 
such conformity itself cannot be denied. They may say, with 
regard to such kind of collateral things as those above mentioned, 
that any odd accidental events, without meaning, will have a 
meaning found in them by fanciful people : and that such as are 
fanciful in any one certain way, will make out a thousand coinci- 
dences, which seem to favor their peculiar follies. Men, I say, 
may talk thus : but no one who is serious, can possibly think 
these things to be nothing, if he considers the importance of 
collateral things, and even of lesser circumstances, in the evi- 
dence of probability, as distinguished in nature, from the evidence 
of demonstration. In many cases indeed it seems to require the 
truest judgment, to determine with exactness the weight of cir- 

#- All the particular things mentioned in this chapter, not reducible to the 
head of certain miracles, or determinate completions of prophecy. See p. 263. 

25* 


294 


THE PARTICULAR EVIDENCE 


TART II. 


cumstantial evidence : but it is very often altogether as convincing, 
as that which is the most express and direct. 

This general view of the evidence for Christianity, considered 
as making one argument, may also serve to recommend to serious 
persons, to set down every thing which they think may be of 
any real weight at all in proof of it, and particularly the many 
seeming completions of prophecy: and they will find, that, 
judging by the natural rules, by which we judge of probable 
evidence in common matters, they amount to a much higher 
degree of proof, upon such a joint review , than could be sup- 
posed upon considering them separately, at different times ; how 
strong soever the proof might before appear to them, upon such 
separate views of it. For probable proofs, by being added, not 
only increase the evidence, but multiply it. m Nor should I dis- 
suade any one from setting down, what he thought made for the 
contrary side. But then it is to be remembered, not in order to 
influence his judgment, but his practice, that a mistake on one 
side may be, in its consequences, much more dangerous, than a 
mistake on the other. And what course is most safe, and what 
most dangerous, will be thought a very material consideration, 
when we deliberate, not concerning events, but concerning con- 
duct in our temporal affairs. To be influenced by this considera- 
tion in our judgment, to believe or disbelieve upon it, is indeed 
as much prejudice, as any thing whatever. And, like other pre- 
judices, it operates contrary ways, in different men; for some are 

m [Butler states this argument with more than his usual brevity, and its 
force is not seen without reflection. “ If contrivance or accident could have 
given to Christianity any of its apparent testimonies, its miracles, its prophe- 
cies, its morals, its propagation, or [the character of] its founder, there could 
he no room to believe, or even imagine, that all these appearances of great 
credibility, could be united together, by any such means. If successful craft 
could have contrived its public miracles, or the pretence of them, it requires 
another reach of craft, to adopt its prophecies to the same object. Further, it 
required not only a different, but a totally opposite art to conceive and pro- 
mulgate its admirable morals. Again, its propagation, in defiance of the 
powers and terrors of the world, implied still other qualities of action. Lastly, 
the model of the life of its founder, is a work of such originality and wisdom, 
as could be the offspring only of consummate powers of invention, or rather 
never could have been devised, but must have come from real life. The hypo- 
thesis sinks under its incredibility. Each of these suppositions of contrivance, 
being arbitrary and unsupported, the climax of them is an extravagance.” — 
Davison, on Prophecy.] 


CHAP. VII. 


FOR CHRISTIANITY. 


295 


inclined to believe what they hope, and others what they fear. 
And it is manifest unreasonableness to apply to men’s passions 
in order to gain their assent. But in deliberations concerning 
conduct, there is nothing which reason more requires to be taken 
into the account, than the importance of it. For, suppose it 
doubtful, what would be the consequence of acting in this, or in 
the contrary manner : still, that taking one side could be attended 
with little or no bad consequence, and taking the other might be 
attended with the greatest, must appear, to unprejudiced reason, 
of the highest moment towards determining how we are to act. 
The truth of our religion, like the truth of common matters, is 
to be judged of by all the evidence taken together. And unless 
the whole series of things which may be alleged in this argu- 
ment, and every particular thing in it, can reasonably be sup- 
posed to have been by accident (for here the stress of the 
argument for Christianity lies) ; then is the truth of it proved : 
in like manner, as if in any common case, numerous events 
acknowledged, were to be alleged in proof of any other event 
disputed ; the truth of the disputed event would be proved, not 
only if any one of the acknowledged ones did of itself clearly 
imply it, but, though no one of them singly did so, if the whole 
of the acknowledged events taken together could not in reason 
be supposed to have happened, unless the disputed one were 
true. 

It is obvious, how much advantage the nature of this evidence 
gives to those persons who attack Christianity, especially in con- 
versation. For it is easy to show, in a short and lively manner, 
that such and such things are liable to objection, that this and 
another thing is of little weight in itself; but impossible to 
show, in like manner, the united force of the whole argument 
in one view. 

Lastly, as it has been made appear, that there is no presump- 
tion against a revelation as miraculous ; that the general scheme 
of Christianity, and the principal parts of it, are conformable to 
the experienced constitution of things, and the whole perfectly 
credible : so the account now given of the positive evidence for 
it, shows, that this evidence is such, as, from the nature of it, 
cannot be destroyed, though it should be lessened. 


CHAPTER VIII. 

OBJECTIONS AGAINST ARGUING FROM THE ANALOGY OF 
NATURE, TO RELIGION. 

If every one would consider, with such attention as they are 
bound, even in point of morality, to consider, what they judge 
and give characters of; the occasion of this chapter would be, in 
some good measure at least, superseded. But since this is not to 
be expected; for some we find do not concern themselves to 
understand even what they write against : since this treatise, in 
common with most others, lies open to objections, which may 
appear very material to thoughtful men at first sight ; and, be- 
sides that, seems peculiarly liable to the objections of such as can 
judge without thinking, and of such as can censure without 
judging; it may not be amiss to set down the chief of these 
objections which occur to me, and consider them to their hands. 
They are such as these : 

“That it is a poor thing to solve difficulties in revelation, by 
saying, that there are the same in natural religion ; when what 
is wanting is to clear both of them of these their common, as 
well as other their respective, difficulties; that it is a strange 
way indeed of convincing men of the obligations of religion, to 
show them, that they have as little reason for their worldly pur- 
suits : and a strange way of vindicating the justice and goodness 
of the Author of nature, and of removing the objections against 
both, to which the system of religion lies open, to show, that the 
like objections lie against natural providence; a way of answering 
objections against religion, without so much as pretending to 
make out, that the system of it, or the particular things in it 
objected against, are reasonable — especially, perhaps some may 
be inattentive enough to add, must this be thought strange, when 
it is confessed that analogy is no answer to such objections : that 
when this sort of reasoning is carried to the utmost length it can 
be imagined capable of, it will yet leave the mind in a very un- 
satisfied state ; and that it must be unaccountable ignorance of 
mankind, to imagine they will be prevailed with to forego their 
296 


chap. viii. OBJECTIONS AGAINST THE ANALOGY. 297 

present interests and pleasures, from regard to religion, upon 
doubtful evidence.” 

Now, as plausible as tbis way of talking may appear, that ap- 
pearance will be found in a great measure owing to half views, 
which show but part of an object, yet show that indistinctly, and 
to undeterminate language. By these means weak men are often 
deceived by others, and ludicrous men, by themselves. And even 
those, who are serious and considerate, cannot always readily dis- 
entangle, and at once clearly see through the perplexities, in 
which subjects themselves are involved ; and which are height- 
ened by the deficiencies and the abuse of words. To this latter 
sort of persons, the following reply to each part of this objection 
severally, may be of some assistance ; as it may also tend a little 
to stop and silence others. 

First , The thing wanted, i.e. what men require, is to have all 
difficulties cleared. And this is, or at* least for any thing we 
know to the contrary, it may be, the same as requiring to com- 
prehend the divine nature, and the whole plan of Providence 
from everlasting to everlasting ! But it hath always been allowed 
to argue from what is acknowledged, to what is disputed. And 
it is in no other sense a poor thing, to argue from natural reli- 
gion to revealed, in the manner found fault with, than it is to 
argue in numberless other ways of probable deduction and infer- 
ence, in matters of conduct, which we are continually reduced to 
the necessity of doing. Indeed the epithet poor may be applied, 
I fear as properly, to great part or the whole of human life, as it 
is to the things mentioned in the objection. Is it not a poor 
thing, for a physician to have so little knowledge in the cure of 
diseases, as even the most eminent have? To act upon con- 
jecture and guess, where the life of man is concerned? Un- 
doubtedly it is : but not in comparison of having no skill at all 
in that useful art, and being obliged to act wholly in the dark. 

Further : since it is as unreasonable, as it is common, to urge 
objections against revelation, which are of equal weight against 
natural religion ; and those who do this, if they are not confused 
themselves, deal unfairly with others, in making it seem that 
they are arguing only against revelation, or particular doctrines 
of it, when in reality they are arguing against moral providence; 
it is a thing of consequence to show, that such objections are as 


298 


OBJECTIONS AGAINST 


PART II. 


much levelled against natural religion, as against revealed. Ob- 
jections, which are equally applicable to both, are properly speaking 
answered, by its being shown that they are so, provided the 
former be admitted to be true. And without taking in the con- 
sideration how distinctly this is admitted, it is plainly very mate- 
rial to observe, that as the things objected against in natural 
religion are of the same kind with what is certain matter of expe- 
rience in the course of providence, and in the information which 
God affords us concerning our temporal interest under his govern- 
ment; so the objections against the system of Christianity, and 
the evidence of it, are of the very same kind with those which 
are made against the system and evidence of natural religion. 
However, the reader upon review may see, that most of the 
analogies insisted upon, even in the. latter part of this treatise, do 
not necessarily require to have more taken for granted than is in 
the former; [viz.] that -there is an Author of nature, or natural 
Governor of the world: and Christianity is vindicated, not from 
its analogy to natural religion, but chiefly from its analogy to the 
experienced constitution of nature. 

Secondly , Religion is a practical thing, and consists in such a 
determinate course of life, as what, there is reason to think, is 
commanded by the Author of nature, and will, upon the whole, 
he our happiness under his government. If men can be con- 
vinced, that they have the like reason to believe this, as to be- 
lieve that taking care of their temporal affairs will be to their 
advantage; such conviction cannot but be an argument to them 
for the practice of religion. And if there be really any reason 
for believing one of these, and endeavoring to preserve life, and 
secure ourselves the necessaries and conveniences of it; then 
there is reason also for believing the other, and endeavoring to 
secure the interest it proposes to us. And if the interest, which 
religion proposes to us, he infinitely greater than our whole tem- 
poral interest; then there must be proportionably greater reason 
for endeavoring to secure one, than the other; since, by the sup- 
position, the probability of our securing one is equal to the proba- 
bility of our securing the other. This seems plainly unanswerable ; 
and has a tendency to influence fair minds, who consider what 
our condition really is, or upon what evidence we are naturally 
appointed to act; and who are disposed to acquiesce in the terms 


CHAP. VIII. 


THE ANALOGICAL ARGUMENT. 


299 


upon which we live, and attend t6 and follow that practical in- 
struction, whatever it be, which is afforded us. 

But the chief and proper force of the argument referred to in 
the objection, lies in another place. The proof of religion, it is 
said, is involved in such inextricable difficulties, as to render it 
doubtful ; and that it cannot be supposed that if it were true, it 
would be left upon doubtful evidence. Here then, over and 
above the force of each particular difficulty or objection, these 
difficulties and objections taken together are turned into a posi- 
tive argument against the truth of religion; which argument 
would stand thus. If religion were true, it would not be left 
doubtful, and open to objections to the degree in which it is : 
therefore that it is thus left, not only renders the evidence of it 
weak, and lessens its force, in proportion to the weight of such 
objections, but also shows it to be false, or is a general presump- 
tion of its being so. Now the observation, that from the natural 
constitution and course of things, we must in our temporal con- 
cerns, almost continually, and even in matters of great conse- 
quence, act upon evidence of a like kind and degree to the evidence 
of religion, is an answer to this argument. Because it shows, 
that it is according to the conduct and character of the Author 
of nature to appoint we should act upon evidence like to that, 
which this argument presumes he cannot be supposed to appoint 
we should act upon : it is an instance, a general one, made up of 
numerous particular ones, of somewhat in his dealing with us, 
similar to what is said to be incredible. As the force of this 
answer lies merely in the parallel, which there is between the 
evidence for religion and for our temporal conduct; the answer 
is equally just and conclusive, whether the parallel be made out, 
by showing the evidence of the former to be higher, or the evi- 
dence of the latter to be lower. 

Thirdly , The design of this treatise is not to vindicate the 
character of God, but to show the obligations of men : it is not to 
justify his providence, but to show what belongs to us to do. 
These are two subjects, and ought not to be confounded. Though 
they may at length run up into each other, yet observations may 
immediately tend to make out the latter, which do not appear, by 
any immediate connection, to the purpose of the former; which 
is less our concern, than many seem to think. For, first, 


300 


OBJECTIONS AGAINST 


PART II. 


It is not necessary we should justify the dispensations of Provi- 
dence against objections, any farther than to show, that the things 
objected against may, for aught we know, be consistent with jus- 
tice and goodness. Suppose then, that there are things in the 
system of this world, and plan of Providence relating to it, which 
taken alone would be unjust: yet it has been shown unanswer- 
ably, that if we could take in the reference, which these things 
may have to other things, present past and to come; to the 
whole scheme, which the things objected against are parts of; 
these very things might, for aught we know, be found to be, not 
only consistent with justice, but instances of it. Indeed it has 
been shown, by the analogy of what we see, not only possible that 
this may be the case, but credible that it is. And thus objec- 
tions, drawn from such things, are answered, and Providence is 
vindicated, as far as religion makes its vindication necessary. 

Hence it appears, Secondly, that objections against the Divine 
justice and goodness are not endeavored to be removed , by show- 
ing that the like objections, allowed to be really conclusive, lie 
against natural providence: but those objections being supposed 
and shown not to be conclusive , the things objected against, con- 
sidered as matters of fact, are farther shown to be credible, from 
their conformity to the constitution of nature; for instance, that 
God will reward and punish men for their actions hereafter, from 
the observation, that he does reward and punish them for their 
actions here. x\nd this, I apprehend, is of weight. 

Thirdly, it would be of weight, even though those objections 
were not answered. For, there being the proof of religion above 
set down; and religion implying several facts; for instance again, 
the fact last mentioned, that God will reward and punish men for 
their actions hereafter; the observation, that his present method 
of government is by rewards and punishments, shows that future 
fact not to be incredible : whatever objections men may think 
they have against it, as unjust or unmerciful, according to their 
notions of justice and mercy; or as improbable from their belief 
of necessity. I say, as improbable: for it is evident no objec- 
tion against it, as unjust , can be urged from necessity; since this 
notion as much destroys injustice, as it does justice. 

Fourthly, Though objections against the reasonableness of the 
system of religion cannot indeed be answered without entering 


CHAP. VIII. 


THE ANALOGICAL ARGUMENT. 


301 


into consideration of its reasonableness; yet objections against 
the credibility or truth of it may. Because the system of it is 
reducible into what is properly matter of fact: and the truth, the 
probable truth of facts, may be shown without consideration of 
their reasonableness. Nor is it necessary, though, in some cases 
and respects, it is highly useful and proper, yet it is not neces- 
sary, to give a proof of the reasonableness of every precept en- 
joined us, and of every particular dispensation of Providence, 
which comes into the system of religion. Indeed the more 
thoroughly a person of a right disposition is convinced of the 
perfection of the Divine nature and conduct, the farther he 
will advance towards that perfection of religion, which John* 
speaks of. a But the general obligations of religion are fully 
made out, by proving the reasonableness of the practice of it. 
And that the practice of religion is reasonable, may be shown, 
though no more could be proved, than that the system of it may 
be so, for aught we know to the contrary: and even without 
entering into the distinct consideration of this. 

Fifthly, It is easy to see, that though the analogy of nature is 
not an immediate answer to objections against the wisdom, the 
justice, or goodness, of any doctrine or precept of religion ; yet 
it may be, as it is, an immediate and direct answer to what is 
really intended by such objections; which is, to show that the 
things objected against are incredible. 

Fourthly , It is most readily acknowledged, that the foregoing 
treatise is by no means satisfactory; very far indeed from it: but 
so would any natural institution of life appear, if reduced into a 
system, together with its evidence. Leaving religion out of the 
case, men are divided in their opinions, whether our pleasures 
overbalance our pains : and whether it be, or be not, eligible to 
live in this world. b And were all such controversies settled, 
which perhaps, in speculation, would be found involved in great 

* 1 John iv. 18. — [“There is no fear in love,” Ac.] 

a [Obedience from dread, if it continue to be the only motive, precludes ad- 
vance toward perfection; for “He that feareth is not made perfect in love.” 
But obedience from a discernment of the reasonableness and beneficence of 
religion, and of the perfections of its Author, increases love till it “ casteth out 
fear.”] 

b [See a discussion of this subject, in Baylf/s Historical and Biographical 
Dictionary : art. Xenophanes : notes D, E, F, G.] 

26 


302 


OBJECTIONS AGAINST 


PART ir. 


difficulties; and were it determined upon the evidence of reason, 
as nature has determined it to our hands, that life is to be pre- 
served : still, the rules which God has been pleased to afford us, 
for escaping the miseries of it, and obtaining its satisfactions, the 
rules, for instance, of preserving health, and recovering it when 
lost, are not only fallible and precarious, but very far from being 
exact. Nor are we informed by nature, as to future contingen- 
cies and accidents, so as to render it at all certain, what is the 
best method of managing our affairs. What will be the success 
of our temporal pursuits, in the common sense of the word suc- 
cess, is highly doubtful. And what will be the success of them 
in the proper sense of the word; i.e. what happiness or enjoy- 
ment we shall obtain by them, is doubtful in a much higherv 
degree. Indeed the unsatisfactory nature of the evidence, with 
which we are obliged to take up, in the daily course of life, is 
scarce to be expressed. Yet men do not throw away life, or dis- 
regard the interests of it, upon account of this doubtfulness. 
The evidence of religion then being admitted real, those who 
object against it, as not satisfactory, i.e. as not being what they 
wish it, plainly forget the very condition of our being : for 
satisfaction, in this sense, does not belong to such a creature 
as man. 

And, what is more material, they forget also the very nature 
of religion. For, religion presupposes, in all those who will 
embrace it, a certain degree of integrity and honesty; which it 
was intended to try whether men have or not, and to exercise in 
such as have it, in order to its improvement. Eeligion presup- 
poses this as much, and in the same sense, as speaking to a man 
presupposes he understands the language in which you speak ; or 
as warning a man of any danger presupposes that he hath such 
a regard to himself, as that he will endeavor to avoid it. There- 
fore the question is not at all, Whether the evidence of religion 
be satisfactory; but Whether it be, in reason, sufficient to prove 
and discipline that virtue, which it presupposes. Now the evi- 
dence of it is fully sufficient for all those purposes of probation ; 
how far soever it is from being satisfactory, as to the purposes of 
curiosity , or any other: and indeed it answers the purposes of 
the former in several respects, which it would not do, if it were 
as overpowering as is required. Besides, w r hether the motives or 


chap. viii. THE ANALOGICAL ARGUMENT. 303 

the evidence for any course of action he satisfactory, meaning 
here, by that word, what satisfies a man that such a course of 
action will in event be for his good ; this need never be, and I 
think, strictly speaking, never is, the practical question in com- 
mon matters. The practical question in all cases is, Whether 
the evidence for a course of action be such as, taking in all cir- 
cumstances, makes the faculty within us, which is the guide and 
judge of conduct,* determine that course of action to be pru- 
dent. Indeed, satisfaction that it will be for our interest or 
happiness, abundantly determines an action to be prudent : but 
evidence almost infinitely lower than this, determines actions to 
be so too ; even in the conduct of every day. 

Fifthly , As to the objection concerning the influence which 
this argument, or any part of it, may, or may not be expected to 
have upon men ; I observe, as above, that religion being intended 
for a trial® and exercise of the morality of every person’s cha- 
racter, who is a subject of it; and there being, as I have shown, 
such evidence for it, as is sufficient, in reason, to influence men 
to embrace it : to object, that it is not to be imagined mankind 
will be influenced by such evidence, is nothing to the purpose of 
the foregoing treatise. For the purpose of it is not to inquire, 
what sort of creatures mankind are ; but what the light and 
knowledge, which is afforded them, requires they should be : to 
show how, in reason, they ought to behave; not how, in fact, 
they will behave. This depends upon themselves, and is their 
own concern ; the personal concern of each man in particular. 
How little regard the generality have to it, experience indeed 
does too fully show. But religion, considered as a probation, 
has had its end upon all persons, to whom it has been proposed 
with evidence sufficient in reason to influence their practice : for 
by this means they have been put into a state of probation ; let 

* See Dissertation II. 

c [IUs remarked by Dean Fitzgerald, that “ It is not inconceivable that 
the Almighty should apply such a test of men's candor and fidelity, as should 
require them first to act upon a thing as true, before they were so fully satis- 
fied of its truth as to leave no doubt remaining. Such a course of action 
might be the appointed, and for all we know, the only possible way of over- 
coming habits of thought and feeling, repugnant to the belief demanded, so 
that a fixed religious faith might be the reward, as it were, of a sincere course 
of prudent behavior.”] 


304 


OBJECTIONS AGAINST 


PART II. 


them behave as they will in it. Thus, not only revelation, but 
reason also, teaches us, that by the evidence of religion being 
laid before men, the designs of Providence are carrying on, not 
only with regard to those who will be influenced by it, but like- 
wise with regard to those who will not. Lastly, the objection here 
referred to, allows the thing insisted upon in this treatise to be 
of some weight ; and if so, it may be hoped it will have some 
influence. And if there be a probability that it will have any at 
all, there is the same reason in kind, though not in degree, to lay 
it before men, as there would be, if it were likely to have a greater 
influence. 

Further, I desire it may be considered, with respect to the 
whole of the foregoing objections, that in this treatise I have 
argued upon the principles of others,* not my own : and have 
omitted what I think true, and of the utmost importance, because 
by others thought unintelligible, or not true. Thus I have argued 
upon the principles of the fatalists, which I do not believe : and 
have omitted a thing of the utmost importance which I do be- 
lieve, — [viz.] the moral fitness and unfitness of actions, prior 
to all will whatever; which as certainly determine the divine 
conduct , as speculative truth and falsehood necessarily determine 
the divine judgment. Indeed the principle of liberty, and that 
of moral fitness, so force themselves upon the mind, that moral- 
ists, ancient as well as modern, have formed their language upon 
it. And probably it may appear in mine, though I have endea- 
vored to avoid it ; and, in order to avoid it, have sometimes been 
obliged to express myself in a manner, which will appear strange 
to such as do not observe the reason for it. But the general 
argument here pursued, does not at all suppose, or proceed upon 
these principles. 

Now, these two abstract principles of liberty and moral fitness 
being omitted, religion can be considered in no other view, than 
merely as a question of fact : and in this view it is here con- 
sidered. It is obvious, that Christianity, and the proof of it, 
are both historical. Even natural religion is, properly, a matter 

* By arguing upon the principles of others, the reader will observe is meant, 
not proving any thing from those principles, but notwithstanding them. Thus 
religion is proved, not from the opinion of necessity; which is absurd : but, 
notwithstanding or even though that opinion were admitted to be true. 


CHAP. VTII. 


THE ANALOGICAL. ARGUMENT. 


305 


of fact. For, that there is a righteous Governor of the world, is 
so : and this proposition contains the general system of natural 
religiop. But then, several abstract truths, and in particular 
those two principles, are usually taken into consideration in the 
proof of it : whereas it is here treated of only as a matter of 
fact. To explain this ; That the three angles of a triangle are 
equal to two right ones, is an abstract truth ; hut that they ap- 
pear so to our mind, is only a matter of fact. This last must 
have been admitted, if any thing was, by those ancient sceptics, 
who would not admit the former : but pretended to doubt, 
whether there were any such thing as truth, or whether we 
could certainly depend upon our faculties of understanding for 
the knowledge of it in any case. 

The assertion that there is, in the nature of things, an original 
standard of right and wrong in actions, independent upon all 
will, but which unalterably determines the will of God, to exer- 
cise that moral government over the world, which religion teaches, 
(i.e. finally and upon the whole to reward and punish men re- 
spectively as they act right or wrong;) contains an abstract truth, 
as well as matter of fact. But suppose that in the present state, 
every man without exception, was rewarded and punished, in 
exact proportion as he followed or transgressed that sense of 
right and wrong, which God has implanted in his nature : this 
would not be at all an abstract truth, but only a matter of fact. 
And though this fact were acknowledged by every one, yet the 
same difficulties might be raised as now are, concerning the ab- 
stract questions of liberty and moral fitness. And we should 
have a proof, even the certain one of experience, that the govern- 
ment of the world was perfectly moral, without taking in the con- 
sideration of those questions : and this proof would remain, in 
what way soever they were determined. 

Thus, God having given mankind a moral faculty, the object 
of which is actions, and which naturally approves some actions 
as right, and of good desert, and condemns others as wrong, and 
of ill desert ; that he will, finally and upon the whole, reward the 
former and punish the latter, is not an assertion of an abstract 
truth, but of what is as mere a fact, as his doing so at present 
would be. This future fact I have not, indeed, proved with the 
force with which it might be proved, from the principles of liberty 
U 26* 


306 


CONCLUSION. 


PART II. 


and moral fitness; but without them have given a really conclu- 
sive practical proof of it, which is greatly strengthened by the 
general analogy of nature; a proof easily cavilled at, easily shown 
not to be demonstrative, (and it is not offered as such;) but im- 
possible, I think, to be evaded, or answered. Thus the obliga- 
tions of religion are made out, exclusive of the questions con- 
cerning liberty and moral fitness; which have been perplexed 
with difficulties and abstruse reasonings, as every thing may. 

Hence therefore may be observed distinctly, what is the force 
of this treatise. It will be, to such as are convinced of religion 
upon the proof arising out of the two last mentioned principles, 
an additional proof and confirmation of it: to such as do not 
admit those principles, an original proof of it,* and a confirma- 
tion of that proof. Those who believe, will here find the scheme 
of Christianity cleared of objections, and the evidence of it in a 
peculiar manner strengthened. Those who do not believe will at 
least be shown the absurdity of all attempts to prove Christianity 
false, the plain undoubted credibility of it; and, I hope, a good 
deal more. 

Thus, though some perhaps may seriously think, that analogy, 
as here urged, has too great stress laid upon it; and ridicule, un- 
answerable ridicule, may be applied, to show the argument from 
it in a disadvantageous light; yet there can be no question, but 
that it is a real one. For religion, both natural and revealed, 
implying in it numerous facts; analogy, being a confirmation of 
all facts to which it can be applied, and the only proof of most, 
cannot but be admitted by every one to be a material thing, and 
truly of weight on the side of religion, both natural and revealed. 
And it ought to be particularly regarded by such as profess to 
follow nature, and to be less satisfied with abstract reasonings. 


CONCLUSION. 

Whatever account may be given of the strange inattention 
and disregard, in some ages and countries, to a matter of such 
importance as religion ; it would, before experience, be incredible, 
that there should be the like disregard in those, who have had 
• P. 141, &c. 


PART II. 


CONCLUSION. 


307 


the moral system of the world laid before them, as it is by Chris- 
tianity, and often inculcated upon them: because this moral 
system carries in it a good degree of evidence for its truth, upon 
its being barely proposed to our thoughts. There is no need of 
abstruse reasonings and distinctions, to convince an unprejudiced 
understanding, that there is a God who made and governs the 
world, and will judge it in righteousness; though they may be 
necessary to answer abstruse difficulties, when once such are 
raised : when the very meaning of those words, which express 
most intelligibly the general doctrine of religion, is pretended to 
be uncertain; and the clear truth of the thing itself is obscured 
by the intricacies of speculation. To an unprejudiced mind, ten 
thousand thousand instances of design cannot but prove a de- 
signer. And it is intuitively manifest, that creatures ought to 
live under a dutiful sense of their Maker; and that justice and 
charity must be his laws, to creatures whom he has made social, 
and placed in society. 

The truth of revealed religion, peculiarly so called, is not in- 
deed self-evident, but requires external proof, in order to its 
being received. Yet inattention, among us, to revealed religion, 
will be found to imply the same dissolute immoral temper of 
mind, as inattention to natural religion: because, when both are 
laid before us, in the manner they are in Christian countries of 
liberty, our obligations to inquire into both, and to embrace both 
upon supposition of their truth, are obligations of the same nature. 
Revelation claims to be the voice of God : and our obligation to 
attend to his voice is surely moral, in all cases. And as it is in- 
sisted, that its evidence is conclusive, upon thorough considera- 
tion of it; so it offers itself with obvious appearances of having 
something more than human in it, and therefore in all reason 
requires to have its claims most seriously examined into. 

It, is to be added, that though light and knowledge, in what 
manner soever afforded, is equally from God; yet a miraculous 
revelation has a peculiar tendency, from the first principles of 
our nature, to awaken mankind, and inspire them with reverence 
and awe. And this is a peculiar obligation, to attend to what 
claims to be so, with such appearances of truth. It is therefore 
most certain, that our obligations to inquire seriously into the 
evidence of Christianity, and, upon supposition of its truth, to 


3C8 


CONCLUSION. 


PART II. 


embrace it, are of the utmost importance, and moral in the highest 
and most proper sense. Let us then suppose, that the evidence 
of religion in general, and of Christianity, has been seriously in- 
quired into, by all reasonable men among us. Yet we find many 
professedly to reject both, upon speculative principles of infi- 
delity. All of them do not content themselves with a bare neg- 
lect of religion, and enjoying their imaginary freedom from its 
restraints. Some go much beyond this. They deride God’s 
moral government over the world. They renounce his protection, 
and defy his justice. They ridicule and vilify Christianity, and 
blaspheme the author of it; and take all occasions to manifest 
scorn and contempt of revelation. This amounts to an active 
setting themselves against religion; to what may be considered 
as a positive principle of irreligion, which they cultivate within 
themselves; and, whether they intend this effect or not, render 
habitual, as a good man does the contrary principle. Others, 
who are not chargeable with all this profligateness, yet are in 
avowed opposition to religion, as if discovered to be groundless. 

Now admitting, which is the supposition we go upon, that 
these persons act upon what they think principles of reason, (and 
otherwise they are not to be argued with,) it is really inconceiv- 
able, that they should imagine they clearly see the whole evidence 
of it, considered in itself, to be nothing at all : nor do they pre- 
tend this. They are far indeed from having a just notion of its 
evidence : but they would not say its evidence was nothing, if 
they thought the system of it, with all its circumstances, were 
credible, like other matters of science or history. Their manner 
of treating it must proceed, either from such kind of objections 
against all religion, as have been answered or obviated in the 
former part of this treatise; or else from objections, and diffi- 
culties, supposed more peculiar to Christianity. Thus, they 
entertain prejudices against the whole notion of a revelation, and 
miraculous interpositions. They find things in Scripture, whether 
in incidental passages, or in the general scheme of it, which 
appear* to them unreasonable. They take for granted, that if 
Christianity were true, the light of it must have been more 
general, and the evidence of it more satisfactory, or rather over- 
powering : that it must and would have been, in some way, other- 
wise put and left, than it is. Now this is not imagining they 


PART II. 


CONCLUSION. 


309 


see the evidence itself to be nothing, or inconsiderable; but quite 
another thing. It is being fortified against the evidence, in 
some degree acknowledged, by thinking they see the system of 
Christianity, or something which appears to them necessarily con- 
nected with it, to be incredible or false; fortified against that 
evidence, which might otherwise make great impression upon 
them. Or, lastly, if any of these persons are, upon the whole, in 
doubt concerning the truth of Christianity; their behavior seems 
owing to their taking for granted, through strange inattention, 
that such doubting is, in a manner, the same thing as being 
certain against it. 

To these persons, and to this state of opinion concerning reli- 
gion, the foregoing treatise is adapted. For, all the general 
objections against the moral system of nature having been ob- 
viated, it is shown, that there is not any peculiar presumption at 
all against Christianity, considered either as not discoverable by 
reason, or as unlike to what is so discovered; nor any, worth 
mentioning, against it as miraculous, if any at all; none, cer- 
tainly, which can render it in the least incredible. It is shown, 
that, upon supposition of a divine revelation, the analogy of 
nature renders it beforehand highly credible, I think probable, 
that many things in it must appear liable to great objections; 
and that we must be incompetent judges of it, to a great degree. 
This observation is, I think, unquestionably true, and of the very 
utmost importance. But it is urged, as I hope it will be under- 
stood, with great caution not to vilify the faculty of reason, 
which is the candle of the Lord, within us ;* though it can afford 
no light, where it does not shine; nor judge, where it has no 
principles to judge upon. The objections here spoken of, being 
first answered in the view of objections against Christianity as a 
matter of fact, are in the next place considered as urged more 
immediately against the wisdom, justice, and goodness of the 
Christian dispensation. And it is fully made out, that they 
admit of exactly the like answer, in every respect, to what the 
like objections against the constitution of nature admit of: that, 
as partial views give the appearance of wrong to things, which, 
upon further consideration and knowledge of their relations to 
other things, are found just and good; so it is perfectly credible, 
* Prov. xx. 27. 


310 


CONCLUSION. 


PART II. 


that the things objected against the wisdom and goodness of the 
Christian dispensation, may be rendered instances of wisdom 
and goodness, by their reference to other things beyond our 
view. Because Christianity is a scheme as much above our 
comprehension, as that of nature; and like that, a scheme in 
which means are made use of to accomplish ends, and which, 
as is most credible, may be carried on by general laws. And 
it ought to be attended to, that this is not an answer taken 
merely or chiefly from our ignorance : but from something posi- 
tive, which our observation shows us. For, to like objections, 
the like answer is experienced to be just, in numberless parallel 
cases. 

The objections against the Christian dispensation, and the 
method by which it is carried on, having been thus obviated, in 
general, and together; the chief of them are considered dis- 
tinctly, and the particular things objected to are shown credible, 
by their perfect analogy, each apart, to the constitution of nature. 
Thus, if man be fallen from his primitive state, and to be re- 
stored, and infinite wisdom and power engages in accomplishing 
our recovery: it were to have been expected, it is said, that this 
should have been effected at once ; and not by such a long series 
of means, and such a various economy of persons and things; 
one dispensation preparatory to another, this to a further one, 
and so on through an indefinite number of ages, before the end 
of the scheme proposed can be completely accomplished; a 
scheme conducted by infinite wisdom, and executed by almighty 
power. But now, on the contrary, our finding that every thing 
in the constitution and course of nature is thus carried on, shows 
such expectations concerning revelation to be highly unreason- 
able; and is a satisfactory answer to them, when urged as objec- 
tions against the credibility, that the great scheme of Providence 
in the redemption of the world may be of this kind, and to be 
accomplished in this manner. 

As to the particular method of our redemption, the appoint- 
ment of a Mediator between God and man : this has been shown 
to be most obviously analogous to the general conduct of nature, 
i.e. the God of nature, in appointing others to be the instru- 
ments of his mercy, as we experience in the daily course of Pro- 
vidence. The condition of this world, which the doctrine of our 


PART II. 


CONCLUSION. 


311 


redemption by Christ presupposes, so much falls in with natural 
appearances, that heathen moralists inferred it from those appear- 
ances : inferred that human nature was fallen from its original 
rectitude, and in consequence of this, degraded from its primi- 
tive happiness. However this opinion came into the world, these 
appearances kept up the tradition, and confirmed the belief of it. 
And as it was the general opinion under the light of nature, that 
repentance and reformation, alone and by itself, was not sufficient 
to do away sin, and procure a full remission of the penalties an- 
nexed to it ; and as the reason of the thing does not at all lead 
to any such conclusion ; so every day’s experience shows us, that 
reformation is not, in any sort, sufficient to prevent the present dis- 
advantages and miseries, which, in the natural course of things, 
God has annexed to folly and extravagance. 

Yet there may be ground to think, that the punishments, 
which, by the general laws of divine government, are annexed 
to vice, may be prevented : that provision may have been, even 
originally, made, that they should be prevented by some means 
or other, though they could not by reformation alone. For we 
have daily instances of such mere?/, in the general conduct of 
nature : compassion provided for misery,* medicines for diseases, 
friends against enemies. There is provision made, in the original 
constitution of the world, that much of the natural bad conse- 
quences of our follies, which persons themselves alone cannot 
prevent, may be prevented by the assistance of others ; assistance 
which nature enables, and disposes, and appoints them to afford. 
By a method of goodness analogous to this, when the world lay 
in wickedness, and consequently in ruin, God so loved the world , 
that he gave his only -begotten Son to save it : and he being made 
perfect by suffering , became the author of eternal salvation to all 
them that obey him. f Indeed neither reason nor analogy would 
lead us to think, in particular, that the interposition of Christ, in 
the manner in which he did interpose, would be of that efficacy 
for recovery of the world, which the Scripture teaches us it was. 
But neither would reason nor analogy lead us to think, that other 
particular means would be of the efficacy, which experience shows 
they are, in numberless instances. Therefore, as the case before 
us does not admit of experience ; so, that neither reason nor 
* Serm. at the Rolh, p. 106. t John " 5 - 16 : IIeb - v - 


312 


CONCLUSION. 


PART II. 


analogy can show how, or in what particular way, the interposi- 
tion of Christ, as revealed in Scripture, is of that efficacy, which 
it is there represented to be ; this is no kind nor degree of pre- 
sumption against its being really of that efficacy. 

Further: the objections against Christianity, from the light of 
it not being universal, nor its evidence so strong as might possi- 
bly be given, have been answered by the general analogy of 
nature. That God has made such variety of creatures, is indeed 
an answer to the former : but that he dispenses his gifts in such 
variety, both of degrees and kinds, among creatures of the same 
species, and even to the same individuals at different times ; is a 
more obvious and full answer to it. And it is so far from being 
the method of Providence in other cases, to afford us such over- 
bearing evidence, as some require in proof of Christianity; that 
on the contrary, the evidence upon which we are naturally ap- 
pointed to act in common matters, throughout a very great part 
of life, is doubtful in a high degree. And admitting the fact, 
that God has afforded to some no more than doubtful evidence of 
religion; the same account may be given of it, as of difficulties 
and temptations with regard to practice. But as it is not im- 
possible,* surely, that this alleged doubtfulness may be men’s 
own fault ; it deserves their most serious consideration, whether 
it be not so. However, it is certain, that doubting implies a 
degree of evidence for that of which we doubt : and that this 
degree of evidence as really lays us under obligations as demon- 
strative evidence. 

The whole of religion then is throughout credible : nor is 
there, I think, any thing, relating to the revealed dispensation 
of things, more different from the experienced constitution and 
course of nature, than some parts of the constitution of nature 
are from other parts of it. If so, the only question which re- 
mains is, What positive evidence can be alleged for the truth of 
Christianity? This too in general has been considered, and the 
objections against it estimated. Deduct, therefore, what is to 
be deducted from that evidence, upon account of any weight 
which may be thought to remain in these objections, after what 
the analogy of nature has suggested in answer to them : and 
then consider, what are the practical consequences from all this, 
* P. 258, Ac. 


PAHT IT. 


CONCLUSION. 


313 


upon the most sceptical principles one can argue upon (for I am 
writing to persons who entertain these principles): and upon 
such consideration it will be obvious, that immorality, as little 
excuse as it admits of in itself, is greatly aggravated, in persons 
who have been made acquainted with Chriatianity, whether they 
believe it or not : because the moral system of nature, or natural 
religion, which Christianity lays before us, approves itself, almost 
intuitively, to a reasonable mind, upon seeing it proposed. 

In the next place, with regard to Christianity, it will be ob- 
served that there is a middle between a full satisfaction of the 
truth of it, and a satisfaction of the contrary. The middle state 
of mind between these two consists in a serious apprehension, 
that it may be true, joined with doubt whether it is so. And this, 
upon the best judgment I am able to make, is as far towards 
speculative infidelity, as any sceptic can at all be supposed to go, 
who has had true Christianity, with the proper evidences of it, 
laid before him, and has in any tolerable measure considered them. 
For I would not be mistaken to comprehend all who have ever 
heard of it; because it seems evident, that in many countries 
called Christian, neither Christianity nor its evidence, is fairly 
laid before men. And in places where both are, there appear 
to be some who have very little attended to either, and who reject 
Christianity with a scorn proportionate to their inattention ; and 
yet are by no means without understanding in other matters. 
Now it has been shown, that a serious apprehension that Chris- 
tianity may be true, lays persons under the strictest obligations 
of a serious regard to it, throughout the whole of their life ; a 
regard not the same exactly, but in many respects nearly the same 
with what a full conviction of its truth would lay them under. 

Lastly, it will appear, that blasphemy and profaneness, with 
regard to Christianity, are absolutely without excuse. There is 
no temptation to it, but from the wantonness of vanity or mirth; 
and these, considering the infinite importance of the subject, are 
no such temptations as to afford any excuse for it. If this be a 
just account of things, and yet men can go on to vilify or dis- 
regard Christianity, which is to talk and act as if they had a 
demonstration of its falsehood, there is no reason to think they 
would alter their behavior to any purpose, though there were a 
demonstration of its truth. 


27 
























* 












DISSERTATIONS. 


OF PERSONAL IDENTITY. 
OF THE NATURE OF VIRTUE. 




In the first copy of tnese papers, I had inserted the 
two following dissertations into the chapters, on a Future 
Life , and on the Moral G-overnmcnt of G-od ; with which 
they are closely connected. But as these do not directly 
fall under the title of the foregoing treatise, and would 
have kept the subject of it too long out of sight, it seems 
more proper to place them by themselves. 


DISSERTATION I. 


Dmmtal gtotrfg. 


W hether we are to live in a future state, as it is the most 
important question which can possibly be asked, so it is the most 
intelligible one which can be expressed in language. Yet strange 
perplexities have been raised about the meaning of that identity 
or sameness of person, which is implied in the notion of our 
living now and hereafter, or in any two successive moments. 
And the solution of these difficulties hath been stranger than the 
difficulties themselves. For, personal identity has been explained 
so by some, as to render the inquiry concerning a future life of no 
consequence at all to us the persons who are making it. And 
though few men can be misled by such subtleties; yet it may be 
proper to consider them a little. 

When it is asked wherein personal identity consists, the answer 
should be the same, as if it were asked wherein consists simili- 
tude, or equality; that all attempts to define would but perplex 
it. Yet there is no difficulty at all in ascertaining the idea. For 
as, upon two triangles being compared or viewed together, there 
arises to the mind the idea of similitude ; or upon twice two and 
four, the idea of equality: so likewise, upon comparing the 
consciousness of one’s self, or one’s own existence, in any two 
moments, there as immediately arises to the mind the idea of 
personal identity. And as the two former comparisons not only 
give us the ideas of similitude and equality; but also show us 
that two triangles are alike, and twice two and four are equal : so 
the latter comparison not only gives us the idea of personal 
identity, but also shows us the identity of ourselves in those two 
moments ; the present, suppose, and that immediately past ; or 
the present, and that a month, a year, or twenty years past. In 

27 * 317 


818 


PERSONAL IDENTITY. 


other words, by reflecting upon that which is myself now, and 
that which was myself twenty years ago, I discern they are not 
two, but one and the same self. 

But though consciousness of what is past does thus ascertain 
our personal identity to ourselves, yet to say, that it makes per- 
sonal identity, or is necessary to our being the same persons, is to 
say, that a person ha3 not existed a single moment, nor done one 
action, but what he can remember; indeed none but what he 
reflects upon. And one should really think it self-evident, that 
consciousness of personal identity presupposes, and therefore 
cannot constitute, personal identity; any more than knowledge, 
in any other case, can constitute truth, which it presupposes. 

This wonderful mistake may possibly have arisen from hence; 
that to he endued with consciousness is inseparable from the idea 
of a person, or intelligent being. For, this might be expressed 
inaccurately thus, that consciousness makes personality: and 
from hence it might be concluded to make personal identity. 
But though present consciousness of what we at present do and 
feel is necessary to our being the persons we now are ; yet pre- 
sent consciousness of past actions or feelings is not necessary to 
our being the same persons who performed those actions, or once 
had those feelings. 

The inquiry, what makes vegetables the same, in the common 
acceptation of the word, does not appear to have any relation to 
this of personal identity : because, the word same , when applied 
to them and to a person, is not only applied to different subjects, 
but it is also used in different senses. For when a man swears 
to the same tree, as having stood fifty years in the same place, he 
means only the same as to all the purposes of property, and uses 
of common life; and not that the tree has been all that time the 
same, in the strict philosophical sense of the word. For he does 
not know, whether any one particle of the present tree be the 
same with any one particle of the tree which stood in the same 
place fifty years ago. And if they have not one common particle 
of matter, they cannot be the same tree in the proper philosophic 
sense of the word same: it being evidently a contradiction in 
terms, to say they are, when no part of their substance, and no 
one of their properties is the same : no part of their substance, 
by the supposition ; uo one of their properties, because it is 


PERSONAL IDENTITY. 


319 


allowed, that the same property cannot be transferred from one 
substance to another. Therefore w r hen we say the identity or 
sameness of a plant consists in a continuation of the same life, 
communicated under the same organization, to a number of par- 
ticles of matter, whether the same or not; the word same , when 
applied to life and to organization, cannot possibly be understood 
to signify, what it signifies in this very sentence, when applied to 
matter. In a loose and popular sense then, the life and the organ- 
ization and the plant are justly said to be the same, notwith- 
standing the perpetual change of the parts. But in strict and 
philosophical language, no man, no being, no mode of being, no 
any thing, can be the same with that, with which it has indeed 
nothing the same. Now sameness is used in this latter sense, 
when applied to persons. The identity of these, therefore, can- 
not subsist with diversity of substance. 

The thing here considered, and as I think, demonstratively 
determined, is proposed by Mr. Locke in these words, Whether 
it, i.e. the same self or person, he the same identical substance? 
And he has suggested what is a much better answer to the ques- 
tion, than that which he gives it in form. For he defines person, 
a thinking intelligent being, &c., and personal identity, the same- 
ness of a rational being .* The question then is, whether the 
same rational beins: is the same substance : which needs no an- 

o 

swer, because being and substance, in this place, stand for the 
same idea. The ground of the doubt, whether the same person 
be the same substance, is said to be this; that the consciousness 
of our own existence, in youth and in old age, or in any two 
joint successive moments, is not the same individual action ,j* 
i.e. not the same consciousness, but different successive conscious- 
nesses. Now it is strange that this should have occasioned such 
perplexities. For it is surely conceivable, that a person may 
have a capacity of knowing some object or other to be the same 
now, which it was when he contemplated it formerly: yet in this 
case, where, by the supposition, the object is perceived to be the 
same, the perception of it in any two moments cannot be one and 
the same perception. And thus, though the successive conscious- 
nesses, which we have of our own existence, are not the same, 
yet are they consciousnesses of one and the same thing or object; 

#- Locke’s Works, vol. i. p. 146. f Locke, pp. 146, 147. 


320 


PERSONAL IDENTITY. 


of the same person, self, or living agent. The person, of whose 
existence the consciousness is felt now, and was felt an hour or a 
year ago, is discerned to be, not two persons, but one and the 
same person; and therefore is one and the same. 

Mr. Locke’s observations upon this subject appear hasty: and 
he seems to profess himself dissatisfied with suppositions, which 
he has made relating to it.* But some of those hasty observa- 
tions have been carried to a strange length by others; whose 
notion, when traced and examined to the bottom, amounts, I 
think, to this : f u That personality is not a permanent, but a tran- 
sient thing : that it lives and dies, begins and ends continually : 
that no one can any more remain one and the same person two 
moments together, than two successive moments can be one and 
the same moment: that our substance is indeed continually 
changing; but whether this be so or not, is, it seems, nothing to 
the purpose; since it is not substance, but consciousness alone, 
which constitutes personality : which consciousness, being succes- 
sive, cannot be the same in any two moments, nor consequently 
the personality constituted by it.” Hence it must follow, that it 
is a fallacy upon ourselves, to charge our present selves with any 
thing we did, or to imagine our present selves interested in any 
thing which befell us yesterday; or that our present self will be 
interested in what will befall us to-morrow: since our present 
self is not, in reality, the same with the self of yesterday, but 
another like self or person coming in its room, and mistaken for 
it; to which another self will succeed to-morrow. This, I say, 
must follow. For if the self or person of to-day, and that of to- 
morrow, are not the same, but only like persons; the person of 
to-day is really no more interested in what will befall the person 
of to-morrow, than in what will befall any other person. 

It may be thought, perhaps, that this is not a just representa- 
tion of the opinion we are speaking of : because those who main- 
tain it allow, that a person is the same as far back as his remem- 
brance reaches. Indeed they use the words, identity , and same 
person. Nor will language permit these words to be laid aside; 
since if they were, there must be I know not what ridiculous 

* Locke, p. 152. 

•J- 'See an answer to Dr. Clarke’s Third Defence of his Letter to Mr. Dodwell, 
2d edit. p. 44, 56, &c. 


PERSONAL IDENTITY. 


321 


periphrasis substituted in the room of them. But they cannot, 
consistently with themselves , mean, that the person is really the 
same. For it is self-evident, that the personality cannot be really 
the same, if, as they expressly assert, that in which it consists is 
not the same. And as, consistently with themselves, they can- 
not, so, I think it appears, they do not mean , that the person is 
really the same, but only that he is so in a fictitious sense : in 
such a sense only as they assert, for this they do assert, that any 
number of persons whatever may be the same person. The bare 
unfolding this notion, and laying it thus naked and open, seems 
the best confutation of it. However, since great stress is said to 
be put upon it, I add the following things. 

First , This notion is absolutely contradictory to that certain 
conviction, which necessarily and every moment rises within us, 
when we turn our thoughts upon ourselves, when we reflect upon 
what is past, and look forward upon what is to come. All imagi- 
nation of a daily change of that living agent which each man 
calls himself, for another, or of any such change throughout our 
whole present life, is entirely borne down by our natural sense 
of things. Nor is it possible for a person in his wits to alter his 
conduct, with regard to his health or affairs, from a suspicion, 
that, though he should live to-morrow, he should not, however, 
be the same person he is to-day. Yet, if it be reasonable to act, 
with respect to a future life, upon the notion that personality is 
transient, it is reasonable to act upon it, with respect to the pre- 
sent. Here then is a notion equally applicable to religion and to 
temporal concerns. Every one sees and feels the inexpressible 
absurdity of it in the latter case ; therefore, if any can take up 
with it in the former, this cannot proceed from the reason of the 
thing, but must be owing to inward unfairness, and secret cor- 
ruption of heart. 

Secondly , It is not an idea, or abstract notion, or quality, but 
a being only, which is capable of life and action, of happiness and 
misery. Now all beings confessedly continue the same, during 
the whole time of their existence. Consider then a living being 
now existing, and which has existed for any time alive. This 
living being must have done and suffered and enjoyed, what it 
has done and suffered and enjoyed formerly, (this living being, I 
Bay, and not another) as really as it does and suffers and enjoys, 


322 


PERSONAL IDENTITY. 


what it does and suffers and enjoys this instant. All these suc- 
cessive actions, enjoyments, and sufferings, are actions, enjoy- 
ments, and sufferings, of the same living being. And they are 
so, prior to all consideration of its remembering or forgetting: 
since remembering or forgetting can make no alteration in the 
truth of past matter of fact. And suppose this being endued 
with limited powers of knowledge and memory, there is no 
more difficulty in conceiving it to have a power of knowing 
itself to be the same living being which it was some time ago, 
of remembering some of its actions, sufferings, and enjoyments, 
and forgetting others, than in conceiving it to know or remember 
or forget any thing else. 

Thirdly , Every person is conscious , that he is now the same 
person or self he was as far back as his remembrance reaches : 
since when any one reflects upon a past action of his own, he 
is just as certain of the person who did that action, namely, 
himself who now reflects upon it, as he is certain that the 
action was done at all. Nay, very often a person’s assurance 
of an action having been done, of which he is absolutely assured, 
arises wholly from the consciousness that he himself did it. 
This he, person, or self, must either be a substance, or the 
property of some substance. If he, a person, be a substance; 
then consciousness that he is the same person is consciousness 
that he is the same substance. If the person, or he, be the 
property of a substance, still consciousness that he is the same 
property is as certain a proof that his substance remains the 
same, as consciousness that he remains the same substance would 
be; since the same property cannot be transferred from one 
substance to another. 

But though we are thus certain, that we are the same agents, 
living beings, or substances, now, which we were as far back as 
our remembrance reaches ; yet it is asked, whether we may not 
possibly be deceived in it ? And this question may be asked at 
the end of any demonstration whatever : because it is a question 
concerning the truth of perception by memory. He who can 
doubt, whether perception by memory can in this case be de- 
pended upon, may doubt also, whether perception by deduction 
and reasoning, which also include memory, or indeed whether 
intuitive perception can. Here then we can go no further. For 


PERSONAL IDENTITY. 


323 


it is ridiculous to attempt to prove the truth of those perceptions, 
whose truth we can no otherwise prove, than by other perceptions 
of exactly the same kind with them, and which there is just the 
same ground to suspect; or to attempt to prove the truth of our 
faculties, which can no otherwise be proved, than by the use or 
means of those very suspected faculties themselves. a 

a [“One is continually reminded throughout this dissertation, of what is 
called The common-sense school of Scotch metaphysicians. Nor can there be 
any doubt that Reid, in particular, was largely indebted to Butler, of whose 
writings he was a diligent student, for forming that sober and manly character 
of understanding which is, I think, his great merit.” — Fitzgerald.] 


DISSERTATION II 


fWra of iirtat. 


That which renders beings capable of moral government, is 
their having a moral nature, and moral faculties of perception 
and of action. Brute creatures are impressed and actuated by 
various instincts and propensions : so also are we. But addi- 
tional to this, we have a capacity of reflecting upon actions and 
characters, and making them an object to our thought : and on 
doing this, we naturally and unavoidably approve some actions, 
under the peculiar view of their being virtuous and of good 
desert; and disapprove others, as vicious and of ill desert. That 
we have this moral approving and disapproving* faculty, is cer- 
tain from our experiencing it in ourselves, and recognising it in 
each other. It appears from our exercising it unavoidably, in the 
approbation and disapprobation even of feigned characters; from 
the words right and wrong, odious and amiable, base and worthy, 
with many others of like signification in all languages applied to 
actions and characters : from the many written systems of morals 
which suppose it, since it cannot be imagined, that all these 
authors, throughout all these treatises, had absolutely ho mean- 
ing at all to their words, or a meaning merely chimerical : from 

'* This way of speaking is taken from Epictetus, f and is made use of as 
seeming the most full, and least liable to cavil. And the moral faculty may be 
understood to have these two epithets, doxipacrTiKq and dmoSoKi/jiaariKi) [applauding 
and condemning] upon a double account ; because, upon a survey of actions, 
whether before or after they are done, it determines them to be good or evil ; 
and also because it determines itself to be the guide of action and of life, in 
contradistinction from all other faculties, or natural principles of action; in 
the very same manner as speculative reason directly and naturally judges of 
speculative truth and falsehood : and at the same time is attended with a con- 
sciousness upon reflection , that the natural right to judge of them belongs to it. 

f Arr. Epict. lib. i. cap. i. 

324 


NATURE OF VIRTUE. 


our natural sense of gratitude, which implies a distinction be- 
tween merely being the instrument of good, and intending it : 
from the distinction every one makes between injury and mere 
harm, which, Hobbes says, is peculiar to mankind; and between 
injury and just punishment, a distinction plainly natural, prior 
to the consideration of human laws. 

It is manifest that great part of common language, and of 
common behavior over the world, is formed upon supposition of 
such a moral faculty; whether called conscience, moral reason, 
moral sense, or divine reason ; whether considered as a sentiment 
of the understanding, or as a perception of the heart; or, which 
seems the truth, as including both. Nor is it at all doubtful in 
the general, what course of action this faculty, or practical dis- 
cerning power within us, approves and what it disapproves. For, 
as much as it has been disputed wherein virtue consists, or what- 
ever ground for doubt there maybe about particulars; yet, in 
general, there is in reality a universally acknowledged standard 
of it. It is that, which all ages and all countries have made 
profession of in public : it is that, which every man you meet 
puts on the show of : it is that, which the primary and funda- 
mental laws of all civil constitutions over the face of the earth 
make it their business and endeavor to enforce the practice of 
upon mankind : namely, justice, veracity, and regard to common 
good. It being manifest then, in general, that we have such a 
faculty or discernment as this, it may be of use to remark some 
things more distinctly concerning it. 

First , It ought to be observed, that the object of this faculty 
is actions,* comprehending under that name active or practical 
principles : those principles from which men would act, if occa~ 
sions and circumstances gave them power; and which, when 
fixed and habitual in any person, we call his character. It does 
not appear, that brutes have the least reflex sense of actions, as 
distinguished from events : or that will and design, which con- 
stitute the very nature of actions as such, are at all an object to 
their perception. But to ours they are: and they are the object, 
and the only one, of the approving and disapproving faculty. 

*• Oi'tti h dptrf) teat Kauda — iv neicei, aWa tvepyeia, [Virtue and vice are not in feel- 
ing, but in action,] M. Anton, lib. ix. 16. Virtutis laus omnis in actione con- 
sists. [The whole praise of virtue, depends on action.] Cic. Oil. lib. i. cap. 6. 

28 


326 


NATURE OF VIRTUE. 


Acting, conduct, behavior, abstracted from all regard to what is 
in fact and event the consequence of it, is itself the natural ob- 
ject of the moral discernment; as speculative truth and false- 
hood is of speculative reason. Intention of such and such 
oonsequences, is indeed, always included ; for it is part of the 
action itself : but though the intended good or bad consequences 
do not follow, we have exactly the same sense of the action, as 
if they did. In like manner we think well or ill of characters, 
abstracted from all consideration of the good or the evil, which 
persons of such characters have it actually in their power to do. 
We never, in the moral way, applaud or blame either ourselves 
or others, for what we enjoy or what we suffer, or for having im- 
pressions made upon us, which we consider as altogether out of 
our power : but only for what we do or would have done, had it 
been in our power : or for what we leave undone, which we might 
have done, or would have left undone, though we could have 
done. 

Secondly, Our sense or discernment of actions as morally good 
or evil, implies in it a sense or discernment of them as of good 
or ill desert. It may be difficult to explain this percep- 
tion, so as to answer all the questions which may be asked con- 
cerning it : but every one speaks of such and such actions as 
deserving punishment; and it is not, I suppose, pretended, that 
they have absolutely no meaning at all to the expression. Now 
the meaning plainly is not, that we conceive it for the good of 
society, that the doer of such actions should be made to suffer. 
For if, unhappily, it were resolved, that a man, who by some 
innocent action, was infected with the plague, should be left to 
perish, lest, by other people's coming near him, the infection 
should spread; no one would say he deserved this treatment. 
Innocence and ill desert are inconsistent ideas. Ill desert always 
supposes guilt : and if one be no part of the other, yet they are 
evidently and naturally connected in our mind. The sight of a 
man in misery raises our compassion towards him ; and if this 
misery be inflicted on him by another, our indignation against 
the author of it. But when we are informed, that the sufferer 
is a villain, and is punished only for his treachery or cruelty; 
our compassion exceedingly lessens, and in many instances our 
indignation wholly subsides. Now what produces this effect is 


NATURE OF VIRTUE. 


the conception of that in the sufferer, which we call ill desert. 
Upon considering then, or viewing together, our notion of vice 
and that of misery, there results a third, that of ill desert. And 
thus there is in human creatures an association of the two ideas, 
natural and moral evil, wickedness and punishment. If this 
association were merely artificial or accidental, it were nothing : 
but being most unquestionably natural, it greatly concerns us to 
attend to it, instead of endeavoring to explain it away. 

It may be observed further, concerning our perception of good 
and of ill desert, that the former is very weak with respect to 
common instances of virtue. One reason of which may be, that 
it does not appear to a spectator, how far such instances of virtue 
proceed from a virtuous principle, or in what degree this principle 
is prevalent : since a very weak regard to virtue may be sufficient 
to make men act well in many common instances. On the other 
hand, our perception of ill desert in vicious actions lessens, in 
proportion to the temptations men are thought to have had to 
such vices. For, vice in human creatures consisting chiefly in 
the absence or want of the virtuous principle; though a man be 
overcome, suppose by tortures, it does not from thence appear to 
what degree the virtuous principle was wanting. All that ap- 
pears is, that he had it not in such a degree, as to prevail over 
the temptation; but possibly he had it in a degree, which would 
have rendered him proof against common temptations. 

Thirdly , Our perception of vice and ill desert arises from, and 
is the result of, a comparison of actions with the nature and capa- 
cities of the agent. For the mere neglect of doing what we 
ought to do, would, in many cases, be determined by all men to 
be in the highest degree vicious. This determination must arise 
from such comparison, and be the result of it; because such 
neglect would not be vicious in creatures of other natures and 

c? # # 

capacities, as brutes. It is the same also with respect to positive 
vices, or such as consist in doing what we ought not. For, 
every one has a different sense of harm done by an idiot, mad- 
man, or child, and by one of mature and common understanding; 
though the action of both, including the intention, which is part 
of the action, be the same : as it may be, since idiots and mad- 
men, as well as children, are capable not only of doing mischief, 
but also of intending it. Now this difference must arise from 


828 


NATURE OF VIRTUE. 


somewhat discerned in the nature or capacities of one, which 
renders the action vicious; and the want of which, in the other, 
renders the same action innocent or less vicious : and this plainly 
supposes a comparison, whether reflected upon or not, between 
the action and capacities of the agent, previous to our determining 
an action to be vicious. Hence arises a proper application of the 
epithets, incongruous, unsuitable, disproportionate, unfit, to ac- 
tions which our moral faculty determines to be vicious. 

Fourthly , It deserves to be considered, whether men are more 
at liberty, in point of morals, to make themselves miserable with- 
out reason, than to make other people so: or dissolutely to 
neglect their own greater good, for the sake of a present lesser 
gratification, than they are to neglect the good of others, whom 
nature has committed to their care. It would seem, that a due 
concern about our own interest or happiness, and a reasonable 
endeavor to secure and promote it, (which is, I think, very much 
the meaning of the word prudence, in our language;) it would 
seem, that this is virtue, and the contrary behavior faulty and 
blamable; since, in the calmest way of reflection, we approve of 
the first, and condemn the other conduct, both in ourselves and 
others. This approbation and disapprobation are altogether 
different from mere desire of our own, or of their happiness, and 
from sorrow upon missing it. For the object or occasion of this 
last kind of perception is satisfaction or uneasiness : whereas the 
object of the first is active behavior. In one case, what our 
thoughts fix upon is our condition : in the other, our conduct. 

It is true indeed, that nature has not given us so sensible a 
disapprobation of imprudence and folly, either in ourselves or 
other s, as of falsehood, injustice, and cruelty : I suppose, because 
that constant habitual sense of private interest and good, which 
we always carry about with us, renders such sensible disapproba- 
tion less necessary, less wanting, to keep us from imprudently 
neglecting our own happiness, and foolishly injuring ourselves, 
than it is necessary and wanting to keep us from injuring others, 
to whose good we cannot have so strong and constant a regard : 
and also because imprudence and folly, appearing to bring its 
own punishment more immediately and constantly than injurious 
behavior, it less needs the additional punishment, which would 
be inflicted upon it by others, had they the same sensible indigna- 


NATURE OF VIRTUE. 


329 


tion against it, as against injustice, and fraud, and cruelty. Be- 
sides, unhappiness being in itself the natural object of compassion; 
the unhappiness which people bring upon themselves, though it 
be wilfully, excites in us some pity for them; and this of course 
lessens our displeasure against them. Still it is matter of expe- 
rience, that we are formed so as to reflect very severely upon the 
greater instances of imprudent neglect and foolish rashness, both 
in ourselves and others. In instances of this kind, men often 
say of themselves with remorse, and of others with some indigna- 
tion, that they deserved to suffer such calamities, because they 
brought them upon themselves, and would not take warning. 
Particularly when persons come to poverty and distress by a long 
course of extravagance, and after frequent admonitions, though 
without falsehood or injustice; we plainly, do not regard such 
people as alike objects of compassion with those, who are brought 
into the same condition by unavoidable accidents. From these 
things it appears, that prudence is a species of virtue, and folly 
of vice : meaning by folly , something quite different from mere 
incapacity; a thoughtless want of that regard and attention to 
our own happiness, which we had capacity for. And this the 
word properly includes; and, as it seems, in its usual accepta- 
tion : for we scarcely apply it to brute creatures. 

However, if any person be disposed to dispute the matter, I 
shall very willingly give him up the words virtue and vice, as 
not applicable to prudence and folly : but must insist, that the 
faculty within us, which is the judge of actions, approves of pru- 
dent actions, and disapproves imprudent ones : I say prudent and 
imprudent actions as such, and considered distinctly from the 
happiness or misery which they occasion. And by the way, this 
observation may help to determine what justness there is in the 
objection against religion, that it teaches us to be interested and 
selfish. 

Fifthly , Without inquiring how far, and in what sense, virtue 
is resolvable into benevolence, and vice into the want of it; it 
may be proper to observe, that benevolence, and the want of it, 
singly considered, are in no sort the whole of virtue and vice. 
For if this were the case, in the review of one’s own character, or 
that of others, our moral understanding and moral sense would 
be indifferent to every thing, but the degrees in which benevo- 

28 * 


330 


NATURE OF VIRTUE. 


lence prevailed, and the degrees in which it was wanting. That 
is, we should neither approve of benevolence to some persons 
rather than to others, nor disapprove injustice and falsehood upon 
any other account, than merely as an overbalance of happiness 
was foreseen likely to be produced by the first, and of misery by 
the second. On the contrary, suppose two men competitors for 
any thing whatever, which would be of equal advantage to each 
of them; though nothing indeed would be more impertinent, 
than for a stranger to busy himself to get one of them preferred 
to the other; yet such endeavor would be virtue, in behalf of a 
friend or benefactor, abstracted from all consideration of distant 
coDsequences : as that examples of gratitude, and the cultivation 
of friendship, would be of general good to the world. Again, 
suppose one man should, by fraud or violence, take from another 
the fruit of his labor, with intent to give it to a third, who he 
thought would have as much pleasure from it as would balance 
the pleasure which the first possessor would have had in the 
enjoyment, and his vexation in the loss of it; suppose also that 
no bad consequences would follow : yet such an action would 
surely be vicious. Nay further, were treachery, violence, and 
injustice, no otherwise vicious, than as foreseen likely to produce 
an overbalance of misery to society; then, if in any case a man 
could procure to himself as great advantage by an act of injustice, 
as the whole foreseen inconvenience, likely to be brought upon 
others by it, would amount to ; such a piece of injustice would 
not be faulty or vicious at all : because it would be no more than, 
in any other case, for a man to prefer his own satisfaction to 
another’s, in equal degrees. 

The fact, then, appears to be, that we are constituted so as to 
condemn falsehood, unprovoked violence, injustice, and to ap- 
prove of benevolence to some preferably to others, abstracted 
from all consideration, which couduct is likeliest to produce an 
overbalance of happiness or misery. Therefore, were the Author 
of nature to propose nothing to himself as an end but the pro- 
duction of happiness, were his moral character merely that of 
benevolence ; yet ours is not so. Upon that supposition indeed, 
the only reason of his giving us the above mentioned approbation 
of benevolence to some persons rather than others, and disappro- 
bation of falsehood, unprovoked violence, and injustice, must be, 


NATURE OF VIRTUE. 


331 


that he foresaw this constitution of our nature would produce 
more happiness, than forming us with a temper of mere general 
benevolence. But still, since this is our constitution, falsehood, 
violence, injustice, must be vice in us; and benevolence to some, 
preferably to others, virtue ; abstracted from all consideration of 
the overbalance of evil or good, which they may appear likely to 
produce. 

Now if human creatures are endued with such a moral nature 
as we have been explaining, or with a moral faculty, the natural 
object of which is actions: moral government must consist in 
rendering them happy and unhappy, in rewarding and punishing 
them, as they follow, neglect, or depart from, the moral rule of 
action interwoven in their nature, or suggested and enforced by 
this moral faculty;* in rewarding and punishing them upon ac- 
count of their so doing. 

I am not sensible that I have, in this fifth observation, contra- 
dicted what any author designed to assert. But some of great 
and distinguished merit, have, I think, expressed themselves in 
a manner, which may occasion some danger, to careless readers, 
of imagining the whole of virtue to consist in singly aiming, ac- 
cording to the best of their judgment, at promoting the happiness 
of mankind in the present state; and the whole of vice, in doing 
what they foresee, or might foresee, is likely to produce an over- 
balance of unhappiness in it: than which mistakes, none can be 
conceived more terrible. For it is certain, that some of the most 
shocking instances of injustice, adultery, murder, perjury, and 
even of persecution, may, in many supposable cases, not have the 
appearance of being likely to produce an overbalance of misery 
in the present state ; perhaps sometimes may have the contrary 
appearance. 

This reflection might easily be carried on, but I forbear. The 
happiness of the world is the concern of Him who is the lord and 
the proprietor of it : nor do we know what we are about, when 
we endeavor to promote the good of mankind in any ways, but 
those which he has directed; that is indeed in all ways not con- 
trary to veracity and justice. I speak thus upon supposition of 
persons really endeavoring, in some sort, to do good without 
regard to these. But the truth seems to be, that such supposed 

* P. 145. 


332 


NATURE OF VIRTUE. 


endeavors proceed, almost always, from ambition, tbe spirit of 
party, or some indirect principle, concealed perhaps in great 
measure from persons themselves. And though it is our business 
and our duty to endeavor, within the bounds of veracity and 
justice, to contribute to the ease, convenience, and even cheerful- 
ness and diversion of our fellow-creatures : yet, from our short 
views, it is greatly uncertain, whether this endeavor will, in par- 
ticular instances, produce an overbalance of happiness upon the 
whole; since so many and distant things must come into the ac- 
count. And that which makes it our duty is, that there is some 
appearance that it will, and no positive appearance sufficient to 
balance this, on the contrary side; and also, that such benevolent 
endeavor is a cultivation of that most excellent of all virtuous 
principles, the active principle of benevolence. 

However, though veracity, as well as justice, is to be our rule 
of life; it must be added, otherwise a snare will be laid in the 
way of some plain men, that the use of common forms of speech, 
generally understood, cannot be falsehood; and in general, that 
there can be no designed falsehood, without designing to deceive. 
It must likewise be observed, that in numberless cases, a man 
may be under the strictest obligations to what he foresees will 
deceive, without his intending it. For it is impossible not to 
foresee, that the words and actions of men, in different ranks and 
employments, and of different educations, will perpetually be 
mistaken by each other. And it cannot but be so, while they 
will judge with the utmost carelessness, as they daily do, of what 
they are not, perhaps, enough informed to be competent judges 
of, even though they considered it with great attention. 


INDEX TO PART I 


REFERENCES TO THE EDITOR’S NOTES ARE IN BRACKETS. 


PAGE 


Abstract reasonings may mislead. 162 

fitness of things note 166 

Actions 

distinguished from their quali- 
ties Ill 

manifest character 156 

rewarded and punished. ..... 98 

this world a theater of. 156 

what sort exercise virtue 152 

Active and passive impressions. . 140 

Advantages of virtue 113 

may never recur 101 

Affections, excited by objects. . . . 145 

need control 166 

part of our constitution 147 

Affliction, a discipline 150 


chiefly of our own making. . . . 100 
Agent, the living, not compounded 81 
Alienation of parts of our body. . S4 


All things made double 137 

Allurements, use of. 151 

Analogy 

answers objections as to a pre- 
sent state of trial 135 

as to modes of existence 78 

carrying the force of positive 

argument [105 

deals only with facts 171 

indicates future punishment. . 101 

may amount to proof. 168 

objections which it cannot an- 
swer 171 

the only proof of some things- 79 
Antiquity of religion 167 


PAGE 

Atheists not argued with, in this 


treatise 181 

Beginnings of a righteous govern- 
ment seen on earth 107 

Bible, teaches the existence of 

general laws [99 

Bodies 

not necessary to us 82 

not ourselves 83 

only instruments 85, 86 

their solid elements 88 

Bodily and mental habits 134 

Brain, does not think [89 

Brahminical notion of death 92 

Brutes, 

are they immortal ? [88 

may have greater strength than 

man 119 

under man's control 119 

Capacities, 

state of in infancy 88 

not destroyed by death 89 

not dependent on the body. . . 79 

Causes and ends incomprehensible 172 
Changes compatible with iden- 
tity 78, 83 

Character 

manifested by probation 156 

not given but acquired 155 

what it means note 163 

Conscience, 

how it acts 164 


333 


334 


INDEX TO PART I. 


PAGE 

Conscience 

implies government 115 

a rule 164 

authority 164 

future retribution. ... 165 

may be impaired 168 

perverted 168 

Consciousness an indiscerptible 

entity 82 

presupposes identity [77 

Consequences 

may sometimes be avoided. . . 102 

may be foreseen 98 

show a moral government. ... 98 

Course of nature constant 97 

Creatures finitely perfect 147 

may fall 148 

have each a way of life 137 

Danger of wrong doing, how in- 
creased 132 

Death 

and birth similar 91 

enlarges our sphere 92 

has no power over matter. . . . [91 

is not a suspension of our 

powers 91 

is not our destruction 80 

what it is 80 

Decay of vegetables, inference 

from 92 

Definitions of identity 77 

Delivering up of the Lord Jesus 

Christ .[Ill 

Destruction of seeds 153 


Different states of human existence. 89 
Difficulties belong to all subjects. [96 
exercise the virtuous principle. 152 
Disadvantages of virtue tempo- 


rary 126 

Discipline, its true nature and 

use [148 

Disease not destructive to the soul. 90 

sometimes remedial 177 

Disorder produced by sin 148 

Distress excites passive pity and 

active relief. 140 


PAGE 

Distributive justice a natural rule. 110 
Divine government a scheme, chap.vii. 


Domestic government 114 

Dreams, what they prove 86 


Earthly satisfactions attainable. . 183 
Effects of actions on the actor. . . [143 
Ends often produced by unlikely 


means 180 

Enjoyments in our own power to 

a great degree 95 

Error, how spread [96 

Evidence of natural religion 166 

Evil, may possibly be useful. . . . 177 

its possible origin 147 

not a necessary part of proba- 
tion [128 

Exceptions to the happiness of 

virtue 108 

Experience indispensable 141 

Faculties, human, not perfect at 

first 141 

Fall of man 133, [148 

Fallacy in fatalism 169 


Fallen creatures require discipline. 150 
Fatalism, — see Necessity. 

Fear a proper motive to obe- 


dience 154 

Folly, destructive, as well as 

crime 132 

Formal notion of government. ... 99 

Foundation of moral improve- 
ment [108 

Future advantages, how propor- 
tioned 93 

Future existence probable. . . chap. i. 

of brutes [79 

Future interest dependent on con- 
duct 95 

Future life, 

a solemn subject 95 

not an inactive condition. . . . 144 
reconcilable with atheism. ... 94 

this life preparatory to it. chap. v. 
Future punishment credible 103 


Future retribution, how proved. . 125 


INDEX TO PART I. 


335 


PAGE 

Future state 

different from the present. ... 78 

brings us into new scenes. ... 93 


may have temptations [145 

social 144 


will not require such virtues 

as does the present life. . 154 

General laws 

govern the world 177, [99 

produce punishment 103 

wisdom of them 178 

General method of God’s govern- 
ment . 97 

General system of religion 124 

Gradual improvement, a wise 

arrangement. ...... 141, 142 

GOD 

an intelligent governor 106 

determined by what is fit. . . . [166 
governs by human instruments. Ill 

governs justly [108 

has a will and a character. . . . 163 
his aims incomprehensible. . . 97 
his attributes inferred from our 

own [115 

his general government 97 

his government just and good. 176 

his indirect commands 165 

moral government of. . . chap. hi. 

natural " “ ii. 

necessarily existent 159 

not indifferent to human ac- 
tions 125 

not simply benevolent 106 

rewards and punishes 169 

the only necessary being 159 

Good actions, how punished Ill 

Good habits necessary even to the 

virtuous 149 

Good men befriended as such. . . 112 

cannot now all unite 121 

Good not forced upon us [134 

Government, 

civil, an ordinance of God. . . Ill 
considered as a scheme, chap. vii. 
of God CHAP. II. ' 


PAGE 

Government, 

not perfected in this world. . . 107 

the formal notion of it 98 

the perfection of. 106 

Habits, 

how formed, <fec 139 

necessary to us hereafter. . . . [145 

of resignation 155 

often ruinous 101 

of virtue an improvement in 

virtue 147 

passive 138 

shape the character 141 

Happiness 

not always the immediate re- 
ward of virtue 108 

not given promiscuously 138 

requisites for 137 

the result of virtue 118 

Helplessness of man [138 

Higher degrees of retribution pro- 
bable 127 

Hinderances to virtue 121 

History of religion 169 

Honest men befriend the honest. . 112 
Hope and fear appeal to self- 

love 153 

are just principles of action. . 154 
Human life preparatory 144 


Hume’s wonderful discovery. . . . [162 
Human powers may be overtasked. 152 

Identity 

does not depend on the same- 
ness of the body 83 

of living agents 77, 78 

not explicable [77 

Ignorance 

acknowledged on all subjects 

but religion 174 

answers objections 175 

the argument from 180 

total, destroys proof. 178 

Illustration of the modification of 
an action by its inten- 
tion [Ill 


336 


INDEX TO PART I. 


PAGE 


Imagination a source of discontent. 154 

produces much error 81 

Immortality of brutes 88 

Improvement 

by discipline 144 

by habit 147 

of our faculties gradual 141 

wisdom of this 142 

Incomprehensibilityof God’s plans 97 
Inconsiderateness destructive. . . 102 

Inferiority of brute force 119 

Infidelity unjustifiable 105 


Insignificance of our knowledge. . [174 
Interest coincident with virtue. . . 154 
not a sufficient restraint. . note 146 
Interpositions to prevent irregu- 


larities 177 

would produce evil 178 

Intentional good rewarded 114 

Irregularities perhaps unavoid- 
able 177 

seeming may not be such. . . . 176 
Inward peace attends virtue. ... 112 

Kingdom, idea of a perfect 123 

Knowledge of man insignificant. [174 

Liberty does not account for the 

fall 147 

implied in our present condition 162 

Life a probation 128 

one part of it preparatory to 

another [142 

what is it intended for 137 

Living agent not subject to death. 79 

Living powers see Death. 

Locke on human identity [77 

Maimonides, his similitude [173 

Man 

an inferior part of creation. . . 133 

a system of parts [98 

by nature social [93 

capable of improvement 145 

connected with present, past, 

and future 181 

dealt with as if free 162 


PAGE 

Man 

has a moral nature. 115 

his fall not accounted for by 

his free agency 147 

his helplessness [138 

knows nothing fully 173 

may become qualified for new 

states 137 

not a competent judge of God’s 

schemes 174 

requires moral culture 145 

Mania often produced by moral 

causes [85 

Materialism, its philosophical ab- 
surdity [81 

Matter and mind not the same. . . [83 

affect each other 85 

Means 

learned by experience 176 

man not a competent judge of 

the fitness of them 178 

not always agreeable 176 

Men often miss possible temporal 

good 129 


Men’s temporal interests greatly . 

depend on themselves. . 131 
Might of unarmed virtue. ..... [121 


Mind 

influenced by the passions. . . 131 

is the man [87 

its effects on the body [85 

may survive the body [89 

the only real percipient 85 

uses the body as an instru- 
ment [87 

Miracles, properly speaking, not 

unnatural 94 

Miseries as contingent as conduct. 135 

generalty are avoidable 100 


Mixture of suffering and enjoy- 
ment in this world. . . . [128 
Moral and natural government of 
God similar to each 

other 184 

Moral attributes of God may be 

inferred from our own. . [115 
Moral discipline chap. v. 


INDEX TO PART I. 


337 


PAGE 

Moral government of God. . chap. hi. 
Moral improvement, basis of. . . . [108 
Moral world, its apparent irregu- 


larities 176 

Mystery of God, finished. . . . note 102 

Natural, the true meaning of the 

word 94 


Natural government of God. chap. h. 
Natural religion, 

its evidences not affected by the 


doctrine of necessity. . . 166 

proof of. 166 

teaches the doctrine of punish- 
ment 102 

Necessary agents may be punished 169 
Necessary bulk of one’s self. .... 84 

Necessary existence of God 159 

Necessary tendencies of virtue. . . 118 
Negligence and folly disastrous. . 132 
Necessity 

consigns us to a fallacy 169 


contradicts the constitution of 

nature 170 

destroys no proof of religion. . 170 

different kinds of. [157 

does not exclude design 160 

doctrine of. chap. vi. 

not an agent 159 

not applicable to practice. . . . 163 
not in conflict with religion. . . 160 
our condition indicates freedom 162 


reconcilable with religion. . . . 168 

the doctrine absurd 157 

what it means 158 

writers for and against [170 

New scenes in the next world. . . 93 

Obedience, reluctant, useful [152 

Objections 

against a proof and against a 

thing to be proved 179 

against the scheme of Provi- 
dence 174 

analogy of plants 92 

Christianity not universal. ... 169 

course of nature 97 

W 


PAGE 


Objections, 

destruction of seeds 153 

difference between temporal 

and eternal things [135 

discipline might have been 

avoided 156 

God simply benevolent 106 

good and evil may be mixed in 

the next world 124 

gratification of appetites natu- 
ral and proper 98 

ignorance, the argument from 
invalidates the proof of 

religion 178 

immortality of brutes 87 


incredible that necessary agents 

should be punished. . . . 169 
irregularities of the moral world 176 
necessity destroys the proof of 


religion 165 

our powers may be overtasked 152 
probabilities may be over- 
balanced by probabili- 
ties 169 


punishments are only natural 

events 99 

rectitude arising from hope and 

fear, sordid 153 

rewards and punishments. ... 95 

sin need not have entered the 

world 177 

society punishes good actions. Ill 
special interpositions might 

prevent evil 177, 178 

to the doctrine of neces- 
sity cnAP. vi. 

to the doctrine of future punish- 
ments 100-103 

virtue sometimes punished. . . Ill 
virtues of the present life not 

wanted hereafter 154 

world disciplines some to vice. 153 
Obligation certain, when proofs 

are not 179 

Occasional disadvantages of virtue 117 
Occasional indulgences in wrong- 
doing awfully dangerous [143 


29 


338 


INDEX TO PART I. 


PAGE 

One period of life preparatory to 

another [142 

Opportunities once lost irrecover- 
able 143 

Organs of sense mere instruments 89 
Our moral nature proves a moral 

government 115 

Pain, no contrivance for it in man. [110 
Partial ignorance does not destroy 

proof. 178 

Passions 

carry away the judgment. . . . 131 
make our condition one of 

trial 130 

may account for the fall of man 147 
may be excited where gratifi- 
cation is impossible or 

unlawful 146 

may remain in a future state. . 147 
should he subject to the moral 

principle 145 

the bare excitement of, not 

criminal 145 

but dangerous 146 

Passive habits 138 

Passive impressions weakened by 

repetition 139 

Passive submission essential. . . . 155 

Peace of the virtuous 112 

Perception, instruments of. 85 

possible without instruments. . 86 

Perfection of moral government 106,107 

of an earthly kingdom 123 

Persecution unnatural Ill 

Philosophy never arrogant [174 


what it cannot teach [87 

Pleasure 

not a sufficient reason for action 98 
and pain mostly depend on 

ourselves 95 

the distribution indicates moral 

government 105 

Powers 

may be improved by exercise. . 138 

may be overtasked 152 

may exist and not be exercised. 80 


PAGE 

Powers 

no reason for supposing that 


death will destroy them. 81 

Practical proof, what 168 

Present existence unaccounted for 

by atheism 94 

Presumptions that death will de- 
stroy us 81 

that it will suspend our exist- 
ence 91 

Presumptuousness unjustifiable. . 105 


Private vices not public benefits. [Ill 
Probabilities in favor of religion 
may be overbalanced by 
..probabilities against it. . 169 

Probation chap. iv. 

applies to the present life as 

well as the future 130 

does not necessarily imply 

suffering [128 

implies allurements 129 

is more than moral govern- 
ment 128 

requires severe discipline. ... 150 

Proofs of natural religion 166 

of religion not affected by the 

doctrine of necessity. . . . 160 
Propensions necessarily create 


temptations 146 

are excited by their appropriate 

objects 147 

Proper gratification of the appe- 
tites 98 

Prosperity of a virtuous commu- 
nity 123 

may beget discontent 154 


Providence, objections to God’s 140, 1 74 
Public spirit a fruit of virtue. . . . 120 


Punishment 

an alarming subject 105 

especially considered 100 


greater hereafter than now. . . 127 
in a future state credible. 103, 125 
is God’s voice of instruction. . [108 


is sometimes capital 102 

not unjust 163 

often long delayed 101 


INDEX TO PART I. 


339 


PAGE 

Punishment 

often overtakes suauemy. . . . 101 

of virtuous actions Ill 

religious and natural similar. . 100 
results from folly as well as 

crime 132 

the result of general laws. . . . 103 

Quotations. 

Aristotle [152 

Chalmers [131, 138, 148 

Cicero [82, 86 

Clarke [97 

Fitzgerald [145 

Robert Hall [118 

Hume [162 

Maimonides [173 

Mandeville [Ill 

Plato [87, 113 

Son of Sirac [137 

Strabo [92 

Rashness, consequences of. 96 

Reason 


an incompetent judge of means 178 
gives power over brute force. . 119 

needs experience 141 

not dependent on bodily powers 89 
requires a fair opportunity 119-121 
Recapitulation of the whole argu- 


ment 180 

Rectitude, is self-interest a proper 

motive to it? 153 

References to other authors. 

Bates [128 

Baxter [88 

Bayle [88 

Beattie [170 

Belsham [170 

Berkeley [Ill 

Bonnett [89 

Bramhall [171 

Brown [Ill 

Bryant [171 

Butterworth [107 

Calcott [128 

Capp [109 


PAGE 

References to other authors. 


Chalmers. . . . , 
Charnock. . . . 

Cheyne 

Clarke 

Colliber 


Collings 


Compte 


Crombie 


Crouse 


Davies 


D’Holbach. . . . 


Descartes. . . . , 


Ditton 


Doddridge. . . . 


Dodwell 


Dwight 


Edwards 


Fabricius. . . . . 


Fichte 


Gibbs 


Grove 


Haller 


Harris 


Hartley 


Hegel 


Henly 


Hobbes 


Holtzfusius. . . , 


Holyoake 


Horseley 


Hume 


Hunt 

, [109 

Jackson 

[171 

Kennicott. . . . , 


King 

[98, 171 

Law 


Lawson 


Le Clerc 


Leland 


Leroux 

[170 

Liefchild 


Locke 

[88 

Manton 

[128 

Martineau. . . . 

[170 

Martinius 

[119 

Milman 

[142 


340 


INDEX TO PART I. 


References to other authors. 


PAGE 


Morgagni. . 
Morton. . . . 
Musseus. . . 
Palmer. . . . 
Pearson. . . , 
Polignac. . . 
Porteus. . . . 

Price 

Priestley. . . 

Reid 

Rutherford. , 

Search 

Seed 

Selden 

Shaftesbury. 
Sherlock. . . 
Shuckford. . 
Son of Sirac. 

South 

Stapfer. . . . 

Strabo 

Toplady. . . , 
Topping. . . 
Twisse. . . . . 
Wagstaff. . . 
Warburton. , 

W atts 

Whately. . . 

Willis 

Wisheart. . . 
Witsius. . . . 
Wittichius. . 


[89 

[109 

[128 

[171 

[128 

[88 

[109 

[158 

. . [142, 170 

[170 

. . [109, 15S 

[88 

[109 

[128 

108 

[109 

[128 

[137 

. . [109, 128 

[128 

92 

[128 

[109 

[109 

[88 

[HI 

[77, 88, 171 
. . [142, 158 

[88 

[109 

[128 

[109 


Reflection not dependent on sensa- 


tion 


91 


Reformation is attended with dis- 
comfort 108 


may not prevent penalties. . . . 102 
Relation between us and our bodies 85 
Relations of things, limitless. ... 173 
Religion 

a question of fact 165 

historical evidence of. 168 

professed in all ages 167 

its proofs not affected by the 

doctrine of necessity. . . 170 
nor by our ignorance 178 


PAGE 

Reluctant obedience profitable. . [152 
Remedies often very disagreeable 176 


Repentance may be too late 104 

Requisites to the superiority of 

reason 119 

of virtue 120, 121 

Resentment of injuries 114 

Resignation 

a temper consonant with God’s 

sovereignty 155 

essential to virtue 154 

the fruit of affliction 155 


the habit necessary hereafter. . 155 
Retributions are divine teachings [108 
Revelation, 


antiquity of. 167 

not improbable 167 

not universal note 107 

Rewards and punishments, how 

distributed 126 

Satisfactions of virtue 108 

Scheme of God incomprehensible. 172 
Self-denial, its relations to present 

happiness 134 

not essential to piety 152 

Self-discipline, what [148 

Self-love 

a just principle of action. . . . 154 

appealed to 153 

how moderated and disciplined 155 
not a sufficient restraint. . note 146 

reasonable and safe 130 

Sensation not necessary to reflec- 
tion 91 

Senses not percipients 85 

Severe discipline necessary 150 


Similitude of a historical painting [174 


Simplicity of the living agent. . . 83 

Sin, why not kept out of the world 177 
Skepticism does not justify irre- 

ligion 105 

Social, our nature essentially such [93 
Society 

must punish vice 110 

natural and necessary [93 

sometimes punishes the good. Ill 


INDEX TO PART I. 


341 


PAGE 

Soul 

a simple substance 82 

not destroyed with the body. . 79 

not naturally immortal [81 

Souls of brutes 88 

Special interpositions of Provi- 
dence 177, 178 

Stages of existence 78 

State of probation chap. iv. 

State of discipline and improve- 
ment CHAP. Y. 

Submissive temper necessary. ... 155 
Subordinations exceedingly bene- 
ficial 142 

Subserviencies in nature 173 

Sufferings may be avoided 95 

not necessary to the cultiva- 
tion of virtue [128 

Temporal and religious probation 

similar 132 

Temptations 

increased by bad examples. . . 132 

and by former errors 132 

intended for our improvement. 136 

involve probation 129 

may improve or injure us. ... 153 
security against their evils. . . 146 
sources of, to upright beings. . 147 
the necessary result of propen- 


sions 146 

Tendencies of virtue 11S 

hindered 121 

essential, not accidental 126 

Terms “nature” and “course of 

nature” [97 

Theorizing no aid to virtue 139 

Thoughtlessness often fatal 101 

Transmigration of souls [87 

Trials 

manifest character 156 

may exist in a future state. . . 147 
produced by our propensions. 131 

qualify for a better state 144 

unreasonable ones are not in- 
flicted 133 

why we are subjected to them. 136 


PAGE 


Ultimate design of man [98 

Understanding may be perverted. 168 
Uneasiness produced by former 

sins 109 

Union of good beings 122 

Unjustifiableness of religious in- 
difference 105 

Upright creatures may fall 3.47 

need good habits 149 

Universe and its government im- 
mense 123 


Vice 

actually punished by society 110,111 


must produce uneasiness 112 

never rewarded as such 116 

not only criminal but depraving 149 

often increased by trials 153 

punished as such 114 

Vicious men lose their influence. [121 
Virtue 

a bond of union 122 


as such, rewarded on earth. . . Ill 
“brings its own reward”. ... [118 
has occasional disadvantages. [117 


hinderances accidental 121 

how and why rewarded Ill 

improved by trials 151 

its benefits to a community. . . 123 

natural, not vice 116 

not always rewarded in this life 108 
on the whole happier than vice 113 

secures peace 112 

tendencies essential 126 

tends to give power. ... 118, [121 
Virtuous beings need virtuous 

habits 149 

Virtuous habits a security 147 

how formed 139 

improve virtue 147 

necessary in a future state. . . [145 
Voice of nature is for virtue 117 

Waste of seeds 153 

Wickedness may produce some 

benefits 177 

voluntary 136 


342 


INDEX TO PART I. 


PAGE 

Will and character 

of God, how determined. . note 166 

what they mean note 163 

Wonderful discovery of Hume. . [162 
World 

a system of subordinations. . . 173 
a theater for the manifestation 

of character 156 


PAGE 


World, ( continued .) 

disciplines some to vice 153 

fitted for man’s discipline. . . . 150 
governed by fixed laws 110 

Youth 

a determining period 101 

if lost, not to be recovered. . . 143 
its beneficial subordinations. . 142 


INDEX TO PART II 


REFERENCES TO THE EDITOR’S NOTES ARE IN BRACKETS. 


PAGE 

A common absurdity 243 

Abstract truth distinguished from 

facts 305, [186 

Absurdity of some objections to 

Christianity 245 

Abuse of our natural endowments 217 
Accidental, what events are so 

called 226 

Accountability gradually increases 251 
Actions, 

definition of, in morals 261 

distinguished from things done 261 
their bad consequences some- 
times escaped 232 

virtue and vice consist in them 261 
Advantage, as proper a considera- 
tion in religion as in tem- 


poral affairs 298 

variously bestowed 249, 312 

Analogy 


a confirmation of all facts to 

which it can be applied. .306 
affords no argument against the 

scheme of Christianity. . 203 
nor against miracles. . . 203 
answers presumptions against 


miracles 207 

does not prove the wisdom of 

God 301 

does not teach that the whole 
of God’s government is 
like that on earth. ..... 204 
easily cavilled at, but unan- 
swerable 306 


PAGE 


Analogy, ( continued .) 

between natural information 
and that derived from 

inspiration 212 

between the remedies of nature 

and those of grace 219 

between the gospel and human 

discoveries 219 

between the light of nature and 

of revelation 218 


between the use of natural 

gifts, and miraculous. . . 217 
between the government of God 
and that of a human mas- 
ter 261 

its small influence on men. . . 303 
how used in this treatise. . . . 306 
may show our duty, but not the 

design of the requirement 246 
objections to this mode of 

arguing chap, viil 

shows that there may be infinite 
reasons for things, with 
which we are not ac- 
quainted 188 

the only ground for some of 

our knowledge 306 

Antidote to heresies [191 

Apocalypse, its principal object. . [249 
Appearances of men and things 

deceptive 248 

Arguments proper as to human 
writings, are not so as 
to Scripture 214 


343 


344 


INDEX TO PART II. 


PAGE 

Atonement, 

how held by the ancients. . . . 241 
makes the innocent suffer for 

the guilty 243 

Author of nature taken for granted 298 
Authoritativeness of revelation. . 189 

Baptism 

a test of obedience [199 

commanded and important. . . 194 

why the form of words 194 

Bible, how to be interpreted. [202, 215 

Brutes, their great sagacity 216 

Boundary of human inquiry. . . . [223 

Candor necessary in judging of 

Christianity 302 

Chance, really no such thing. . . 226 
Characters drawn in Scripture 

evidently unfeigned . . . 287 

Christ 

a mediator chap. v. 

a prophet 240 

a priest and king 241 

his history, as given in Scrip- 
ture 285 

his pre-existence taught 282 

his satisfaction 239 

his sufferings voluntary 243 

manner of his interposition. . . 238 

not merely a teacher and ex- 
ample 242 

offered himself a propitiatory 

sacrifice 241 

Christianity 

a fearful curse, if it give no 
more light than natural 

religion [196 

a question of fact 301 

a remedial system [193 

an authoritative republication 
of the religion of na- 
ture 188, 189 

a particular scheme under a 

general plan 194, 224 

a scheme imperfectly compre- 
hended CHAP. iv. 


P^GE 

Christianity, ( continued .) 

a scheme revealed but? in part. 226 
brings life and immortality to 

light 190 

could not possibly be a contri- 
vance [222, 294 

demands attention, if barely 

probable 253 

has evidences besides miracles 

and prophecy 263 

in what degree remedial. . . . [193 

is a real revelation 213 

is conformable to the constitu- 
tion of things 295 

its benefits require the use of 

means 197 

its establishment and preva- 
lence, the most conspicu- 
ous and important event 

in history 286 

its evidences chap. yii. 

its good effects not small. ... 192 
its precepts plain and obvious. 218 

its proof historical 304 

its proofs liable to objection. . 260 
men bound to examine its evi- 
dence 197 

miracles and prophecy its direct 

and fundamental proofs. 263 

must have mysteries [223 

no objection to the morality of 

it 214, 220, 222 

not merely a republication of 

natural religion [196 

not primarily designed to re- 
medy the defects of na- 
ture [193 

not the discovery of reason. . . 188 
objections to its evidence. . . . 210 

objections to its nature 210 

offered to some in a corrupt 

state 250 

prescribes new duties 194 

preserves natural religion in 

the world 191 

propagated against all obstruc- 
tions [294 


INDEX TO PART II. 


345 


PAGE 

Christianity, ( continued .) 

rashness of treating it light- 
ly 194, 196, 197 

requires means to accomplish 

ends • 225 

reveals a particular dispensa- 
tion of Providence 194 

reveals important facts 196 

some of its dark parts may be 
cleared up, others can- 
not [223 

teaches more than natural re- 
ligion 194 

the evils ascribed to it, are 

not its evils 192 

the one great question concern- 
ing it 213, 214 

the only religion professedly 

confirmed by miracles. . 268 
to be transmitted by Chris- 
tians [190 

universal, in nature and in- 
tention [248 

what alone could disprove it. . 295 
why not remedial to a greater 

degree 193 

why not sooner promulgated. . 219 
Christians 

bound to spread Christianity. 190 
primitive, their testimony. . . . 267 
Church 

men bound to support it 193 

preserves a knowledge of reli- 
gion 191 

visible, its design 190, 191 

Circumstantial evidences of Chris- 
tianity 263, 281 

often as convincing as direct 

testimony. 294 

Clemens Romanus, testimony of. 266 
his letter to the Corinthians. . [266 
Climax of infidel extravagance. . [294 
Coincidence of natural and re- 
vealed religion. . . . 211, 21S 

Coincidences of Scripture 266 

Comparison, how it may mislead 

201 


PAGE 

Compassion distinct from goodness 233 
visible in the constitution of 


the world 233 

Consequences of infidelity ; more 
dangerous than those of 

faith 294 

of sin, often averted 233 

Conversational objections to reve- 
lation 295 

Conversion, how produced [225 

Course of nature 


different from what we might 
have supposed, previous 


to experience 211 

none at the beginning 205 

our total darkness as to its 

causes 208 

Creation 

Mosaic account of, referred to 

by John 282 

a different exertion of power 

from government 205 


why Scripture describes it. . . 281 
Creatures of like moral qualities 
placed in different reli- 


gious situations 251 

Credulity of mankind acknow- 
ledged 269 


Cumulative proof of Christianity. [207 
Daniel 

his book had more evidence of 
authenticity than has 


come to us 279 

his predictions a support of 

Jewish faith [249 

quoted by Christ 279 

Dark parts of revelation [223 

Degrees of evidence have degrees 

of weight 255 

require nice examination. . . . 258 
Deistical explanation of Christ’s 

miracles [206 

Deists, why do they oppose Chris- 
tianity [196 

Depravity of man obvious 238 

doctrine of. [218 


us. 


346 


INDEX TO PART II. 


PAGE 

Desert of good and ill, the notion 


of. 305 

Development, of truth 218 

modern, doctrine of. [218 


Differences of religious advantages 
may have like reasons as 
those for different tem- 
poral advantages 251 

would remain if revelation 

were universal 252 

Difficulties 

absurdity of requiring them to 

be all removed 297 

as to the evidence of religion, 
analogous to those at- 
tending the practice of it 256 
cannot be solved by analogy. . 296 


speculative, may be the chief 


trials of some 257 

the discernment which can see 
them, might suffice to 
see through them 260 


Direct and circumstantial evidence 

must be taken together. 280 
Diseases of body and mind, analo- 
gous as to their reme- 


dies 220 

Disobedience, without possible ex- 
cuse 253 

Dispensations, preparatory one to 

another 310 

Disregard of religion a great pro- 
fligacy 233 

Distinction between moral and 


positive obligation. 198, [198 
between acts and principles. . [235 
between temporary, individual, 

and universal commands [188 


Doubt 

affords scope for probation. . . 262 
exercises our virtuous princi- 
ples 256 

implies some evidence. 252, 254, 283 

involves some obligation 263 

puts us upon probation 253 

Doubtful evidence should have 

some influence 255 


PAGE 

Duties arising from revealed rela- 
tions 195 

moral and positive 194 

Earth, its appearances confirm 

Scripture . 238 

Effect of Adam’s transgression. . . 238 
of combined probabilities. 294, [294 

Efficacy of repentance [190 

not taught by the light of na- 
ture 190 

End, God’s not known 246 

Enthusiasm 

is not peculiar to religion. . . . 272 
impairs no testimony for Chris- 
tianity 271 


may often weaken testimony. 271 
sometimes mixed with knavery 272 
the absence of all sign of it in 
Christianity, a presump- 
tive proof in its favor. . . 222 
will not account for the spread 

of Christianity 270 

Enthusiasts make as great sacri- 


fices as Christians. . . . 270 

Epistles of Paul, proof from 266 

Eternal retribution not taught by 

natural religion [190 

Ethics of natural religion distin- 
guished from its objects [194 
Events expound Scripture 219 


Evidence 

of Christianity impregnable. . 295 
collateral and direct to be 

viewed together 294 

from miracles and prophecy. . 267 
imperfect, should yet influence 
practice in proportion to 


its degree 255 

of circumstances may be most 

direct 294 

of religion, open to all 260 

of religion, the same in kind 
as that which controls us 
in temporal things 258 


much lower than satisfactory 

often determines us. . . . 303 


INDEX TO PART II. 


347 


PAGE 

Evidence, ( continued .) 

not only increased but multi- 
plied by a combination 
of probabilities. . . . 294, [294 
reason the proper judge of. . . 221 

requires careful sifting 256 

candor in judging. . . 302, [303 
safety always in admitting it. 294 

why liable to objection 257 

Evil, remedies provided for it. 219, 232 
Exaggeration practised by many 

who will not lie 272 

External manner of heart worship 195 
Experience 

affords no presumption against 

Christianity 203 

corroborates Christian doc- 
trines 245 

teaches the effects of actions. . 246 
Extravagance of some objec- 
tions 187, 188 


Facts 

analogy the only proof of 

some 306 

distinguished from abstract 

truths 305 

of revelation distinguished 

from its principles [235 

Fall of man, assumed as a fact. . . 236 
confirmed by appearances. . . . 238 
Falsehood, its degrees and induce- 
ments 272 

False miracles have deceived many 273 
have some historic evidence. . 273 
Fatalists, their principles argued 

upon 304 

Fear cast out by love [301 

Fitness, moral 304, 305 

Flippant objections to Christianity 295 

Folly, a real vice 280 

Foresight of brutes 216 

Future punishments, 

all the reasons for them not 

known 234 

not arbitrarily appointed. . . . 232 
natural sequences 231, 232 


PAGE 


Future punishments, 

rendered credible by temporal 

punishments 300 


Genealogy of mankind given in 

Scripture 283 

General laws 

a wise arrangement 227 

do not render miracles in- 
credible 227 

control the Christian dispensa- 
tion 226 

few events can be traced up to 

them 226 

miracles may be their re- 
sults 226, 227 

the ground of believing there 

are such 226 

things called accidental go- 
verned by them 226 

Geology, its impressive lessons. . [229 
GOD 

a master giving laws 261 


all his reasons for giving a 
command must be cer- 
tainly known, and known 
to have passed away, be- 
fore we can safely disre- 


gard it 188 

duties towards him as the 

Father 194, 195 

governs by mediation 230 

his government shows com- 
passion 233 

progressive 229 

his means and ends we cannot 

distinguish 228 

his providence, objections to it 

idle 300, 301 

his reasons not assigned 246 

his will, as absolute or con- 
ditional 261 

how he would act in contingen- 
cies, unknown [222 

how to be worshipped, a pure 


matter of revelation. . . . 195 
instructs us by experience. 211, 246 


348 


INDEX TO PART II. 


PAGE 

GOD, ( continued .) 

little known [222 

not indifferent as to who suffer. 243 
reveals our duties, not his 

plans 246 

the real author of the prophe- 
cies 276 

Good and evil unequally distri- 
buted 248 

Government of God sometimes, 
apparently, tardy in its 

results 224, 225 

Gradual growth of causes [208 

Happiness not always secured by 

well-laid schemes 247 

Hazard of neglecting Christianity. 262 
Heathen world, condition of. 186, 250 
Hieroglyphic and figurative lan- 
guage of Scripture 210 

Hinderances to natural and spiri- 


tual knowledge similar. . 218 

History 

of miracles 264 

of the Jews confirmed by their 

condition 289, 290 

of the origin of religion 206 

furnishes no parallel to revela- 
tion 207 

prophecy is histor}' anticipated 281 
Scripture, has not been inva- 
lidated 283 

Holy Spirit, its operations on the 

heart [225 

Human contrivance unequal to 

some things [222 

Human life, in what sense it may 

be called poor 297 

Human testimony, reliable not- 
withstanding the preva- 
lence of falsehood 273 

Identity of principle between na- 
tural and revealed re- 
ligion [235 

Ignorance 

of heathen writers [187 


PAGE 


Ignorance 

of other worlds, forbids objec- 
tions to Christianity on 
the ground of miracles. 207 
of the laws of miracles, not 
greater than of natural 

laws 256 

of the reason of our present 

condition 251 

much of it our own fault. . . . 259 
Imagination may fancy unreal 

coincidences 293 

Immorality not authorized in 

Scripture 221, 222 

Impassable limit to human know- 
ledge [223 

Imperceptible accumulation of 

forces [208 

Imperfect knowledge, better than 

acting in the dark 297 

Imperfection of language 216 

Importance of revelation. . . chap. i. 

an abstraction [186 

precludes the idea that the first 

witnesses were careless. . 274 
Improbability before and after an 

event [207 

of the Deistical theory greater 

than that of miracles. . . [206 

Inadequacy of repentance [236 

Inattention to religion, real depra- 
vity 252, 307 

prevents convincement 258 

Incarnation an invisible miracle. 204 

cannot be paralleled 5 . [235 

Influence of the Holy Ghost. . . . [225 
of the analogical argument. . 303 
Innocent sometimes suffer for the 

guilty 243 

Inspiration, the proper kind and 
extent of it not discover- 
able by reason 212 

not to be interpreted like other 

writings. . . 214 

Inspired writers, key to their 

meaning [276 

their one great scheme [276 


INDEX TO PART II. 


349 


PAGE 

Inspired writers, ( continued .) 
show a foresight more than 

human 278, 279 

Instruction from God to savages. [206 
Intercession by the good for the 

bad [232 

Interest, temporal, not always 

apparent 302 

Interpositions of men for each 

other [232 

Internal improbabilities weaken 

external proof. 215 

Interpretation of Scripture [215 

Irregularity, really no such thing. 226 
whence the appearance of. . . . 227 
Irregularities of men, conse- 
quences proportioned to 

magnitude 233 

Irreligion an aggravated sin. . . . 233 
especially in persons in high 

standing 254 

not justifiable on any pre- 
tence 256, 312 

Invention an irregular way of in- 
formation 216 

Invisible miracles [204 

things of God, how learned. . [230 

Jews 

God’s dealing with them .... 290 
their continuance, a standing 


miracle 290 

their history confirmed by facts 291 

their system of Theism [206 

Jewish miracles, a part of civil 

history [265 

John, his allusion to Christ, in the 

beginning of his gospel. 282 
his doctrine agrees with that 

of Paul 282 

Kingdom of Christ on earth 241 

Knowledge 

profound, not necessary to 

piety 218 

scientific and religious, have 

the same difficulties. ... 218 


PAGE 

Knowledge of Scripture, improved 
in the same way as know- 


ledge of the sciences. . . 218 
unequally distributed 249 

Language necessarily ambiguous. 216 
of the prophecies, often figura- 
tive 210 

Laplace, error of. [207 

Levity destructive to religious 

influence 259 

Liberty 

belief of our, unavoidable. . . . 304 


of the will, not discussed, note 304 
necessary to the progress of 


knowledge 218 

the principle so natural that 
language is formed on 
it 304 

Life 

future, brought to light by the 

gospel 190 

may be taken away by com- 
mand 221 

not thrown away because suc- 
cess is uncertain 302 

whether desirable or not 301 

Light of nature 

displayed in the Scriptures. . . 188 
does not teach our future con- 
dition 190 

favors the doctrine of a Me- 
diator 230 

has left the greatest heathen 

in doubt 186 

Ludicrous turn, danger of. 259 


Mahometanism not received on 

the footing of miracles. [268 
Mahometans and ancient Per- 


sians, how situated as to 
revelation 250 

Man 

accepted according to what he 

hath 251 

his circumstances no ground 

of complaint 252 


30 


350 


INDEX TO PART II. 


PAGE 

Man, ( continued .) 

his obligation to study the 

Scriptures 202, 262 

must be renewed 197 

Manasses, prayer of. [237 

Manner of worship a matter of 

pure revelation 195 

Martyrs 


could not have been impostors 272 
had full knowledge of facts 269,271 
the full force of their testimony 269 
their obligations to veracity. . 274 


were not enthusiasts 271 

Means as related to ends 225 

Mediation seen everywhere 230 

exemplified in social life. . . . [232 
Mediator, 

appointment of. chap. v. 

the notion of, natural 230 

the Scripture doctrine of. 238-240 
whether one was necessary. . . 243 
why most objected to 243 


Medium between full satisfaction 
of a truth and full satis- 
faction to the contrary. . 313 
Memory, eloquence, <fcc. impru- 


dently used 217 

Men apt to be deluded by pre- 
tences 273 

their conduct may be guessed 

at [222 

Mercy seen in the constitution of 

the world 233 

Messiah came at the expected time 285 

his mission 224 

Minuteness of predictions touch- 
ing Christ 207 


Miracles 

admitted evidence for such as 
are false does not impair 
the evidence of Chris- 


tian 273 

contrary to the course of na- 
ture ? 206 

denying them leads to 

Atheism [205 

disorderly use of. 217 


PAGE 


Miracles, ( continued .) 

distinct reasons for them. . . . 208 
large historical evidence for 

their truth 270 

manner in which related .... 264 
no argument of analogy against 

them 205-207 

none parallel to those of Scrip- 


ture 

. . 207 

not mere embellishments. . 

. . 264 

not to be compared to common 

events 

. . 209 

nowise incredible 

. . 209 

occasions for them likely 

to 

arise in the course 

of 

ages 

. . 208 


of the Old Testament, insepa- 
rable from history [265 

operate by general laws 226 

Pagan and Popish, were 
wrought after those sys- 
tems had obtained 268 

peculiar to the Jewish and 

Christian religions 268 

received as genuine from the 

first 268, 269 

regulated by general laws. . . . 227 
satisfactorily account for the 

existence of Christianity 265 
should be compared to uncom- 


mon events 209 

the credentials of Christianity 267 
the evidence of their truth at 

first 249 

the question of their truth only 
one of degree in point of 

evidence 208 

the only satisfactory account 

of some events 265 

the real nature of presump- 
tions against them 208 

the term a relative one 205 

their direct proof of Chris- 
tianity 264 

their evidence the same as that 

for common facts 264 

their force as proofs 189 


INDEX TO PART II. 


351 


PAGE 

Miracles, (continued.) 

visible and invisible. . . . 204, [204 
what evidence arises from their 
having been accepted as 
true by the first Chris- 
tians 268 

writers upon [264, 268 

Miraculous power 

creation not properly an act of 205 

misused by some 217, 267 

pretences of, have deluded 

some 273 

why bestowed 190 

Misconduct creates need of assist- 
ance 235 

Mistake of some of Hume’s oppo- 
nents 207 

Mistakes of philosophers dan- 
gerous [230 

of transcribers, <fcc 228 

Modern geology, lesson from. . . . [229 
Moral action, the nature of. ... . 261 
an action becomes such by 

command [221 

Moral duties. See Positive. 

Moral faculty, its object 305 

Moral government. See Govern- 
ment. 

Moral precepts. See Positive. 

Moral system revealed to man- 
kind 190 

Morality of Scripture, reason a 

judge of. 220 

Mysteries to be expected in reve- 
lation 223, 224 

as many in nature as in Scrip- 
ture 246 

Mystery of godliness 225 

Mythological writings resemble 

prophecy 276 

Narratives of Scripture unadorned 228 
Natural consequences of vice are 

judicial punishments. . . 197 
and spiritual things analogous 

in importance 219 

endowments often abused. . . . 217 


PAGE 

Natural light compared to revela- 
tion 218 

Natural religion 

and revealed, coincide 211 

as much perverted as Chris- 
tianity 192 

could not have been reasoned 

out 192 

discloses no Redeemer [194 

its ethics and objects distin- 
guished [194 

its light wholly insufficient. . . 1S7 
might be authenticated by 

miracles 190 

moral system of. 187 

taught and confirmed by Chris- 
tianity 188, 286, 292 

what it does not teach. . . [190, 194 
Nature carried on by uniform 

laws 226 

implies the agency of God. . . 231 

its light insufficient 186 

Nature and obligation of sacra- 
ments note 195 

Necessity of revelation [186 

Negligence prevents the recogni- 
tion of truth 258 

wholly inexcusable 197 

Obedience from dread [301 

or disobedience, an important 

matter 188 

to a positive rite, especially 

indicative of piety 199 

Objections 

to certain precepts of Scrip- 
ture, as immoral 221 

to prophecy, from its obscurity 275 
to revelation, are of equal 
weight against natural 

religion 97 

to the analogical argument, as 

such CHAP. vm. 

to the distribution of good and 

evil 248-250 

to the doctrine of media- 
tion CHAP. V. 


352 


INDEX TO PART II. 


PAGE 

Objections, ( continued .) 

to the evidence for mi- 
racles CHAP. II. 

to the unequal distribution of 

religious knowledge. . . . 249 
Objections to Christianity 

as a matter of fact 301 

as a remedial system. . . . [193, 219 

as a roundabout, perplexed 

contrivance 228 

as deficient in point of truth. . 247 

as a scheme 209 

as mysterious [223 

as to its wisdom and good- 
ness CHAP. IV. 

as unimportant chap. i. 

atonement makes the innocent 

suffer for the guilty. 227, 243 
contains things unlike the 

course of nature 204 

does not remove difficulties . . [223 

has been perverted 192 

has been productive of evils. . 192 
has internal improbabilities 225-227 
disclosed to the world so re- 
cently 219 

disorderly use of miraculous 

gifts 227 

has small influence 192, 303 

if true would not be left doubt- 
ful 299 

is not satisfactory 260, 261 

its doctrine of mediation, chap. v. 
its external proof weakened 
by internal improbabili- _ 

ties 215 

its lack of evidence. . . . chap. vi. 

its late introduction 219 

may be advanced flippantly, 
but cannot be so an- 
swered 295 

natural things too unimportant 
to furnish analogies in 

its favor 219 

not just and good chap. iv. 

not necessary 147 

not universal chap. vi. 248 


page 

Objections to Christianity, {con- 
tinued.) 

slowly developed 219 

some of its precepts immoral. . 221 
sufficiency of natural religion. 187 

vicarious sufferings 245 

Obligation arises from the bare 
supposableness of Chris- 
tianity 253, 262 

Obligations to God arising out of 

relationship 196 

Obscurity in part of a prophecy, 
does not impair the evi- 
dence of foresight 275 

Offenders Often shielded by friends [232 
Offices of Christ as a mediator 238-240 
Opinions must be distinguished 

from facts 270 

Ordinary rules of interpretation. . [215 


Pagan and Popish miracles easily 

accounted for 268 

Parables show what the author 

intended 276 

Partial views give an appearance 

of wrong 309 

Passion hinders correct judgment 259 
Paul, his separate testimony. . . . 266 
how he received the gospel. . . 267 
summary of his testimony. . . 267 


Perfection of religion, what ? chap. viii. 
Persons for whom this treatise is 

written 309 

Philosophy, its true mode of pro- 
ceeding [230 

Piety superior to ritual observ- 
ances 201 

Pleasures and pains, which over- 
balance? 301 

Political events, how mentioned 

in Scripture 282 

Popish doctrine of a miracle at 

the Eucharist [204 

Popular conversational objections 295 
Porphyry’s mode of interpretation 

frivolous note 279 

objections to the book of Daniel 279 


INDEX TO PART II. 


353 


Positive evidence of Chris- 
tianity CHAP. VII. 

ositive institutions 
belong to the notion of a 

church 192 

lay us under the strictest obli- 
gation 202 

means to moral ends 199 

men disposed to depend on 

them 200 

necessary to keep up and pro- 
pagate religion 246 

not to be made light of. 201 

not to supersede moral obe- 
dience 200 

the reason of them often ob- 
vious 198 

two modes of viewing them. . . 198 
Positive precepts compared with 

moral 198, 201 

create moral obligations 221 

Power of healing [217 

Practice should be influenced by 

probability 254 

Predictions of Christ very nume- 
rous and minute. . . 207, 208 
Prejudice a hinderance to know- 
ledge 258 

a mark of weakness 280 

as hostile to truth as enthu- 
siasm 272 

operates contrary ways 294 

Preservation of the Jews as a dis- 
tinct race 291 

Presumptions 

against miracles 205 

against revelation as miracu- 
lous CHAP. II. 

none against the general 

scheme of Christianity. . 203 
none peculiar to miracles. . . . 207 
strong, overcome by weak 

proof. 207, [207 

Priesthood of Christ 238 

Jewish, typical of Christ 239 

Principles argued upon in this 

treatise 304 


PAGE 

Progressions in our existence. . . . 229 
Progress in theology probable. . . [218 
Probable proofs, by being added, 
not only increase evi- 
dence, but multiply it. . . 294 
Probability should influence prac- 
tice 254 

Profane history corroborates 

Scriptui-e statements. . . 287 
Proofs of Christianity 

a touchstone of honesty [259 

level to common men 260 

some important ones omitted 

in this treatise, and why. 304 

why not more plain 261 

Prophecy 

a joint review of prophecies 
furnishes a far stronger 
proof than examination 

in detail 294 

a series of, being applicable to 
certain events, is proof 
that it was intended of 

them 276 

compared to compiled me- 
moirs 278 

created the expectation of a 

Messiah 284 

confirmed by appearances. . . . 292 

evidence from 275 

expressed in figurative lan- 
guage 275 

how understood by ancient 

Jews 277 

in relation to the Jews 284 

is history anticipated 281 

its obscurity 275 

its proofs amazingly strong. . [207 
may not always have been un- 
derstood by the writer. . 278 

proves foresight 276, 279 

sometimes obscured by inter- 
preters 210 

summary of, concerning Christ 284 

use of, to future ages 249 

writers upon 277, 285 

Prophet, Christ a 240 


30 ! 


X 


354 


INDEX TO PART II. 


PAGE 


Prophets 

not the authors of what they 

wrote 278 

their sense of their predictions 
not necessarily the whole 

sense 278 

whether they had in view the 
events which Christians 
consider fulfilments. . . . 277 

Proverbial, use of the word 201 

Providence, never hasty [229 

objections to it useless. . . 300, 301 
the course of, progressive. . . . 229 

Province of reason 220 

Prudence, its best plans often 

frustrated 247 

often requires us to act with 
uncertain prospect of 

success 247, 248 

Punishment 

follows wickedness, of course. . 231 

instances of vicarious 244 

not always avoided by reforma- 
tion 235 

not promiscuously inflicted. . . 243 
provision made for escaping 


it 232, 311 

we cannot of ourselves escape 

it 234 

we cannot know why such and 

such are inflicted 231 

Quotations. 

Angus [202, 223 

Augustine note 187 

Arnobius [269 

Clemens Romanus [266 

Davidson [294 

Fitzgerald [303 

Grotius [259 

Guizot [229 

Hurd [276 

Dr. Johnson [288 

Mahomet [268 

Powell [230 

Warburton [217, 223 

Whately [206 


PAGE 

Rashness of interpreters 210 

of treating religion lightly. . . 197 
Reason 

could not have invented Chris- 
tianity 206 

could not ascertain the power 

of penitence 194 

discovers our relation to God 

the Father 194 

but not our relation to the Son 

and Holy Ghost. . . 194, 196 

its limits very narrow [223 

its proper province 220 


must have right principles. . . 220 
needs the aid of experience in 
judging of the conse- 
quences of actions 246 

not sufficient to construct a 
system of natural reli- 
gion free from supersti- 
tion 186 

our only faculty for judging 

even revelation 210 

requires the importance of a 
question to be taken into 

account 295 

teaches nothing of the certain 
means of either temporal 

or spiritual good 197 

very incompetent to judge 
what a revelation ought 

to be 210-212 

Reasoning by analogy to any 
extent, leaves the mind 

unsatisfied 296 

Redemption 

agreeable to our natural no- 
tions 235 

analogous to natural remedies. 232 
conjectures about it must be 

uncertain 242 

mode of, not discoverable by 

reason 243 

men not competent judges of 

its plan 243 

on whom are its benefits. . note 237 

Scripture account of. ... . 239, 240 


INDEX TO PART II. 


oOO 


Redemption, ( continued .) 

PAGE 

) 

we should be thankful for it, 

without disputing how it 

was procured. . 

242 

References to other authors. 

Alexander 

[269 

Apthorpe 

[285 

Bayle 

[301 

Benson 

[215 

Birk 

[266 

Blaney 

[285 

Blunt 

[266 

Bolingbroke 

[265 

Boswell 

[288 

Boyle 

[264 

Butler 


Campbell 

[264 

Celsus 

[287 

Chalmers 

[187, 194, 242 

Colliber 

195 

Damascenus 

[2S7 

Davidson 

[285 

Diodorus Siculus. . . . 

[287 

Eupolemus 

[287 

Featley 

[215 

Fitzgerald 

[193, 206,207 

Fleetwood 

[264 

Fuller 


Gibbon 

[268 

Graves 

[266 

Grotius 

[266 

Gulick 

[277 

Hengstenburg 

[277 

Horseley 

[277 

Howe 

[236 

Hurd 

[285 

Jortin 

. . . [264, 285 

Julian 

[257 

King 


Lardner 

[264 

Leland 


Longinus 

[287 

Lyall 


McCosh 


Mackintosh 

[223 

Magee 

. . . [236, 242 

Manasses 

[237 


PAGE 

References, ( continued .) 

Menander [287 

Michaelis [215 

Mills [207 

Newman [235 

Numenius [287 

Owen [242 

Paley [205, 266, 268 

Pascal [187, 223 

Pfaffius [264 

Phlegon [287 

Phoenician Annals [287 

Pliny [287 

Porphyry 279, [287 

Samuel Stanhope Smith [206 

Solinus [287 

Spinoza [215 

Stapfer [242 

Storr [215 

Strabo [287 

Suetonius [287 

Tacitus [287 

Taylor [264 

Tindall [196, 248 

Tucker [264 

Turretin [242 

Vitringa [276 

Warburton [187 

Waterland [195 

Watson [264 

Waugh [277, 285 

Wayland [188, 236 

Whately [206, 268, 288 

Witsius [264 

Reformation does not always pre- 
clude punishment 235 

Regard due to the Son and Holy 

Spirit 195 

Regard to God as Creator, the 
essence of natural reli- 
gion 195 

Rejection of Christ by many, at first, 

the argument from it. . . [269 

foretold 2S5 

Relations, being learned, duties 

are perceived 194 


35G 


INDEX TO PART II. 


PAGE 


Relations of man to Deity 194 

to the Son and Holy Ghost. . . 195 
Religion 

a practical thing 298 

a question of fact 301, 304 

affords particular reasons for 

miracles 208 

confirmed "by the establish- 
ment of a church 191 

considered as external and 

internal 195 

doubt of its evidence does not 
release from moral obli- 
gation 254 

has its end on all persons to 

whom proposed. . . 303, [303 
if true, why susceptible of any 

possible doubt? 299 

its acceptance safe 295 

its general spirit intimated 200, 201 
its great importance 254 


its introduction into the world 206 
its reasonableness fully shown, 
if it can only be proved 
that it may be reason- 


able 301 

its very nature overlooked by 
those who insist that it 
should have overwhelm- 
ing evidence 302 


may be true, though doubtful. 299 
must be judged by its evi- 
dences taken together. . . 294 


not a thing reasoned out 206 

not equally taught to all men. 206 
objections to it removed by 

analogy 300 

presupposes candor in those 

who examine it 256,302, [303 
reason may judge of its mo- 
rality 220 

reasonable, for aught which 
can be shown to the 

contrary 301 

the perception of. 302 

the view of it taken in this 

treatise 299 


PAGE 


Religion, ( continued .) 

the evidence for it may be 
lessened, but cannot be 

destroyed 295 

why its evidences are allowed to 

admit of doubt. 249, 253, 299 

Relief for evils provided 232 

Remedial nature of Christianity. [193 
Remedies 

provided in nature 219, 232 

may be unskilfully used 220 

show the compassion of 

God 233 

and also his strictness 234 

Repentance 

cannot cancel guilt 236, [236 

general sense of mankind on 

the subject 236 

its efficacy not taught by na- 
tural religion [190 

its efficacy taught in the Scrip- 
tures 190 

not sufficient to preclude 

disaster 234, 235 

Revelation 

a particular part of a great 

plan 224 

accounts for the Theism of the 

Jews [206 

at the beginning of the world, 

would not be miraculous 205 
cannot be neglected with im- 
punity 260-262 

considered as miraculous, chap. ii. 

considered historically 281 

difference between its facts 

and its principles [235 

discovers new relations, and so 

new duties 194 

distinguished from natural re- 


ligion 195 

does not compel assent 253 


has twice been universal. . . . [248 
how it could be overturned. . . 214 
its disclosures, of course, could 
not have been antici- 
pated 211, 212 


INDEX TO PART II. 


357 


PAGE 

Revelation, ( continued .) 

its measure of evidence puts 

us on probation 253 

its facts necessarily singular. [235 
no more different from the 
course of nature than 
some parts of the course 
of nature are different 

from other parts 312 

necessary chap. i. 

republishes and confirms na- 
tural religion 188, 189 

nothing incredible in it 271 

teaches that God’s laws are 

compassionate 236 

the use of unwritten revela- 
tion 213 

what is to be expected in reve- 
lation 210, 212 

Reverence for the will of God. . . [199 
Ridicule of Scripture 

an offence against natural 

piety 286 

easier than examination 259 

the great weakness of being 

influenced by it 280 

Roman Empire mentioned 279 

Rules for health very fallible and 

inexact 302 

of Biblical interpretation. . . . [215 


Sacrifices 

commanded 241 

expiatory 239 

how the ancients regarded 

them 242 

learned by the heathen from 

tradition 241 

really efficacious 242 

the prevalence of. 236 

Sacrifice of Christ 

an objection to it 243 


how efficacious, not taught 242 

proper and real 239-241 

puts us into a capacity for 

salvation 242 

voluntary 244 


PAGE 

Safety an important consideration 


in judging 294 

Satirical writings, how under- 
stood 276, 277 

Scheme of nature, vast 204 

progressive 229 


Scheme of providence, if under- 
stood, would justify facts 
which are objected to. . . 300 
Schemes, the best may be discon- 
certed 247 

Science confirms Scripture history 287 

Scorn of prophetic diction 210 

Scripture 

announces a general restora- 
tion of things 282 

antiquity of. 287 

characters evidently not feigned 287 
confirmed by profane authors. 288 
confirmed by the state of the 

earth 287 

considered historically 281 

contains an abridged history 

of the world 282 

exposed to criticism 283 

expounded by itself. [202 

gives a history of this world as 

God’s world 281 

gives an account of civil go- 
vernments only as they 

affected religion 282 

has internal evidence of truth 287 

history genuine 265 

how distinguished from other 

books 281-283 

how to be interpreted [202 

if false could be shown to 

be so 283 

includes a history of thou- 
sands of years 283 

includes the chronology of 
nearly four thousand 

years 284 

its authority the great ques- 
tion, not its contents. . . 214 
its chronicles confirmed by 

history 287 


358 


INDEX TO PART II. 


FAGE 


Scripture, ( continued .) 

its evidences comprise a series 
of things of great variety 
and reaching to the be- 
ginning of time 263 

its evidences not intended to 

be overpowering 253 

its great proofs are miracles 

and prophecy 264 

its relation to miracles only 
to be accounted for on 
the supposition of their 

truth 265 

its strangeness not surprising. 288 

its style objected to 210 

its truth must be judged of by 
the evidence taken to- 
gether 295 

may contain things not yet 

discovered 218 

miracles, their first reception. . 265 
naturalness of its statements. . 287 
not composed by rules of art. . 210 
nothing improbable related in 


any part 287 

not to be judged by precon- 
ceived expectation 215 

not to be judged exactly as 

other books 214 

ordinary rules of interpreta- 
tion [215 

our duty to search it. . . . 202, 262 
precepts, some give offence. . . 210 
reveals our relation to the Son 

and Holy Spirit 194 


the possibility of its truth de- 
mands investigation. . . . 258 
truths not discoverable by 


reason 203 

variety of topics introduced. . 283 

written in a rude age 283 

why it describes creation. . . . 282 
Searching the Scriptures a great 

duty 202 

Self-deceit, our liability to it. . . . 262 
Serious apprehension may com- 
port with doubt 313 


PAGE 

Shameful mistakes of philosophers [230 
Similarity of objections to reli- 


gion and nature 298 

Sincerity of belief proved by 

dying for it 270 

Skepticism no justification of irre- 

ligion 253 

Sorrow cannot of itself restore 

abused benefits 234 

Speaking with tongues [217 


Speculative difficulties similar to 

external temptations. . . . 256 
the chief trial of some. . . 257, 259 
Spread of Christianity unaccount- 
able if it were an im- 


posture 290 

Standing ministry, what for. . . . [191 
Strangeness of some Scripture 

events 288 

Stupidity of the martyrs, if in- 
sincere [269 

Subserviences, the world a system 

of. 229 

Success, temporal, always uncer- 
tain 302 


Suffering, ignorance does not pre- 
vent it either in tempo- 
ral or spiritual things. . . 196 
Sufferings of Christ vindicate 

God’s law 244 

of the early Christians 269 

Sufficiency of light of nature pre- 
tended 186 

Summary of Jewish history 284 

of the historical evidence of 

Scripture 292 

Supernatural instructions neces- 
sary from the first [206 

Temporal interests not always 

discerned 247, 248 

managed by prudent persons 
on the very principles 
proposed by religion as 
to spiritual interests 298, 299 
Temporal interests often decided 
by considerations which 


INDEX TO PART II. 


359 


PAGE 

fall short of demonstra- 


tion 299 

Temporary commands, distin- 
guished from perpetual. [188 
Temptation 

a wholesome discipline 256 

earthly and spiritual similar. . 256 
calls forth virtuous effort 257 


Testimony 

can be destroyed only by 
counter-testimony, or by 
the incompetency of the 

witness 274 

for miracles not mentioned in 
Scripture, does not im- 
pair the testimony for 
those there recorded. . . . 273 
of Paul, separate and inde- 
pendent 266 

of profane authors to the truth 

of Scripture history. . . . [287 
of the first Christians. . . . 269, 271 j 
must be judged candidly. . . . [259 ' 
none counter to Christianity. . 275 
slight, overcomes strong pre- 
sumptions 208 i 

unconfuted, must be admitted. 273 
value of, lessened by enthu- 
siasm 271 

Theism of the Jews accounted 

for [206 

Theology of the Bible, not to be 

corrected [202 

Things which it is unreasonable 

to dispute 307 

Thoughtlessness of men 233 

Tradition teaches that there was 
a revelation at the be- 
ginning 205 

of the fall of man 311 

Transubstantiation [205 

Trial by speculative difficulties, 

analogous to other trials. 256 

True philosophy inductive [230 

Truth 

of Christianity proved, unless 
the whole of its history 


PAGE 

and influence can be ac- 
counted for by accident. . 295 

Truth, how developed [218 

the, of an event may be fully 
proved, though no one 
of sundry proofs may be 

complete 295 

whether there is any such 

thing, denied by skeptics 305 
Twofold effect of the analogical 

argument 306 


Unbelievers, acknowledgment of. . 289 
cannot deny a conformity be- 
tween prophecy and 


events 293 

Understanding, its right use 245 

Undesigned coincidences in Bible 

history [266 

Un determinate language deceives 

many 297 

Unequal distribution of religious 

knowledge 249 

Unfair dealing of objectors 297 

Unreasonableness of applying to 

passion for guidance. . . . 295 
Unsatisfactory evidence, men 
often obliged to act 
upon it. 302 

Variety in the distribution of 

God’s gifts 249, 312 

Vastness of the scheme of nature. 204 
Veracity of the first Christians. . . 274 
Vicarious punishments witnessed 

every day 244 

deter from sin 245 


Vice 

appointed to be punished. . . . 231 
blinds men to just evidence. . . 255 
its effects in the present world 234 
its natural consequences are 

God’s judicial inflictions. 197 


its real enormity 234 

not palliated by any supposed 
lack of evidence for reli- 
gion 255 


360 


INDEX TO PART II. 


PAGE 

Vindication of religion by ana- 
logy impossible 296 

of the character of God, not 
attempted in this trea- 
tise 299, 300 

Way of salvation for the helpless [186 
Will of God, as absolute or con- 
ditional 261 

World, wickedness of. 238 


PAGB 

Worship, mode of, a matter of 


pure revelation 195 

Writers 

on the atonement [242 

Christian sacraments [195 

miracles [264, 268 

necessity of revelation [187 

prophecy [277-285 

Scripture difficulties [215 


undesigned coincidences. . . . [266 


THE END. 




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